Shocks and regime development : the case of the nuclear nonproliferation regime by Simpson, Fiona M. A.
  
 
SHOCKS AND REGIME DEVELOPMENT : THE CASE 
OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
 
Fiona Mary Ann Simpson 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
2002 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14457    
           
 
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
University of St. Andrews
Shocks and Regime Development:
The Case of the Nuclear NonproUferation Regime
Degree of Ph D
Fiona Mai*y Ann Simpson
July 22"^ 2002
m
ProQuest Number: 10166181
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166181
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

Abstract
The nuclear nonproliferation regime was established in the late 1950’s and I960’s, 
especially with the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) in 1968, and has altered considerably in subsequent decades. It has 
also been subject to the challenges posed by several external shocks. This thesis 
seeks to examine the relationship, if any, between shocks and the ways in which the 
regime has changed fi*om its inception to the present day.
While there is a wide theoretical literature on international regimes, much of it ignores 
the ways in which regimes change and develop over time. Instead, most regime 
theory focuses on the reasons behind regime creation and decay, rather than on the 
processes that occur in between. When the question of regime change has been 
examined, it has also commonly been assumed that such change occurs in a gradual, 
incremental fashion.
This dissertation will examine the nuclear nonproliferation regime in order to 
challenge the assumptions in regime theory regarding the existence and manner of 
regime change. Specifically, the relationship between certain shocks and subsequent 
change (or its absence) will be examined through four contrasting case studies of 
shocks and their aftermaths. They involve the Indian nuclear test of 1974, the Israeli 
attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, the post-Gulf War revelations of Iraq’s 
nuclear weapon progiamme, and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998.
These case studies make it possible to understand both the implications for regime 
theory generally, and the cii’cumstances under which such change occurs, or fails to 
occur. The thesis ultimately asserts that the nonproliferation regime has indeed 
changed considerably since its creation, of necessity for its survival, and that such 
change was often non-incremental. It ends by proposing a model by which to 
illustrate the conditions under which regime change occurs in response to a shock.
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Introduction
The First Attempts at Preventing Nuclear Proliferation, 1945 -1968:
The bombing of Hiroshima, in 1945, stood as the first public demonstration of 
the destructive power of nuclear weapons. This demonstration was closely followed 
by the bombing of the city of Nagasaki and, despite the fact that nuclear weapons 
have not been used in warfare since, the nature of warfare was changed as a result of 
their existence. Even before the acceptance of the notion of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD), the costs of a war in which such weapons were employed became 
far greater than those which had existed before.
As a consequence, the dawn of the nuclear age gave rise to acute pressures to 
prevent the proliferation of such weapons and equally acute difficulties in achieving 
that end. The United States -  for a brief period the only state to possess these 
weapons -  adopted three approaches which made various attempts to restrict then 
proliferation outside that nation’s borders. These three separate but slightly 
overlapping phases emphasized denial, bilateral constraint and security guarantees 
and were applied before the founding of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the 
late I960’s.
The attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation with outright denial o f the 
technology and materials required was the first method adopted following the end of 
the Second World War. The United States ceased its nuclear cooperation with the 
United Kingdom and Canada -  cooperation which had been so instrumental to the 
success of the Manhattan Project. The 1946 American suggestion of the Baruch Plan
11
represented “the first effort to control nuclear arms” ', and proposed that an 
International Atomic Development Authority be created to oversee all aspects of 
nuclear energy development and with the ability to punish those who contravened its 
authority. Upon the establishment of such an authority, “production of atomic 
weapons would cease, existing stocks would be destroyed, and all technological 
information would be communicated to the authority.”  ^ After the Soviet rejection of 
the proposal, which would have created an Authority immune to a veto by the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council, denial became the official American policy on 
nuclear weapons.
This policy was soon made redundant when, in 1949, the Soviet Union 
successfully canned out its own test of an atomic bomb. The growing capability of 
these two nuclear states to cany out a successful -  and devastating -  attack upon each 
other gave rise to a desire to prevent the further spread of these weapons by means of 
bilateral control on the part of the United States and USSR. The spread of nuclear 
weapons to other states, however, continued apace. The United Kingdom, despite 
having been shunned by its former nuclear partner following the end of World War II, 
first tested its nuclear capabilities in 1952. France followed suit in 1960, and China in 
1964.
With the denial and constraint of nuclear technologies not having achieved the 
desfred end, the United States also began to turn towards security guarantees as a 
means by which to dissuade other states — particularly West Germany and Japan -  
ft'om acquiring their own nuclear weapons technology. The 1949 creation of the
‘ Albert Camesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffiiian, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Scott D., 
Sagan, Living With Nuclear Weapons, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 1983),
p .80.
“ Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, (London: Sage Publications 
Ltd.; 1994), p.31.
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) typified this shift in favour of a 
collective security agi eement. NATO, established within the fi'amework of Article 51 
of the UN Charter, had its self-confessed origins in “concerns with expansionist 
policies and methods of the USSR.”  ^ As a nuclear state, a NATO member such as the 
United States (and later the United Kingdom and France) offered a nuclear guarantee 
to other, non-nuclear members, such as West Germany. The extension of a “nuclear 
umbrella” was also provided to Japan by the United States in 1960 with the signing of 
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In order to deter the possibility of 
Japan seeking to bolster its own security by gaining a nuclear capability, the United 
States offered a guarantee of that security by asserting that if Japan was attacked on 
Japanese soil, the US would defend it, by use of nuclear weapons if need be.
The Creation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (1968):
A widely-used definition of an international regime sees it as consisting of the 
“sets of implcit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”'' 
While the merits and inadequacies of such a definition will be discussed in the 
following chapter, it will suffice for an initial discussion of the creation of a nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.
Agreement on the first formal international treaty dealing with the specific 
question of nuclear weapons proliferation occurred in 1968. This “Treaty on the non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons (Non-Proliferation treaty, NPT)” originated with the
 ^NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation, (Brussels; NATO Office o f Information and Press; 
1992), p. 14. Article 51 of the UN Charter, under which NATO was created, reaffirms the inherent 
right of the individual state to collective self-defence.
Stephen Krasner, “International Regimes''' International Organization, vol.36, no. 3, Spring 1982,
p. 186.
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1959 Irish Resolution, which was put forward in the United Nations and which called 
upon nuclear states not to provide nuclear weapons or the related technology to other 
states, and on non-nuclear states not to acquire nuclear weapons. The NPT was 
negotiated in the mid-1960’s with the final draft being adopted in 1968 as Security 
Council Resolution 255 and entering into force in 1970. This treaty became the 
backbone of a multilateral regime which had universal pretensions, and which centred 
around the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Given its centrality to the regime, it 
is necessary to outline some of its more important aspects, some of which would 
frequently resurface in discussion and debate over the course of the next thirty years.
The NPT itself consisted of ten articles and created a legal distinction between 
nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Those five 
states who had tested theft nuclear weapon capabilities prior to January 1967 
were, under the NPT, legally entitled to be considered nuclear weapon states, while 
the rest were not.  ^ The treaty, in keeping with the Irish Resolution, did indeed oblige 
the NWS not to provide NNWS with nuclear weapons or otherwise to give assistance 
to a NNWS in creating such weapons.^ The NNWS, for theft* part, undertook not to 
seek to construct or purchase nuclear weapons or to seek nuclear technology for that 
purpose.^ In concert with such an undertaking, the NPT required that NNWS agree a 
safeguards deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had 
been created in 1956 to administer a system of safeguards capable of detecting a 
diversion fi*om civil activities of nuclear materials for military purposes. This 
agreement with the IAEA (eventually codified in the NPT safeguards document.
 ^ See Treaty on the non-proliferation o f  nuclear weapons (Non-Prolifei‘ation Treaty), Article IX. 
 ^ Ibid., Ai'ticle I.
 ^ Ibid., Article II.
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INFCIRC/153 of 1971) allowed for inspections to be made of the nuclear facilities of 
NNWS.
One of the most important components of the treaty was its fourth article, 
which enshi'ined the “inalienable right” of all parties to the treaty to develop, research, 
produce and use nuclear energy for peacefril purposes. The tension between the 
desfte to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation while otherwise encouraging the 
peaceful application of nuclear energy was fated to become one of the more 
problematic issues for the regime. Equally as important -  and equally as destined to 
be a source of future conflict within the regime -  was the obligation on the part of 
NWS to “purse negotiations in good faith” relating both to an end to the nuclear arms 
race and to eventual disarmament (Article VI). The NPT, finally, was to be reviewed 
by its signatories every five years with a conference to be held after twenty-five years 
on whether to extend the life of the treaty for another set period of time, or to abolish 
it altogether, or to indefinitely extend it.
The Course of the Nonproliferation Regime:
In the time that has passed since the creation of the NPT and the establishment 
of the nonproliferation regime, there have been far fewer instances of actual nuclear 
proliferation than was generally expected. In fact, only two further states have 
demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability since 1968: India in 1974 and Pakistan 
(with India once again) in 1998. The regime has thus far weathered both of these 
incidents. In addition, it has survived Israel’s vote of no-confidence through its 
bombing of an Iraqi reactor in 1981, the revelations a decade later about Iraq’s 
extensive nuclear progiamme, the questions over North Korea’s intentions, the South
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African admission that it had constructed (and then dismantled) six nuclear bombs, 
and the collapse of a NWS in the form of the Soviet Union. What is more, the NPT 
remained textually intact throughout its history. Its indefinite extension in 1995, was 
achieved without its amendment.
This is not to say, however, that the nuclear nonproliferation regime itself is 
the same as it was when it came into being in 1968. Rather, it has developed and been 
elaborated in various ways. New bodies such as the London Suppliers Club (LSC) 
have taken theft place within the regime, and new ways of thinking about the issue of 
non-proliferation have emerged. Importantly, such developments do not appear 
exclusively to have been part of a linear, incremental process. Instead, instances of 
rapid change have occurred after periods of inactivity which were ended by what may 
be described as a shock to the regime.''
The notion of a relationship between exogenous shocks and change is one 
which is found in economic literature although, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter, it has been all but ignored in International Relations theory. The impact of 
trade and supply shocks, for example, has been the focus of substantial examination in 
theories of economics and continues to be a popular subject for investigation.^ The 
concern with the existence and role of shocks began to manifest itself at the beginning
 ^ In this, the regime reflects not a gradual, step-by-step evolution, but rather the kind of development 
which has, in evolutionary biology, been described as ‘punctuated equilibrium’ -  a temi first coined by 
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould in a 1972 article entitled “Punctuated Equilibria; An 
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism” in T..T.M. Schopf (ed.) Models in Paleobiolog)!, (San Francisco; 
Freeman, Cooper and Co.; 1972). This refers to the notion that discontinuity is, in fact, a basic feature 
o f evolution and that evolution occurs as rapid bursts o f diversification interspersed with periods of 
stability.
Some instances o f this can be found in works such as Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, “Sectoral 
Shocks, Learning, and Aggregate Fluctuation,” The Review o f  Economic Studies, vol.60, 1993; 
Mingwei Yuan and Wenli Li, “The Dynamic Effect o f Government Spending Shocks on Employment 
and Work Hours,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper; 98/09, August 1998; Paul 
Collier and Jan Willem Gunning and associates. Trade Shocks in Developing Countries, vol.l: Africa, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1999); and, most recently, David Rapach, “Monetary Shocks and 
the Real Exchange Hypothesis; Evidence firom the G-7 Countries,” Review o f  International 
Economics, vol.9, no.2. May 2000.
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of the 1980’s. The oil shoeks of the 1970’s, in particular, gave rise to the initial 
literature in this area, which attempted to understand the effect of such events. In 
addition, the effect of monetary policy shocks and “technology shocks” has also 
become the subject of speculation. ' '
The various conclusions reached in these studies need not be documented 
here. Rather, it is enough to point out that the study of the wider impact of shocks, 
although largely absent in International Relations theory, occurs elsewhere in the 
social sciences. The concept of a “shock” is, apparently, so much taken for granted 
that a definition of the word is difficult to find. One article which focuses on the oil 
shocks speaks of a concern to understand how “unanticipated change in official 
interest rates pass through the economy.” ’^  The vague notion of an “unanticipated” 
event surfaces again in another article, written eight years later. A specific 
definition of a “shock”, however, appears to be missing from that literature which 
seeks to discover their impact.
Consequently, it is necessary to fomiulate a working definition, not simply of 
a shock but, in keeping with the focus of the investigation, of a shock to an
See, for example, Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatom, “Energy Price Shocks, Aggregate Supply 
and Monetary Policy: The Theory and International Evidence” in Supply Shocks, Incentives and 
National Wealth, vol. 14, Spring 1981, Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (eds.), (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland Publishing Company; 1981); Yannis Georgellis. “The Oil Price Shocks and the unit root 
hypothesis: the UK experience,” Applied Economics vol,26, no.8, August 1994, pp.827-30.
Stanley W. Black, “Learning from Adversity: Policy Responses to Two Oil Shocks” in Essays on 
International Fhiance, no. 160, (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press; 1985); and Joe Ganley and 
Chris Salmon, “The Industrial Impact of Monetary Policy Oil Shocks; Some Stylised Facts”, Bank of 
England Working Paper Series, no.68 (London; Bank of England; 1997).
‘ ' See the series of articles in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1998; Adam B. Jaffe “What do 
Technology Shocks Do? Comment,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1998, vol. 13, 1999, and two 
frirther articles with the same title in the same publication, by Jordi Galli and John Shea, respectively. 
Most recently in the area of technology shocks was Peter N. Ireland, “Technology Shocks and tlie 
Business Cycle; An Empirical Investigation,” Journal o f  Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.25, 
no.5, May 2001. Recently, too, was W. Douglas McMillin, “The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks; 
Comparing Contemporaneous versus Long-Term Identifying Restrictions,” Southern Economic 
Journal, vol.67, i3, January 2001, pp.618-36.
Ganley and Salmon, “The Industrial Impact o f Monetary Policy Oil Shocks,” p.7.
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international regime. A “shock” will thus be defined simply as an event which 
challenges generally-held expectations of the future course of the regime and the 
problem that it addresses -  in this case, the nonproliferation regime and the prospects 
tor nuclear proliferation. It is the role of such shocks -  and the pattern of regime 
development of which they appear to be a central part -  which is the focus of this 
investigation. Such an investigation will lead both to a re-examination of the accepted 
understanding of regime change in mainstream regime theory, and to the proposal of a 
model of the processes by which such change may or may not take place following a 
shock. Although focusing on the role of shocks within the context of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, the following exploration will therefore have significance to 
more general questions regarding the ways in which regimes develop over time and 
regarding the ways in which change does or does not occur.
The Methodology;
The issue of regime change and development in the context of regime theory, 
and of the nonproliferation regime itself, raises three questions which the following 
examination will seek to answer:
1)Is it indeed the case that the development of the nonproliferation regime 
has occurred in a non-incremental manner, and how does this fit with 
the accepted understanding of regime change in mainstream regime 
theory?
2)Is it necessarily the case that, if significant regime change occurs 
following a shock to the regime, a shock to the regime will 
inevitably be followed by regime change?
3)Under what circumstances does a shock lead to, or fail to lead to, regime 
change?
13 Caplin and Leahy, “Sectoral Shocks, Learning and Aggregate Fluctuations,” p.786.
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Providing an answer to the first of these three questions, initially requires a 
detailed discussion of how regime change is understood in regime theory. This will 
therefore provide the subject of discussion in the following chapter. The ways in 
which these three questions will be answered will be elaborated below in the 
discussion of the structure of the thesis.
Before elaborating on the approach to these three questions, it is important to 
clarify the method to be used. The understanding of the relationship between shocks 
and regime development necessitates a detailed investigation of such shocks and a 
comparison between them. This invites the case study approach which has been 
adopted here. The selection of those cases is less obvious. A comparative analysis 
naturally presupposes that more than one case study is to be examined. A single case 
study, while capable of providing an answer to the first question -  of whether or not 
the regime has developed in a non-incremental manner -  is of little use in answering 
the remaining two questions: whether or not regime change necessarily follows a 
shock, and under what conditions. In addition, there is thus far no reason to assume 
that shocks affect the regime in identical ways and that therefore there exists one 
‘representative’ shock which can be selected. It has been rightly observed that a 
single case study founders on the fact that “evidence can be found for too wide an 
array of variables and propositions,” ''' This may not be a problem if one simply 
wishes to falsify certain assumption. If one wishes to go beyond that, as this 
investigation does, then the use of a single case study becomes problematic. It was 
also remarked of single case studies that although they may “provide interesting 
insights, they do not by themselves provide clear guidance for generalizations to other
Gary King, Robert O. Keoliane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inqiiiiy: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press; 1994). p.8.
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cases.” However, the possibility of this, and the further potential of extrapolating to
other regimes, is one of the stated goals of this investigation. Consequently, the
examination of a single event appears to be of little use in this instance.
If more than one case is to be examined, then, the question remains as to
which and how many should be chosen. The ‘correct’ number of cases, assuming one
is spoiled for choice, has unsurprisingly provoked debate. Too large a number of
cases will impede the possibility of arriving at a robust theory. A smaller number of
cases, on the other hand, has the advantage of more thorough study o f context and
contingencies. It allows, as one author observed, for the development of models or
theories “that are sensitive to variations by time and place.” In making use of a
controlled comparison of a small number of cases -  and by combining both historical
methods and those of the social scientist -  the methodological underpinnings of the
investigation most closely resemble those of Alexander George’s structured, focused
comparison. Such an investigation, in George’s words, is
focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects 
of the historical case [in this instance, the effect of the shock 
on the nuclear nonproliferation regime]...and structured because 
it employs general questions to guide the data collection and 
analysis in the historical case [reflected here in the three questions 
which underpin the investigation].'^
However, it is equally true that the decision to make use of a small number of case
studies in order to answer the questions raised has been dictated as much by practical
considerations as by methodological preference.
Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,’ 
World Politics, vol.41, no.2, January 1989, p. 146.
Michael Coppedge, “Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in 
Comparative Politics,” Comparative Politics, vol,31, no.4, July 1999, p.471.
Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy, New Approaches in Histoiy, Theory and 
Policy, (New York: New York Free Press; 1979).
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The choice of cases to examine is, first of all, limited by the confines of the 
investigation. Given that the focus lies on the relationship between shocks and the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime, it stands to reason that those events which occurred 
before the formal regime existed are therefore excluded. This is not to argue that 
certain events were not a shock according to the definition cited above, simply that 
they could not have been shocks to the nonproliferation regime. As a consequence, 
events such as the bombing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki; the first Soviet hydrogen bomb 
test; the Cuban Missile Crisis; or the fu'st British, French or Chinese nuclear test are 
excluded here as candidates for investigation.
In the years since the formal establishment of the nonproliferation regime 
during the 1960’s there are three events which have likewise been excluded from the 
discussion and whose exclusion requfres justification. These tlu*ee are: the admission 
by South Afidca in 1993 that it had acquired and dismantled six nuclear bombs; the 
growing evidence of North Korean attempts at nuclear proliferation beginning in 
1992; and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, which saw a significant 
proportion of that state’s nuclear arsenal left in the territories of the newly 
independent states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
There are some good arguments for including these cases. However, the 
South Aft'ican and North Korean events occurred in the shadow of the Iraq shock. 
North Korea, although it had signed the NPT in 1985, only signed the required 
agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/153) in April of 1992, and it was this document 
which, in the words of one former official “contained some surprises” '  ^and 
demonstrated the extent to which this NPT-signatory had been flouting its obligations. 
Similarly, it was in 1993 that South African President F.W. de Klerk revealed that
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South Africa had constructed and then dismantled six nuclear weapons. Both having 
occurred in the wake of the 1990/1991 revelations about Iraq’s nuclear programme, it 
is consequently difficult to argue that, in keeping with the definition of a shock which 
will be used for the purposes of this thesis, these two events could be said to have 
challenged generally-held expectations of the course of the regime.
The case of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990 is slightly more 
difficult to reject. It could be argued that its collapse was, first and foremost, a shock 
to the international system. Given that the USSR was a nuclear weapons state under 
the NPT, such a shock inevitably had implications for the nonproliferation regime.
As a shock to that regime, however, it was indirect. Indeed, the whole event can be 
regarded as reinforcing rather than upsetting the regime.'^
Primarily, however, the choice of the four cases was influenced both by the 
limitations of time and by a consideration that is both analytical and aesthetic. These 
cases are: the Indian peaceful nuclear test of 1974; the bombing of Osiraq in 1981 ; 
the revelations about Iraq’s nuclear programme in 1991 ; and the Indian and Pakistani 
tests of 1998. Four cases appears to be sufficient in number not to fall prey to the 
problems posed by the investigation of a single case study and sufficiently low in 
number that a comprehensive investigation -  one which allows for the nuances of 
historical context and contingency -  may be successfully undertaken. The selection 
of these particular cases allows for a representation of different ‘types’ of shock. The 
Indian test of 1974 stands as an instance of a shock which was followed by a delayed 
but effective reaction. This is complemented by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests 
of 1998, in which the shock was apparently followed a quick but ineffective reaction.
David Fischer, The Histoiy o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first fo rty  years, 
(Vienna: IAEA; 1997), p.289.‘
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Between these two cases, the first Iraqi shock of 1981 (the bombing of Osiraq) 
provoked very little reaction in the context of the regime. A decade later, the 
revelations about Iraq’s nuclear programme provoked a great and immediate reaction 
in that context. Finally, the fact that the two instances of South Asian nuclear 
proliferation frame the two cases focussing on Iraqi nuclear ambitions has a pleasing 
symmetry.
Finally, there is a significant literature on each of these cases which can be 
drawn upon. This included, for example, American Congressional hearings, 
publications by the IAEA, as well as secondary literature. Even the bombing of 
Osfraq, historically the least well-explored of the four cases selected, had given rise to 
a base of literature capable of providing answers to the questions asked. There were, 
of course, limitations imposed by geography. It was not possible -  and as will 
become clear not necessary -  to do research in countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel 
or Iraq. The pivotal role of the United States in implementing regime change meant 
that the investigation could be successfully caiTied out by examining literature in 
English (although the study includes some in French, German and Russian).
Structure of the Thesis:
The discussion of the case studies, as noted above, will be examined 
chronologically, beginning with the Indian test of 1974, then the bombing of Osiraq 
and the Iraqi revelations in 1981 and 1991 respectively. The 1998 nuclear tests by 
India and Pakistan will then be considered. However, given the relatively small 
amount of time which has passed, this last case study will be condensed into one 
chapter rather than the two alloted to each of the other cases. The likelihod of regime
See William Walker, “Nuclear weapons and tlie former Soviet republics,” International Affairs,
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change as a consequence of this shock will then be speculated upon in the light of 
conclusions drawn horn the other three.
In order best to answer the tliree questions posed above, each case study (with 
the exception of that which explores the 1998 South Asian tests) will be divided into 
two chapters. The opening chapter seeks an answer to the first question. From a 
historical narrative of the case, conclusions will be drawn as to whether a non- 
incremental pattern of regime development may be identified and how this fits with 
the general understanding of change in mainstream regime theory. As an inevitable 
consequence of such an approach to the four cases, it will ultimately become possible 
to answer the second question: whether the relationship between a shock and the 
ensuing development of the regime may always be assumed.
The second of the chapters devoted to each case study will attempt to 
answer the third question which is to be investigated -  one which seeks to discover 
the conditions under which a shock was followed by, or perhaps not followed by, 
change to the regime. This focuses especially on the ways in which the shock was or 
was not interpreted by the relevant actors involved. During the course of the 
investigation four interpretations of the event appeared to be linked with the eventual 
occurrence or absence of subsequent regime development. These four, which provide 
sub-headings in these chapters, are: the understanding of the danger posed to the 
regime by the shock; the acceptance of responsibility for bringing about change; the 
understanding of the urgency of change; and the belief in the solvability of the 
problems raised by the shock. As will be demonstrated, these themes manifested in 
the wake of the first shock to the fledgling regime in 1974. Such interpretations -  
which appear to underlie the conditions in which shocks translate to regime change -
vol.68, no.2, April 1992, pp.255-277.
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will ultimately provide the basis for the model of regime change which will be 
proposed as part of the concluding section. A glance at Figure 1 in the Conclusion 
will give the reader an appreciation of where the following discussion is heading.
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Chapter 1: Regime Theory and Conceptions of Regime Change
Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.
Richard Hooker (Quoted by Johnson, as from 
Hooker, in the Preface to the English Dictionmy)
The goal of determining the pattern of development in the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, in the context of regime theory, necessitates an evaluation of 
whether and how such theory attempts to deal with change. Following a clarification 
of how regime change will be defined, it will be argued that the existence of a non- 
incremental pattern of overall regime development is one which, if established, is 
problematic for regime theory as a whole. My assertion is that the bulk of regime 
theory tends to ignore or, at best, marginalise the issue of regime change.
Furthermore, when actively considered in regime theory, gradualist assumptions of 
change prevail.
The willingness to engage with the question of regime change began on an 
encouraging note in the late 1970’s, with an extensive discussion in Power and 
Interdependence, by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. ‘ In this text, one of the 
first to deal with the issue of international regimes, Keohane and Nye stated that 
"changes in international regimes are very important”  ^and sought an understanding 
of the concept of political interdependence in part by answering the question of: “how 
and why do regimes change?”  ^ In practice, this tended to emphasise the “why” rather 
than the “how”, with Keohane and Nye presenting four models in order to explain the
' Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
(Boston, Mass.; HarperCollins Publishers; 1977).
“ Ibid., p.21.
 ^ Ibid., p. 19.
26
reasons for regime change.^ It is not necessary to explore these models in detail here 
but rather to note the acceptance of the idea that international regimes underwent 
adaptation and change (although the style and manner of that change remained 
broadly unexplored).
In spite of this promising beginning, Keohane and Nye’s emphasis all but 
disappeared with the arrival of regime theory proper, in the early 1980’s. Although 
the study of international regimes and their place in the realm of international politics 
was first raised in the mid-1970’s ,^ it was the special issue oiInternational 
Organization in 1982 which truly heralded the arrival of regime theory.^ The series 
of essays which comprised this special issue has become so seminal that it is 
impossible to undertake any investigation into this area without a reference to them, 
and it was this series of essays which set the agenda for theorising about regimes for 
at least the next decade. Their importance is underscored by the eventual primacy of 
the so-called consensus definition of an international regime which underlay them. 
This definition, formulated by Stephen Krasner, identified a regime as constituting 
“sets of implicit or explicit principles, nouns, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”  ^
Although two decades have passed since this definition was coined, it remains (with,
These models were labelled the economic process model; the overall power sti'ucture model; the 
power structure within issues areas model; and a model of power capabilities as affected by 
international organization. (See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, Chapter 3.) 
Interestingly, the authors asserted that “some regime changes have been rapid and dramatic whereas 
others have been gradual” (p.21). Apart from this, however, the manner of regime change was ignored 
at the expense of explaining why the change occurred.
 ^ See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and 
Tre-nés,’'’ International Organization, vol.29, no.3 Summer 1975, pp.557-583 and Ernst B. Haas, “Is 
there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, and Intei dependence and the Construction of 
International Regimes,” pp.827-876 in the same.
 ^International Organization, vol.36, no.2 (Spring 1982).
 ^ Stephen Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” in 
International Organization, vol.36, no.2, p. 186.
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perhaps, some minor modifications) the description “which one will inevitably find in 
practically every work on regime theory.”  ^ While it has been criticised horn the very 
outset for its “wooliness” and “imprecision”,"^ it has nonetheless provided the basis 
firom which discussions of regimes tend to proceed. Only recently it was correctly 
noted that
for all its alleged flaws, the consensus definition has 
significantly promoted research by providing practitioners 
of regime analysis with a valuable analytical tool or, at 
the very least, a salient, non-arbitrary point of departure 
for further specifying their object of study.
Despite Krasner’s definition providing a useful starting point, this discussion (like so
many others) will proceed as much from its apparent failings as fi'om its successes.
During the past two decades, regime theory has developed enormously. Its
American originators and much of the literature were occupied primarily with the
need to illustrate that, in contrast to the tenets of a neo-realist framework.
 ^Gerd .Tunne, “Beyond Regime Theory,” Acta Politica, vol.27, 1992, p.l3. Another regime theorist 
spoke o f Kj-asner’s definition of being “widely accepted” in spite of criticisms levelled at it for being 
somewhat vague (see Volker Rittberger, “Research on Regimes in Germany” in Regime Theoiy and 
Inteniaticmal Relations, (Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1993), p.9). Nonetheless, Krasner’s 
definition provides the starting point not only for the 1982 edition o î International Organization, but 
also for Oran R. Young, who notes the “remarkable achievement” of such consensus, before going on 
to criticise it (see “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics, 
vol.39, no. 1, October 1986, pp. 105-108. In addition, the definition was broadly accepted in other 
articles, such as Peter F. Cowhey and Edward Long, “Testing theories of regime change: hegemonic 
decline or surplus capacity,” International Organization, vol.37, no.2, Spring 1983; Roger K. Smith 
“Explaining the non-proliferation regime: anomalies for contemporary international relations theory,” 
International Organization, vol.41, no.2. Spring 1987; Peter Van Ham, “The Lack of a Big Bully: 
Hegemonic stability theory and the study of regime in international relations,” Acta Politica, vol.27 
1992; Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zum, “The Study o f International Regimes,” 
European Journal o f  International Relations, vol.l, no.3, September 1995.
Susan Strange, ""Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime AwdXyshf International Organization, 
vol.36, no.2, Spring 1982, p.343. In this article Strange criticised not only Ki'asner’s definition, but the 
methods and utility o f regime theory generally.
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories o f  International Regimes, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997), p .l 1. Harald Müller referred to these four 
components as “the building blocks set out by regime theory” (“er [the article] bescheibt sodann die 
von der Regimetheorie prognostizierten Regimebausteine -  Prinzipien, Norm en, Regeln und 
Prozeduren und ihr Ineinandergreifen” [and tlieir interconnection].) In “Regimeanalyse und 
Sicherlieitspolitik: Das Bespiel Nonproliferation,” in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.). Regime in den 
Internationalen Beziehungen, (Baden-Baden: Nomos; 1989), p.278.
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international regimes mattered. ‘ ’ A variety of theories soon developed in an attempt 
to explain the creation, maintenance and/or demise of an international regime. These 
tended to be a reflection in miniature of the ongoing -  and overarching -  neo­
realist/neo-liberal debate. In addition, the idea of “cognitivist” theories of 
international regimes also had their beginnings in 1975 and, though overshadowed by 
the other debate for much of the 1980’s, grew in popularity in the following decade. 
This division of regime theory into thr ee broad categories has been generally accepted 
and have been perhaps best, and most simply, identified as realist, neo-liberal, and 
cognitivist branches of regime theory.
The broader history of regime theory is, for the purposes of this discussion, 
secondary to the question of how much space regime theory tends to make for the role 
and existence of regime change and the manner in which regimes develop after their* 
formation. For this r eason, these three approaches will be discussed in greater detail 
to identify their various understanding of regime change and development.
Krasner’s Definition and the Question of Regime Change:
Before doing so, Krasner’s definition will be briefly examined in the context 
of its implications for the question of change. Kr asner’s definition of a regime as 
“sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonirs, rules and decision-making procedures
“ See e&pQCitàWy International Organization, vol. 36, no.2, Spring 1982. Robert O. Keohane went so 
far as to assert that “American literature on international regimes has been shaped -  one might say 
distorted -  by its advocates’ theoretical stiuggles with neo-realists, as represented by Kenneth Waltz.” 
(See Robert O. Keohane, “The Analysis o f International Regimes,” in Rittberger (ed.). Regime Theoiy 
and International Relations, p.29.
Haas, “ Is There a Hole in the Whole?”
This is typified most recently in Hasenclever et.al,. Theories o f  International Regimes. Others, such 
as Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, have cited the game-tlieoretic approach to the study of 
international regimes as occupying its own category (see Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 
“Theories o f International K cgim csf International Organization, voI.41, no.3. Summer 1987, pp.491-
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around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations” 
elaborated on those four variables, stating that
principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures 
are prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice.
However, Krasner also acknowledged the possibility of regime change in the context 
of this definition. Change within a regime -  superficial change -  he identified as 
involving only the alteration of the rules and decision-making procedures of the 
regime. ‘Genuine’ regime change, however, involves a deeper change to the norms 
and principles of the regime. While the validity of the Ki'asner’s distinctions 
between principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures has been 
questioned, this conception of regime change is nonetheless useful. A worthwhile 
discussion of how the nonproliferation regime developed over time requires that 
significant, substantial regime change be distinguished from merely the addition or 
subtraction of a few rules and procedures (although changes in the norms and 
principles of a regime are usually accompanied by significant changes in rules and 
decision-making procedures).
For the purposes of the following discussion and for the purposes of retaining 
the usefulness of Krasner’s description of regime change, we need to make a further 
distinction between what may be called primary and secondary regime norms and 
principles. Primary, or foundational norms and principles of a regime are those which
517). Hasenclever et.al., placed game theory under the general heading of interest-based approaches, 
citing it as “an attempt at extending and farther developing...[the] interest-based argument” (p.44).
Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” p. 186.
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cannot change without undermining and thus destroying the very purpose of the 
regime itself The fundamental principle of the nonproliferation regime is one which 
assumes that nuclear proliferation is inherently a dangerous thing and that the 
possibility of nuclear war is raised with the number of states who acquire nuclear 
weapons. A change to these principles, clearly, undermines the whole basis upon 
which the nonproliferation regime is founded. Similarly, the fundamental norm o f  the 
NPT requires that non-nuclear states not seek to obtain nuclear weapons and the 
nuclear weapons states not give others nuclear weapons or otherwise assist them in 
attaining a nuclear weapon capability. A change to this norm would also nullify the 
rationale behind a nuclear nonproliferation regime. While there may be other, 
secondary norms and principles behind the regime which are subject to change (the 
possibility of which is to be explored), there are clearly primary norms and principles 
which cannot change if the regime is to be maintained. Nonetheless, Krasner’s 
distinction between ‘superficial’ and ‘genuine’ regime change will be accepted and 
used as the criteria upon which the occurrence o f ‘genuine’ regime change may, or 
may not, be demonstrated.
This is not to say that Krasner’s definitions are to be accepted unconditionally. 
Perhaps most notably, the definition implies but makes no specific mention of the 
existence of institutions in which these other four variables are embodied. Moreover, 
and despite his acknowledgement of the existence of regime change, the consensus 
definition set the tone for what will be later demonstrated to be a disinterest in regime 
change in regime theory, or an assumption of its absence. The claim that the four 
components of a regime are those “around which actor expectation converge in a
Ibid., pp. 187-89. Krasner states that “change within a regime involves alterations of rules and 
decision-making procedures, but not o f norms or principles; change of a regime involves alteration of 
norms and principles” (p. 189).
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given area of international relations” '  ^implies from the outset that such expectations 
come to be fixed. The definition makes no indication of the possibility that such 
expectations could diverge and then reconverge as part of a regime’s overall 
development. In spite of a discussion of regime change, then, the consensus 
definition of an international regime may already be seen to incline away fr om 
change.
Regime Theory and the Question of Change -  the Realist Approach:
The concept o f ‘hegemonic stability’ is one of the more familiar approaches to 
the study of international regimes. Although the acceptance that regimes ‘mattered’ 
jarred with the theoretical inclinations of neo-realism, hegemonic stability theory 
(HST) allowed tor some level of reconciliation between the two. While accepting that 
regimes did matter, HST rooted itself firmly in the tradition of power politics.
HST did not, interestingly, have its origins in power politics, but rather in the 
world of international economics and the work of Charles Kindleberger in 
particular.'^ Kindleberger’s thesis proposed that hegemonic powers, desiring 
economic stability, endeavour to advance it tlu'ough regimes and other means, even if 
there is some risk and cost to them in so doing. HST claimed that international public 
goods are unlikely to exist unless “a single state has sufficient interest in the goods to 
be willing to bear the full costs of its provision.” "^  The hegemon, in this version of 
HST was seen as proffering a collective good by creating stability.
‘"Ibid., p. 186.
Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939, (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin 
Press; 1973). Kindleberger later reiterated his views in an article entitled “Systems of International 
Economic Organization” in David Calleo (ed.). Money and the Coming World Order, (New York:
New York University Press; 1976).
Duncan Snidal, “The limits o f hegemonic stability theory,” International Organization, vol.39, no.4, 
Autumn 1985, p.581.
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In contrast to this optimistic view of the benefits to be reaped from the 
existence of a hegemon was the idea of the coercive hegemon. Snidal wrote of the 
tendency in HST “to lump together quite different, though partially compatible, 
theoretical orientations.” '"^  In a more obviously power politic version of HST cited by 
those such as Ki asner and Gilpin, the ability of the hegemon to force and maintain 
(economic) stability was em phasised.T he hegemon, in this view, was far removed 
from the more benevolent version proposed by Kindleberger.
Despite its initial existence in the realm of international economics, HST 
found wider application in regime analysis. Happily, the interest of a hegemon 
provided a neat explanation for the creation, survival, or decay of a regime in an 
otherwise anarchic international system. Linking HST and international regimes in a 
1980 article, Robert Keohane observed that, insofar as the study of international 
regimes was concerned, HST “is clearly useful as a first step; to ignore its 
congruence with reality, and its considerable explanatoiy power, would be foolish.” '^
HST, particularly when applied to international regimes, has not remained fr ee 
of criticism. Its utility is especially in doubt in regard to regime change. As an 
analytical model, it has been rightly charged with being “fundamentally static in 
nature.”^^  HST is, by definition, concerned to investigate stability or its absence.
Ibid., p.585.
See Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Sti ncture o f International Trade,” World Politics, vol.28, 
April 1976, A year previous to Krasner’s article, another had argued in favour of the hegemon as 
primarily coercive: Tom Baumgartner and Tom Bums, “The Stmcturing of International Economic 
Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, June 1975. Gilpin, for his part, directed his 
attention not to international regimes as such, but towards the international system as a whole and the 
tendencies o f a hegemon to structure the international system exclusively for their own benefit. See 
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981), as 
well as The Political Economy o f  International Relations, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 
1987).
■' Robert Keohane, “The Theory o f Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic 
Regimes,” in O Holsti, Robert Si verson and A. George (eds.), Change in the International System, 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; 1980).
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When taken outside the realm of economics and used as a tool in regime analysis, it 
has served as a means by which to explain the reason for the existence of a regime in
the world of self-interested states.
Such a concern therefore mitigates against HST as a useful means for di awing
conclusions as to how regimes change and develop over time. Change is 
characterized merely as a consequence of the whims of the hegemonic powei. In the 
context of regime theory, HST asserts that “regimes are established and maintained by 
actors who hold a preponderance of power resources... and that regimes decline... when 
power becomes more equally distributed among theii* members. The use of HST in 
regime theory seeks to answer ‘grander’, structural questions as regards the existence 
of a regime -  what brought it about, what maintains it, what destroys it. However, 
whether or not the hegemon decides to implement or prevent change, the theory says 
very little about the manner, extent, and process of that change. The prominence of 
the idea of regime maintenance involves no exploration of the processes behind that 
maintenance -  whether and why the regime, once established, retains its form or 
changes throughout its existence. HST, in the words of one author, is “not very useful 
in telling us what actors did in order for system to move from point A to point 
In focusing on the existence of regimes, HST has little interest in looking within. As 
a consequence, it is “less useful for understanding processes than for establishing 
correlations.”^^  Thus the application of this power-based approach to regime theory
■" Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Tlieory,” p.584.
Hasenclever et.al.. Theories o f International Regimes, p.90. As the authors note, this is the 
manifestation of HST as it is applied to the study of regimes. In its original form, Kindleberger’s 
primary concern was with the international economic sphere — an ai ena of which international 
(economic) regimes were only a part. The same was true of Gilpin’s War and Change in World 
Politics and The Political Economy o f  International Relations.
Timothy J. McKeown, “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19“' Century Tariff Levels in Europe,” 
International Organization, vol.37, no. 1, Winter 1983, p.79.
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appears to shed no light on, and express no concern with, the question of regime 
change.^^
The emphasis on issues of regime formation, maintenance, and demise which 
come at the expense of a concern with process are not confined to HST, but pervade 
other power-based approaches to international regimes. The authors of these 
approaches, which surfaced in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, addressed what they 
viewed as the inadequacies of the neo-liberal (liberal-institutionalist) understanding of 
international regimes.^^ Power, it was argued, had been unnecessarily expelled from 
the discussion. In the debate between the self-appointed “two schools” of 
international relations theory, it was charged that neo-liberalism “fails to address a 
major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by 
international anarchy and which is identified by r e a l i s m . I n  a 1993 article on the 
subject, Krasner maintained that “regime analyses based upon market failure 
inevitably obscure issues of power.”^^  The neo-liberal method by which to 
understand regimes (of which more will be said in the next section) was charged with
“ Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p.502.
It should be noted that HST has also been subject to charges of being constrained by its American 
ancestry and thus of being blinkered. HST has been identified as holding great appeal for the 
hegemonic power in question, and it has been argued that it is no coincidence that the proponents of 
this theory has hailed from the United States. (See, for example, Susan Strange’s article: “The Myth 
o f Lost Hegemony,” International Organization, vol.41, no.4, Autumn 1988. It was elaborated upon a 
couple o f years later by Isabelle Grunberg, who observed that “to some extent, the theory o f hegemonic 
stability has a built-in, ethnocentric bias simply in the sense that it links the fate o f the world with that 
o f the United States.” See Isabelle Grunberg, “Exploring the ‘myth’ o f hegemonic stability,” 
International Organization, vol.44, no.4, Autumn 1990, p.447).
A detailed overview of these non-HST approaches to the analysis of international regimes may be 
found in Hasenclever et.al.. Chapter 4.
Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the limits o f cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism,” International Organization, vol.42, no.3. Summer 1988, p.487.
Stephen Kiasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World 
Politics, vol.43, no.3, April 1991, p.336.
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having neglected the fundamental role of power as the means by which a regime may 
be coordinated/'^
It should be noted here that these later realist critiques centred around the 
perceived limitations in these understandings o f cooperation. However, while 
international regimes are an undoubted indicator of cooperation, it is equally clear that 
cooperation may occur in the absence of the creation of a regime. For instance, 
adherents to the power-based approach to international regimes such as Grieco argued 
against the neo-liberal approach on the grounds “that it [cooperation] is harder to 
achieve and more difficult to maintain than the institutionalist tradition suggests.” '^ 
Such a statement has obvious implications primarily for the possibility of regime 
formation. Krasner, in his attempt to bring power back to into the equation wrote of 
the reasons behind the failure to create a global communications regime. What 
apparently links these two strains of realist regime analysis is the continuing, almost 
obsessive desii e to reconcile the role of power in an anarchic system with the 
existence of cooperation which in turn underlies the establishment and maintenance of 
a regime. The realist approach to international regimes, according to Kiasner, seeks 
to affimi that “international regimes are created to promote the interests of particular 
actors. Regime creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power 
and interests among states.”^^  Regime formation, as well as regime maintenance and 
termination, are again the focus for investigation and the emphasis, as in HST, is on
This was also pointed out by Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: 
The European Community’s Internal Market,” in John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters: The 
Theory and Praxis o f  an Institutional Form, (New York: Columbia University Press; 1993).
Joseph Grieco, “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation: Comment,” in The 
American Political Science Review, vol.87, no.3, September 1993, p.729.
Stephen Krasner, “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights,” in Volker Rittberger (ed.). Regime 
Theojy and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993), p. 140. K asner goes on to argue 
that the power-based approach provides a better understanding than its liberal counterpart of why 
certain international regimes on human rights have been maintained (adhered to).
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providing an explanation for structure, not for process. Moreover, both versions of a 
realist regime analysis approach take as given the existence of exogenous preferences 
which are fixed. Such an approach could explore the question of regime change in the 
context of changed relative capabilities of regime actors and theii* effect on the 
structure of the regime, if not the processes behind its development.
However, although realism does not preclude the possibility of alteration either in 
interests or power, this ingrained bias towards stability appears to have mitigated 
against a sympathy towards the investigation of change in practice. More important 
still, such an approach ignores the possibility that continued stability actually requires 
change: if a regime is to remain relevant to, and useful in, a changing international 
environment, it must adapt to external changes in that environment.
Regime Change and Game Theoiy:
Although game theory has been consistently used in regime analysis, it has 
usually been subsumed into neo-liberal or realist approaches when seeking to explain 
the desire for cooperation between states, of the sort which might lead to the 
formation of a regime. It was observed by Kydd and Snidal that those games most 
commonly cited in regime analysis have been “directed towards general issues of 
cooperation and [were] insufficiently attuned to the specific role of regimes as 
institutions.”^^  Nonetheless, attempts to project from game to regime found support, 
and shall therefore be considered separately, and briefly, here.
A dichotomy between two ‘styles’ of games -  those characterised by an 
emphasis on collaboration (for example. Prisoners Dilemma, Assurance) and those 
characterised by an emphasis on coordination (for example, Battle of the Sexes) -  was
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fu'st discussed in the context of international regimes by Arthur A. Stein, in 1983/'' 
This division once again reflected the broader realist/neoliberal debate, with those of a 
realist bent (Krasner) arguing for the utility of coordination games in understanding 
regimes and those of a neoliberal persuasion (Keohane) arguing in favour of 
collaborative games/^ It is not, for the purposes of this discussion, necessary to go 
into the finer points of these games or game theory generally. It is simply important 
to note that the use of game theory in regime analysis was, ultimately, to focus on 
regime fonnation by providing yet another means by which to reconcile the apparent 
contradiction between international cooperation in a world of utility-maximising 
states. It again sought to provide “a complete understanding of how and why regimes 
are c r e a t e d . G a m e  theory focuses on the processes that precede the formation of a 
regime in an attempt to explain a states’ motivation for involving themselves.
Such attempts to resolve this collective action problem and thereby explain the 
attractiveness and consequent formation of international regimes were periodically 
cited as usefid in commentaries by Snidal, Oye, Krasner, and Keohane among
 ^ Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, “Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis o f International 
Regimes,” in Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Relations, p. 113.
Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Stephen D. 
KrasnQT, International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1983). More recently, others have 
identified further game-theoretic approaches to regime: ‘assurance’ and ‘suasion’. (See Michael Zurn, 
“Problematic Social Situations and International Institutions: On the Use of Game Theory in 
International Politics,” in Frank R. Pfetsch (ed.), International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical 
Approaches and Empirical Findings, (Münster: L it; 1993). Also see Lisa Martin, “The Rational State 
Choice of Multilateralism,” in Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters. Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of 
the Sexes (the collaboration/coordination binary have, however, dominated the game-theoretic 
approach to regimes, and will thus take precedence in this brief overview. Games such as Chicken 
may, interestingly, be resolved successfully as a consequence of the two players collaborating or 
coordinating. The only unsuccessful outcome (fi'om the perspective o f both players, comes about if 
each defects).
See Kiasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” and Robert 
O. Keohane, “The demand for international regimes,” International Organization, vol.36, no.2. Spring 
1982.
Hasenclever et.al.. Theories o f  International Regimes, p.50.
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others/^ This concern was not merely to provide an explanation for the creation of a 
regime but, more ambitiously, to account for the varying regime structures (or forms) 
which arise from a game. Snidal, for example, identified the utility of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) as highlighting the role of regimes in facilitating cooperation, but 
argued for a better use of coordination games in order to answer “the fundamental 
question of what sorts of regimes are appropriate for solving particular problems.” '^' 
The same is true in the application of the Battle of the Sexes to regime analysis, where 
the concern once again is to use a game to demonstrate what it is, exactly, that 
regimes do and thus why they are created. Krasner, citing the need to incorporate 
dilemmas of common aversion as well as those of common interest, highlighted the 
ability of the Battle of the Sexes game to explain not simply the fact of a regime’s 
creation, but the form it takes. As Krasner noted, “the problem is not how to get to 
the Pareto frontier but which point along the frontier will be chosen.”^^  The Battle of 
the Sexes game has likewise been used to demonstrate that the ability of a regime to 
facilitate a coordination of policy explains its existence.
As a tool for regime analysis, game theory has therefore been concerned solely 
to demonstrate the role of a regime in making possible either collaboration or 
coordination between actors. Its focus, much like HST, lies on the initial 
establishment of an international regime. At best, this focus allows game theory to 
“suggest conditions conducive to stable compliance, but...[to] have difficulty
Duncan Snidal, “Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes,” The American Political Science Review, vol.79, no.4, December 1985; 
Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy; Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Kenneth A. 
Oye (ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1986); Robert O. 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1984), see especially Chapter 5.
Snidal, “Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma,” p.923 and 926. It is this perceived ability of 
game theory to use the purpose o f a regime as a way of explaining its existence which endeared it to 
fimctionalists such as Keohane (discussed in the next section).
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explaining organizational form, scope or change/'' Moreover, game theory again 
assumes the existence of static, given interests (specified at the onset of the game) 
which, even were it not confined to concentrating on questions of the formation and 
function of regimes, inclines away from an ability to address regime change. Game 
theory may be used to explain why collaboration/coordination -  resulting in a regime 
-  occurs and continues, but is of little use in understanding any changes that occur 
after a regime’s establishment.
Finally, game theory takes as a given the existence of a situation upon which 
the game may be built. This therefore requftes that the situation remain stable in 
order for the game to continue. A change in interests would requiie a new game, just 
as the maintenance of the regime would require a compliance with the situation 
established at the outset of the regime’s creation.'" As a consequence, game theoretic 
approaches to regime theory are ill-disposed towards an understanding of how, and in 
what way, the established regime might change internally without itself collapsing.
Regime Change and the Neo-liberal approach:
As stated earlier, the debate between the two main forms of approach to the 
analysis of international regimes tended to reflect the neorealist and neoliberal 
discussions of international relations generally. In spite of this wider debate, both 
these approaches to regimes have certain tenets in common. Both start from a 
premise that regimes are founded on the belief by its participants that joining the 
regime would maximise their (exogenously given and stable) interests. The neo liberal
Ki asner, “Global Communications and National Power,” p. 340.
Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p.504.
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approach to regimes places much less emphasis on the centrality of power. Although 
its proponents claimed it as a more subtle, and more effective, way by which to 
understand various aspects of international regimes, issues of regime change and 
development once again barely figure in their deliberations.
In its initial form, from roughly 1984 to 1989, this approach consisted of a 
method of analysis formulated by Robert Keohane known as ‘contractualism’.''^  This 
was articulated in the book After Hegemony, in which the formation of international 
regimes was explained in terms of the role (function) that they serve. Regimes, 
Keohane argued, are foiined as a consequence of thefr perceived ability to “reduce 
transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate ones.”''^
This approach eschewed the realist conviction that desire for cooperation is 
undermined by the simultaneous desfre to prevent others fr om achieving the benefits 
that a regime might bring. Instead, the contractualist approach developed by Keohane 
in 1984 explained the formation of regimes simply as a product of the capacity o f a 
regime to “permit governments to attain objectives that would otherwise be 
unattainable.”''''
This explanation of regime formation and persistence -  as a function of the 
reduced cost of bargaining that a regime provides -  appeared to find favour in
Nor, too, is such change allowed for by the possibility o f iterated games, since iterated games 
continue to assume that interests remain as agreed upon in tiie first game. Consequently, change as a 
consequence o f new interests cannot be accounted for without starting a new game.
‘ Conti actualism’ was not the original term used by Keohane. Rather, he termed this approach 
‘fimctionalism’. The unrelated existence, in sociology, o f a methodology also known as 
‘functionalism’ eventually inclined Keohane towards a different moniker. As he explained in a 1993 
essay, “since that phrase [functional theory] carries connotations of sociological functionalism, with 
which I do not identify, I now use the language o f ‘contractualism’ ratlier tlian ‘functionalism’. (See 
Robert O. Keohane, “The Analysis o f Regimes: Towards a European-American Research 
Programme,” in Rittberger et.al.. Regime Theoiy and International Relations, p.36.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
(Princeton, N..T.: Princeton University Press; 1984), p.90.
Ibid., p.97.
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publications which followed immediately on the heels of Keohane’s proposal. In 
speaking of the creation of the regime surrounding the textile trade, Aggarwal noted 
the advantages of one regime over many different bilateral agreements. In 
highlighting these advantages, Aggarwal explained the formation of the textile trade 
regime by the function it served.''^ Kenneth Oye also adopted this kind of interest- 
based approach, explaining regime formation in the context of the utility of regimes in 
facilitating communication.''^
What characterizes this conception of international regimes is the desire, much 
like the realist approaches, to explain the presence of a regime -  in particular the 
reasons for its formation and, to a lesser extent, its persistence or decline. Keohane’s 
original designation of this branch of regime theory as ‘funetionalism’ thus aptly 
identifies perfectly its concerns, and itself had its origins in the work of David 
Mitrany in the 1930’s and 1940’s.''  ^ Nearly a decade after the publication o f After 
Hegemony, the author himself observed that “explaining regime formation is one of 
the most important contributions of this theory.”''^  It seeks primarily to explain the 
creation of a regime by emphasising a state’s recognition of the benefits (especially in 
terms of problem-solving) that regime membership would bring. Implicitly, this then 
explains the maintenance/persistence of the regime (it continues to function as a
Vinod Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics o f  Organized Textile Trade, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press; 1985).
Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Kennetli A. 
Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy, (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press; 1986).
Mitrany’s idea of a flinctional theory o f International Organizations was first put forward in 1932 at 
the 3“' o f the Dodge Lectures at Yale. He later articulated his concern as seeking to create and facilitate 
effective international organizations and believed that his functional approach would “help to mitigate 
the obstinate problem of equal sovereignty” (See David Mitrany, “The Functional Approach to World 
Organization,” in International Affairs, vol.24, no.3, July 1948, p.358.). Also see David Mitrany, The 
Functional Theory o f  Politics, (London: Martin Robertson & Company, Ltd.; 1975). It is fiom such 
beginnings that the (neo)fiinctionalism of Keohane and others emerged in the 1970’s and was applied 
to international regimes.
Keohane, “The Analysis o f International Regimes,” p.36 (footnote 7).
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means by which the state’s interest in reducing transaction cost and facilitating 
agi'eement is fulfilled). In addition, the approach formulated by Keohane has further 
implications for the reasons behind the demise of the regime: it ceases to function as 
an effective means by which to reduce transaction costs and facilitate agreement.
This means that the question of change within a regime, or the manner of a regime’s 
development between its creation and demise remain unaddressed by this branch of 
the interest-based approach. Any concern with regime change, as Haggard and 
Simmons noted, manifests only in a concern to “try to explain why regimes eventually 
weaken or decay.”"*"'
The decision to explain regimes in tenns of the function they serve (leading to 
their formation), continue to serve (maintenance), or cease to serve (demise) rests 
once again on the assumption of fixed interests in a fixed environment. The regime 
functions, and is thus created, to satisfy these interests; it persists if it continues to 
satisfy these interests in this enviionment; it collapses when fails to satisfy these 
interests. Given this emphasis on the stability of actor interests (or, as in Krasner’s 
definition, the convergence of actors’ “expectations”), the tendency to underestimate 
and even ignore variations in the process behind the structure is hardly surprising.
More recently, neo liberal regime theory was expanded to include an approach 
which was identified by its creator as “institutional bargaining.” This offshoot was 
introduced into the discussion in a 1989 article by Oran Young. Institutional
Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” p.496.
Oran R. Young, “The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the 
environment,” International Organization, vol.43, no.3, Smiimer 1989. Young’s approach as a type of 
neoliberalism is inherent in its assumption o f states as utility-maximising rational actors who, as 
Hasenclever et.al. note “are confronted with both tlie possibility o f achieving joint gains from 
effectively coordinating their behavior and the difficulty o f settling upon a specific set of nonns and 
rules for that purpose.” (Hasenclever et.al., Theories o f  International Regimes, pp.68-69). It is for this 
reason that Young’s approach to regimes is included under the, fortunately large, neo-liberal umbrella. 
In other woi ks. Young has taken more of a ‘cognitivist’ approach with an emphasis on regime 
dynamics (which will be discussed in the next section). Young has, for instance, observed tliat regimes
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bargaining was intended as another means by which the formation of international 
regimes, or the lack thereof, could be explained. As its central concern, Young sought 
“to illuminate the process of regime formation in international society.” '^ Very 
simply put, the uncertainty among potential regime participants, as regards their 
strategic options and the variation in the potential benefits of their outcomes, will 
incline them towards what Young labels ‘integrative bargaining’ in their quest to 
establish a regime. A state, desiring not to reduce inadvertently the rewards it might 
gain from a regime -  due to imperfect information in the bargaining process -  will 
“have compelling incentives to engage in exploratory interactions to identify 
opportunities for devising mutually beneficial deals.”^^  Importantly -  given the 
subject of the investigation -  Young explicitly made reference to a relationship 
between international regimes and shocks, claiming that “exogenous shocks or crises 
frequently play a significant role in breaking...logjams and propelling parties toward 
agreement on the terms of institutional arrangements.”^^  Despite identifying the 
potential importance of shocks, however. Young did so in order to identify factors 
aiding the success or failure of the institutional bargaining which in turn leads to the 
formation of a regime.
“evolve continuously in response to their own inner dynamics as well as change in the political, 
economic, and social environments” (see Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building 
Regimes fo r  Natural resources and the Environment (Ithaca; Cornell University Press; 1989). 
Following the publication of the 1989 International Organization article, however, Young has tended 
to lean more towards a neo-liberal approach, the assumptions of which informed his tlieory o f 
institutional bargaining.
Oran R. Young, “The Politics of Regime Formation; managing natural resources and the 
environment,” p.349. Young himself defined institutional bargaining as “efforts on the part of 
autonomous actors to reach agreement among themselves on the terms of constitutional contracts or 
interlocking sets of rights and mles that are expected to govern their subsequent interactions.” (See 
Oran R. Young, “Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in 
international society,” International Organization, vol.45, no.3. Summer 1991, p,282.
lbid.,p.361.
Oran R. Young, “The politics of international regime formation,” pp.371-72.
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Young reiterated and refined his method of regime analysis several times in 
the years following his initial article on institutional bargaining. In each instance the 
question of the circumstances of regime formation took centre stage. In 1991, for 
example, Young added political leadership to his list of necessary variables which 
influenced the success of institutional bargaining, and therefore regime formation.^'' 
With Gail Osherenko, institutional bargaining was again proposed as a theory of 
regime formation, confirming this form of regime theory’s disinterest in questions of 
post-formation regime change and development.^^
Although Young’s model of institutional bargaining is, to an extent, concerned 
with process, he concentrates on the processes preceding the establishment of regime. 
Once established, institutional bargaining, like HST, is theoretically inclined to 
viewed the regime as essentially fixed or in decline. According to institutional 
bargaining, the state -  uncertain as to its own eventual gains from the regime -  seeks 
to hedge its bets by ensuring the regime will be mutually beneficial. This presupposes 
that the regime, once established, is fixed (and that therein lies the need to ensure, 
during the formation process, that all participants will benefit). Change within the 
established regime is thus not simply unaddressed by, but also incompatible with, the 
assumptions of institutional bargaining.
As in the case of realism and game theory, the neo liberal approach to the study 
of international regimes ignores both practically and theoretically the question of 
post-fbrmation regime development and change in favour of an account of formation, 
persistence, and demise of the stmcture of the regime itself. The contractualism 
proposed by Keohane overtly emphasises regime formation in terms of its effect, or
Young, “Political leadership and regime formation” .
Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (eds.), Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental 
Regimes, (Ithaca; Cornell University Press; 1993).
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function. By extension, the continuing ability or failure of the regime to provide the 
advantages which prompted its formation may be used to explain the maintenance or 
collapse of the regime as a whole. In short, institutional bargaining, much like 
Keohane’s contractualism and realist analyses, concentrates on justifying the 
existence of regimes. In emphasising the ability of a regime to satisfy a state’s desfre 
to ensure and entrench a mutually beneficial agreement, the assumption is therefore 
made that once established, the regime will be unchanging.
Regime Change and Cognitivism:
It has thus far been argued that most ‘mainstream’ regime theory has 
evidenced little interest in, and made little provision for, an exploration o f regime 
change. In preferring to focus on structure (particularly the antecedents for a regime’s 
formation) rather than on process, the approaches discussed are unhelpflil to an 
investigation into regime change, and the role that shocks play in its initiation. 
Mainstream regime theory is bound by its assumption of exogenously-given, fixed 
interests. A regime either continues to fulfil those given interests (in which case the 
regime which entrenched them continues to exist) or it does not (in which case, it 
follows, the regime collapses). Since fixed interests cannot, by definition, grow and 
adapt within a regime which has cemented them, then neither may the regime itself.
Another approach to the study of international regimes, however, seeks to 
supplement or even replace the realist/neoliberal theories which have generally held 
sway. Known variously as cognitivist or knowledge-based methods of regime 
analysis, this third group of regime theorists became established as an alternative to
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mainstream regime theory by the beginning of 1990’s, taking up the concern with 
regime development which had surfaced, albeit briefly, in the late 1970’s/^
The cognitivist approach to regimes, as the name implies, examines 
international regimes with an emphasis on the roles of ideas, knowledge and learning. 
Although there are noteworthy difference among the various proponents of this 
approach, all share a belief in the need to highlight the role of knowledge.^^ 
Furthermore, all share a concern not only with the broader structural questions of 
regime analysis (and mainstream regime theory’s apparent inability to answer them), 
but an equally strong concern with process and the question of the dynamics of an 
established regime. The centrality of knowledge -  its acquisition, interpretation and 
diffusion -  have allowed this approach to be correctly described by one author, 
“particularly important in explaining the substantive content of regime rules and why 
they evolve.”^^
The cognitive challenge to regime analysis was encouraged by the bickering in 
the 1980’s between the neorealist and neo liberal camps. Ki'atochwil and Ruggie, in 
1986, argued for “a more interpretive approach that would open up regime analysis to 
the communicative rather than the merely referential function of nonns in social 
interactions.”^^  Disquiet with the accepted notion that regimes could be understood 
strictly as a product of the rational choices of states led to a desire to highlight “the
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
Some such as Hasenclever et.al., subsequently divide this branch of regime theory into weak 
cognitivists (those who wish to enliance mainstream analysis) and strong cognitivist (those who desire 
that the mainstream be replaced entirely). Altliough such a dichotomy is tempting, it is not altogether 
obvious where, precisely, the line between the two should be drawn. The following discussion, 
therefore, will simply aim to provide an overview of cognitivist regime theory generally, without 
attempting to subcategorise it farther.
Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of international regimes,” p.510.
Friedrich Kratochwil and .Tohn Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an 
Art of the State,” International Organization, vol.40, no.4. Autumn 1986, p.774.
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flexibility and structural indétermination of many notions that are frequently taken as 
given and assumed to be stable.”^  Mainstream regime theory, as Wendt noted, had 
been fated to ignore the question of change because “regimes cannot change identities 
and interests if the latter are taken as given.”'" According to this approach, interests 
are neither exogenously given nor fixed, but may be altered by the changing 
understanding of those interests which is inspired by new knowledge and/or a new 
environment.
The importance of change is thus central to the assumptions of this approach, 
regardless of whether the goal is to complement mainstream regime theory or to 
replace it. In the words of one of the key proponents of this notion, “social sciences 
have done relatively well at developing theories to explain periods of order and 
stability, but have done less well at explaining the dynamics of periods of change.”"^  
More radical forms of this approach equally considered the lack of fixed interests and 
the resultant likelihood of regime change to be important as well and accepted the 
possibility -  highlighted above -  that regimes must change in order to remain relevant 
to a changing international environment. Neufeld proposed that, rather than fixing 
interests permanently, international regimes were constantly undergoing a process of 
international renegotiation and reinterpretation.Kratochwil and Ruggie, for thefr 
part, declared that international regimes “are conceptual creations, not concrete
Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions fo r  International Environmental 
Governance, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang; 1994), p.56.
Alex Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” 
International Organization, vol.46, no.2, Spring 1992, p.393.
Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics o f  International Environmental Cooperation, 
(New York: Columbia University Press; 1990), p.xviii,
Mark Neufeld, “Interpretation and the ‘science’ of international relations,” in Re\>ie\v o f  International 
Studies, vol.19,110.1, 1993, p.55.
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entities"^, indicating their concern to understand the occurrence and likelihood of 
regime change. Harald Müller, in an article which focused on the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, drew attention to the “dynamic further development of the 
regime structure according to changed environmental conditions.”^^
The existence of such assumptions were most obviously emphasized by those 
cognitivists who, in attempting to complement pre-existing regime theory, focused 
upon the impact o f ‘epistemic communities’ which supported international regimes. 
Described by Haas as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area”^^ , the epistemic community was 
identified as a body thi'ough which the diffusion of new knowledge could take place. 
Epistemic communities ai e important by virtue of their ability to shape the 
perceptions of the decision-makers.*’^  As a consequence, “the diffusion of new ideas 
and information can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important 
determinant of international policy coordination.”*’^  While the spread of new 
knowledge is emphasised in terms of the creation of a regime, the role of new 
knowledge and subsequent change to the established regime is not merely allowed
Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Ai t of the State,” 
p .763.
Müller, “Regimeanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik,” in Kohler-Koch (ed.), Regime in den 
interncitionalen Beziehungen, p.278. Müller wrote of “die dynamische Weiterentwicklung der 
Reginiestmktur nach Ma^gabe veraiiderter Umweltbedingungen.”
Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 
International Organization, vol.46, no. 1, Winter 1992, p.3. The premise underlying the influence o f 
the epistemic community is that decision-makers recognise the limitations of their own knowledge and 
call upon the assistance of those with specific expertise in the issue-area in question.
These perceptions are cited by Haas and Adler as manifesting in the innovation, selection, dif&sion 
and persistence of policy (see Peter M. Haas and Emanuel Adler, “Conclusion: epistemic 
communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program,” International 
Organization, vol.46, no. 1, Winter 1992.
68 Ibid., p.5
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for, but explicitly acknowledged,^^ “Incremental change,” Hopkins observes, “can
occur when consensual views of an epistemic community diverge from the politically
modal position of the supporters of a policy.”^^  Taking the example of the regime to
protect the Mediterranean Sea, Haas claimed that a cognitivist approach allowed the
theorist to demonstrate that “new regime patterns may result from new information
and as a consequence of self-reflection by various actors.” '^ In questioning the
concept of fixed interests, cognitivists do not restrict themselves to questions of
regime formation, maintenance and decline and towards the processes which occur
during the life of the regime. Kr atochwil and Ruggie declared, for instance, that:
the idea that [Krasner’s] four regime components should 
also be coherent, and that coherence indicates regime strength, 
is even more profoundly problematical. The basic epis- 
temo logical problem with this notion is its presumption that, 
once machinery is in place, actors merely remain programmed 
by it. But this is clearly not so. Actors not only reproduce 
normative structures, they also change them by their very 
practice, as underlying conditions change.
There is thus a self-conscious determination among cognitivists to “adopt an ontology
that embraces historical, interpretive factors as well as structural forces, explaining
change in a dynamic way.”^^
Consequently, the relationship between change and learning pervades this
school of regime theory. This is hardly surprising, given that an emphasis on the role
This was also observed by Christer .lonssoii, who noted that “Haas emphasizes the role of 
knowledge-based communities in the creation of regimes rather than the maintenance of regime.” (See 
Jonsson, “Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics,” in Rittberger et al.. Regime Theoiy and 
International Relations, p.215.)
Raymond F. Hopkins, “Reform in the international food regime: the role of consensual Icnowledge,” 
International Organization, vol.46, no.l, Winter 1992 p.264.
Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental 
Cooperation,” in Rittberger et.al.. Regime Theoiy and International Relations, p. 170.
Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State,” 
p.770.
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of new knowledge as leading to the formation and change to a regime is meaningless 
without that knowledge being adopted and acted upon (learnt from). This link 
between learning and regime change was cited as an essential component of the 
cognitivist approach when it was observed that “regimes are not simply static 
summaries of rules and nomis; they may also serve as important vehicles for 
international learning that produce convergent state policies.” "^* As one survey of this 
approach to regimes noted, “regime analysts who have proposed learning as a key 
variable accounting for regime change understand the concept in terms of cognitive 
change in response to new information.”^^
Learning -  alluded to in this context as “a critical process by which regime 
patterns change over time” *^’ -  was generally subdivided into two types which, 
regardless of how the author labelled them, differentiated simple adaptation by a 
regime to new knowledge from ‘real’ learning as a result of that new knowledge. In 
1987, ten years after his first expression of concern with how and why regimes 
change, Nye categorised these differences as “simple” and “complex” learning.
Simple learning, he declared, involved changes to the means, without altering any 
deeper goals, while complex learning, “involves recognition of conflicts among
Haas and Adler, “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective 
research program,” p.370
Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediteiranean pollution control,’ 
International Organization, vol.41,no.3. Summer 1989, p.377.
Jonsson, “Cognitive Factor in Regime Dynamics,” in Rittberger et.al., Theories o f  International 
Regimes, p.217.
Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and Dynamics of International Environmental 
Cooperation,” in Rittberger et.al, Theories qflnternational Regimes, p.201.
.Toseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear learning and US-Soviet security regimes,” International Organization, 
vol.4I, no.3. Summer 1987, p.380. Nye adopted his distinction from that made by Argyris and Schon, 
who identified single loop versus double loop learning. (See Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, 
Organization Learning: A Theoiy o f  Action Perspective, (Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley; 1978).
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means and goals...and leads to new priorities and trade-ofFs.”^^  Similarly, Emanual 
Adler and Peter Haas’s evaluation of regimes contained the observation that learning 
could be “the adaptation of new instrumental ends (new practices) and the adoption of 
new principled ends (new g o a l s ) . E r n s t  Haas, too, made the distinction between 
adaptation (a change of procedures) and true learning (a change of principles or 
underlying values)^®.
What is both interesting and important about such distinctions is their 
correspondence to Krasner’s conception of regime change. As was noted earlier, 
Krasner differentiated between ‘genuine’ regime change (a change in the norms and 
principles of the regime which would be reflected in concurrent change to the rules 
and decision-making procedures) and change within the regime (change which is 
limited to the rules and decision-making procedures). This distinction is one which 
drew the attention of, and been underscored by, cognitivist regime theorists and 
demonstrates once again a concern with the question of regime change that was 
almost entirely lacking in mainstream regime theory.
More recently, the development of international regimes was studied with 
regard to the quesiton of regime robustness. In a 1994 article, Frank Schimmelfennig 
engaged with the question of change by attempting to measure this robustness, as he 
defined it: “the (more or less well-developed) disposition of international regimes to 
survive, ensure rule-compliant behaviour of the participating states, and attain the 
regime goals even in the case of major shocks.” '^ Not only does such a study broach
Nye, Jr., “Nuclear learning and US-Soviet security regimes,” p.380.
Adler and Haas, “Conclu 
approach program,” p.386.
Ernst Haas, M'^ hen Knowl 
(Berkeley, California: University o f California Press; 1990), p.3
sion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective)
Whe edge is Power: Three Models o f  Change in International Organizations,
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the question of shocks, but it engages with the possibility that change, or at least 
adaptation to external events, is an ingrained capability of a successful regime. In 
practice, however, Schimmelfennig was concerned simply to measure the health of a 
regime by its reaction to a shock and its ability to maintain compliance. The presence 
or absence of this ability was considered to reflect the strength or weakness of the 
regime, in this case, selected arms control regimes (including the nonproliferation 
regime).
Schimmelfennig’s conclusion that the nonproliferation regime reaction to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union indicated regime weakness^^ was criticised, as was his 
tendency to conflate regime attractiveness with regime s t rength.The exploration of 
regime robustness was intended by the author to “put the main emphasis on the 
observable process of regime evolution and the motivations of the actors conveyed by 
them.” "^^ Indeed, and in common with cognitivist approaches, the subject of regime 
robustness has an inbuilt sensitivity to the question of regime change and adaptation 
to shocks. In practice, however, Schimmelfennig’s intentions were similar to those of 
the realist. The article was, by his own admission, concerned to use regime robustness 
“with regard to different aspects of the question ‘Do regimes matter (for peace)?’ 
rather than how, why and more importantly whether a regime adapts in the face of 
one.
Frank Schimmelfennig, “Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union. Realism, 
Institutionalism and Regime Robustness” in Cooperation and Conflict, vol.29, no.2, June 1994, p .ll7 -  
18.
Schimmelfennig, “Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union”, p. 126. (The 
author writes that the reaction to the collapse of tlie USSR “has so far been slow and hesitant. This in 
itself is hardly an indication of regime strength.”)
Harald Müller, “Regime Robustness, Regime Attractivity and Anns Control Regimes in Europe”, in 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol.30, no.3, September 1995, pp.287-297.
Frank Schimmellemiig, “New States, Old Regimes, Short Time: A Rejoinder”, in Cooperation and 
Conflict, vol.30, no.3, September 1995, p.302.
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Cognitivist regime theory, while continuing to focus on the apparently all 
important question of regime formation,^*’ therefore exhibits a clear sympathy for the 
existence of, and importance of, regime development and change after its 
establishment and before its demise. Cognitivists, even those who seek primarily to 
complement mainstream theories of regimes, seek to achieve a ft'esh balance betwen 
structure and process. However, despite the importance granted to the question of 
change and regimes, most cognitivist approaches exhibit a limited understanding of 
the manner of that change. While sensitive to the existence of change to the regime 
following its formation, this approach is infused with underlying assumptions that 
change is gradual and incremental. While rejecting the notion that regimes are fixed 
once established, they argue in favour of a continuous evolution.
Peter M. Haas entrenched these gradualist assumptions when he expressed his 
concern that cognitivist regime theory redress the ignorance regarding “broader 
patterns of regime change over time.” With specific reference to the Mediterranean 
Sea protection regime, Haas wrote of the need to “explain the regime’s evolutionary 
p a t t e r n . T h i s  imagery manifested again in Adler and Haas’s discussion of 
epistemic communities in which “the most ft uitful metaphor for thinking about 
epistemic communities is that of evolution.
More pointed still are those cognitivists who actively refute the possibility of a 
non-incremental pattern of regime development. Hopkins, as noted earlier, claimed
Schimmelfennig, “Arms Control Regimes and tlie Dissolution of the Soviet Union”, p. 145.
86As Gerd .Tunne notes, cognitive theories of regime tend to “see a convergence of interests (as a result 
of common knowledge ideology, or increasing transnational contacts) as tlie major source of regime 
formation.” (See .Tunne, “ Beyond regime theory,” p. 15).
Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental 
Cooperation,” p.200 and p. 169 respectively.
Adler and Haas, “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective 
research program,” p.372.
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that “incremental change can occur when consensual views of an epistemic 
community diverge from the politically modal position of the supporters of a 
policy.”^^  Immediately after that declaration, Hopkins asserted that “synoptic change, 
however, is not plausible.” *^^ Thomas Gehidng, in his discussion of environmental 
regimes, was still more opposed to the possibility of non-incremental change when he 
stated that “careful case studies did not support the hypothesis of institutional stability 
followed by sudden change, but revealed a gradual, continuing development of
„9Iregimes.
Although, broadly speaking, cognitivist approaches to regime analysis reveal a 
concern with the question of regime development, when the manner of that 
development is explicitly discussed, there appears to be an assumption of incremental 
change.'^  ^ It is not the contention of this investigation to deny the existence of this 
type of giadual, evolutionary regime development. Rather, in answering the question 
of how the nuclear nonproliferation regime has developed, it will be demonstrated 
that this gradualist evolutionary model is often inappropriate.
Some Conclusions Regarding Regime Theoiy and Change:
This overview of the place of regime change in regime theory allows some 
interesting conclusions to be drawn. It is apparent that indications of non-incremental 
regime change in response to shocks poses a problem for the accepted understanding
Hopkins, “Reform in the international food regime,” p.264.
Ibid., p.264. The author went on to state that “turbulent condition, as in tlie 1973-74 period can 
accelerate change, but when tlie larger world economic order is not dissolving, the dominant pattern is 
incremental change.” (p.264).
Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for Environmental Governance, p.29.
Certainly, the possibility o f a non-incremental pattern of regime development has been proposed, 
although not investigated in any detail. Christer Jonsson, for example, noted that “a pertinent question
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of how and whether regimes change after theii* formation. It has become clear, for 
example, that mainstream regime theory of the sort which reflects realist and 
neoliberal assumptions tends not only to ignore the questions of regime change and 
development, but to exclude them by virtue not only of their overriding concern to 
explain regime formation, but of their assumption of fixed interests, around which (as 
Ki'asner claimed) actor expectations converge.
Cognitivist regime theory, on the other hand, has a sympathy for, and active 
engagement with, questions of regime change. In this, it differs markedly from 
approaches which have hitherto dominated the discussion. However, this 
acknowledgement of the existence and importance of regime change nonetheless 
assumes that such change tends to occur in a very specific fashion. Where the pattern 
of overall regime development is explicitly discussed, cognitivist regime theorists 
usually presuppose incremental, gradual change and, in some cases, actively to 
dismiss the possibility of any other kind of pattern. As a result, this branch of regime 
analysis has -  in practice, if not in theory -  provided insufficient understandings of 
how regimes change and develop.
An exploration of non-incremental regime development is, therefore, one 
which has been occasionally referred to and yet remained unexplored in regime 
theory. This investigation seeks to establish that this neglect is unjustified. The 
nuclear nonproliferation regime did not develop in a continuous, giadual way but 
rather in phases of rapid change which stood in contrast to periods of inactivity. This 
pattern of change is one which, as noted earlier, ultimately lends itself to a model 
through which the circumstances of such change may be understood. Although this 
does not mean that regimes never evolve gradually, it does mean that the assumptions
for farther research is whether international regimes tend to change together after periods of regime
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regarding regime change which underlie regime theory require both réévaluation and 
supplementation.
persistence and stability.” (See Jonsson, “Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics,” p.220).
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Chapter 2: The Indian Nuclear Test of 1974 ~ A Case of 
Regime Change?
The decision by the Indian government to conduct a nuclear test on May 18^ ,^ 
1974, resulted in the first overt act of nuclear proliferation since the 1964 Chinese 
nuclear test. It was, moreover, the first act of proliferation since the codification of 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime (in the form of the NPT) six years earlier. The 
first four years of the decade had been uneventfiil insofar as nuclear proliferation was 
concerned. In the sense that no direct proliferation challenges had been posed, the 
regime appeared to be a success in spite of the fact that neither West Germany nor 
Japan had as yet ratified then signature of the Treaty.'
As a consequence, and in spite of India’s non-participation in the NPT, the so- 
called ‘peaceful’ Indian test posed the first serious challenge to the new regime. It 
was later recalled by a member of the Carter Administration that by the early 1970’s 
“there was a degi ee of complacency about the nonproliferation regime that had been 
constructed.”  ^ However, in the light of the Indian test, the fact that the establishment 
of the regime had not been followed by nuclear proliferation looks as much a 
coincidence as a credit to the regime. Having “shattered the smugness” ,^ the 1974 
Indian test stood as the first real shock to the regime instituted in the 1960’s.'' The 
nuclear explosion “painfully exposed the failure of the NPT to achieve universality” .^
‘ Some of these other states who had not ratified tlie NPT as of May 1974 were: Ai'gentina, Brazil, 
Indonesia, the Netherlands, Portugal. Canada and Sweden, however, stood as two examples of states 
who had a nuclear capability who had nonetheless ratified the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.
“ Joseph Nye, “Sustaining Nonproliferation in the 1980’s,” Sunnval vol.23, no.3, May/June 1981, 
p.99.
 ^ Ash ok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, 
(New York: Praeger Publishers; 1979), p. 183.
 ^The notion o f the test as such is echoed by several commentator who referred to it, variously, as “the 
most dramatic blow struck at the NPT” (Hedley Bull, “Rethinking Non-Proliferation,” International 
Affairs, vol.51, no.2 April 1975, p. 175) and “the first serious challenge to the Nonproliferation Treaty
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thereby raising doubts regarding the direction, and indeed purpose, of the regime 
itself. The Indian test was subsequently credited with having “undermined 
international confidence in the effectiveness of international commitments.”^
The purpose of the following discussion is to examine the years immediately 
prior to and following the shock in the hopes of drawing thiee conclusions. An 
analysis of the years immediately prior to the shock will help to clarify whether or not 
the shock did indeed occur following a period of inactivity in the regime. Secondly, 
and more importantly, an analysis of post-shock events will indicate whether or not 
the Indian test was indeed followed by a development of the regime in the form of 
what has been accepted to be ‘genuine’ regime change: change to the norms and 
principles of the regime, as well as to its mles and decision-making procedures. This 
will be accomplished by examining the immediate international reactions to the event 
itself and then by examining the years following those reactions and the regime 
change that occurred, or failed to occur, during this time. It will then be possible to 
begin to answer the first question posed in the introduction: whether or not a pattern 
of regime development may be detected in which -  in contrast to that assumed by 
regime theory -  regime inactivity is punctuated by a shock and followed by rapid and 
genuine regime change. Moreover, the historieal narrative of the events following the 
shock provides a necessary basis for any subsequent attempt to understand the 
circumstances under which the shock resulted in, or failed to result in, regime change 
-  the discussion of which will be the focus of the next chapter.
system” (James E. Dougherty, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” Orbis, vol. 19, no.3. Fall 1975, p.925). 
David Fischer, formerly of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referred to the test 
explicitly as “the first shock to the newly-created ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’.” (David Fischer, 
Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p.96).
■*’ Harald Müller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1994), p.22.
 ^David Fischer, in interview via e-mail, July 18, 2000.
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The Regime and Nuclear Context Prior to the Test:
As noted in the introductory chapter, the establishment of a formal nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 at its 
centre, had cemented the legality of nuclear weapons possession by a few countries 
(the Peimanent five members of the UN Security Council, as it happened) and looked 
forward to their renunciation by the rest. Such an explicit stratification of the 
international order offended the sensibilities of some, particularly post-colonial states 
such as India. Not surprisingly, then, this inequity within the regime was highlighted 
following the Indian test although not exclusively by post-colonial countries. 
Moreover, although India had refosed to join the NPT, the testing of a nuclear device 
-  even one which claimed to be ‘peaceful’ -  nonetheless challenged the norm against 
nuclear proliferation which the regime had attempted to establish.
The four years which preceded the Indian test and followed the NPT’s official 
entry into force had seen a solidification of NPT safeguards ( lNFCIRC/153, 
developed between 1968 and 1971) and efforts to expand the number of participants 
to the regime. In spite of the existence of a new regime, the years between 1970 and 
1974 have nonetheless been identified as part of a broader ‘period of consensus’,^  
which had its origins with the policies first proposed in the 1953 Atoms for Peace 
plan put forward by American President Eisenhower. The right of a state to access 
the benefits of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, a central tenet of the Atoms for 
Peace plan, was subsequently enshrined in the NPT, which affirmed that
’ Berti’and Goldschmidt and Myron B. Kjratzer, Peaceful Nuclear Relations: A Study o f  the Creation 
and Erosion o f  Confidence, (New York: Rockefeller Foundation/Royal Institute of International 
Affairs; 1978), quoted in M.J. Wilmhurst, “The Development of Current Non-Proliferation Policies,” in 
John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (eds.), The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System: 
Challenges and Choices, (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1984), p.23.
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ail Parties to the Treaty are entitles to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further develop­
ment of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
In spite of the stratification inherent in the new nonproliferation regime, such 
sentiments did not upset the broad assumptions of peaceful nuclear technology which 
had prevailed thus far, nor the assumptions that future proliferation was likely to 
occur in highly industrialised states. The so-called period of consensus which had 
formed prior to the codification of the regime continued after its creation and until the 
Indian test challenged those assumptions. The years immediately prior to the test, 
however, are palpably free of any substantial change to the regime other than a 
numerical expansion of participants and the debates over ratification that 
accompanied it within countries such as Japan and West Gennany. Certainly, no 
changes to the structure of the regime had taken place since the establishment of 
INFCIRC/153 in 1971: no new components had arisen, no new rules or decision­
making procedures. As a consequence, the norms and principles of the regime 
remained correspondingly unaltered. Whatever the reasons, the years which preceded 
the Indian test did indeed appeal* to reflect stability in the regime, both structurally 
and normatively.
This is not to say that the nuclear context in which the regime existed had 
remained unchanging. Although the nonproliferation regime had undergone no 
significant alteration in the four years previous to the Indian test, the nuclear context 
in which it existed had changed in other respects. Most significantly, between 1973 
and 1974, there was an oil embargo and the seizure by Arab states of control over the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), Preamble.
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reserves. This embargo, following on the heels of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, 
resulted in a four-fold increase in oil prices which, among other things, had a dhect 
impact upon expectations of the future role of nuclear energy which differed from 
those which had existed at the time of the formal institutionalisation of the regime in 
the NPT. The celebrated power of the atom was increasingly viewed as the way of 
the future, and the only means by which any oil-deficient state was to survive the 
expected energy crises. Nuclear power was, in fact, believed to be nothing less than 
“the only really viable and relevant alternative source of energy.”'^  Such a possibility, 
of course, posed problems of its own. Specifically, it began to hint at increased 
likelihood of nuclear proliferation by “[raising] questions about whether there would 
be sufficient uranium to fuel all the reactors that suddenly appeared on the market.”'® 
The plutonium created as a consequence of the uranium reprocessing appeared as the 
most obvious and most viable alternative fuel in the instance of a uranium shortage.
The oil crisis and the period that followed it served to highlight the decline of 
the American dominance of the nuclear industry which had prevailed since the end of 
the Second World War. This aspect of US nuclear hegemony had been slowly 
dissipating as other countries such as Canada, France and West Germany moved “on 
to the offensive in civil nuclear markets” ' ' and proved themselves increasingly able to 
sell facilities capable of being used to produce weapons-usable material. Despite 
these new developments, the norms, principles, mles and decision-making procedures 
-  as codified in the NPT six years earlier -  remained unaltered.
Karl Kaiser, “Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation in the 1980’s,” Aiheitspapiere zur Intemationalen 
Politik 12: Nuclear Policy in Europe: France, Germany and the International Debate, March 1980,
p.20.
.Toseph Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” in George H. Quester (ed.) Nuclear 
Proliferation: Breaking the Chain, (London: The University of Wisconsin Press Ltd.; 1981), p.20.
” William Walker and Mans Lonnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and 
Proliferation Control, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; 1983), p.29.
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The Shock:
The Indian test in May of 1974 therefore occurred amidst a background of 
woiTies about energy supplies and changing expectations as to the likelihood and 
manner of future nuclear proliferation. It stood as a challenge to a nonproliferation 
regime which had been settled since its inception. Although the Indian capability to 
conduct such a test had often been recognized,*^ the test confirmed the new 
expectations of the future manner of proliferation and yet simultaneously ran counter 
to the trend which included an increasing number of NPT signatories and gradual 
entrenchment of the regime’s norms. For the first time in ten years, a nuclear 
explosive device had been tested by a new state. This new state, however, was not 
one of the industrialized states who were originally envisioned as being the most 
likely proliferators of the immediate future. Rather, it was one of the so-called less 
developed countries which had successfully carried out such an event. The fact that 
the country in question stubbornly insisted that its explosion had been ‘peaceful’ did 
little to alter the fact that nuclear proliferation had occurred. The use of a plutonium- 
based device by India, furthermore, hinted forebodingly at the problem of the 
increased availability of plutonium. While proliferation expectations had changed, 
the regime remained as it was -  a reflection of expectations which existed before the 
fear of widespread access to plutonium had been raised.
One State Department official, for example, was quoted as observing that an Indian test was a matter 
o f “when” rather than “i f ’ (official cited by George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on 
Global Proliferation, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California; University o f California Press; 1999), 
p. 183). In the United Kingdom, The Daily Telegraph had reported a year earlier that India “had 
decided to start work on the development of atomic explosives and could set off her atomic bomb in 
less than two years” (27 .luly 1971).
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Initial International Reactions:
Immediately following the successfiil test, India set about implementing 
damage control in anticipation of criticism from outside the country. Obviously, 
countries such as Pakistan and China were far from delighted that the Indians were 
both willing and able to carry out the test. In Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto and others muttered ominously about the need tor Pakistan to be fr ee of 
nuclear blackmail and to reassess its intentions.'^ The Chinese, although certainly 
displeased that the test had taken place, reacted in a manner which one author 
described as “conscious aloofness, reporting the event without comment.”*''
However, those in India’s immediate neighbourhood were not the only source of 
discontent. Despite Indian Prime Minister Gandhi’s assertion that the explosion was 
“nothing to get excited about” the first act of nuclear proliferation in a decade -  
peaceful or no -  was simply not going to pass unacknowledged.
It would be a Sisyphean task to detail the reactions of every state to the Indian 
test. A useful discussion of the consequence of the shock in the context of the regime 
may be equally well-served by examining the reactions of certain actors: key regime 
participants (such as the United States, the USSR and, to a lesser extent the United 
Kingdom) and the relevant nuclear suppliers (France, West Germany and, in this case, 
Canada).'® Not surprisingly, these states were the major players in determining the
Prime Minister Bhutto was quoted as/stating that Pakistan was “detennined not to succumb to 
“nuclear blackmail” {New York Times, 20 May 1974). A Foreign Ministry statement was reported as 
having rejected the Indian distinction between a peacefal and military nuclear explosion {New York 
Times, 19 May 1974).
Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 187. It was observed, in 1996, that “one can only conclude that 
China has not felt much threatened by India’s nuclear weapon program.” (See William Walker, 
“India’s Nuclear Labyiinth,” The Non-Proliferation Review, vol.4, no .l. Fall 1996, p.63.)
Quoted in The New York Times, 19 May 1974.
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outcome of the shock. Given that the test was the first by a new state in ten years, the 
international reaction, with one exception, was sui*prisingly understated, at least in the 
months immediately following the test and was subsequently described as being 
“conspicuous by its silence.” *^
Canada
The one exception to an otherwise subdued international reaction to the Indian 
test was Canada. It had been a Canadian-supplied CIRUS research reactor (provided 
on the condition of use for peaceful purposes only) which had been used by the 
Indians as the source for plutonium. Consequently, the Indian test stood as “the 
first...nuclear test that had used fissile material produced by a reactor designed and 
supplied for use only in ‘peaceful’ research.” '^
Consequently, and despite continuing Indian protestations that the explosion 
had been ‘peaceful’ and therefore in keeping with the terms of supply, the Canadian 
reaction was one of vocal anger and embarrassment. Canada’s Representative to the 
UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament stated that the Canadian 
Government was “very disturbed” by the explosion and that “Canada has made it 
clear that it sees no difference between the development of nuclear explosives 
intended for peaceful purposes and the development of nuclear explosives for military 
purposes.”*® Addressing the same body a day later, the Canadian Secretary of State
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), althougli obviously a crucial part of the regime, 
lies outside the discussion in tliis case, having not been responsible for safeguarding the reactor in 
question and thus not being directly affected by the shock nor involved in its outcome.
Robert L. Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control o f  Peaceful Nuclear 
Activities, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, Inc.; 1985), p.217.
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.97.
“Statement by the Canadian Representative (Barton) to the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament: Indian Nuclear Explosion,” May 2f% 1974 in Reprinted in United States Arms Control
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for External Affairs stated that his government was “very distressed and concerned 
that this latest member of the nuclear club should be a country with which successive 
Canadian governments have carried on...extensive co-operation.” ®^ He went on to 
accuse the Indians of having conducted a test which “undermines the position which 
Canada has tor a long time been firmly convinced is best for world peace and 
security.” '^ Indian protestations that a peaceful explosion did not contravene 
Canadian supply conditions did little to mollify such sentiments. An editorial in the 
Ottawa Citizen, for example, demanded that Canada cut off all nuclear aid to India, 
claiming that “Prime Minister Gandhi has known Canada’s position for years. It is 
unequivocally against nuclear explosion -  underground, above ground, on the 
ground.
Canada moved immediately following the explosion to cancel all existing 
supply arrangement with India. On May 22"®, assistance was frozen subject to Indian 
acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all of its reactors.^^ The reaction, in other words, 
was both vociferous and swift. Canadian concern at the way India had -  in its view -  
distorted the terms of supply, clearly caused discomfiture at the role Canada had 
therefore played in aiding this latest act of nuclear proliferation. Perhaps as a 
consequence, this initial reaction differed markedly fr om those elsewhere in the world 
(with the obvious exception of Pakistan).
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Documents on Disarmament 1974 (Washington, D.C.: 
USACDA; 1974),p.l51.
Canadian External Affairs Secretary Sliarp, “Address to the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament,” 22 May 1974, in Documents on Disarment, 1974, p. 153.
Ibid., p. 153.
The Ottawa Citizen, 22 May 1974.
Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, (New York: Vintage Books; 1984), pp.38-39.
66
The Soviet Union
In harmony with the majority of other international reactions, the Soviet 
reaction to the Indian test was muted. The Tass News Agency was reported in an 
American newspaper as having observed merely that India was simply “striving to 
keep at the level of world technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.” '^* 
The USSR’s care and strictness within its own borders regarding the spread of nuclear 
technology were ample evidence of its own concern with preventing proliferation. Its 
1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India discouraged a strong 
expression of concern. Moreover, it “accepted at its face value the Indian assertion 
that it was a ‘peaceful’ [explosion].”^^  Its reaction, as a consequence, was accurately 
described as being fundamentally “non-committal” by one commentator.^®
Nonetheless, and given its own history and its position as an NPT signatory, 
the subdued Soviet reaction was by no means evidence of an endorsement of the 
Indian test. Past Soviet commitments to nuclear nonproliferation, and events which 
were to come, seem to indicate, rather, that the Soviet Union was “privately 
displeased”^^  with the Indian decision, in spite of the two states’ official h'iendship.^^
Quoted in The Washington Post, 19 May 1974.
Roland Timerbaev (at the time Deputy Director of International Organizations in the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs). From an interview conducted via e-mail, 17 December 1999.
Lt. Col. Naeem Aiimed Salik, Nuclear Politics o f  India and Pakistan, (Islamabad: Institute of 
Strategic Studies Islamabad; 1992), p. 13.
Perkovich, Ind ia ’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 187.
28 Dougherty, in his article “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” stated that Soviet pique was simply a
charade and “designed to disguise the tact that the Soviet Union had been kept fully informed of the
67
The United Kingdom
In keeping with the generally muted reaction internationally, the breast- 
beating which had characterised the Canadian response was absent in the United 
Kingdom. In a statement to the UN Committee on Disarmament, for example, it was 
declared by the UK representative that “ray government shares the concern which 
other have expressed over this e v e n t . I t  was further observed -  rather self- 
evidently -  that the Indian test “has created a new situation.” ®^ The question of what 
do in response remained, in keeping with the reaction of the majority of other states, 
unanswered.
France and West Germany
The reaction to the Indian test by the two most commercially-minded nuclear 
suppliers did not reflect any outrage at the event. In France, the timing of the Ind ian 
test coincided with the election of the new President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing. In 
spite of such distractions, the chahman of the French Atomic Energy Commission 
was still able to send a congratulatory telegram to his Indian counterpart. This was in 
keeping with the French commitment to the right of a state to develop or import the 
necessary (and presumably French) products in order to receive the benefits of nuclear 
energy. France, a non-participant in the NPT, also held the view that all states -its 
neighbours apart -  possessed a sovereign right to acquire and test nuclear weapons.
West Germany, another rising star in the nuclear industry, also strongly 
supported the right of access to peaceful nuclear technology as defined under the NPT
decision and had rendered advice and assistance” (p.952). There seems, however, to be little evidence 
o f this.
Statement by the British Representative (Hain worth) to the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, 23 May 1974, reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1974, p. 155.
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(which included peaceful nuclear explosions). In the words of one observer -  at the 
time a member of the Ministry of Research and Teclinology -  “nuclear power will 
not only be beneficial to industrialized nations, but will also be important for the 
economic development and welfare of other countries in the world.”^^  The belief was 
also expressed that “on the basis of NPT terms, countries with a highly developed 
nuclear technology should continue to cooperate with recipient countries.”^^
The United States
As one of the architects and depositories of the NPT (with the USSR and UK), 
it may have been expected that the United States should react strongly and vocally 
against the Indian test. Instead, the initial American reaction was somewhat muted. 
Given that the Nixon Administration was occupied with the Watergate scandal, this 
was perhaps understandable. A State Department comment on the subject blandly 
observed that “the United States has always been against nuclear proliferation for the 
adverse impact it will have on world stability.” ®^ No mention was made of what the 
United States intended to do in response to the event. Rather, the mildness of the 
reaction supported the notion that the test had provoked among the State Department 
and Administration, “neither profound concern nor sharp displeasure.”^^
Ibid., p. 155.
lu this commitment to tiie right to acquire peaceful nuclear power, the West German position was 
like that of France’s. The French belief in the right to develop nuclear power for military purposes, 
however, was not shared by West Germany.
Wolf-J. Schmidt-Kiister, “German Nuclear Energy Development and International Cooperation”, in 
Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger, Atoms fo r  Peace: An Analysis After Thirty 
Years, (Boulder and London: Westview Press; 1985), p. 108.
Ibid., p. 108.
New York Times, 19 May 1974.
Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Remaking o f  US Policy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981), p.68.
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However, the official nonchalance of the American reaction to the Indian test 
did not appear to extend throughout government. Barely two months after the test, the 
first Congressional hearings were held in an attempt to answer the questions India was 
seen to have raised.^® In sharp contrast to the ambivalent reaction at the executive 
level, these first Senate hearings evidenced a distinct unease with the Indian test.
Feai's were expressed over the precedent that India had set and the ways in which 
similar events were to prevented.The Indian test had communicated to the Senate 
an impression o f -  as one Senator put it -  “what can happen to what was, indeed, a 
very fine concept:....the peaeeful uses of atomic energy.”^^  Consequently, another 
participant in this initial hearing even went so far as to contribute an article to Foreign 
Affairs, calling for the United States to lead the quest for changes which the Indian 
test had shown to be necessary.^®
From the outset, then, the apparent diffidence of the American 
Administration’s reaction to the Indian test was belied by nervous mutterings in 
Congress. A growing division, albeit one whieh was emerged only gradually in the 
few months following the test, was nonetheless evident. This disagreement would 
eventually prove crucial to the outcome of the shock as a whole. The immediate 
aftermath of the Indian test, however, merely demonstrated that the half-hearted 
reaction of the American Administration was not, by any means, shared tlii oughout all
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Finance of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affair, United States, Congress, Senate, 
Ninety-third Congress, second session (On Export Policy, Conti'ol, and Credits witli particular to 
exports of nuclear technology and nuclear materials), July 12 and 15, 1974.
Ibid., see especially, though not exclusively, pp .l, 2, and 24.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.26. (Speaker: Senator Jackson.)
Adlai E. Stevenson III, “Nuclear Reactors: American Must Act,” Foreign Affairs, vol.53, no. 1 
1974.
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levels of government and that a gulf was forming between Congress and the 
Administration.
The Outcome of the Shock:
In spite of the initial hesitation that characterized international reactions to the 
Indian test, the three years which followed it saw a substantial elaboration of the 
nonproliferation regime in the form of a new institution and corresponding 
international agreement of the conditions of nuclear exports. This agreement, entered 
into by the nuclear supplier states, was the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (NSG) which 
provided standards for nuclear exports by the member states. The path from the 
Indian test to the creation of this new part of the regime had its origins in the division 
which had opened between Congress and the Administration in the couple of months 
which followed the Indian test.
Canadian antipathy to the Indian test notwithstanding, real internationalisation 
of the problems raised by India was a consequence of a gi adual consensus within the 
American government that such action was necessary. This consensus appears to 
have been rooted in what one commentator has described as “one of the most 
significant recent assertion of Congressional over U.S. Foreign Policy.”®® As a 
consequence of proliferation becoming a central concern of Congress, the 
Administration found it difficult to avoid taking an international lead to solve the 
problems and close the loopholes brought to light in May 1974.
The first example of this Congi essional consciousness-raising occurred barely 
two months after the Indian test and in the face of apparent official unconcern. In 
these July 1974 healings, growing disquiet was expressed not only with the possibility
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of imitators of India’s strategy, but with the state of American nuclear export policy 
and the ways in which it could contribute to further acts of proliferation. A rising 
belief that “the standards that we have applied are apparently not adequate”®' 
pervaded the tone of these first hearings and (combined with questions about 
American nuclear policy questions that were asked of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) representative)®^ stood as the beginnings of Congressional 
pressure on the Administration to change and internationalise standards for nuclear 
exports. Despite the inactivity which prevailed elsewhere, the Indian test evoked a 
belief in Congress in the necessity of “trying to legislate and see if we can avoid some 
more Indias.”®^ In this venture, it was frequently supported by newspaper editorials 
calling for action to be taken.®® In the immediate aftermath of the shock, it was noted 
by U.S. News and World Report that “much editorial comment in U.S. newspapers 
ran against India.”®^
These calls for change were beginning to make themselves heard at the 
Administrative level in the months following the accession of Gerald Ford as 
President. This came after a five month gap in which no concrete activity was 
undertaken to deal with the consequences of the Indian test. Although the test had 
been followed by a June meeting of the Zangger Committee (a gi'oup of NPT 
suppliers who met on an informal basis to discuss export control), this meeting had
Frederick Williams, “The United States and Nonproliferation,” International Security’, vol.3, no.2 
Fall 1978, p.45.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.24 (speaker; Senator Jackson).
Ibid., p.40.
Ibid., p.24.
See, for example, the editorial in The Washington Post in which was declared that “for India to call 
its explosion ‘peaceful’ and to abjure all military intent is, in a word, rubbish.” (21 May 1974).
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been scheduled prior to the shock. It did not, therefore, stand as an independent, pro­
active attempt to deal with the questions the Indian test had raised. Moreover, no 
actions to change the measures which had thus far failed to prevent Indian 
proliferation were decided upon.
By the fall of 1974, however, the fretting in Congress had “created frresistible 
pressure to rewrite the rules governing nuclear exports”®® and was manifesting in the 
outlook of the new Ford Administration. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
asserted in a statement before the United Nations General Assembly, that the 
advantages of nuclear explosive technology “will prove to be ephemeral” and that 
“when Pandora’s box has been opened, no country will be the beneficiary.”®^ 
Nonetheless, no decisive action had been taken by the Administration in the first five 
months following the test to deal with a situation that, it was now acknowledged, was 
undoubtedly problematic for international attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation.
This time, the determination within Congress that “we just cannot tolerate a 
further lack of attention on (sic) a problem of this magnitude”®^ was accompanied by 
evidence of an impetus on the part of the Ford Administration to make up for lost 
time. Between October and December of 1974, the first internationalisation of the 
search for a solution occurred when the US and USSR “agreed in Moscow...to 
establish a Nuclear Suppliers’ Group of governments that were, or were expected to
“Fresh Fears of a ‘Minor League’ A-Bomb Race,” 3 June 1974, in U.S. News and World Report, 
vol.76, April-June 1974, p.46.
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.71.
“An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community”, Address by Secretary of State 
Kissinger to the 29"' U N . General Assembly [Extracts], September 23'^ '', 1974,” reprinted in Documents
on Disarmament 1974, p .511.
Senator Brock,
November 1975.
 quoted in “Nuclear Fuel Conti'ol Urged by Hill Group,” in The Washington Post, 10
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become, exporters of nuclear materials or equipment.” In spite of their cautious 
reaction, the discussions -  and general harmony of interests -  between the United 
States and Soviet Union were indicative of the fact, as one participant recalled, that 
the USSR was no happier than the US at “the activities of Western developed 
economies trying to conquer nuclear equipment and technology markets to the 
detriment of nonproliferation.”’^  ^ Having been (with the exception of the experience 
with China) successful at preventing the proliferation of its own technology, there was 
little Soviet enthusiasm for such efforts being negated by proliferation elsewhere. 
Consequently, consultations between the United States and the USSR were held at 
which, in the recollection of one participant, it was decided to proceed with 
Kissinger’s suggestion of “the establishment of a body comprising all major nuclear 
exporters, including France, to elaborate joint measures to avoid gaps in the system of 
nuclear nonproliferation.” '^ A few months later, in February 1975, consultations with 
the United Kingdom also took place during which the convening of a group of 
suppliers in London was agreed.
This movement fi'om expressions of concern to action came about following 
continuing distress in Congress immediately after the test and growing concern in the 
Administration. Following the 1975 amiouncements that France and West Germany 
had signed deals with Pakistan and Brazil respectively, such concerns appeared 
validated. These deals, which would see a reprocessing plant go to Pakistan and 
provide the Brazilians with a complete fuel cycle, alarmed Congi'ess still further and 
prompted a series of hearings on the subject between March 1975 and November
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 98.
Roland Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Why and How it Was Created (1974-1978) PIR 
Library Series. Moscow; Center for Policy Studies in Russia, October 2000., p.23.
Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers Group, p.28.
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1976.^  ^ Nuclear nonproliferation had gone ftom existing only in “the shadowed 
recesses of U.S. foreign policy machinery”^^  to something approaching importance in 
the Administration and an unquestionable priority to Congress. Following the five 
month international delay after the Indian test things were, at last, beginning to move 
and multilateral solutions being proposed.
The series of Congressional hearings in 1975 and 1976 left little opportunity 
for the Administration to demote nuclear nonproliferation even had it wished to. In 
the opening statement of these hearings, it was asserted balefully that “the recent 
Indian nuclear explosion demonstrated dramatically that a country can develop 
nuclear explosives without any economy-breaking national d r i v e . T h e  first NPT 
Review Confèrence in May 1975 had reaffirmed, in its final declaration, the potential 
benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions which could be made available by nuclear- 
weapon states to non-nuclear, non-NPT states. Such a suggestion, however, was 
linked with a concern that such “access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. 
Nonetheless, the demands for action by the Administration to counter this thieat and 
ensure that others did the same continued apace.
Nonproliferation Issues, Hearings before tlie Subcommittee on Arms Control, International 
Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
Ninety-fourth Congress, first and second sessions on nonproliferation issues, March 19, April 16 & 28, 
July 18 & 22, October 21 & 24, 1975; February 23 & 24, March 15, September 22, and November 8, 
1976.
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.83.
Nonproliferation Issues, p. 1 (Speaker: Senator Symington).
“Final Declaration of Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, May 1975,” reprinted in Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards, (Vienna: IAEA; 
1978), p.60.
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The Internationalisation o f the Indian test
This action, at the international level, began formally in April of 1975 with the 
fu'st meeting in London of the nuclear suppliers. The commitment to participating in 
such a group was varied. The active participation of the US, USSR, UK, and Canada 
was in keeping with the concern over nuclear proliferation the Indian test had 
ultimately (or in the case of Canada, immediately) produced. France and West 
Germany were less enamoured of the whole enterprise than the others. Instead, and as 
one member of the French delegation later observed, the aim of multilateral export 
controls merely appeared to them to be an example of “the United States seeking to 
impose theh plutonium-phobia upon the rest of the world.”^^  In addition, such an 
agreement would, fi'om the French point of view, bring about a new discrimination 
and contradict Article IV of the NPT -  a treaty which France had not signed but had 
declared it would abide by.'"*^  Similarly, the West Germans were concerned that the 
implementation of export control should occur without “impairing [West Germany’s] 
commercial viability, flexibility, and competitiveness.”^^
As a consequence, the negotiations which began in April of 1975 were far 
fi'om smooth. Quite apart from thefr instinctive distaste for the goals of the 
proceedings, neither France or West Germany were willing to be persuaded to cancel 
their respective deals with Pakistan and Brazil. It was at a French request, moreover, 
that the meetings were held in secret, and it was this secrecy which “seemed to lend 
weight to the charge that the industrialized countries were creating a cartel to deny
Bertrand Goldschmidt, Le Complexe Atomique, p.475 (Goldschmidt writes: “alors que les États-Unis 
cherchaient à imposer au reste du monde leur phobie du plutonium.”)
Ibid., p.415 (Goldschmidt stated that these new proposals “va être la cause d ’une nouvelle 
discrimination” and that they were “en contradiction formalle avec l’article IV de celui-ci.”)
Erwin Hâckel “International Nuclear Commerce and Non-Proliferation: A West German View,” in 
Rodney W. Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph F. Pilât and William G. Potter (eds.), The Nuclear Suppliers 
and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices, (Lexington: Lexington Books; 1985), p.71.
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advanced technology to the Thiid World.”^^  As a consequence of these varying 
levels of enthusiasm, the negotiations of 1975 were not especially productive. The 
meetings, furthermore, were not to remain secret for long. By June it had been 
reported that nuclear suppliers were meeting “to draw up a convention that would 
pledge these countries -  and, potentially, others who may become major exporters in 
the future -  to place stringent controls on equipment and material sold to other
nations.”^^'
As the newspaper reports accurately noted, the intention was to achieve a 
commitment h om the suppliers to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive 
technology. This necessitated agreement on what constituted sensitive technology 
and how much restraint was required in terms of the application of safeguards. The 
disagi'eements over such issues divided the French and West German delegations, 
who wanted no interference over thefr own export policies, from the others. These 
initial London meetings, then, manifested “two schools of thought on the possible 
means of reinforcing nonproliferation.”'' ' Moreover, the possibility of requfring that 
non-NPT states such as India and Brazil accept full-scope safeguards (those applied to 
NNWS parties to the NPT) did little to bring these two factions together, with France 
and West Germany wishing to retain the freedom to export to all countries.
David Fischer, Towards 1995: The Prospects fo r  Ending the Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons, 
(Geneva: UNIDIR; 1993), p. 100. It was observed that “from the outset, France insisted on avoiding 
any publicity about the Group and limiting to the bare minimum the number of other governments that 
could be kept informed of what was happening,” (See Wilmhurst, “The Development of Current Non- 
Proliferation Policies,” p.29.) While it has been suggested (for example, by Edward Wonder, “Nuclear 
Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and Brazil, 1975,” Orhis, vol.21, no.2, Summer 1977, 
p.303) that the Soviet Union also insisted on secrecy regarding the proceedings, this was recently 
denied by one of the Soviet delegation, Roland Timerbaev. (See Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, p.28, fn.45.)
The Washington Post, 19 June 1975.
Bertrand Goldschmidt, “A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies,” International Security, 
vol.2, no. 1, p.79.
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Nonetheless, the year 1976 saw the beginnings of a gradual consolidation 
among the participants. An initial version of the Guidelines had been passed, albeit 
without measures dealing with physical protection. The first two months of the year 
saw, respectively, the Soviet Union and the United States approve these preliminary 
Guidelines. Measures dealing with physical protection were adopted by the end of 
March.
More importantly, however, the French position was beginning to move from 
being, as one participant recalled, “quite passive”^^  to becoming gradually more 
involved in the discussions and, increasingly, more amenable to the possibility of a 
formal agreement. The continuing American pressure on France (and West Germany) 
to abandon their deals with Pakistan and Brazil had made little official progress. 
American efforts were portrayed as a simple unwillingness of the US government to 
compete with rivals such as France and West Gennany.'’^
By the middle of 1976, however, there was evidence that the French position 
was beginning to change and become more favourable to the possibility of a supplier 
agreement. The newly elected French President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing was “more 
willing to pay attention to American concerns.” '^"' A newspaper article in May of that 
year observed that Giscard d’Estaing had declared that France would restrict sales of 
nuclear technology unless countries accepted agreed-upon controls. As the article
Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers Group, p .36.
Le Monde, 1 August 1976. (It was stated of the US that “le gouverament ne veut pas être handicapé 
face à des concurrents étrangers particulièrement actif sur le marché expansion, comme les Français ou 
les Allemands.”) West Germany too was identified as having been antagonised by US attempts to 
pressure for export controls. An editorial in Die Zeit (27 June 1975) was headlined: “Foreign Affairs -  
Are US Misgivings .lust Sour Grapes?” (Translated and reprinted in “Nonproliferation Issues,” p. 125. 
An academic article underscored this perception, declaring that “those closest to the nuclear industry 
perceived nuclear energy as a conventional commercial undertaking, a matter of marks and pfennigs 
from which questions of a political nature should be excluded.” (Wonder “Nuclear Commerce and 
Nuclear Proliferation,” p.292).
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n65accurately noted, “it was the most binding public pledge yet from his government.” 
The French President confirmed this more public nonproliferation commitment when 
he noted that while he believed France had to develop its own nuclear weapons, “we 
must be very careful not to increase the risk of nuclear danger to the world.
Such sentiments, however, did not prevent what was referred to as a 
“spectacular public dispute”^^  between French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and 
Secretary of State Kissinger over the Franco-Pakistani nuclear deal in August of 1976. 
This stood as the culmination of the dispute between the newly proliferation-aware 
Ford Administration and the “ambivalent and somewhat ambiguous posture”^^  
characteristic of the Gaullist sympathies of Chirac.
This dispute did not, to American disappointment, directly result in a 
cancellation of the deal with Pakistan. It was followed, happily from the point of 
view of the American Administration, by the resignation of Chirac in the same month. 
In the remaining months of the year, France demonstrated conclusively that her 
position on nuclear exports was indeed “moving cautiously towards a more co­
operative posture in the Suppliers’ Club consultations and adopting a more restrictive 
export policy of her own.”^^  In September, and although the deal with Pakistan 
ostensibly still remained, France announced an embargo on the future sale on nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plants. One month later -  and two and a half years following the
David Fischer, Stopping the Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons: The Past and Prospects, (London and 
New York; Routledge; 1992), p.78.
The Washington Post, 2 1 May 1976.
“Interview o f French President Giscard d ’Estaing at the National Press Club: Nuclear Export Policy 
[Extract], May 20, 1976,” reprinted in Documents on Disannament 1976, (Washington, D.C.: ACDA; 
1976), p. 323.
Pierre Lei louche, “France in the International Nuclear Energy Controversy: A New Policy Under 
Giscard d ’Estaing,” Orin's, vol.22, no.4. Winter 1979, p.955.
Ibid., p.955.
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Indian test -  France presented its official, six-point nuclear export policy which, while 
it continued to affirm French commitment to the peaceful application of nuclear 
energy, also stated the intention to “strengthen all relevant regulations and guarantees 
in the field of equipment, materials and technology.Final ly,  in mid-December, it 
was announced that France would no longer make any bilateral deals for the transfer 
of reprocessing technology. In defending this apparent policy change against charges 
of having submitted to the wishes of the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
proclaimed that “over the past two years or so the world scientific community has 
realized that irradiated fuel reprocessing plants could lead to the bomb -  notably after 
the Indian explosion in 1974.” '^
The reasons behind the French shift were various. The departure of Chirac has 
been credited with having “finally cleared the way for a clarification of French 
nuclear policy in the manner hoped for by the moderates within the French 
establishment and by Washington.”^^  In addition, it has been asserted that the United 
States made France aware of the dubious intentions of Pakistan by supplying 
corroborating intelligence data.^  ^ Regardless of the reasons, the change in French 
policy made the institutionalisation of supplier standards much more feasible. This 
change also “left (W.) Germany alone in refusing to ban the future sale of sensitive
Strategic Survey 1976 (London: International Instifiite of Strategic Sfridies; 1977), p .l 15.
“Statement by the French High Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy: Nuclear Export Policy,” October 
11, 1976. (Released: French Embassy press release). Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1976, 
p.669.
“Televised Interview of French Minister of Foreign Affairs de Guiringaud; Nuclear Export Policy, 
December 16, 1976,” (French Embassy press release), reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1976, 
p.670.
Leliouche, “France in the International Nuclear Controversy,” p.959. The “tension” cited by 
Lei louche (p.957) between Chirac and Giscard as one of the factors blocking a declaration of nuclear 
export policy appears to be supported by the fact that the new policy was eventually made by the High 
Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy o f France -  a body established by President Giscai d d’Estaing.
See, for example, Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers Group, p.20.
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segments of the fuel c y c l e . A  mere six months later, in June 1977, West Germany 
also announced its intent not to export any more reprocessing plants, although it still 
refused to cancel the deal with Brazil.
At the same time as the French commitment to nonproliferation was 
hardening, the November Presidential elections in the US had made nuclear non- 
proliferation a central issue. Ford had solidified his Administration’s commitment to 
nuclear nonproliferation in his nuclear policy statement that October.^^ The election 
of Jimmy Carter, who in his inaugural address promised to “move this year a step 
towards our ultimate goal -  the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth”^^  
entrenched the continuing centrality of nonproliferation in the US Administration both 
internationally and domestically.^^ Private studies, such as that by the Ford 
Foundation/Mitre Corporation published in 1977, were also important in maintaining 
the prominence of nuclear nonproliferation issues. The nuclear nonproliferation 
policy of the Carter Administration was, in fact, credited as having been “heavily 
influenced”^^  by the recommendations of the study, which supported the notion that 
the spread of plutonium for commercial use was incompatible with nuclear
74 Strategic Survey 1976, p. 115.
“Nuclear Policy Statement by Gerald R. Ford,” 28 October 1976. Reprinted in Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: US GPO; 1977), pp.2763- 
68 .
Jimmy Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs o f  a President, (Toronto, New York, London, Sydney; 
Bantam Books; 1982), p.20.
The support given by the President himself to domestic legislation such as the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act o f 1977 -  which called for a re-negotiation of previous contracts and full-scope 
safeguards on all reprocessing ~ was evident in the support he gave to the Act in his speech to Congress 
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nonproliferation. With the French position beginning to shift towards a supplier 
agreement and American determination to achieve such an agreement reinvigorated in 
the new Administration, the year therefore saw the continuing internationalisation of 
efforts to solve the problems raised by the Indian test and the formalisation these 
solutions in the form of a suppliers’ agreement.
The Nuclear Suppliers ’ Guidelines...
“By mid-1977”, it was observed, “despite their very different starting points, it 
was clear that Western European export policies had substantially converged.”'^ '' The 
adoption of the Guidelines for nuclear transfers came about in September 1977, the 
full text being published in February 1978. The initial group of suppliers had 
expanded in the previous year to include eight further members,^' and in the absence 
of the vocal discontent on the part of France (which had hitherto stalled such 
progress), even a reluctant West Germany was persuaded to adopt the Guidelines.
These Guidelines were concerned, primarily, to establish “fundamental 
principles for safeguards and export c o n t r o l . I n  a nod to the Indian test, the first 
principle articulated a new prohibition on nucleai* explosives, requiring that the 
supplier gain “formal governmental assurances fiom recipients explicitly excluding 
uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device.”''^  The NSG also attempted 
to prevent nuclear proliferation by necessitating that provisions be made for the
Fischer, Stopping the Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons, p.91.
These new members were Belgium, East Geraiany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Switzerland, and Sweden.
Guidelines fo r  nuclear transfers, the Nuclear Suppliers ’ Group, para. 1. Reprinted in Brenner, 
Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, Appendix I, pp.296-299.
Ibid., para.2.
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physical protection of materials to prevent “unauthorized use and handling/’^ '* Most
importantly, however, the Guidelines incorporated a “trigger list” of teclmologies
which should require safeguards. They also obliged the supplier state to
exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, 
technology and weapons-usable materials. If enrichment 
or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be 
transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, 
as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement 
and/or other appropriate multi-national participation in resulting 
facilities.''^
While these were not quite the full-scope safeguards hoped for by the United States, 
USSR, and UK, paragraph 7 (and the rest of the Guidelines) nonetheless created 
obligations on the part of the nuclear suppliers, as well as the recipient state, when 
transferring sensitive (or proliferation-prone) technologies such as those for 
“reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy water production.
The creation of these new obligations was far from lost on countries who 
found themselves outside the sacred inner circle and who saw the NSG as a threat to 
their own nuclear development. The disputes between suppliers and recipients 
tlii'eatened to inflict real damage to the nonproliferation regime. The creation -  at the 
behest of the United States -  of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation programme, 
or INFCE, was the American response."^ This programme, which began in October
' Ibid., para.3.
Ibid., para.7. It is worth noting here tliat the notion of a multinational fliel-cycle centre is an example 
of a measure which, though much discussed, was not eventually adopted, demonstrating that some 
proposals for regime development end up being rejected.
Ibid., para.6(a).
INFCE, in fact, began its life as the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme, or INCEP, until 
the French pointed out that the “Programme” part o f the title was redundant. The ‘P ’ was subsequently 
dropped, rendering the acronym simultaneously more sensible and less pronounceable. INFCE was not 
exclusively a reaction against the NSG. The Carter administration had, o f course, pushed for an end to 
all reprocessing by all states. INFCE also enabled the US to retreat from tliis more fundamentalist 
position.
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1977 and concluded in February 1980, began life as an attempt to allay fears of 
rampant plutonium production by identifying a less proliferation-prone fuel cycle.
This soon changed focus and became “a forum for discussing technical, economic and 
institutional aspects of nuclear trade and development.”"" It also served as a means 
by which to soothe tempers inflamed by the creation of the NSG. INFCE has been 
credited, in the words of one member of the Carter Administration, with helping “to 
restore a basis for consensus on the refurbished regime for the international fuel 
cycle.”"^  ^ This may be a generous assessment of the proceedings, especially with 
reference to the word ‘consensus.’ In fact, INFCE failed to publish any ‘answers’ or, 
for that matter, arrive at any commonly agreed conclusions. It has, for example, also 
been suggested that the beneficial cooling of tempers owed itself equally to the 
possibility that three years of discussion simply bored the participants into silence.^'' 
However, and despite the inability of INFCE to draw any formal conclusions, 
the obligations which were manifested in the Guidelines were new in the 
nonproliferation regime. Along with other developments in the normative framework, 
they helped to demonstrate, firstly, that a significant development in the norms, 
principles and structures of the regime had taken place and that, therefore, a pattern of 
regime change may be demonstrated which challenges the assumptions of change in 
regime theory.
Walker and Lonnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles, p.41. 
*** Nye, Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime, p.25.
This particular suggestion of a reason for the failure of INFCE to come to any formal conclusions 
was made by Professor William Walker.
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The History and Outcome of the Shock: a case of regime change?
The preceding narrative allows us to answer the first question of the three 
posed in the previous chapter: whether or not genuine regime change can be said to 
have occurred -  and the regime to have developed in a non-incremental manner. To 
this end it has first been necessary to establish whether or not the years immediately 
following the Indian test indicated regime change and not merely the addition or 
subtraction of a few rules. Secondly, the overall narrative on the years before and 
following the shock allows us to answer the question of whether or not this then 
indicates an overall pattern of regime development which confirms or contradicts 
such understandings of change in regime theory generally. The events which 
followed in the wake of the Indian test do indeed demonstrate that genuine and rapid 
regime change had occurred. Accepted proliferation expectations -  that access to 
peaceful technology could be separated hom military and that industrialised states 
were the primary proliferation risk -  had been formalized in 1968 and had then been 
shattered six years later by the Indian test. It may further be argued, in the light of the 
narrative of the years following the test, that the regime underwent an initial post­
shock period of disagreement, or diverging expectations, before a reconvergence of 
expectations occurred in the form  q/'a period of significant change to the norms, 
principle, rules and decision-making procedures which had prevailed in the years 
before 1974. Moreover, and given that such regime change did occur following a 
period of regime inactivity, a non-incremental example of regime change has indeed 
been demonstrated which is, as noted in the previous chapter, problematic for the 
understandings of change in regime theory.
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As the discussion has thus far demonstrated, the elaboration of the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime following the shock of the Indian test 
came in the form of the establishment of a formal suppliers group and the resultant 
guidelines which members were to observe. The creation of the NSG, self-evidently, 
involved the creation of a new institution in the regime. This, in turn, involved a 
significant expansion of the regime’s mles and decision-making procedures. Not only 
did it incorporate a formal trigger list to activate safeguards, but it also requfred that 
the supplier obtain assurances from the recipient state as to the intended function of 
the equipment or technology received. One paragraph, for example, requfred the 
supplier to ensure that any enrichment facility or technology supplied will not “be 
designed or operated for the production of greater than 20 percent enriched uranium 
without the consent of the supplier nation, of which the IAEA should be advised.”^’
In addition, the Guidelines contained new decision-making procedures such as those 
which -  in the event of a suspected violation of supplier/recipient understandings -  
declared that “suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order 
to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged violation.”^^  The NSG, in 
other words, was more than merely an addendum to existing rules and decision­
making procedures, but the creation and institutionalisation of the new capacity of the 
regime to regulate nuclear transfers.
The NSG also stood both as an example and a reflection of changed norms and 
principles. As the previous chapter stated, the norms of a regime refer broadly to 
those rights and obligations of the regime participants which proscribe or prescribe 
certain behaviour. In keeping with this definition, the NSG represented the 
institutionalisation of a new norm in the nonproliferation regime. Although Article
Guidelines fo r  nuclear transfers, the Nuclear Suppliers ' Group, para. 8.
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IIL2 of the NPT established obligations on the part of nuclear suppliers, the NSG 
formally placed the norm of nonproliferation over the commercial gain. While India 
was not a member of this treaty, the test explosion nonetheless demonstrated that the 
prevention of proliferation would be hampered if responsibility continued to be 
placed, de facto, only on the recipient state. To this end, the Guidelines requfred 
suppliers “to demand from their recipients pledges of non-use of received materials 
for the development of any explosive device.”^^  ^ Thus -  in calling for suppliers to 
“exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities” '^' -  the NSG emphasised the 
rights and obligations of supplier states to prevent proliferation. By thefr very 
existence, the Guidelines pointed to a belief in suppliers’ obligations not to indulge in 
unfettered competition at the expense of nonproliferation objectives. While 
obligations of recipient states under the NPT not to use imported technology to 
proliferation remained intact, the test explosion by a non-NPT recipient state therefore 
led to change in the obligations of supplier states. Consequently, the norms 
surrounding the transfer of technology and equipment had changed and, in the form of 
the NSG, placed formal obligations and instituted standards of behaviour on nuclear 
suppliers as well as recipients.
In addition, the establishment of the NSG indicated a change to the principles 
-  the beliefs about the basic facts and causal relationships -  of the regime. The 
deeision by the Indians to label their test a ‘peaceftil’ nuclear explosion resulted in the 
undermining and alteration of the principles laid down in 1953 in Eisenhower’s 
Atoms for Peace plan. The goal, as articulated by the President, was to take atomie
X
Ibid., para. 14(c).
Statement of Igor Morokhov, head of the Soviet delegation at the plenary session o f the First NPT 
Review Conference, 6 May 1975, quoted in Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers' Group, p.32.
Ibid., para.7.
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power and “strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace”^^  thus making its
rewards available to all. This belief, moreover, was enshi ined in the preamble of the
NPT, which affirmed
the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of 
nuclear technology, including any technological by-products 
which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the 
development of nuclear explosive devices, should be 
available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, 
whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States.^^
The Indian test, however, damaged confidence in the principle, laid out in the Atoms
for Peace plan and enslirined in the NPT, that a meaningful distinction could and
should be made between peaceffil and military nuclear technology. Although the
right of access to peaceful nuclear technology was reaffirmed in the Final Declaration
of the first NPT Review Conference, the shock -  together with gi owing fears of freer
access to plutonium worldwide -  nonetheless brought about a return to the policy of
denial which ran counter to the idealism of the policies of the Atoms for Peace plan.
The ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion encouraged the creation of the NSG by making it
clear that there was “no essential technical difference between a nuclear explosive
intended for peaceful purposes and one intended for waging war.”^^  In the American
Congress, as noted previously, concerns were expressed at the Indian illustration o f
in the words of one Senator, “what can happen to what was, indeed, a very fine
concept....the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” "^ Kissinger’s assertion that the policy
of peaceful nuclear assistance “cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of
“Atomic Power for Peace,” Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President o f the United States before 
tlie General Assembly o f the United Nations, December 8*'', 1953. Reprinted in Joseph F. Pilat et.al.. 
Atoms fo r  Peace, Appendix C. pp.283-291.
Treaty^ on the Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty), preamble.
William Epstein, “The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Scientific American, vol.232, no.4, April 
1975, p. 18
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.26 (Speaker: Senator Henry Jackson).
nuclear explosives”*^^  ^confirmed this change. The NSG did not, jucr se, resurrect the 
policy of denial which had preceded the Atoms for Peace plan. The Guidelines did, 
however, place stricter regulations on nuclear trade and establish a notion of 
“restraint” in such dealings. In so doing, it represented a change in the belief that 
access to ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology could be kept independent of access to 
military benefits. Consequently, the shock of the Indian test apparently “brought to 
an end two decades of stability under the rules of nuclear ethics and international 
cooperation ushered in by President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Plan.” "''' The 
principle of the right of access to peaceful technology enshi ined in the NPT was not 
abandoned. However, in practical terms the institutionalisation of trade restraints by 
the NSG stood as evidence that this principle had been altered in the face of the 
challenge posed by the Indian test. Furthermore, the very meaning ascribed to the 
word “proliferation” appeared to have undergone a change, following the events of 
1974. Previously, and as manifested in the NPT, it applied mainly to the spread of 
nuclear weapons. Henceforth, it would apply also to the spread of technologies and 
materials relevant to the manufacture of weapons. In keeping with this, evidence of 
proliferation expanded to include not only explosive testing, but also the acquisition 
of reprocessing and eniichment technology, in particular.
Conclusions:
By constructing a history of the events in the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
before, during, and after the shock of the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the preceding 
discussion has shown that the regime activity which occurred in the wake of the shock 
— the NSG -  was more than merely an incremental elaboration of the rules and
‘Address by Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger,” September 23", 1974.
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decision-making procedure in the nonproliferation regime. Rather, an entfrely new 
institution had been created to support the regime which contained both new rules and 
new decision-making procedures and, crucially, reflected an alteration in the norms 
and principles which had previously prevailed. The years following the Indian test 
have been shown to bring about a change in the obligations of supplier states. 
Speaking in 1979, Senator John Glenn observed that “a new policy has emerged 
within the United States designed to raise the consciousness level of the world to the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation and to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons.”"" 
The Guidelines codified the emerging norm that not only recipient states, but also 
supplier states, were obliged to be pro-active in preventing proliferation by exercising 
restraint in their dealings. In addition, the effective return to a policy of (selective) 
denial and control upon which the NSG was premised, demonstrated a change in the 
principle of a distinction between the peaceful and military atom and thus a change in 
the absolute nature of the principle of peaceful nuclear assistance. The re­
establishment, then, of a policy of denial therefore demonstrated that the regime had, 
for the time being at least, “replaced the assumption of qualified trust that underlay 
the NPT with the assumption of unqualified m i s t r u s t . T h e  principle of Atoms for 
Peace, enshrined in the preamble of the NPT, had also undergone a change.
As such, the regime activity which took place in the years immediately 
following the Indian test appear to be not merely the addition of a few new rules, but
'***’ Bertrand Goldschmidt, “From Nuclear Middle Ages to Nuclear Renaissance,” in Pilat et.al., Atoms 
for Peace, p.111.
Nuclear Proliferation: The Situation in India and Pakistan, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United 
States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, May 1, 1979., p .l.
Walker and Lonnroth, Nuclear Po^ver Struggles, p.39.
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rather to consist of significant regime development. Moreover, and as the section 
dealing with the history of the regime in the years before the test showed, this regime 
change occurred after a period of comparative regime inactivity prior to the shock. It 
was observed that the years between the establishment of the regime and the Indian 
test (1968-1974) had seen little activity. Certainly, the years immediately prior to the 
test -  after the establishment of INFCIRC/153 in 1971 -  had seen no change other 
than an expansion in the number of NPT participants. The narrative dealing with the 
years immediately after the shock, by comparison, has revealed that considerable 
regime change occurred in the space of three and a half years. In other words, it has 
been possible to establish that the change to the regime involved a divergence and 
reconvergence of actor expectations resulting in a non-incremental pattern of 
development. It is this pattern which, as the previous chapter demonstrated, presents 
a challenge both to the general neglect of regime change and to the assumptions of the 
manner of regime development present in regime theory.
The discussion of the 1974 Indian test, however, remains incomplete. The 
preceding narrative has not only been necessary to establish the occurrence of genuine 
regime change as part of a broader, non-incremental pattern of development, but also 
provides the discussion with a basis for answering the other questions posed at the 
outset. It is already clear, from this chapter, that the second question posed in the 
introduction -  of whether it may be assumed a shock necessarily leads to change -  has 
not been undermined by the outcome of the Indian test. The answer, thus far, appears 
to be that such an assumption would still be valid. However, the nanative of this 
chapter will also provide a basis for the ensuing discussion of the third question posed 
in the introduction -  how the translation of the shock into regime change may be 
understood.
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Chapter 3: The 1974 Indian Nuclear Test -  Understanding 
Regime Change
The narrative of the years immediately prior to and following the Indian 
test explosion in 1974 indicated a non-incremental pattern of regime 
development. The Indian test occurred after a period of comparative regime 
inactivity and was followed by the creation of the NSG. To leave the discussion 
of the shock there, however, would be to ignore the possibility of understanding 
why the shock was translated into the kind of significant regime development 
which has been shown to have occurred. The previous chapter, in seeking to 
establish or refute a pattern of regime change, provided a nanative of the way in 
which the shock was internationalised and how -  in this international context -  
change to the regime was subsequently negotiated. The thesis, however, also 
seeks to understand why consequent regime change occurred, and in the rapid 
manner that it did.
Certainly, it is not self-evident that the events of 1974 should have been 
considered of such significance that concrete actions were required. Yet such a 
determination was made. In spite of the fact that “no safeguards agreement or 
NPT commitments were broken by the Indian nuclear explosion, the event cast 
doubt on the adequacy of the entire structure of nonproliferation restraints.”’
The eventual effects of the shock on the regime can be seen to have originated 
with American concern and the whole episode was ultimately to become “one of 
the most significant recent assertions of Congressional power over US foreign
’ Goldschmidt and Kratzer, Peaceful Nuclear Relations: A Study o f  the Creation and Erosion o f  
Confidence, (New York and London; The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs; 1978), p.73.
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policy.”  ^ The fact that countries such as Canada felt as strongly about the need 
tor change as the United States eventually did was important, but hardly decisive. 
In addition, it has been shown that France and West Germany not only had little 
interest in the type and extent of regime change desired by the United States but, 
during the first two and a half years after the Indian test, actively fought against it.
Simplisticaliy, the answer to the question of how to understand why the 
Indian test eventually prompted significant regime change is that the United 
States (with the support of states such as the USSR and UK) became interested in 
the subject and by turns persuaded and harangued those who were not into 
agreeing to the changes that were made. In order to understand the outcome of the 
shock, the subject of greatest interest is not the opponents of change, but those 
who initiated it and who, in the end, forced it through.
Simply to say that the regime change which occuned may be understood 
as the will of the United States, however, is insufficient to explain why the United 
States, and eventually the reluctant holdouts, responded to the shock in the way 
that they did. To do this, it is necessary to illuminate the circumstances and 
interpretations of the shock which allowed such change to occur.
Understanding of Danger:
The first of these interpretations is one which, however important, stands 
as self-evident. The internationalisation of the shock, and the consequent regime 
change which occurred suggests the acceptance of a belief that the Indian test was 
not an innocuous act, Rather, it was considered to represent a more general 
danger of proliferation, and thereby tlueatened the credibility of any regime
Williams, “The United States and Non-proliferation,” p.45.
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designed to prevent such things. There is little benefit (and, as the history ot the 
aftermath of the Indian test demonstrated, a great deal of difficulty) in bringing 
about changes to the wider regime if the risks revealed by the shock are seen 
simply to be the product of a unique occurrence. If the problems exposed by the 
Indian test were confined to India and to the hazard thereby posed by that state, 
then efforts to deal with it could be limited to responses which were more easily 
implemented, such as unilateral sanctions, diplomatic withdrawals, and so on. 
Fundamentally, if the Indian test was not understood as creating or illuminating 
wider danger, then no action need be taken. It is only if the shock is interpreted as 
a precedent-setting occurrence which, crucially, undermines the stability and 
credibility of an international regime that multilateral change need be initiated. 
The alteration of safeguards, the creation of exporters guidelines and multilateral 
diplomatic wrangling are understandable only if the Indian test was believed to be 
the potential inspiration for similar incidents which must be prevented in order to 
preserve the credibility of the regime designed to prevent such things. It is this 
understanding of the danger which one would therefore expect to find pervading 
the reaction in the United States, the originator of such change.
However, as one author noted, the reaction of the American 
Administration was “tardy and low-key.”  ^ Mfred as it was in the Watergate 
scandal, this is perhaps hardly surprising. In addition, it was not initially clear 
whether the explosion should, as one author put it, “be treated as a bomb or 
somehow re-defined as a non-bomb.”'' However, it has become clear that this 
apparent indifference to the shock was not shared by the American Congress,
 ^ Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.68.
George H. Quester, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” The Journal o f  International Affairs, vol.40, 
no .l. Summer 1986, p. 181.
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which was “shaken out of its somnolent state”  ^by the test. Indeed, it was 
declared that “the US Congress in particular was stunned by the Indian ‘betrayal 
of trust’.”  ^ As a consequence, the Indian test inspired a wealth of activity in 
Congress which exerted unwavering and prolonged pressure on the Ford 
Administration to act. Furthermore, fears that the Indian test would open the door 
to a host of future proliferators were expressed almost immediately following the 
test. From the first hearing on the subject it was observed, and went 
unquestioned, that the Indian test had “caused a cascade of potential nuclear 
powers to reconsider their politics”  ^-  a situation which (in spite of India’s non- 
NPT status) raised inevitable questions regarding the effectiveness of a regime 
aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. One participant went so far as to 
identify the ultimate goal as “trying to legislate and see if we can avoid some 
more Indias.”" The identification of the shock as representing not only a danger, 
but a danger derived from the likelihood of its imitation is therefore evident from 
the outset. After an initial hesitation. Congress “suddenly wanted clear 
assurances that another string of countries could not acquire nuclear weapons.”''
 ^ Leonard Weiss, “Nuclear Safeguards; A Congressional Perspective,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.34, no.3, March 1978, p.29.
Joan Johnson-Freese, “Interpretations of the Nonproliferation Treaty; the US and West 
Germany,” Journal o f International Affairs, vol.37, no.2. Winter 1984, p.288.
 ^Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology Hearings before the Subconunittee on 
International Finance of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States, 
Congress, Senate, Ninety-third Congress, second session (On Export Policy, Control, and Credits 
with particular attention to exports o f nuclear technology and nuclear materials) July 12 & 15, 
1974. p .2 (speaker; Senator Adlai Stevenson III).
 ^ Ibid., p.24 (speaker; Senator Jackson).
Quester, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” p. 185.
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In spite of the rather grandiose claim by one hawkish Indian academic that India, 
after its test, “constitutes a higher stake to big Powers in international politics” '". 
Congressional fears emphasized the fact that the door had been opened, rather 
than focusing on the state which had opened it. Instead of focusing attention on 
India, “doubts clustered around a number of hypothetical scenarios rather than 
about any specific country.” ' ' “The Indian explosion” it was again declared in 
the first Senate hearings, “has really rocked the world in a sense of what can 
happen.” '^
This theme continued throughout further hearings into the implications of 
the 1974 test and the future of nuclear proliferation. Senator Symington identified 
the basis of concern as the fact that “the recent Indian nuclear explosion 
demonstrated dramatically that a country can develop nuclear explosives without 
any economy-breaking national drive.” Concern was then repeatedly expressed 
about the intentions of Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Aigentina and Brazil''' and there was 
common agreement that, as it was still being asserted in 1977, “we will probably 
see more of this in the future if we are not careful.” '^
However, such convictions were not confined to Congress, although the
K. Subrahmanyan! “The hidian Nuclear Explosion and its Impact on Security,” India 
Quarterly, vol.30, no.4, October-December 1974, p.260.
' ‘ Fischer, Stopping the Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons, p.59.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.26 (speaker: Senator Jackson).
Nonproliferation Issues , p .l.
''' Indeed, and as will be discussed later, the intentions of Pakistan and Brazil, and the deals they 
had struck with France and West Geimany respectively, were to be crucial in underscoring this 
sense of India as having released the genie from the bottle.
The Nuclear Anti-proliferation Act o f  1977, Hearings and markup before the Committee on 
International Relations, House o f Representatives and its Subcommittees on International Security 
and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade. Ninety-fifth Congress, 
first session, April 4, May 19 & 26, July 27 & 29, August 1 & 2, 1977., p. 87. (speaker: Senator 
John Glenn).
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post-Watergate Administration remained slow to acknowledge the shock’s 
implications. Nonetheless, it is misleading to overstate the contrast between the 
Ford and Carter era. Despite the slow start, both Administrations became 
convinced that the shock had consequences which extended far beyond India. 
Although one author declared that Secretaiy of State Kissinger’s “natural 
preference was for doing nothing” ' ,^ the months following the Indian test and the 
fii'st Congressional hearings on the subject, saw his concern over the issue of 
nuclear nonproliferation raised sufficiently for him to express his conviction -  
before the UN General Assembly -  that “[previous] policy cannot continue if it 
leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives.” '  ^ This increasing concern within 
the Ford Administration regaining the dangerous precedent India had set, was 
eventually expressed in the President’s statement on nuclear policy. In it Ford 
stated that in the absence of connective action.
nuclear proliferation will accelerate as nations initially 
having no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons conclude 
that they are forced to do so by the actions o f others 
[my italics]. Should this happen, we would face a world in 
which the security of all is critically imperilled.'"
The general acceptance of the shock as establishing a dangerous precedent 
(thus undermining the effectiveness of the regime) also pervaded the security
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.68.
”  “An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community”, Address by Secretary o f State 
Henry Kissinger before the 29*'’ UN General Assembly, September 23"', 1974. Reprinted in 
Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation, p .815. Although there is little evidence that 
Kissinger himself was in any way sent into a panic by the Indian test, his address to the UN and 
his subsequent haranguing of the French and West Gemians over tlieir respective nuclear deals 
(discussed later) does appear to mitigate somewhat against Brenner’s assertion that “Kissinger’s 
natural preference was for doing nothing” (Brenner Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.69), 
only acting “when forced to intercede” (p.71).
Public Papers o f  the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford (Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, 
and Statements o f  the President), 1976, document 987, p. 2763.
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establishment. An internal paper of the United States Mission to NATO a month
after the test expressed the fear that “the Indian example...could make it easier for
others to follow suit, claiming that they too are following the route o f ‘peaceful’
accession to nuclear power status.”'" Still more importantly, in his testimony
before the spate of hearings between March 1975 and November 1976, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, claimed that the
Indian test was problematic in the sense that “ftirther proliferation would have
serious implications for the United States.” "^ Further evidence that such concerns
were growing was revealed the following March. At this time. The Washington
Star printed an interview with Fred C. Iklé (head of the Aims Control and
Disarmament Agency) in which he was asked whether the wave of concern
generated by the Indian test was exaggerated. Iklé replied that
if anything the situation has become more serious. The 
right way to look at this next step in proliferation, the 
Indian explosion, is not that India is number six in a 
so-called nuclear club, but in a way it’s number one among 
a great many countries to come, maybe 10, 20 countries.^'
The understanding of the danger posed by the Indian test had, after an initial
hesitation, moved outside Congi'ess and into the Executive.
The existence of such sentiments were ft-equently alluded to in other fora. 
One author called for immediate action “to see whether fingers cannot be burned 
a little less often in the future.”^^  Less than a year later, in the same journal, the 
identical opinion was again expressed, citing a prevailing concern that “the crucial
Internal Paper o f  the US Mission to NATO, June 5"', 1974, para. 2.D, reprinted in Appendix Q 
in Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Langman Ltd.; 1993).
Nonproliferation Issues, p.243 (speaker: testimony o f Robert Ellswortli, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense).
Washington Star, 12 March 1975
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new reality is thus not merely the existence of a sixth (or seventh) nuclear power; 
it is above all the altered prediction that influential people around the world are 
making as a consequence.”^^  The Executive-Director of the Aims Control 
Association in Washington, D.C. contributed one article entitled “The spread of 
nuclear weapons -  is the dam about to burst?” "^^ concluding, not surprisingly, that 
it was. An annual survey by one journal observed this -  and reflected the 
understanding of the danger revealed by the shock -  when it noted that the 
explosion had essentially destroyed “the assumption of previous years that 
somehow the spread of nuclear weapons could be halted.
As asserted above, the pursuit of regime change cannot be understood in 
the absence of a belief on the part of the initiators of such change that not only is 
the event itself dangerous, but that much of its danger lies in the potential for 
imitation. Wliile the narrative revealed little evidence that countries such as 
France and West Genuany felt initially concerned by the Indian test, (the French 
telegram of congratulations to India being a case in point) the American reaction 
indicated a generally-held belief that the Indian test presaged a flood of 
proliferation, a state of affairs which necessarily undermined the credibility of the 
nonproliferation regime and the NPT as well as posing obvious strategic risks to
““ George H. Quester “Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?” Foreign Affairs vol.53, no.l (1974) 
p.94.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield “Nuclear Spread and World Order,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no.4 July, 
1975, p.743
Thomas A. Halsted “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons -  is the dam about to burst?” Bulletin o f  
the Atomic Scientists vol.3I, no.5 May 1975.
Strategic Survey 1974, (London: International Institute of Security Studies; 1975), p.33. 
Newspapers, too, reflected concerns over the future of the spread o f nuclear weapons in light of 
the Indian test. The Washington Post (19 May 1974) stated that “what worries experts...is that 
India’s action could trigger similar moves by as many as half a dozen countries tliat have die 
materials, personnel, money and motives to develop and explode atomic bombs.” The New York 
Times (26 May 1974), chose to treat its readers to a list of the next likely candidates (both NPT
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the United States. The Soviet Union, while remaining relatively quiet on the 
subject, nonetheless appeared to share the concerns of the United States. While 
looking favourably on India, a former member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
recalled that the USSR was nonetheless worried, “mostly because of further 
challenges to nonproliferation.”^^’ France and West Genuany, by contrast, 
considered theii* interests more likely to be harmed by the apparent American 
detenuination to cling to a failing nuclear monopoly and freeze others out. The 
United States came to believe that the Indian test had opened a Pandora’s box 
which must be closed to prevent further escapes. In this it was supported by the 
USSR and UK, among others.
Understanding of Responsibility;
The acceptance, by the United States, of the precedent posed by the Indian
test is certainly useful in understanding the decision to internationalise the
response to the shock. It became clear that effective action could not simply be
confined to unilateral sanctions (as indeed they were not). However, an
acceptance that the shock has both damaged the credibility of, and poses a future
danger to, the regime does not explain why regime change was able to proceed.
As the previous chapter showed, the concerns over the Atoms for Peace progium
paved the way for a réintroduction of the policies of denial and control. In 1978 it
was observed that
for more than 20 years, the United States pursued [the 
nuclear market] on the theory that the combination of 
bilateral and international inspections would provide
and non-NPT) to join the nuclear weapons club, citing Brazil, Canada, Japan, Australia, West 
Germany, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and Sweden.
26 Roland Timerbaev, interview via e-mail, 17 December 1999.
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adequate protection against diversion to military purposes...
That notion has now been pretty much put to rest.^^
It was further demonstrated that the international initiatives for regime 
change began in the United States, albeit supported by the USSR, the UK, Canada 
and others. The Indian test had provoked debate within the United States 
regarding the distinction between peaceful and military atomic power which lay at 
the heart of Atoms for Peace. The result, in the form of the NSG, was a sharp 
break by the US with an American approach which had prevailed since 1954.
This movement away fi'om the Atoms for Peace programme indicates an 
acceptance of the need to lead the changes to the regime deemed necessary. It is 
just such a belief, therefore, that one would expect to see supported in the relevant 
literature.
The narrative of the years immediately following the shock -  and the type 
of changes that occurred -  certainly support such an interpretation. Without a 
sense of responsibility for effecting solutions, it is difficult to countenance action 
being taken and regime change occurring as a result. The regime change which 
occurred, in other words, did not simply happen of its own accord, but reflected a 
desire by key actors for such change and a willingness to bring it about.
This is supported by the actions, or lack thereof, on the part of states such 
as France and West Genuany. Far fi'om leading or initiating movement towards 
regime change, these two suppliers only participated -  for the most part 
reluctantly -  in the supplier talks. Just as the existence of US initiatives hints at 
an American understanding of responsibility for closing the loopholes exposed.
Victor Gilinsky, “Plutonium, Proliferation and the Price of Reprocessing,” Foreign Affairs, 
vol.57 ,110.2, Winter 1978/79, p.377.
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the unenthusiastic participation of France and West Germany hints at the 
opposite: a lack of belief in a need to take such responsibility.
The acceptance of some level of blame for the shock was acknowledged 
in Congress and in the press, eventually influencing the policy of the 
Administration. It was during this time that “the public and congressional outcry 
over the Indian test had created hresistible pressure to rewrite the i*ules governing 
nuclear exports.”^^  A significant proportion of that outcry involved breast-beating 
over the previous thirty years of American nuclear policy and its assistance to 
India and those deemed likely to follow her.
In Congress, it will be recalled, this self-chastisement began slowly with 
the first hearings in July of 1974, “grew for a thorough-going analysis of the 
proliferation implications of the ‘nuclear juggernaut, and reached its apex with
the revelations surrounding the use of American heavy water by the Indians. 
Although far fi'om conclusive, the disclosures strengthened the determination in 
the United States to galvanise the rest of the supplier nations into agreeing 
common principles for nuclear trade. It was suggested, initially somewhat 
tentatively, that “the standards that we have applied apparently are not 
adequate”^^  -  an assertion that was met with basic, if confused agreement. At the 
time of the hearing, the representative of the AEC and indeed the AEC itself, was 
unwilling to admit to an American contribution to India’s nuclear programme, 
reflecting what has been described as the “benign AEC attitude toward
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.71.
Robert L. Beckman, Congress and the Control o f  Peaceful Nuclear Activities, (Boulder and 
London: Westview Press, Inc.; 1985), p.224.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, 12 & 15 July 1974, p.24 (speaker: Senator 
Jackson).
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reprocessing’s possible contribution to weapons spread.” '^ This scepticism 
regarding American responsibility was encapsulated by the testimony of John H. 
Pender (assistant general council of the AEC) at that first hearing, when he 
declared confidently that “if Canada had earlier followed the policy we had, at 
least they would have known at a very early date what the Indians were doing 
with their own natural uranium that was coming out of the reactor.
Nonetheless, a sufficient level of unease existed to merit the additional claim by 
one Senator that “at the present time the United States does not have a coherent 
nuclear export policy -  unless it is to promote the indiscriminate sale of nuclear 
facilities abroad.”^^  The newspapers, on the other hand, were initially placated by 
the fact that “US officials expressed strong doubts...that India used fissionable 
material originating in this country to detonate its first nuclear explosion.” "^^
As early as the start of 1975, such uncertainty was giving way to 
vociferous and passionate avowals of past neglect and the deske to make amends 
by taking the initiative in the face of the apathy considered to reign in Western 
Europe. The eight hearings on the subject which took place between March of 
1975 and November 1976, heavily emphasised the growing belief that, as one 
Representative later wrote, “the Indian case illustrates the ‘wrongheadedness’ of 
American policy.” *^* The Atoms for Peace plan, in particular, was held up as the 
source of recent and future proliferation, not only by members of Congress but
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 70.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Teclmologyr, hearings of 12 & 15 July 1974, p.40 (speaker: 
John H. Pender, Assistant General Council of the Atomic Energy Commission).
Ibid., p. 1
Washington Post, 21 May 1974. (Also in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times of the 
same date).
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also, and significantly, by those testifying before them. These differed sharply in
tone fi'om the conhision and hesitancy which pervaded the discussion of
responsibility in the hearings of the previous July. Dean Adrian Fisher of
Georgetown Law School observed, in the hearings of March 1975, that “through
peacehil nuclear explosions I think we have created a Frankenstein’s monster, and
we are Frankenstein. In other words, we created this problem.
Such language was far h om exceptional during the course of the hearings.
The movement of such questions fi'om the periphery of American concern to a
place in the Congressional limelight was accompanied by extensive and
increasing hand-wringing over the role o f American nuclear policy and the
belief in the need for the United States to lead changes to the regime.Perhaps
the best description of this fi esh outlook on the problem of nuclear proliferation
was provided by Brenner, who noted that
congressional discovery that proliferation might be an 
imminent danger, and one encouraged by a less-than-vigilant 
US government, prompted activists in both houses to make a 
lunge for the tail of the horse they visualized cantering out the 
open stable door.^^
Such rhetoric was not simply confined to Congress. It was eventually 
echoed just as vigorously in major American newspapers which, even prior to the
Clarence E. Long, “Nuclear Proliferation: Can Congress Act in Time?” International Security, 
vol.l, no.4, Spring 1977, p.61.
Nonproliferation Issues, March 19, A pril6 & 28, July 18 &22, October 21 & 24, 1975;
February 23 & 24, March 15, September 22, November 8, 1976, p. 11 (speaker: Dean Adrian 
Fisher, Georgetown Law School). The head of the ACDA (Fred Iklé) later concurred, 
commenting that “our unhappy view today [is a result] our rather generous attitude toward charing 
nuclear technology that began in 1954.” (See Nonproliferation Issues, p.276). He also agreed with 
Senator Symington’s suggestion, during the same hearings, that “it is a fair possibility that the 
1954 atoms for peace plan...has turned into an atoms for war plan,” (Ibid., p.274-5).
One author tyj^ified the growing concern when he noted a growing recognition of the fact that 
“not only did the United States let the genie out of the bottle, but her salesmen have proselytized 
the genie’s magic powers as a ‘safe and cheap’ source of energy supplies.” (See Normal Gall, 
“Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for all,” Foreign Policy, no.23, Summer 1976, p. 190).
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con&mation of the use of US-supplied heavy water by the Indians, proclaimed 
both American blame and the consequent need to take responsibility for change.
In the early months of 1975, an editorial in the Washington Post observed that 
“the world’s appetite for power in the next generation may compound the problem 
[of nuclear proliferation]...to which the United States inadvertently contributed by 
carelessness in the last generation.” *^^ Such declarations peaked during the first 
half of 1976, culminating with the June reports of the heavy water to India. 
Editorials in the New York Times expressed sentiments along the lines that “the 
United States, which initiated the nuclear era and has provided dozens of nations 
with civilian technology, has the responsibility now to convince France and 
Pakistan.”'^ ' They reiterated these appeals at regular intervals, professing again 
that “the United States, which invented the bomb, has a special responsibility for 
heading off this evolution by bringing other exporting nations to agi eement.”"^  ^
Demands gi'ew in both the press and the Congress that the United States 
government should accept responsibility for the proliferation problem and take the 
lead in solving it. It was suggested, for example, that other nations “could all see 
the folly [of subsidizing nuclear proliferation] if the United States took the
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.88
The Washington Post, 1 February 1975.
See The Washington Post, 11 June 1976, in which Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff confirmed that 
there were “disturbing indications” regarding the supply o f American heavy water to the Indian 
reactor which ultimately used to produce plutonium.
The New York Times, 25 February 1976.
The New York Times, 4 May 1976. One newspaper, following the revelations about the use of 
US heavy water, printed an article headlined “How We Gave Away Nuclear Control”, in which it 
was declared that “the problem of nuclear proliferation is to a considerable extent a self-inflicted 
wound.” (See The Washington Star, 3 April 1977).
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leadership in pointing the way.”"*^ Officials in the State Department and National
Security Council (NSC) increasingly
saw the importance of readjusting the tenus of nuclear 
cooperation to reduce the risk that the United States would 
unintentionally and unnecessarily contribute to the growth 
of nuclear weapons capabilities in recipient states/'^
The momentum for change -  both to American policy and multilaterally -
thus snowballed during the two years following the test, and can also be seen to
have coincided with increasingly determined rhetoric around the perceived
limitations, or all-out failure, of Atoms for Peace and the need for American
leadership. By 1977, such rhetoric then appears to have become inextricable from
the discussion of how to “solve” the looming proliferation problem. Important
studies such as that by the Nuclear Energy Policy Group (better known as the
Ford/MITRE report) asserted that
the early introduction of plutonium recycle and plutonium 
breeders has been widely believed to be critical to the 
economic use of uranium and nuclear power. These beliefs 
have been encouraged by the emphasis on these progi ams in 
the nuclear development activities of the United States and 
other principal nuclear suppliers. If the nuclear fuel cycle is 
to be controlled internationally, other countries will have to be 
convinced that there are no significant economic penalties in 
deferring these technologies. This will be hard to do if the 
United States is proceeding with reprocessing and breeder 
commercialization.'^^
43 Long, “Nuclear Proliferation; Can Congress Act in Time?”, p.76.
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.70.
Report o f the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group. Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices p.24. 
This members of this group, among others, included Spurgeon M. Keeny (chairman of the MITRE 
Corporation and soon Deputy Director of the ACDA; Albert Carnsale, who was appointed to 
membership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearing board during the course of the study; 
Joseph S. Nye, at the time Professor of Government at Harvard University and later, under Carter, 
the Deputy Undersecretary o f State for Security Assistance. The Ford/MITRE study was a key 
document in the eyes of the Carter administration and, as Brenner observed, “there is no 
gainsaying...the marked influence exercised by the ideas and judgements contained in the report.” 
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p .118.
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In the opinion of one witness at the 1977 hearings, the acceptance of some 
level of blame for the shock and the need to make amends was crucial in 
determining the American-led international non-proliferation effort. When asked 
if the revelations about US heavy water had as significant an impact on American 
nuclear policy as the use of Canadian reactor had had in Canada, he replied: “I 
think it may be fail' to say the Indian explosion has had a similar effect. We have 
been anxious to have other nations join us in leading antiproliferation efforts.
In addition, the change in Administration from Ford to Carter cemented this 
des he for the United States to take the lead in helping to bring about changes to 
international nuclear policy. The question of nuclear proliferation had even 
become an election issue, and the result was the accession of a President who was 
already convinced of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the potential problems 
of the spread of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and who even 
advocated disarmament. In his autobiography, for example. Carter recalled that 
“despite opposition from other suppliers of advanced technology, I wanted to do 
everything possible to prevent this capability from spreading.
The increasing concern with the dangers of nonproliferation -  evident in 
the consciousness-raising within Congress between 1974 and 1976 -  occurred 
alongside the mounting unease regarding both past US policy and the future of 
proliferation in the absence of US leadership, indicating the importance that the 
understanding of responsibility played in explaining the American reaction. This 
understanding, and the consequent sense of the need and entitlement to demand
The Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act o f 1977, p.236. (speaker: Mr. Gerald F. Warburg II, 
Research Assistant, Office of Representative Bingham).
Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs o f a President, pp.215-16. In speaking of nuclear 
disarmament, Carter recalls that “in my inaugural addi ess I had pledged to work toward the 
ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the earth” (p.215).
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and achieve change, was perhaps best articulated in 1977 by the then-ex Director
of the ACDA, who maintained that
none of these foreign countries that differ with us today on 
nuclear export policies would be capable of exporting nuclear 
technology if it had not been for the United States export policy 
over the last 20 years. Making the advanced technology 
available throughout the world has in part created the problem 
we are now confronting. Thus it can be argued that we have a 
certain moral claim, a certain claim to asking for revisions of 
older agreements because it was our generosity in making 
technology available that enabled these countries to be in the 
export business at all.'^ ^
That this sentiment found support and repeated reaffirmation in the years that
followed the Indian test has been established. That such a sentiment was,
furthermore, cited as a reason for nuclear policy change is an evidence of the
significant (though it is not argued causal) role the understanding of responsibility
played in inspiring the regime development that followed.
Understanding of Immediacy:
An account of the understanding of the danger posed and the 
responsibility to be taken helps to pave the way for an understanding of the 
eventual occuiTence of regime change. It does not, however, assist in 
understanding the pace at which such change occurred -  a characteristic which 
stands out in any investigation of the consequences of the Indian test. The fact 
that the regime undei-went significant change in a bare four years following the 
Indian test hints at a further interpretation of the shock by the architect of that 
change, the United States. It implies that change to the regime was understood as 
something which could not -  and need not -  be postponed.
The Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act o f  1977, p.3 (speaker; Fred C. Iklé).
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Certainly, the account of events following the Indian test indicated that 
nuclear nonproliferation regime had returned from being a relatively low priority 
to being at the forefront of American concerns. There was a growing awareness 
of not only of the need for action, but for such action be taken as soon as possible. 
The sudden burst of activity, in contrast to the general inactivity which had 
preceded the shock, indicates that change to the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
was seen as being of immediate necessity and as taking precedence over other 
concerns.
The narrative of events did make clear that the revitalisation of 
nonproliferation concerns in the United States were not obstructed by interests 
which could have postponed change to the regime. Following the Indian test -  
and certainly in the wake of the announcement of the French and West German 
deals -  nuclear nonproliferation concerns were increasingly seen in the United 
States government as having priority over economic ones. Such an interpretation 
was assisted by several variables. Most obviously, it was possible to condemn the 
Indian test as unacceptable without harming important relations with that state. 
The United States had no interests in India which would have prevented these 
expressions of disapproval, and India’s displeasure could therefore be incurred 
with little risk. In addition, the United States was able to provoke the displeasure 
of France and West Germany without causing itself damage. Although American 
dominance of the nuclear industry had diminished, what leverage remained was 
still held by the United States. Pressure could therefore be applied with no direct 
risk to the United States, politically or economically. Finally, of course, the 
relative calm which prevailed in US-Soviet relations was clearly important.
Soviet acceptance, however tacit, of American initiatives in a multilateral context
109
was part of a broader thawing in relations between the two superpowers and 
facilitated attempts at regime change. American-Soviet relations, therefore, did 
not trump wider nuclear nonproliferation concerns and thwart the possibility of 
change. Regime change proceeded rapidly not simply because it was desired, but 
because it was possible as well. The actor responsible for leading such change 
appeared, rightly, to consider that no contradictory interests took precedence over 
the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime.
The fact that no interests were seen as mitigating against American 
leadership is necessary, but not sufficient. The speed of regime change hints at an 
acceptance, by the originators of that change, that “we are...on the fast road to 
nuclear proliferation and possible disaster. Yet, there is still time to act -  albeit 
precious little time.”'^ ^^ Nuclear nonproliferation was not simply understood as 
having importance but also as requiring immediate action.
What is still more notable is the reinforcement of such sentiments after the 
announcement of the Franco-Pakistani and West German-Brazilian nuclear deals. 
Prior to the declaration of these deals in 1975, there was only a minimal effort at 
consciousness-raising as regards the urgency of the situation. As the narrative of 
events made clear, the reaction to the Indian test could best be described as 
delayed. This was perhaps unsurprising, given the disinterest initially evidenced 
by the Administration. Initial Congiessional efforts concerned themselves simply 
with “raising a concern, making nations realize that proliferation is a priority issue 
that deserves serious measures beyond business as usual .Consequent ly,
Nuclear Proliferation: Future US Foreign Policy Implications, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Relations, House o f Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congi'ess, first 
session. May 1, 1979. p .l.
Joseph S. Nye, “Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Foreign Affairs, vol.56, no.3,
Winter 1977-78, p.621.
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Congressional expressions of concern were typified by the petition of Senator 
Symington in March 1975 to Congress, which claimed that “if there is not action, 
and soon, the problem may become irresolvable.” '^
In 1975, however, a belief in the need for immediate action increased 
abruptly, in Congress as well as in the presiding Administration. Certainly, the 
sluggishness of the Ford administration showed signs of ending with Kissinger’s 
claim, before the United Nations, that previous nuclear export policy could not 
continue. Indeed it was here that the fu'st indications of urgency made themselves 
evident. Far from confining himself merely to auguring doom with the opening of 
Pandora’s box, Kissinger asserted that an immediate response would ensure that 
the box could yet be closed. He stated that “this [nuclear proliferation] is not 
inevitable. If we act decisively now, we can still control the future.
Such expressions in the months immediately following the Indian test 
remained unusual. The apparent change in the understanding of the necessity of 
action, came in 1975 with the events which acted together as a kind of 
reinforcement of growing concerns raised by the Indian shock. These events -  the 
announcement of the France-Pakistan and West Germany-Brazil nuclear supply 
deals -  were of vital significance in underscoring the need for immediate action 
and the folly of procrastination. In the United States, and indeed in France and 
West Germany, the deals were interpreted as a symbol that the previous thirty 
years of US nuclear hegemony were rapidly coming to an end, and that other 
suppliers were both willing and capable of providing technology that the United
Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation, p.528 (speaker: Senator Symington is 
quoted from the Congressional record of 13 March 1975).
“An Age o f Interdependence”, speech by Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger to the UN General 
Assembly [Extracts], September 1974.
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States would not/^ It is thus claimed below that the intei*pretation of the 
nonproliferation question, which had initially been raised by the Indian test, 
moved toward the belief that not only must change occur, but that it must occur 
immediately, while the US still retained some leverage (notably with respect to 
enrichment services) in the international nuclear marketplace. The fact that the 
United States then moved to increase pressure for an elaboration of the regime 
consequently appears far from coincidental.
The intentions of the French and West Germans alarmed even those in 
Congress and in the Administration who had hitherto downplayed the idea that the 
Indian shock required immediate preventative action. News of the deals has been 
described as causing “consternation in the National Security Council and State 
Department.” '^' Speaking on behalf of the NRC, Commissioner Kennedy said of 
the West German-Brazilian deal that it “is a frirther indication of the need to move 
to genuine suppliers’ agreement.” *^’ Tellingly, Kissinger’s address to the UN 
General Assembly in 1975 was even more ominous about the need for action than 
it had been a year previous. He declared that “now is the time to act. If we fail to 
restrain nuclear proliferation, future generations will live on a planet shadowed by 
nuclear catastrophe.” '^’ With the French and West German nuclear supply deals, 
it became indisputably clear that the opportunity for action was diminishing. The 
Congiessional hearings of 1977 are consequently filled with such sentiments.
This conviction of the end of the American monopoly was summarised in a 1976 article by Paul 
L. Joscow, entitled “The International Nuclear Industry Today,” Foreign Affairs, vol.54, no.4, July 
1976.
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p.93,
“Nuclear Proliferation: Future US Foreign Policy Implications,” p. 160.
“Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger to the UN General Assembly”[Extract] in 
Documents on Disarmament 1975 (Washington, D C.: US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency; 1976), p.476.
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One academic witness referred, at the beginning stage of the hearing, to this shift
in outlook. He asserted that the combination of the French and West German
deals, and the decline in US nuclear leadership, had “spawned a widespread
feeling that time is running out, that unless action is taken in certain critical areas
very soon, technology will acquire its own momentum, with extensive
uncontrolled proliferation the inevitable r e s u l t . T h e  sense of urgency was
underscored by a representative from the National Resources Defense Council,
who expressed his conviction that the French and West German deals had called
attention to the need for immediate action, stating that
it is important that the United States act now. There are, 
of course, potential political costs involved in this course 
of action. They do not outweigh the longer term benefits 
of a tough US initiative on nuclear weapons proliferation... 
the United States...can no longer afford to ignore the serious 
risks for our Nation’s security and defense and security 
in the future posed by the spread of atomic bombs.
Senator Symington continued in this vein, writing in one journal that “if
we do not [find solutions], the arrival of Aimageddon is only a matter of time.”^^
In fact, accusations were made that the executive branch was moving far too
slowly on the issue of nuclear proliferation. In spite of Kissinger’s August 1976
attempt to convince France to become part of a nuclear suppliers’ agieement, a
The Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act o f 1977, p.9 (speaker: Thomas L Hughes, President of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
Ibid., p,70 (speaker: S. Jacob Scherr (Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council). Such 
opinions were echoed later in the eharings by one ex-Congressman who declared (perhaps 
hyperbolically) that “ours in an opportunity that comes to a country once in many generations...If 
we don’t act soon, that opportunity may be lost forever.” (Ibid., p. 191. Speaker: Hon. Orral 
Hansen.)
Stuart Symington (Senator) “The Washington Nuclear Mess,” International Security, vol. 1, 
no.3, Winter 1977, p.78.
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New York Times newspaper editorial maintained that “the United States has got to 
get a handle on the plutonium issue at home and abroad.” '^'
This shift, or rather progression of understanding, is reflected several 
figures in Congress who persistently pushed for change in nuclear export policy 
and for efforts to continue negotiations within the NSG. Senator Symington, one 
of the first to profess the belief that immediate action was required, was joined by 
the then-chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations Abraham 
A. Ribicoff. Ribicoff maintained that the weaknesses evident in American 
nonproliferation policy, “if left unconected, could result in the rapid spread of 
nuclear weapons material and capability around the w o r l d . H e  opined that 
“little time remains to correct the present dangerous situation”^^  and called on the 
State Department to press for the “shaping of a sane, coherent and effective world 
policy for nuclear export control on terms fair to all.”^^  Other outspoken 
advocates of both unilateral and multilateral action, such as Senator John Glenn, 
expressed the opinion that “we find the sale to Brazil going tlu'ough...the sale to 
Pakistan going through, other sales going tluough, and new technologies...we do 
not have very long to work out these arrangements.”'’''
The shock of the Indian test in 1974 undoubtedly inspired a renaissance of 
interest in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a coiTesponding belief in the 
need for immediate action to change it. A contemporary NRC Commissioner 
observed that
New York Times, 28 September 1976.
Abraham A. Ribicoff, “A Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem,” 
Foreign Affairs, vol.54, no.4, July 1976, p.767.
p.768.
63 Ibid,  p .786.
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what started as a general but vague sense of unease about 
where our nuclear export policies were leading us has built, 
over the past year, into a near-desperate flurry of activity to 
bring the threat of further proliferation under control.^^
In the case of this shock, this perception appears to have been linked to the
exporting intentions of France and West Gemiany, which served to buttress the
conclusions being drawn from the initial shock of the Indian test. While it is
futile to speculate whether the resulting changes to the regime would have
occurred without the shock, the French and West German deals were clearly
worrisome, hinting as they did that the time for action was short. These
agreements solidified the belief that, as Kissinger asserted, India had indeed
opened a Pandora’s box and, furthermore, that its occupants were rapidly
escaping and would continue to do so if debate was not promptly turned into
action.
Consequently, development of the reaction to the shock into one which 
emphasised the need for immediate action is important for a broader 
understanding of the outcome. The insistence of the United States (and its allies) 
on supplier talks and guidelines, and the ensuing expansion of the 
nonproliferation regime into the realm of nuclear trade policies, occurred with 
surprising speed. The growing conviction both that nuclear nonproliferation, and 
the viability of the regime, trumped other interests and that the time for action was 
rapidly diminishing, stands as another important element in understanding not 
simply the occurrence of the regime change but the speed at which it took place.
The NuclearAnti-Proliferation Act o f  1977, p.90.
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Understanding of Solvability:
The desire for regime change and the belief that such change was urgently 
required are still far from sufficient for an understanding of the circumstances of 
regime change. The negotiations for regime change were underscored by an 
interpretation of the shock as raising problems which, however disturbing, had 
specific and workable solutions in the context of the regime. From the 
retrospective unease in the United States regarding the Atoms for Peace plan to 
the establishment of suppliers’ meetings which began in 1975, it was clear that 
nuclear exports -  and, in particular, the conditions applied to them -  were viewed 
as the key to unlocking the proliferation problems which the Indian test had 
apparently foreshadowed. Indeed, the narrative of events gave no evidence of any 
different proposal being seriously considered. The standards applied to nuclear 
technology and equipment for peaceful purposes had, it has been shown, been 
highlighted by the Indians’ use of the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor. As a 
consequence, universal nuclear export standards appeared as the way in which 
similar occurrences could be prevented in the future: the issues raised by the 
shock, it will be argued, were understood as having solutions.
This interpretation is of considerable importance in understanding both the 
way in which -  and the speed at which -  the shock of the Indian test eventually 
gave way to regime change. As has already been established, the shock of the 
Indian test gave rise to an increasing conviction, particularly in the United States, 
in the need for action to be taken in the context of the regime. Such an 
interpretation presages a belief that a con ect response existed and would be 
successful.
65 Victor Gilinsky, “Plutonium, Proliferation and Policy,” Technology Review), vol.79, no.4.
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In the United States, the existence of such an understanding is apparent 
shortly (although not immediately) after the Indian test. The fii'st heal ings, for 
example, tended to express a general desire for what one Senator deemed, “a 
thorough review of the [export] standards.” '^’ It was becoming accepted that 
“only cooperation among the nuclear exporters of the industrial world can help to 
slow the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to many most nations.”'’^  
However, the precise nature and extent of such a review (whether purely domestic 
or even international) remained vague, and took a back seat to the broader 
expressions of concern about the precedent set by India and the general angst over 
past American export policies. It was not long, however, before a belief appeared 
to be growing that “maintaining and refurbishing the international regime would 
require a general approach around which a broad group of nations could rally.”^^  
While the Congressional ft'etting which immediately followed the Indian 
test focused mostly on the danger to the credibility of the regime and the United 
States’s leadership responsibility, the Ford Administration -  after a five month 
delay -  began to display its conviction that it had alighted upon solutions. At the 
bequest of Kissinger, the US ACDA and State Department had begun to 
formulate plans for a multilateral agreement on export controls. The creation of 
this approach to the problems of export controls was hardly surprising. The 
American near-monopoly in the supply of enriched uranium to European reactors 
provided the kind of leverage which would render such a solution workable. In 
the recollection of one delegate, between October and December 1974, the US
February 1977, p.60.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.24 (speaker: Senator Henry M. Jackson).
Steven J. Baker, “Monopoly or Cartel,” Foreign Policy, no.23, Summer 1976, p.204.
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and Soviet Union began “confidential consultations concerning possible steps to 
be taken by nuclear suppliers to tighten sensitive export c o n t r o l s . A  similar 
discussion between the UK and USSR on the need for a suppliers’ agreement 
came several months later, demonstrating that the American conviction that the 
solutions lay in a multilateral export agreement was also shared by these two 
states.
The problems which the American Congress had identified as a 
consequence of the Indian test were understood, by the nuclear weapons states of 
the NPT, to have a specific solution: the establishment of guidelines of nuclear 
supply. There existed a belief -  even before anything had been done -  that 
something could be done. The idea that this something was a multilateral 
overhaul of nuclear supply standards is evident in more than simply the actions of 
the actors involved. In a UN address prior to the US-USSR meeting, Kissinger 
declared, for example, his determination that it was current nuclear supply policy 
which “cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives.” '^' He 
continued to express such a conviction a year later, asserting that “it is crucial that 
suppliers and user nations agree on firm and clear export conditions...the priority 
now is to strengthen the safeguards on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful 
purposes.” '^ An article in Foreign Affairs supported this, suggesting that “the
Nye, “Sustaining Non-proliferation in the 1980’s,” p.lO l.
Timerbaev, The Nuclear Suppliers Group, p.24.
“An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community?” Address by Henry Kissinger 
before the 29"’ UN General Assembly, September 23'", 1974, reprinted in Peaceful Nuclear 
Exports, p.815.
Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger, Address to the Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs, 
Milwaukee, Wis., July 14, 1975, quoted in Michael J. 'QvQimQï, Nuclear Power and Non- 
Proliferation, p.94.
118
aftermath of the Indian detonation is thus clearly a good time for a meeting of 
minds among all potential suppliers.”^^
The need tor such an agreement was, not surprisingly, underscored by the 
1975 nuclear supply deals between France/Pakistan and West Germany/Brazil. 
Such an event confirmed the fact that a unilateral overhaul of supply standards 
would be ineffective. The West German deal, as one American Senator worriedly 
noted, marked “the first time that any nation capable of supplying nuclear 
materials has agreed to provide another nation with a complete ftiel cycle.”^^  The 
initial identification of the need for a multilateral suppliers’ agreement was thus 
borne of the inescapable fact that other suppliers were greatly increasing their 
share of the market. Indeed, it was even argued within the US that unilateral 
action would be not merely ineffective but self-defeating. The Deputy Secretary 
of the Department of the Defense, for example, claimed that “if we pull back, then 
we leave a vacuum for other countries to move in, in a commercial nature, and the 
risks that are associated with this could be high.” '^'
The existence of such a belief in the United States is substantiated by the 
continued Congressional and State Department support for, and determination to 
achieve, the aims and goal of the supplier meetings in London, despite the 
vociferous resistance to them by France and West Germany. The possibility of 
another strategy by which to prevent proliferation remained unexplored. Rather, 
it was consistently vowed that “there has to be an understanding between us and
Quester, “Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?”, p.94.
Ribicoff, “A Market Sharing Approach to tlie World Nuclear Sales Problem,” p.763.
Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, July 12 & 15, 1974, p.85 (speaker: Dr. James P. 
Wade, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense).
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the other suppliers of nuclear techno l o g y .T e s t i mo n y  on behalf of the
Department of State similarly affirmed the belief that
the goal of non-proliferation can be more effectively 
realized if suppliers adopt certain restraints...undertaking 
to supply nuclear materials and equipment only under 
safeguards.^'’
The determination that this was the solution was shared by both Presidents Ford 
and Carter. Ford, in his 1976 nuclear policy statement, continued to proclaim that 
“action to control proliferation must be an international cooperative effort...[and 
that]...Common standards must be developed and accepted by all parties.”^^  
Carter, meanwhile, stated his desire that the more reticent nuclear suppliers “join 
us...in trying to have some worldwide understanding of the extreme threat of the 
further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.” '^'
It is clear then, that a formal agreement between nuclear suppliers was 
considered by the United States as being the answer to the problems that had been 
raised. This conviction showed no evidence of wavering, even in the face of 
strident French and West German objections. In addition, the American belief in 
the need for a suppliers’ agreement was apparently held by the other two NWS: 
the USSR and the UK. As was detailed previously, other participants in the
Office o f  Technology and Assessment Report on Nuclear Proliferation Safeguards, hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Sei'vices of the Committee 
on Governmental Aflhirs, United States Senate, ninety-fifth Congress, first session, 4 April 1977, 
p.22 (speaker: Senator John Glenn).
Nonproliferation Issues, p. 167 (speaker; Myi'on B. Kiatzer, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau 
o f Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State).
Nuclear Policy Statement by President Gerald R. Ford, 28 October 1976, in Public Papers o f  
the Presidents o f  the United States: Gerald R. Ford, p.2764.
Remarks by President Jimmy Carter on nuclear power, April 7, 1977 reprinted in Brenner, 
Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, Appendix E, p.283. As noted earlier. Carter had based 
much of his Administration’s nuclear policy on the findings of the Ford/MITRE study which, not 
surprisingly, had likewise concluded tliat “US nuclear power policies and programs can be shaped 
to support such a strategy, but they can be only partially effective unless they are meshed with
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suppliers meeting became willing to go along with the idea of a formal suppliers 
agreement, although one which was less extensive than the Americans had 
initially envisioned. Nonetheless, the belief existed -  on the part of the initiator of 
such change -  that the problems raised had specific solutions which were, in turn, 
supported by the USSR, UK and others, and eventually accepted by France and 
West Germany. This then further assists in an understanding of why the shock of 
the Indian test was followed by rapid regime change: the belief that such change 
was possible.
Conclusions:
The previous chapter’s narrative of events, it will be remembered, was 
helpful in providing insight into the relationship between regime change and 
regime theory. Such a narrative also hinted at ways by which the occurrence of 
such change following the shock may be understood. These hints now appear to 
be borne out by an examination of how the shock was apparently understood, 
particularly within the United States. Specifically, four interpretations of the 
Indian test paved the way both for regime change to occur and to occur at the pace 
that it did. These variables -  the understandings of danger, responsibility, 
immediacy and solvability -  were implied in the narrative of the changes to the 
regime which occurred between 1974 and 1978 and were supported by the 
language of those who instigated such change.
There is evidence that the Indian test was viewed as having set a 
dangerous precedent which, if imitated, would necessarily destabilise the 
nonproliferation regime. Such an interpretation was suggested by the previous
political actions and with broader arrangements.” (See Nuclear Pow>er: Issues and Choices,
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narrative which, in demonstrating that such change was not simply unilateral but 
occurred in the context of the regime, hinted at a perceived need not merely to 
penalize India but to dissuade others. Furthermore, the persistence of American 
leadership in the post-1974 nonproliferation efforts implied an acceptance of 
responsibility for doing so -  an indication which was again borne out by the 
fi equent expressions of a willingness to lead the necessary changes to the regime. 
The speed at which the regime change occun ed also suggested a belief that such 
change was both of immediate concern and required immediate action. This 
‘understanding of immediacy’ was supported by the evidence that no other 
interests were seen to take precedence over nuclear nonproliferation and the 
apparent belief that action was requii ed before time “ran out.” Finally, the 
occurrence and speed of regime change also hinted at a conviction that solutions 
to the problems raised had been or could be found. Wliile these interpretations of 
the Indian test are not final word on the matter, they do assist an understanding of 
why the shock of 1974 was followed by what was previously demonstrated to 
have been the successful negotiations for rapid regime change. Whether the 
variables suggested by the narrative of the Indian test are of use in understanding 
the outcome in other cases, however, remains to be seen.
p.297).
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Chapter 4: The 1981 Bombing of Osiraq -  A Case of Regime 
Change?
In spite of the significant changes to the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
following the Indian nuclear test of 1974, it was a mere seven years after this shock to 
the regime that the next occurred. This time, however, the locus of the event in 
question was not South Asia, but the Middle East. Moreover, the shock in question 
was as interpreted less an act of proliferation than an act of counterproliferation 
against suspected proliferation.
This event was the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi reactor on the seventh of June, 
1981. The surprise attack on the Osiraq research reactor stood as the first successful 
attempt at this kind of counteiproliferation. ' Not surprisingly, it was credited with 
having “shattered the world’s atomic agenda.”  ^ After the changes to the regime 
which had characterised the second half of the 1970’s, the raid on Osiiaq challenged 
not only the goals of the nonproliferation regime, but the very purpose of the regime 
itself. In the words of one American Senator, “no event since India’s explosion of a 
nuclear device in 1974 has underscored so dramatically the dangers of nuclear 
proliferation.”^
Superficially, such an assessment appears to be tme. The act itself, and the 
immediate international reaction to it, indicated that the shock did indeed challenge 
the expectations regarding nuclear proliferation and the course of the nonproliferation 
regime. It did so by offering up unilateral counterproliferation as a better way than a
‘ There had been, in September 1980, an unsuccessful attempt by Iran to destr oy the same reactor.
“ Bennett Ramberg, “Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: Implications of Israel’s Strike on Osiraq,” Political 
Science Quarterly, vol.97, no.4 ,Winter 1982-83, p.653.
 ^ The Israeli A ir Strike, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
Ninety-seventh Congress, first session on The Israeli Air Strike and Related Issues, June 18, 19, and 
25, 1981, p.l 1 (speaker: Senator John Glenn).
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regime by which to ensure nonproliferation. The purpose of the following discussion 
is to narrate the years immediately before and immediately following the shock. Such 
an analysis will then allow conclusions to be drawn regarding relationship between 
this shock and the understanding of regime change in the context of regime theory. 
This case will show that, in contrast to the Indian test, shocks do not necessarily result 
in regime change.
As before, the investigation of the Osiraq shock in this context will contain a 
brief summary of the years immediately before the event, and a précis of the event 
itself. The discussion of the outcome of the shock will examine the initial reaction to 
the shock and then the years following this reaction to assess the change to the regime 
that did, or indeed did not, occur.
Regime and Nuclear Context Prior to the Shock:
The years which preceded the Israeli bombing of Osiraq did not see a 
continuation of the trends -  either globally or in the context of the regime -  which had 
surfaced during the few years following the Indian test. The 1970’s, for example, had 
been characterised by a relative thaw in Cold War relations and a reprioritisation of 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime near the forefi'ont of American concerns.
However, shortly after the publication of the NSG in 1978 things began to go 
wrong. Globally, the détente in American-Soviet relations faded following the 
election of Ronald Reagan to the American Presidency in 1980. Following the 
American humiliation over the 1979 siege of the US embassy in Iran, the election 
campaign of 1980 saw the hawkish Reagan Republicans winning by a landslide. This 
Administration then took office with what has been described as “a distinctly
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jaundiced view of Soviet behaviour and intentions.”"^ The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan did little to endear the USSR to an President who famously viewed it as 
an “evil empire.” Immediately prior to the Israeli attack on Osiraq, then, the niceties 
of a nucleai* nonproliferation regime took a back seat to the renewed tensions between 
-  and a build-up of nuclear capabilities within -  the United States and USSR. The 
year of the election was fairly described in an annual survey as having “represented 
the lowest point in Soviet-American relations in over a decade.”^
Renewed superpower hostilities did not bode well for the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. The American enthusiasm which had been instrumental in 
leading the changes of the 1970’s was replaced by a comparative disregard of the 
regime and its goals. Indeed, and in contrast to the centrality of nonproliferation 
issues in the 1976 election campaigns, the Reagan Administration had no official 
nonproliferation policy for the first eight months of its term. When it was eventually 
articulated (shortly after the Osftaq bombing), the President’s statement on the subject 
declaied that while nonproliferation efforts were vital, “we must reestablish this 
Nation as a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under 
adequate safeguards.”  ^ The Administration also declared nuclear testing 
indispensable, thus undermining hopes of a CTBT. The trends in policy against 
nuclear proliferation -  specifically against reprocessing and enrichment technology -  
which had prevailed under both the Ford and Carter administrations, were clearly at
Strategic Survey 1981-1982, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1982), p.29.
 ^ Ibid., p.29.
“Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” July 16"', 1981 in Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States -  Ronald Reagan, 1981; Januaiy 20' '^ to December 3P' 1981 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; 1982), p.630.
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an end. This occurred despite ominous warnings in a contemporary survey that “in 
1980 the prospects for nuclear proliferation worsened.”^
It is unfah, however, to lay the blame for such a change exclusively at the feet 
of the new Administration. The optimism with which INFCE had been established, 
tor example, had resulted in little real progress. Instead, it was observed, “the mood 
at the conference was rather sober and sceptical.”  ^ The conception of the NSG as a 
cartel of First World nations seeking to deny Third World advancement had “attracted 
sharp criticism ftom many developing countries,”"^ and this had not been assuaged by 
the time of the 1980 NPT Review Conference. Moreover, disputes between NWS and 
NNWS over the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty peiwaded the 
gathering. The failure of the Conference to agree upon a final document came about, 
it is generally agreed, “partly as a result of assertions that the superpowers had 
abandoned any serious commitment to restraints on their own actions as implied in 
Article VI.” The absence of such a document was indicative of the state of the 
disillusionment with the regime generally. It was observed at the time that 
“diplomatically, then, the Second NPT Review Conference failed in a way that may 
damage the credibility of the Treaty.” ' '
’ Strategic Survey 1980-1981 (London; The International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1981), p. 111.
* Theodor Winkler, “Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980’s,” in Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's: 
Perspectives and Proposals, William H. Kincade (ed.), (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan 
Press, Ltd.; 1982), p. 152.
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 101.
Anthony G. McGrew “Introduction: Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads?” in Simpson and 
McGrew (eds.) The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System, p.5. Article VI, o f course, obliges 
each of the Parties to the Treaty to undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faitli on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear amis race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...” 
David Fischer also noted that “the non-nuclear-weapon States pressed for the prompt negotiation of a 
comprehensive test ban treaty; the USA and the United Kingdom resisted, and the opposition of two 
out of three nuclear weapon States then party to the NPT amounted, in effect, to a veto.” (History o f  
the IAEA, p. 101). As a consequence of this impasse, he notes, the conference ended without a final 
declaration.
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Much as in the years immediately before the Indian test, the nonproliferation 
regime immediately pre-Osii*aq was donnant. Nuclear nonproliferation and 
international regimes had once again receded fi'om the centre of international concern. 
The United States retreated from the proactive role that it had adopted in the latter 
half of the 1970’s. However, while each shock was preceded by dormancy in the 
regime, this donnancy was far fi*om identical As was discussed previously, the 
inertia of the years previous to the Indian test was accompanied by a sense of 
complacency over the fact that the regime had been created and would be successflil. 
The sentiments regarding the regime in the years prior to the Osiraq bombing, 
however, did not reflect any sense of satisfaction. Rather, the relegation o f nuclear 
nonproliferation concerns was a consequence of changed international cii'cumstances 
which focused US and Soviet attention on other matters.
The Shock:
Iraq’s nuclear programme had formally begun in 1959 with the establishment 
of the Iraqi Nuclear Energy Committee. It joined the IAEA in the same year and, a 
decade later joined and ratified the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. At the time of 
its entry into the NPT, Iraq’s nuclear programme comprised a research reactor from 
the USSR, which had begun construction in 1963 at Tuwaitha. This partnership, 
however, was destined to be neither long nor harmonious and ended following the 
Soviet completion of a thermal power reactor in 1968. Shortly thereafter, Iraq turned 
to France for assistance and, in 1974, the two states entered into an agreement which
Strategic Survey 1980-1981, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1981), p .ll4 .
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saw France undertake to build two research reactors (Osiraq -  or Osirak -  and Isis, 
later renamed Tammuz I and II respectively).'^
The Osiraq reactor, however, was not fated to operate. Instead, on June 7"\ 
1981, before radioactive material had been introduced into the reactor, it was attacked 
and destroyed by Israeli jets.'^ Co denamed Operation Babylon by the Israelis, the 
raid involved fourteen planes in all: eight American-supplied F-16’s and six 
American-supplied F-15’s (a fact which was later to cost Israel a delay in future F-16 
shipments from the United States). Nonetheless, the attack was entirely successful. It 
was later reported that the bombing was so accurate that “none of the buildings 
around the reactor had even been damaged.” '"' The same could not be said of all the 
human beings in the area. One French technician on the ground died in the raid. The 
Israeli Air Force planes returned safely to their base at Etzion having utterly destroyed 
the near-completed reactor as Israel prepared to face the international reaction.
Initial International Reactions:
The Israeli PR effort began in earnest as soon as the Israeli Air Force anived 
back at their base. The day after the attack, a letter was given to the President of the 
UN Security Council outlining Israel’s reasons for carrying out the attack, the grounds
For a good overview of the Iraqi programme from its inception to 1984, see Leonard S. Spector, 
Nuclear Proliferation Today, p p .l65-191.
' ^  This was not the first ti'ouble which the reactor had encountered. The programme of which it was a 
part had been the target of two acts of sabotage. Firstly, in April, of 1979 saboteurs destroyed the 
reactor when it was in La Seyne Sur Mer (near Toulon), awaiting shipment. Then, in July of 1980, the 
head o f the Iraqi atomic energy agency, Yahia el Mesnad, was murdered. Finally, in September of 
1980, a (suspected) franian raid on the reactor caused minor damage. (See Jed C. Synder “The Road to 
Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb,” The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1983, pp.579-581. Also 
see Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph Two Minutes Over Baghdad, (London:
Corgi Books; 1982) and Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA p. 104. Fischer notes that “it was widely believed 
that Israeli agents were responsible for blowing up the core of the reactor while it was still in Toulon, 
awaiting shipment to Iraq, and might have been responsible for the death in Paris of one of the 
engineers in charge of the project.”)
The Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1981.
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being that Iraq was using its non-nuclear membership of the NPT as a cover for a
weapons programme. This charge was reiterated later in the year in an Israeli
Govermnent publication which expanded further on the reasons behind the attack.'^
Predictably, the Ai*ab nations -  Iraq in particular -  were incensed by the attack
and its outcome. Iraq, obviously, had lost its research reactor. However, the anger
evident in the reaction of the other Arab states was motivated less by any deep-seated
affection for Iraq than by embarrassment at the ease of the Israeli success. Saudi
Arabia and Jordan (through whose air space the Israeli pilots had flown) had lost
considerable face. Egypt, for its part, was annoyed that the raid had been carried out
only days after a meeting between President Sadat and Prime Minister B e g i n . A n
emergency meeting of the Arab League Council on June 11"^  in Baghdad thus
concluded with a resolution calling upon the UN to impose sanctions on Israel.
Ultimately, the Aiab states’ reaction is of little importance in understanding
the eventual outcome of the shock in the context of the nonproliferation regime. As in
the case of the Indian test, an examination of the event in the context of the regime
requires examination of the reactions of those in the regime most challenged by the
shock. This includes the major actors in the regime (the United States and USSR) and
the relevant suppliers (in this case, France). In addition, Israel had justified its attack
as necessary in the face of inadequate safeguards, making reference to its
unwillingness to entrust its
fundamental security to an inspection procedure which in 
contractually limited, is not unconditional and binding, and
The Iraqi Nuclear Threat: Why Israel Had to Act, (Jemsalem: Government of Israel; 1981). The 
report discussed the Iraqi attitude towards Israel, the nuclear threat it posed and the inadequacy o f the 
safeguards as they had been applied to the reactor. It also discussed the legality of the attack and the 
possibility o f a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East,
It should be remembered, however, tliat enemies of Iraq such as Egypt and Syria, despite their 
official protestations, were likely to have been secretly pleased that Iraq’s nuclear capability -  such as 
it was -  had been destroyed.
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is substantially dependent in both character and duration
on the discretion of the country posing that threat.'^
The bombing of Osiraq, therefore, raised questions regarding the effectiveness of the 
IAEA and the reactions of that body -  specifically, the bureaucracy of that body -  
also requhe investigation.
The Soviet Union
As the reaction to the Indian test indicated, the question of horizontal nuclear 
nonproliferation was one of the few areas in which the USSR and US were in general 
agreement. Neither superpower had any special desire to see nuclear weapons spread, 
particularly to unstable regions such as the Middle East in which both states had 
interests.'^ Consequently, the destruction of the Iraqi reactor was unlikely to have 
met with genuine regret. As a Congressional Research Paper noted shortly after the 
raid, any nuclear proliferation in the Middle East carried with it Cold War overtones, 
and “a nuclear armed Iraq acting irresponsibly might...have been perceived as a 
Soviet client.” '''
This did not mean that the USSR approved of Israel’s action, either officially 
or unofficially. Ustinov declared to his cabinet that “the Israelis completely 
abandoned all restraint -  they’re already falling on our allies. It time to teach them a
The Iraqi Nuclear Threat — Why Israel Had to Act, p.2.
It was reported, for example, that Klirushchev had said of Iraq’s request for nuclear assistance:
“First the Chinese, and now the Arabs are asking for the bomb. And it’s going to be a headache for us 
in the end. Co-operate [with them] but do not give them bombs.” (See Ojier rpHHeBCi<mH,rt/;/a?v/;/>/ 
ôoMÔa u ôjiujicuuù eocmoK (Oleg Gnnevsky, “The Atomic Bomb and the Middle East”), at 
www.world.ng.ru/aziniuth/2001-03-0I/6_bomb.html. The Russian text states: “Kor^a AOKJiazibiBajiH 
XpymeBv t o t  xMWKHyji h  CKa'iaji: Cnauana icHxaHUbi, a xenepb b o x  h  apaôw ôoMÔy npocax. A rojiOBa 
B K oneuH OM  cuexe y nac Oojiexb 6yaex. CoxpyAHHuaxb -  coxpyAHHuanxe, h o  6 o m 6 w  ne n a B a x b !”
Warren Donnelly “The Israeli Raid Into Iraq,” (a brief report made by the Congressional Research 
Service o f the Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division) reprinted in “The 
Israeli Air Stixke”, p.72.
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lesson, or else Syria will be next.” '^' Nor were the Soviets slow to recognise a 
potential propaganda coup when one was presented. Israel’s raid provided a 
convenient and easy means by which to attack the United States. Official 
condemnation of Israel thus became more of a means by which to segue into a 
diatribe against American expansionism. The first Tass report on the incident, for 
example, “actually devoted more space to allegations of US complicity than to 
denunciation of the Israeli raid.” '^ A statement by a group of socialist states before 
the UN Disarmament Committee refeiTed to “Israel’s criminal attack,”^^  and also 
declared that “it is necessary to take all appropriate measures to ensure that similar 
acts will not be repeated in the future.”^^
France
As the supplier of both the reactor and the fuel to be used, France found itself 
entangled in the Israeli raid on Osiraq. Israel’s assertion that the reactor and its fuel 
were amenable to nuclear weapons production put the stringency of France’s nuclear 
export standards under the international spotlight for the second time. Having been 
chastised following the Indian test for its nuclear dealings, the French government 
was less than pleased to have its export criteria examined once again, particularly 
when Israel’s actions had cost the life of a French worker.
Oleg Grinevsky, “The Atomic Bomb and the Middle East,” (Tlie Russian text cites Ustinov as 
stating; “Cobccm pacnojicajiHCt 3th  HapaiuibTaHe -  y>KC na namnx cok)3hhkob nanajtaiOT. Hopa hm 
yicopoT jtasaxb, a xo cne^yioineH ôy^ex CnpHîi.”)
Warren Donnelly, “The Israeli Raid into Iraq,” p.72.
“Statement on Behalf o f a Group of Socialist States by the GDR Representative (Herder) to the 
Committee on Disannanient: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility [Extract], June 18, 1981,” in 
Documents on Disarmament 1981 (Washington, D C.: US Amis Conti'ol and Disarmament Agency; 
1982), p.227.
Ibid., p.227.
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However, the French reaction to the shock “fluctuated between loud 
indignation and a more moderate tone which included declarations of friendship 
towards Israel.” "^' Despite this, France continued to insist that its nuclear export 
standards were in no way lacking. A French source was quoted in one journal as 
declaring that, contrary to the Israeli allegations, “this reactor is extremely poorly 
adapted to the regular production of plutonium.
The French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, immediately summoned the 
Israeli Ambassador in Paris and “protested angidly at the raid.” '^’ The Prime Minister, 
Pierre Mauroy, declared that the raid was “an unacceptable and very serious event 
which the French government condemns.”^^  M. Maui'oy also pointed out, in the face 
of Israeli criticism of French export standards, that the reactor was under IAEA 
safeguards.^^ In spite of the generally pro-Israeli sentiments of the new French 
President François Mitterrand, the French government nonetheless asked the UN 
Security Council to condemn Israel for its a c t i on . Th e  determination by France, -  
that “it would not push protests to the point of straining relations [between itself and 
Israel]” '^' -  did not, however, change the fact that the attack on the reactor once again 
focused unwelcome attention on French nuclear trade standards.
Shlomo Nakdimon, First Strike, (New York: Summit Books; 1987), p.293.
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.23, 11 June 1981, p.2. The Israelis did themselves no favours when, 
hours after the attack, Prime Minister Begin asserted that there was a secret bomb factory which he 
identified as being first 130, then 13 metres beneath the reactor. This assertion was roundly 
discredited. (See Eliot Marshall “Fallout ft om the Raid on Iraq,” Science, vol.213, 3 July 1981, p. 120.)
The Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1981.
Le Monde, 9 June 1981 (M. Mauroy stated that the raid was “une act inacceptable et ties grave que le 
gouvernement français condamne.”)
Ibid., (M. Mauroy said: “je voudrais insister sur le fait qu-il s’agit d’un centre de recherches soumis 
au contrôle de a ’Agences international pour l ’énergie atomique.”)
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.24, 18 June 1981, p.3.
The Washington Post, 11 June 1981, p. A29.
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The United States
It was observed, some years after the Osiraq shock, that “the US seems to have 
been genuinely surprised by the raid, and not only by its timing.” '^ This, combined 
with Soviet accusations of American complicity in the raid may partly explain the 
vehemence of the American reaction. Given that the Reagan Administration was 
“widely considered to by the most pro-Israeli since 1948,”^^  the initial reaction by the 
United States government to news of the Israeli action was one of disappointment and 
fi'ustration.
The attack on Osiraq had thrown American peace initiatives in the Middle 
East into disarray. Consequently, the official State Department reaction to the raid 
consisted of a declaration that the American government “condemns the reported 
Israeli aft strike...the unprecedented nature of which cannot but seriously add to the 
already tense situation in the area.”^^  On the tenth of June, the decision was made to 
suspend a shipment of F-16 jets ft om the US to Israel. The previous use of US- 
supplied aircraft by Israel in the attack raised questions about Israel’s adherence to a 
1952 commitment to use such equipment for defensive purposes only. A letter from 
the Secretary of State to the American Congress on the same date stated, “on behalf of 
the President, that a substantial violation of the 1952 Agreement may have 
occurred.” "^'
The initial reaction by the Administration, then, was more vigorous than 
perhaps may have been expected. This did not mean that the Reagan Administration
Paul F. Power, “The Baghdad raid: retrospect and prospect,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 8, no.3, 
July 1986, p.854.
The O bsen’er, 12 June 1981.
“Statement by the Department of State: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” June 8"*, 1981, 
Department of State Bulletin, August 1981 (reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1981, p .212).
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was abandoning what it saw as its commitments to Israel, However, in light of the 
Middle East peace initiatives, there was a need to convince the Ai*ab states that the US 
“did not accept indulgently everything that Israel undertook.”^^  This did not, 
however, portend a realignment of American policy in this area. Writing in his diary 
immediately after the attack, President Reagan noted that “we are not turning on 
Israel. That would be an invitation for the Arabs to attack.”^^  While the 
Administration felt entitled to express its fi'ustration with -  in the words of the Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs -  “the damage which has been done to the search for 
peace in the Middle East”^^ , this was tempered by an underlying support for the state 
of Israel, if not its actions. The suspension of the delivery of aircraft lasted until 
August -  a bare two months.^^
As in the case of the Indian shock, the disinterest of the presiding 
Administration in the implications of the shock for the nonproliferation regime was 
countered by a flurry of activity in Congress. Following the Osiraq bombing, a series 
of hearings on the subject were once again held. However, instead of focusing 
exclusively -  like the Administration and State Department -  on the meaning of the 
raid in terms of the Middle East peace process, these hearings emphasized the
“Letter from Secretary of State Haig to tiie Congress: Israeli Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” 
June lO"', 1981, reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1981, p.215.
Amos Perlmutter “The Israeli Raid on Iraq; A New Proliferation Landscape,” Strategic Review, 
Winter 1982, p.41.
Ronald Keagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life, (London: Hutchison; 1990), p.413.
“Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities” Hearings before the Subcommittees on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy 
and Trade of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, 
first session, June 17 and 25, 1981, p.5 (speaker: Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, .Ir., Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs, Department of State).
The suspension is unlikely to have lasted even that long had Israel not used American-built planes to 
attack the PLO in Beirut, killing 300 civilians and again raising the question of a violation of the 1952 
agreement and prompting the suspension to be extended.
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challenges the event raised for the nonproliferation regime itself, specifically the 
effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.
Israel had partially justified its attack on the reactor on the grounds that IAEA 
safeguards were ineffective at preventing or discovering attempts by Iraq to divert 
fuel for weapons. These accusations were not lost on Congress, and the IAEA was 
subjected to prolonged and vehement criticism. Hearings in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives evidenced an increasing unease not only with the prospects 
for peace in the Middle East, but with the ability of IAEA safeguards to detect any 
attempted diversion of foel by Iraq or any other state with nuclear weapons 
ambitions.^''
This dim view of the abilities of the IAEA was clear from the outset of the 
hearings. It was asserted, for example, that “there is presently no basis for public 
confidence in IAEA safeguards.”""' However, the event which did most to cement 
Congressional concerns over IAEA effectiveness came courtesy of the testimony of a 
former IAEA inspector before both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In 
the course of this testimony, the inspector in question, Roger Richter, stated not only 
that Iraq aspired to building nuclear weapons, but that the safeguards designed to 
prevent such an eventuality were utterly inadequate. Speaking of the Osftaq reactor in 
particular, Richter maintained that “the IAEA is incapable of safeguarding a facility 
of this type under the present safeguards system.”"" This had the predictable effect of 
galvanizing the members into calling for the Administration to effect a strengthening
See The Israeli Air Strike, (Senate hearings, June 18, 19, and 25, 1981) and Israeli Attack on Iraqi 
Nuclear Facilities (House of Representative hearings, June 17 and 25, 1981).
The Israeli A ir Strike, p.21 (speaker: Senator Cranston). Tliis assertion met with the agreement of 
Senator Boschwitz, who stated that “the nuclear safeguards, as Senator Cranston and others have 
pointed out, are apparently inadequate in the minds of many, including the Israelis.” (Ibid., p.24.)
Ibid., p. 129.
135
of the regime by reforming IAEA safeguards or even reconvening the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group."'  ^ This proposal was destined to be rejected a month after the attack. 
It was reported at the end of July that “Reagan will not seek to reconvene the so- 
called ‘London Suppliers Club’...or form a new group of nuclear suppliers to 
negotiate stronger nonproliferation policies.”"'^  In keeping with the recently 
articulated official policy to “reestablish this Nation as a predictable and reliable 
partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation,”"'"' such opposition was perhaps 
unsurprising.
Such a refusal stood as one of many initial indications that the views of the 
Administration and State Department were different to those which held sway in 
Congress. While the primary reaction of the Administration appears to have been a 
concern with the implications of the raid on the prospects for the Middle East peace 
process, Congressional hearings focused heavily on the inadequacy of IAEA 
safeguards as attested to by witnesses such as Roger Richter. The Administration, on 
the other hand, dismissed Richter’s claims entftely, stating that “Mr. Richter presents 
no specific facts to support his claim” and that “ftom our perspective, Mr. Richter’s 
testimony sheds no additional specific light on this question [of Iraqi intentions].”"'^
The differing initial reaction to a shock within the American government was 
not without precedent. It will be remembered that Congressional concerns following
Senator John Glenn, the participant who was perhaps tlie most vocal in calling for the 
nonproliferation regime to be strengthened in the wake of the Israeli attack, declared his intention to 
send a letter to the President requesting that the NSG be reconvened (see The Israeli A ir Strike, p. 177).
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.30, 30 July 1981, p.3.
“Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, July 16, 1981,” in Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Jan.2(1'' to Dec. 3 f  I98I,  p.630. The Wall Street Journal, in writing 
o f Reagan’s statement, described it as one which “attempts to reconcile his goals of opposing the 
spread of nuclear weapons and promoting the use of nuclear power” ( 17 July 1981).
“Administi ation Comments on the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the 
Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” June 25"’, 1981. Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1981, p.245.
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the Indian test in 1974 had likewise differed sharply from the disinterest of an 
administration which did not initially view the event as significant. Following the 
Osiraq bombing, this divergence manifested not, this time, over whether the shock 
had significance, but in what way.
In light of the Israeli accusations of IAEA incompetence, the Dftector-General 
and the Board of Governors not surprisingly “interpreted the attack as an assault on 
IAEA safeguards.”"*^ It was, after all, the competence of that organization which was 
explicitly challenged by the bombing of the Iraqi reactor. This conviction -  that the 
IAEA had been attacked along with Osiraq -  was first expressed by IAEA Director- 
General Sigvard Eklund in an address to the Board of Governors two days after the 
attack, on the ninth of June."*^  Shortly thereafter, the Board of Governors passed a 
resolution which reasserted confidence in the IAEA safeguards system. Nonetheless, 
Dr. Eklund felt it necessary to restate the Agency’s perception of having been 
undermined when he claimed, in an address to the UN Security Council, that “ft om a 
point of principle, one can only conclude that it is the Agency’s safeguards system 
which has also been attacked.”"*^
Such expressions of anger and concern within the IAEA evidenced its own 
feelings of having been threatened by Israel’s actions. Predictably, such sentiments
Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p. 104. The Board of Governors holds the executive power o f the 
IAEA, and has the authority to carry out the functions of the Agency. This means that the Board 
exercises “exclusive power in most safeguards matters:...[it may] draw up and approve safeguards 
systems, appoint inspectors, approve safeguards agreements and, if doubts arose about the nuclear 
activities of a State in the context of IAEA safeguards, the Board would judge whether a State was 
complying with its safeguards obligations” (see Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p.37). It is therefore 
possible, in this sense, to speak of an “IAEA reaction” to the shock.
“Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue,” 74£'// Bulletin, vol.23, no.3, (1981).
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deepened with the testimony of Roger Richter before both the American Senate and 
House of Representatives. In response to Richter’s assertions that the IAEA was, as 
Israel had charged, incapable of adequately safeguarding Osftaq, the Director-General 
informed the Board that all possible diversion scenarios had been accounted for and 
that “there was thus nothing wrong with the safeguards being applied on the Taniuz 
reactors nor any deficiencies in the inspection schedule or procedures.”"*' Israel had, 
in fact, acted only in anticipation of a failure of IAEA safeguards. Nothing, however, 
had happened which demonstrated that safeguards would indeed fail in Iraq. This 
kind o f  defensiveness found few critics within the organization.
The Outcome of the Shock:
The years which followed the Israeli attack on Osiiaq reverberated with the 
aftershocks of the raid. The destruction of the safeguarded reactor of an NPT member 
by a non-NPT state was extensively discussed, and the issue surfaced repeatedly in 
the United Nations and the IAEA. In this sense, an internationalisation of the shock 
occurred which resembled that which had followed India. This was not laid to rest 
until the 1985 NPT Review Conference. However, this was the only respect in which 
the effects of the Indian test were echoed by the Osiraq case. A chio no logical survey 
of the period of time between the initial reactions to the shock and the Third Review 
Conference in 1985 reveals no evidence of the kind of extensive and rapid regime 
development which occurred in the wake of the Indian test.
Address to the UN Security Council meeting, 19 June 1981, by Director-General Eklund, reprinted in 
“Peaceful Nuclear development must continue,” p.4-5.
Ibid., p.6.
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September 1981 -  August 1982
Insofar as the nonproliferation regime was concerned, the year which began 
with the IAEA General Conference of September 1981 was one which was to prove 
remarkable for all the wrong reasons. Rather than the reactions bringing a growing 
consensus and a determination to bring about change, the year was characterized by a 
further deepening of the divisions which had appeared immediately following the 
raid.
These divisions were not simply international. The United States, which had 
been so instrumental in galvanising multilateral action and regime change in the 
1970’s found itself unable to bridge the gap between the concerns held by the 
Administration and State Department and those held by Congress. There was an 
over-riding concern in Congiess with the fact that “Israel did not [have] confidence in 
IAEA safeguards.” "^ As the preceding discussion revealed, the Israeli action 
prompted disquiet in the Administration over the future of the peace process and in 
Congress over the efficacy of IAEA safeguards.
The year which followed did little to bring these concerns together. If 
anything. Congressional attacks on the IAEA’s safeguarding ability were stepped up, 
much to the distaste and fi'ustration of the State Department. In Senate hearings of 
December 1981, anti-IAEA sentiment was increased by a letter from the chairman of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nunzio J. Palladino, which declared that 
the “NRC is concerned that the IAEA safeguards system would not detect diversion in 
at least some types of facilities.” *^ Palladino’s letter went on to say that “in addition, 
we are not confident that the member states would be notified of a diversion in a
50 A.B. Lovins, “Iraq Nuclear Intentions,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, vol.42, no.8, 1986, p.55.
IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, December 2“", 1981, p.2.
139
timely fashion.”^^  This letter, which was held aloft at the beginning of the hearings, 
was received as still more evidence that the State Department -  which had disparaged 
the testimony of Roger Richter -  had been defending the indefensible. One Senator 
spoke darkly of the “State Department’s reflexive desire to classify and hold any 
information which raises questions about the IAEA system.”^^  Certainly, uniemitting 
Congressional attacks on the IAEA were irksome both to the State Department and to 
the Administration which, in the recollections of one former State Department 
official, “did not want the US Congress to take actions that would have damaged the 
IAEA safeguards system, and hence did what it could to defend the efficacy of 
safeguards.” "^*
Congress, however, appeared once again to have the bit between its collective 
teeth with regards to this aspect of the nonproliferation regime. Yet another ex-IAEA 
inspector was duly produced to testify to the inadequacy of safeguards. This former 
inspector, Emmanuel R. Morgan, confmiied the analysis which had been offered 
months earlier by Richter. Like Richter, Morgan claimed that “IAEA safeguards 
against the diversion of sensitive nuclear materials are not presently effective and will 
not be effective in the foreseeable ftiture.”^^  More ominously still, he suggested that
Ibid., p.2.
Ibid., p.8. (Speaker: Senator John Glenn).
Interview with Fred McGoIdrick, conducted via e-mail, 30 June 2000. The Director of the ACDA 
also felt obliged to advise Congress of speaking out too loudly and indiscriminately, saying that “we 
must recognize that such activities [civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development] in the stable 
industrial democracies simply do not in themselves present a proliferation risk.” (See The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA: Improving Safeguards), p. 147. Speaker: Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, 
Director ACDA).
IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, p.78 (speaker: Emmanual R. Morgan, formerly o f the IAEA and the 
NRC).
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the Osiraq attack may simply have underscored the fact that “perhaps the problem is 
simply bigger than IAEA’s ability to handle it.”^^
The Executive was not only having to resist the continuing attacks from 
Congress. The IAEA General Conference in September 1981 became the forum for 
expressing the anger provoked by Israel. Consequently, it had ended with a 
successful vote for the IAEA to suspend all technical assistance to Israel. Moreover, 
if Israel had not (as requested in UN Security Council Resolution 487) placed its own 
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards by the time of the next General Conference, 
the suspension of Israel’s rights of membership would be considered. “In practice”, it 
was rightly observed, “this would amount to the exclusion of Israel fr om the 
Agency.”^^  This resolution was opposed only by the United States and Canada, and 
following the Conference it was announced that the United States was “engaging in 
what one source described as a ‘very fundamental’ although thus far informal 
reassessment of the US government’s relationship with the Agency. Much to its 
annoyance, the Administration and State Department found themselves not only 
having to defend the IAEA from Congress, but also having to defend Israel fr om the 
lAEA.^"
In March of 1982, the American representative to the IAEA continued to warn 
of the problems he saw forming in the American-IAEA relationship when he 
cautioned that “should the Agency become increasingly politicized so that it can no 
longer meet its responsibilities and especially its vital safeguards mission, the United
Ibid., p.78.
Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p. 104.
“US, Perturbed with IAEA Politics, Examines Role in Agency,” Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.44, 5 
November 1981, p.3
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States would be forced to reassess its role in the lAEA.” "^ A scant three months later,
in June, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions calling
for the withdrawal of the United States from any UN organisation which suspended
Israel. Impatience with the IAEA thus combined with the “gi'eat concern among
Israel’s supporters in Congi'ess and elsewhere...that infringement of Israel’s rights of
participation in any UN-related organisation would lead to moves against Israel all
over the UN system.” *^
The General Conference of the Agency was not the only branch of the Agency
to disagree vehemently with the Israeli and Congressional assessment of its abilities.
Writing on the question of the Agency’s safeguards, the Deputy Director-General of
the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards reiterated Dfrector-General Eklund’s claims
that there was nothing wrong with the safeguai'ds applied to Tammuz. Gruemm
stated, furthermore, that
this should also have been clear to those who were concerned 
about the technical potential of the Taniuz reactor. Was the 
attack therefore really the result of disbelief in the effectiveness 
of the Agency’s safeguards?^^
In another article, Gruemm appeared to take further issue with Congressional
scepticism when he declaimed that “expectations of what safeguards can do are rather
inflated, and confrontation with the limitations of safeguards often leads to the other
extreme -  disappointment and harsh criticism.”^^  In addition, the General Conference
As one author noted a few years following the Osiraq raid, the reaction of the IAEA meant that 
“although the US condemned the raid, Washington became the protector of Israel from punitive steps 
within the IAEA.” (Power, “The Baghdad Raid; retiospect and prospect”, p.86.)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA: Improving Safeguards), p. 121 (Speaker: Richard 
T. Kennedy, US Representative to the IAEA).
Roger Kirk, “The Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA: 1982-1983,” in International Atomic 
Energy! Agency: Personal Reflections, (yioxmsi: IAEA; 1997), p.96.
H. Gruemm, “Safeguards and Tamuz: setting the record straight,” IAEA Bulletin, vol.23, no.4, p. 14.
63 H. Gruemm, IAEA Bulletin Supplement 1982, p.40.
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of September 1981 provided the venue for another US-IAEA conflict, originating in 
the differing official assessments of the attack by the American Administration and 
that articulated by the IAEA Director-General Eklund. It was in this forum that 
American Representative Davis declared, in a direct rebuttal of Eklund’s evaluation, 
that “the United States Government...cannot support the view that the Israeli action 
constituted an attack on the agency and its safeguards regime or that it caused damage 
to that regime.” "^* The disagreements between the United States and the IAEA, then, 
involved both the bureaucracy of the IAEA as well as the Conference of its member 
states, and both the American Congress and administration. By the time of the 
September General Conference, such disagreements had been festering for over a year 
without any movement towards a resolution.
Finally, the position of Iraq’s major supplier -  France -  remained officially 
intractable. The French still maintained that the Israeli attack was unjustifiable and 
that the conditions of supply to the Iraqis had been adequate. To this end, the French 
government continued to express its deteimination to rebuild the Osiiaq reactor."^ 
According to French officials. President Mitterrand “took the position that no grounds 
existed on which France could refiise to provide Iraq with equipment or technology 
available to other count r ies .France,  therefore, entered into negotiations with Iraq 
to rebuild the reactor two months after it had been destroyed.
However, the accusations of having taken insufficient precautions against 
weaponization were not entftely dismissed by the French and, indeed, “French
^  “Statement by US Representative Kenneth Davis to the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency: Resolution Condemning Israel for Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” 
September 26"’, 1981. Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament 1981, p.454.
The Daily Telegraph, 15 January 1982.
Roger F. Pajak, Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications fo r  the Superpowers, 
National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-1 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press; 1982), p.57.
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precautions suggest that the French too [had been] mistrustful of Iraq’s intentions.”^^  
A 1982 announcement by the French government put new conditions on the 
rebuilding of the reactor. Iraq would be obliged to accept low-enriched caramel fuel 
rather than high-enriched uranium (twelve and a half kilograms of which had 
previously been supplied to Iraq by France). In addition, the new conditions requiied 
that French technicians remain permanently at the site and that “Iraq would have to 
include other states in the operation of the installation, making it a regional research 
center.” *^* Iraqi agreement to these conditions, unsurprisingly, was not forthcoming. 
Nonetheless, French resentment of Israel’s action dictated that its support for the 
penalties against Israel in the IAEA remained. Consequently, France voted with the 
majority o f states at the General Conference in favour of suspending IAEA assistance 
to Israel and possibly suspending that state from participation the following year.
September 1982 — February 1983
The General Conference of 1982 thus opened within the context of continuing 
disagreement between the United States and its supporters, and that sizable number of 
states (including the USSR) who still desired to see Israel punished for its 
aggression.*’" In the event, the goal of suspending Israel from the Agency was altered 
somewhat. After the Conference began “it soon became clear...that such a resolution 
would not get the two thirds majority that the Statute required for such a decision.” "^
Fischer, Stopping the Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons, p. 67.
Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 183.
The USSR, while displeased with Israel’s behaviour, nonetheless had no desire to see the Agency 
damaged as a consequence. As one Soviet delegate to the conference recalled, the Soviet delegation 
“had instructions to imporess upon others (including the Arab states) that the Agency is a ‘technical’ 
organization and any political decisions...are up to the UN and its Security Council.” (Roland 
Timerbaev, interview conducted via e-mail, 17 December 1999.)
70 Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 106.
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The Arab states, who were spearheading the movement against Israel, then sought to 
obtain a vote in favour of rejecting Israel’s credentials, which required only a 
majority.
The vote on Israel’s credentials took place amid formal instructions from 
Washington that required the American delegation to walk out of the Conference and 
declare that US participation in the Agency would be reconsidered.^* When the vote 
was finally taken it was evenly split, the resolution thus not achieving the necessary 
majority to pass. At this point, however, the delegate from Madagascar -  whose vote 
had not been counted -  claimed to have been present at the time of the vote and 
wished to register his vote in favour of rejecting Israel’s credentials. This was duly 
approved and the United States and United Kingdom left “followed closely by most 
other Western delegations.”^^  The State Department, in justifying the American 
decision both to leave the Conference and to withdraw temporarily from the IAEA, 
called the rejection of Israel’s credentials “unjustifiable and illegal.”^^  Kenneth 
Davis, the head of the US delegation went further, stating that “this pattern of abusing 
the UN system to cany on political vendettas is corrosive and dangerous.” "^*
The suspension of US involvement in the IAEA -  the “reassessment” as it was 
called -  was more than simply a case of the Americans physically absenting
These instructions to leave the Conference in the event of a rejection of Israel’s credentials were, 
according the American Resident Representative to the IAEA (Roger Kirk), an eleventli-hour 
instruction. Kirk later wrote of the US delegation launching “a frantic last-minute lobbying effort, 
telling every representative they could find what denial of Israeli credentials would now mean.” (See 
Kirk “The Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA,” p.98.)
Fischer, Histoiy o f  the 1Æ A, p. 107. France, it should be noted, was not among the states which left 
lire Conference in protest at the vote against Israel. The USSR, it almost goes without saying, had 
voted in favour o f tlie rejection of Israel’s credentials. For a more thorough discussion of the process 
leading up to the US walkout, see Kirk, “The Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA” or Mark F. 
Imber, Chapter 5 of The UN, UNESCO, ILO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in the 
Specialized Agencies, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1989).
The New York Times, 25 October 1982.
74 Ibid.
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themselves from the Agency. It also entailed the suspension of vital American 
funding to the IAEA. As the United States was the main source of the IAEA’s 
budget, an American reassessment necessarily affected the Agency’s ability to carry 
out its activities. Only a month after the American walkout, Director-General Blix 
was reported as saying that if the suspension of American participation stretched into 
the following year, “it could cripple our operations.”^^  The Agency’s Safeguards 
Division, however, continued to maintain that the Israeli allegations of inadequacy 
and incompetence were unfounded. Another article by its Deputy Dftector appeared 
in the IAEA Bulletin, affirming that the IAEA had applied diversion hypotheses to 
Osiraq and found it untenable. Nonetheless, the article pointed out, the Agency had 
intended both to install cameras and carry out more fr equent inspections once fuel had 
been introduced.^*'
The American reassessment of its participation in the IAEA lasted for five 
months -  until the next meeting of the Board of Governors, on February 22" ,^ 1983. 
During this time, the divisions on the issue between Congress and the executive 
branch continued. While the executive recommended the resumption of American 
involvement, Congress still insisted on IAEA Board certification of Israel’s full 
participation.^^ It was eventually agreed that in order to avoid rejection of a 
resolution reinstating Israel’s credentials, the Chairman (Emil Keblùsek) would 
simply announce the Board’s acceptance of the Director-General’s report.^ ** This 
report, presented to the Board of Governors, would note that the US had been
The New York Times, 11 November 1982.
H. Gruemm, “Safeguards verification -  its credibility and the diversion hypothesis,” IAEA Bulletin, 
vol.25, no.4, December 1983, p.29.
Kirk, “The Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA,” p. 100.
For a more detailed discussion of these events fr om an insider’s perspective, again see Kirk, “The 
Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA.”
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informed of Israel’s status as a fully participating member of the IAEA. Director 
General Blix would then send a letter to this effect to the American Secretary of State. 
This statement duly passed without objection, and the US officially resumed its own 
participation in the Agency.
February 1983 -  September 1985
The re-entry of the United States into the IAEA was not quite the final act in 
the drama which had begun in June 1981. However, the temporary withdrawal and 
resumption of participation by the US certainly was the most remarkable of the events 
which were inspfted by the bombing of Osiraq. The events of 1981 nonetheless 
resurfaced periodically in the context of the nonproliferation regime. Such 
recurrences were subdued and tended simply to perpetuate the anger at Israel and the 
United States rather than translating that anger into any significant regime change.
The IAEA General Conference of 1983, despite the commotion of the 
previous year, still saw continuing challenges to Israel’s credentials. While the 
credentials were not rejected, “strongly critical” "^ resolutions were adopted “amid 
much verbal antagonism directed against both Israel and the USA.” "^ The same was 
true in the General Conferences of both 1984 and 1985.^' The General Conference of 
1985 witnessed the last gasp of the reaction to the Osiraq raid, in the form of an Iraqi- 
sponsored resolution calling on Israel to withdraw what had become known as the 
Begin Doctrine.^^ This resolution, however, failed to pass by the two-thirds majority
Imber, The UN, UNESCO, ILO and IAEA, p.93.
Ibid., p.93.
The Conference of 1984 included China, which had officially joined the IAEA in January.
«2 This resolution, predictably, found support from the Arab states, Iran and the Eastern bloc.
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required and with its passing, the Osftaq incident was, outwardly at least, laid to rest 
in the context of the IAEA and the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a who le.
A year previous to this had seen the Reagan Administration drop its opposition 
to a reconvening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Contrary to the previous vigorous 
rebuttals of Congressional suggestions that the group be reconvened, the American 
government requested a meeting of the NSG, which duly occuiTcd in July 1984. 
However, attendance at this meeting (the first by the group since 1977) was 
disappointing, consisting only of the Western Members of the NSG, with the four 
East Bloc members of the NSG deciding not to attend.^ "* This meeting focused on the 
future role of emerging suppliers and attempts by countries, such as Pakistan, to elude 
controls. At the behest of the United States, the discussions also centred around the 
American “initiative to gain Suppliers Group agreement to ban future nuclear sales to 
nations refusing to accept IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear installations.” *^’ 
While no agreement in this area was reached, the NSG did expand its membership by 
one, with Australia moving from being an observer to a participant. Meanwhile, the 
questions raised by the Osfraq bombing regarding the possible proliferation by Iraq 
and the forceful counterproliferation by Israel, went undiscussed.
At the same time as the shock of 1981 was finally fading from -  or being 
replaced in -  the consciousness of the IAEA and the Western component of the NSG, 
the Thii'd NPT Review Conference was set to take place. These Conferences had not 
had a happy history. The First and Second Review Conferences of 1975 and 1980 
had failed to reach the consensus needed to produce a final document. As a
® Instead, a resolution was adopted which confined itself merely to criticising tlie Osiraq bombing and 
requesting that Israel submit to flill-scope safeguards.
These four were, o f course, the USSR, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
85 Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p.335
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consequence, the desii'e to produce such a document -  to have a "successful"
conference -  was strong. The President of the Conference, Mohammed Shaker,
recalled that "it was accepted by almost all the parties present that a Final Declaration
would be the goal of the Review Conference."^^’ In the tliree meetings of preparatory
committees prior to the Conference, the spectre of Osiraq materialized in the form of
a proposal by Iraq to condemn Israel for its action. A compromise was reached in
which, as the Final Declaration stated, the conference expressed
its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on 
Iraq’s safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981...[and]
...recalls Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981 strongly 
condemning the military attack by Israel.^^
By merely recalling the condemnation of Israel by another UN body, both the
opponents and supporters of Israel were assuaged. The Thü d NPT Review
Conference thus ended on September 22"  ^with its first ever Final Declaration.
This declaration, which also took care to reaffirm the confidence in the abilities of the
lAEA,^^ echoed the near-simultaneous IAEA General Conference in being the last
formal gasp of the Osii aq bombing.
Mohammed Ibrahim Shaker “The legacy o f the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference: the president’s reflections,” in John Simpson (ed.), Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Agenda 
for the 1990 \s, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987), p. 10-11. Shaker further recalled that 
“it was clear that was a detennination on the part o f almost every participant to avoid repeating the 
experience o f 1980” (p. 13).
“Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT” (NPT/CONF.lII/64/I 21 September 
1985), Ai ticle IV. para. 10, reprinted in UN Blue Books Series Volume III: The United Nations and 
Nuclear Non-proliferation (New York: United Nations Depaitment of Public Information; 1995). The 
Final Declaration went on to state that the conference “further noted the demands made on South 
Afi'ica and Israel to place safeguards on all their nuclear facilities to pledge themselves not to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Article IV, para.20).
The Final Document also stated that tire Conference “expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards 
provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating 
this compliance” (Article III, para.2). The Document also noted that “the IAEA, in carrying out its 
safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to 
the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown” (Article 
III, para. 11), in “Final Declaration o f the Third Review Conference o f the NPT” in UN Blue Books 
Series Volume III.
149
External to the more formal setting of the IAEA and the Review Conference, 
the bombing had still provoked little discernable change. Iraq, by the time of these 
conferences in Autumn of 1985, had neither rebuilt nor replaced Osiraq. Nor had it 
secured any nuclear materials or equipment for the Tuwaitha site, at least through 
open transactions. The new conditions which had been attached by the French to the 
rebuilding of the reactor remained objectionable in the eyes of Iraq. In the United 
States, the focus which Congress laid on IAEA safeguards faded following the 
resumption of American participation in the Agency. The Reagan Administration, 
meanwhile, embarked upon improved relations with Iraq, whose war with Iran was 
now stretching into its fifth year. In March of 1984, just under three years since the 
bombing of Osiraq had raised questions about Iraq’s nuclear intentions, it was 
reported that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with relations 
between Iraq and the United States and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been 
restored in all but name.’’^ ® These relations were, in fact, officially restored seven 
months later, in November 1984.^^
The History and Outcome of the Shock: a case of regime change?
The way in which the preceding narrative of events sheds light on the pattern 
of the regime’s development may now be understood. The bombing of Osiraq, like 
the 1974 Indian test, clearly qualified as a shock which interrupted a period of
Writing in 1986, one commentator noted that there had been, thus far, “no firm indicators that Iraq 
had accepted these requirements or, indeed, that France was actively interested in a renewed supply 
role” (Power, “The Baghdad raid,” p.860).
The New York Times, 29 March 1984.
The same article also stated that “Western European diplomats assume that the United States now 
exchanges some intelligence on Iran with Iraq.” {The New York Times, 29 March 1984). Whetlier this 
was in fact tlie case or not -  and the State Department officially claimed neutrality insofar as the h an- 
Iraq War was concerned -  it was certainly true that, slightly more than three years after tlie Osiraq 
bombing, relations between the US and Iraq had vastly improved.
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dormancy in the regime. Nonetheless, it has become clear that the case of the Osiraq 
bombing shows that regime change does not inevitably follow shocks to the regime.
In this, the shock differs sharply from the Indian case.
This said, the period directly following the shock -  the initial reaction to the 
raid -  echoed that following the Indian test. As in 1974, the immediate response 
revealed a clear divergence of expectations as to what, if anything, needed to be done 
as a consequence. Iraq’s main supplier -  France -  and the IAEA (which had been 
responsible for safeguarding the Iraqi reactor) both rejected the accusations of 
incompetence which Israel levelled at them. France insisted that its conditions of 
supply to Iraq were adequate, while the IAEA defended its safeguards and their ability 
to detect a possible diversion. Both attacked Israel’s act of counterproliferation as 
posing far more of a danger than Osiraq ever had. The American reaction, however, 
was very different. The Reagan Administration, while condemning Israel, was 
simultaneously concerned about the anti-Israel and anti-IAEA sentiments being 
expressed. Congress, meanwhile, emphasized not the dangers of Israel’s attack, but 
rather the dangers of the inadequate standards of supply, safeguards and inspections. 
Again, in this initial confusion and disagreement following the shock, the nanative of 
the Osiraq bombing continues to echo the Indian test.
It is clear, however, that the diverging expectations which followed the Osiiaq 
bombing, did not reconverge in a mamier amenable to eventual regime change.
The Indian test had eventually been followed by the creation of new rules, decision­
making procedures and, indeed, a new regime institution in the form of the NSG. 
These changes were further shown to have involved an alteration of some of the 
norms and principles of the regime which had prevailed prior to the 1974 explosion. 
The shock of 1981 did not follow this pattern. Instead, the after-effects of the
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bombing were felt largely in the politicisation of the IAEA. There is no clear instance 
of the Osiraq bombing having inspired any significant change to the lules and 
decision-making procedures of the regime, let alone to its norms and principles. No 
new institutions along the lines of the NSG were created. Indeed the partial 
reconvening of the NSG itself did not occur until 1984. This meeting witnessed an 
American attempt to gain an agreement on the banning of nuclear sales to states 
without full-scope IAEA safeguards. However, even this (ultimately unsuccessful) 
measure cannot be attributed to concerns over Iraq, as that state was already subject to 
the full-scope safeguards requii ed under the NPT.^^ The repeated condemnations of 
the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, which made a regular appearance in the IAEA 
General Conferences of 1981 -  1985 as well as at the NPT Review Conference, did 
not (however heartfelt) constitute the alteration, or establishment, of a norm against 
such acts of counterproliferation. Such a norm may be assumed already to have 
existed, with the sense of outrage at Israel’s action as evidence of a belief that such a 
norm had been violated.
Conclusions:
The narrative of years both before and following the bombing of Osiraq by 
Israel does not indicate regime change. Indeed, the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
which emerged fi'oni the Third NPT Review Conference was not significantly 
different fi'om the one which had existed in the last year of the 1970’s although, for 
the first time, a Review Conference had managed to agree a Final Declaration. No
There was, in addition, a 1988 agreement between India and Pakistan not to attack each other’s 
nuclear facilities {Agreement Between Pakistan and India on the Prohibition o f  Attack Against Nuclear 
Installations and Facilities, signed at Islamabad on 31 December 1988 and entered into force on 27 
.January 1991). While there can be little doubt that the Israeli attack on Iraq at least partially inspired 
such an agreement, this cannot constitute an example of regime change, having occurred, firstly.
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significant development or elaboration of rules and decision-making procedures had 
been created, nor had any new institutions. Consequently, the norms and principles of 
the nonproliferation regime stayed similarly unaltered by the shock of 1981.
Although the shock echoed the Indian test by interrupting a phase of regime 
quiescence and leading to a similar divergence of expectations, these expectations did 
not reconverge to initiate regime change. It is thus not possible to understand the 
shock of the Osii aq bombing as part of a non-incremental pattern of regime 
development. In this case, at least, no problems are posed for the understanding of 
change in mainstream regime theory.
More interesting still is the ability of this case to provide an answer to the 
second question of the three which this study seeks to answer. This question asked 
whether or not, if regime change followed from a shock to the regime, it could be 
assumed that such a shock would therefore necessarily lead to regime change. The 
case of the Indian test did not contradict this assumption. The Osiraq case, on the 
other hand, appears to do just that, standing as a clear example of a shock to the 
previously inactive regime which was not followed by regime change. The third 
question, of how this regime change or (in this case) this absence of regime change, 
may be understood still remains to be answered. Having completed the narrative of 
the events, it is now possible to begin to answer this last question.
outside the context of the regime in the form of a bilateral agreement between, secondly, two non-NPT 
members.
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Chapter 5: The 1981 Bombing of Osiraq -  Understanding Regime 
Change
The previous chapter argued that the bombing of Osiraq was an event which, 
while a shock to the regime, did not herald a period of rapid regime change. The raid 
raised serious questions about the efficacy of the IAEA system, the capabilities of an 
apparently inadequate regime, and the assumption that accession as an NNWS to the 
NPT guaranteed benign intentions. However, the eventual outcome in terms of the 
development of the nonproliferation regime was such that no significant change took 
place, certainly when examined in light of the eventual consequences of the Indian 
test.
There is nothing which could be constmed as preordained about such a result. 
Superficially at least, an attack on a nuclear facility (albeit one into which fissile 
material had not yet been introduced) was stunning evidence of a lack of confidence 
in the utility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular the safeguards as 
implemented by the IAEA. Such a raid was the first of its kind, shattering a taboo 
which had existed regarding the status of nuclear facilities as military targets. As in 
the case of the Indian test six years earlier, this attack on the eredibility of the regime 
was not lost on many in the United States Congress. In this forum, voices were raised 
calling for the United States to lead the way towards change to the nonproliferation 
regime and to close the loopholes considered to have been exposed by the events of 
June 9"’.
The previous chapter has shown not only that the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime did not change in the aftermath of the Oshaq raid, but also that there was, with 
the exception of the US Congress, very little will to bring about such change. The key 
actors of the previous chapter were IAEA (whose safeguards had been dramatically
154
questioned), France (the supplier of the Iraqi reactor which had so unnerved the 
Israelis), the USSR (a former supplier of Iraq and key player in the regime), and the 
United States (the main ally of Israel, arbiter of the Middle East peace process, and 
crucial member of the nuclear nonproliferation regime). None of those four -  
including, crucially, the United States -  was inclined to pursue regime change.
Given that the outcome of the 1981 shock was so different to its predecessor, 
it prompts a comparison between the interpretations of the Indian test with those 
which followed the bombing of Osiraq. The subsequent discussion will therefore 
examine how the shock was generally understood by the relevant actors. Like the 
Indian case, this will be achieved by a discussion of the understandings of the danger 
revealed by the shock, the responsibility for leading change, the immediacy of action 
required, and solvability of the problems raised by it. It will be contended that 
American interpretations differed sharply between Congress, the State Department, 
and the Reagan Administration and that the latter two won the day. Moreover, it will 
be argued that in the international context, no consensus among the key players was 
reached -  or even sought -  on the need for, and possibility of, regime change. The 
understandings of the shock which facilitated the post-1974 regime change to occur 
differed sharply in the case of Osiraq: a shock-which-wasn’ t.
Understanding of Danger:
The United States
The Osiraq shock was not fated to become the vehicle tlii'ough which rapid 
development of the nonproliferation regime was to occur. It also became apparent, 
during course of the narrative of events, that significant disagreements over the 
incident existed between the executive and the Congress, This included their
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respective interpretations of the dangers revealed by the attack. While this 
superficially resembled the reaction to the Indian shock, such similarity was illusory. 
Following the bombing of Osii aq, both the executive and Congress accepted and took 
a proactive interest in, the danger posed by the attack. There was, however, no 
consensus on the nature of this danger. Congress appeared to see the attack as having 
justifiably undermined the credibility o f the regime by exposing problems in the 
IAEA safeguards system. The State Department and Reagan Administration, on the 
other hand, saw the bombing as unnecessarily undermining the credibility of the 
regime by fomenting unnecessary criticism of the IAEA and, more importantly, by 
detracting attention from the real focus of danger: the damage to the Middle East 
peace process. Moreover, the shock itself was beset with ambiguity. Iraqi nuclear 
proliferation was the subject of Israeli accusations but had not been decisively 
demonstrated in the way the that Indian test had demonstrated Indian nuclear 
capability. This did little to assist any agieement regarding the danger posed. 
Consequently, the context in which this danger was interpreted differed sharply and 
remained at odds.
The fii'st Congressional hearings on the subject were convened a mere week 
and a half after the raid. The attack was understood by several members of Congi ess 
as a genuine danger to the regime by having brought to light the inadequacy of IAEA 
safeguards. From the first Senate hearings, sentiments were expressed that, in the 
face of the Agency’s incompetence, Israel had had little option. One Senator opined 
that "were I in Israel’s shoes, would I have done the same thing? I am not sure, but I 
would have been sorely tempted.’’* Another declared that the Israeli action,
done in self defense, in my judgement, very vividly brought
' 77?e Israeli A ir Strike, Hearings before tlie Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
ninety-seventli Congress, first session, on the Israeli Air Strike and Related Issues (June 18, 19, and 25, 
1981 ), p. 19 (Speaker; Senator Tsongas).
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to attention of the world the scope of that threat [nuclear 
proliferation], and the inability of testing agencies or inspecting 
agencies to remove that threat?
These sentiments were accompanied by a sneaking admiration for the audaciousness
of the Israeli attack. Indeed, a government publication, later that year, noted that
“many people, among them Members of Congress, applauded Israeli efficiency and
daring."^
In Congress, the event was initially considered to have revealed a danger 
which could undermine the credibility of the regime and open a door through which 
others might follow. Senator John Glenn, who had played such an important part in 
rousing Congress over the Indian test, attempted to do the same again, declaring that 
“no event since India’s explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 has underscored so 
dramatically the dangers of nuclear proliferation.’’'^  A colleague also alluded both to 
the existence of a serious thi eat to the goals of the nonproliferation regime, stating: 
“that threat [of nuclear proliferation] is no better exemplified, Mr. Chairman, than a 
nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a country like Iraq.’’^  This initial Senate 
hearing echoed the understanding of danger which had prevailed six years previously 
and evidenced serious concern not only over the intentions of Iraq, but over those it 
might inspire.
" Ibid., p.25 (Speaker: Senator Boscliwitz). Such sentiments were typical of these hearings, and 
Israel’s action was generally view as being regrettable but understandable, given the ineffectual nature 
of the IAEA.
 ^ Congress and Foreign Policy -  1981, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House o f Representatives, 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office; 1982), p.98.
The Israeli A ir Strike, p. 11 (Speaker: Senator Glemi).
Ibid., p.23 (speaker: Senator Boschw itz).
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Such views were reinforced by the testimony, in both the initial Senate and 
House of Representatives hearings, of former IAEA inspector Roger Richter? 
Richter’s assertion -  that the IAEA would be incapable of detecting a diversion of 
nuclear material for military puiposes -  provided the members of the Senate and the 
House with a scapegoat. As was pointed out in the narrative of the events following 
the attack, the hearings held after the testimony of Richter focused heavily on the 
IAEA and the question which had been raised regarding its safeguarding abilities. 
Hearings in both the Senate and the House of Representatives contained expressions 
of concern that the effectivenes of the verification component of the nonproliferation 
regime had been justifiably undermined.^ This interpretation of the danger as 
occurring to the regime was later underscored by Congressional suggestion to the 
Administration that the NSG be reconvened.^ The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings in December 1981 again called on the testimony of a former 
IAEA inspector to damn the competence of that agency’s safeguards and declare that 
“perhaps the problem is simply bigger than the IAEA’s ability to handle it.’’'^
The American reaction, thus far, continued to echo that which had followed 
the Indian test of 1974. Broad agreement existed in Congiess that the danger implied 
by the shock was two-fold. Firstly, the danger lay in its having undermined
See The Israeli Air Strike, p. 108 and Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle East and on 
International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, June 17 and 25, 1981, p. 58.
 ^On December 2™', 1981, a hearing entitled IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards was held in die Senate, 
while on March 3*^  ^ and 18''% 1982, a hearing entitled The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 
Improving Safeguards was held in the House o f Representatives.
 ^ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards, p.219.
IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, December 2, 1981, p.78. The testimony was offered by 
Emmanuel R. Morgan, a former employee of both the IAEA and the NRC. Morgan also maintained 
that “IAEA safeguards against the diversion of sensitive nuclear materials are not presently effective 
and will not be effective in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid., p.78).
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confidence in the abilities of the nonproliferation regime to verify compliance and 
secondly, in having hinted darkly at a future in which states would feel compelled to 
take matters into their own hands, as the Israelis had done. In the Indian case, this 
interpretation of the shock centred on the role of nuclear exports and peaceful use, and 
in the Osii aq case, on the efficacy of IAEA safeguards. Indeed, the bombing of 
Osiraq, in the words on one commentator, “lent credence to hardline refomiists in 
Congress who had been arguing for years that national survival dictated putting 
nonproliferation before all other foreign policy concerns.” '  ^ The vocal supporters of 
nonproliferation notwithstanding,' * the hearings which followed the destruction of 
Osiraq indicated little confidence in the competence of the IAEA.
The divisions between Congress and the executive revealed themselves almost 
immediately following the attack itself, and continued to widen in the following 
months. An Administration memorandum of October 1981 had proposed taking 
power fiom the NRC over nuclear exports and giving it to the State Department'^ -  a 
proposal which was credited as having increased “suspicions about the 
administration’s insensitivity to congressional concerns."'^
The Administration’s disinterest was not, however, akin to that which 
followed the Indian test. On the contrary, the bombing of Osiraq caused a great deal 
of concern to the Reagan Administration and the State Department, which also saw 
the bombing as an attack on the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. The 
difference in this understanding of the danger, however, lay in the widely-held
10Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p.374.
' ' Senator John Glenn was perhaps the best example of one of those to whom the nonproliferation 
regime was of paramount concern.
Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p.376.
Ibid., p.376.
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executive belief that the primary cause for concern was the damage that had been 
done to the stability of the region, not the regime. The anxiety which undoubtedly 
followed fi'om the events of June 1981 reflected the concern “that the operation threw 
the Reagan Administration’s emerging approach towards the Middle East into 
disarray.’’*'* The Osiraq raid, in the eyes of the executive, was indeed both a danger in 
itself and as a woriying omen, but did not reflect badly on the effectiveness of the 
nonproliferation regime and, rather, had much more to do with the stability of the 
Middle East and the viability of the peace process.
This predominantly regional understanding of the context of the danger was 
present fi'om the beginning, and may be fnst located in the official State Department 
reaction to the news of Israel’s action, which said nothing about nuclear 
nonproliferation, but did state that the attack “cannot but seriously add to the alieady 
tense situation in the area.’’*^ This regional interpretation was entrenched shortly 
thereafter, when the American Representative to the UN stated that “it is precisely 
because of my government’s deep involvement in efforts to promote peace in the 
Middle East that we were shocked by the Israeli air strike on the Iraqi nuclear 
facility.” "’
Shortly after these official statements, the effort began to persuade Congress 
of how the danger should correctly be understood and to dismiss the growing 
concerns about the efficacy of the IAEA. In the House of Representatives hearing a 
scant eight days after the attack, the statement read out by the Under Secretary for
Shai Feldman “The Bombing of Osiraq -  Revisited,” International Security, vol.7, no.2. Fall 1982,
p. 128.
The Washington Post, 9 June 1981.
“Statement by the US Permanent Representative (Kirkpatrick) to the UN General Assembly: Israeli 
Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” [extract] June 19, 1981. Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 
1981, p.230.
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Political Affairs (Department of State) identified the repercussions of the shock as 
serving to “seriously complicate our efforts to resolve the various problems in the area 
th'ough peaceful means.” '  ^ The Administration, it was proclaimed, was “dismayed 
by the damage which has been done to the search for peace in the Middle East.” '^  
President Reagan himself tellingly stated to reporters that “the biggest thing that 
comes out of what happened is the fact that this is further evidence that a real peace, a 
settlement for all of the Mideast problems is long overdue.” '^
The determination to place the event in a regional security context explains 
the executive belief that criticism of the safeguards aspect of the regime was both 
unnecessary and damaging. This, in turn, helps to account for the Administration’s 
anger at the ‘civil unrest’ in both the IAEA and Congiess. Although there was 
concern with the attacks which had been made on the IAEA as a consequence of the 
bombing, there is little evidence of a fear that the regime had been undermined by the 
possibility that NPT states might harbour nuclear ambitions, or by the threat of future, 
Israeli-style counterproliferation. One former State Department official recalled, for 
example, that “as I recall, we were not terribly concerned that the Israeli bombing 
might lead others like Pakistan or India to launch similar attacks on each others’ 
nuclear facilities.” *^*
Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities, hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle East and on International Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, June 17 and 25, 1981, p. 3 (speaker: 
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.).
"  Ibid., p.5
' ‘^“The President’s News Conference, 16 June 1981,” in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United 
States -  Ronald Reagan, Janiiaiy 2(1'' 1981 to December 3P ‘ 1981, (Washington, D C.: ÙS 
Government Printing Office; 1982) p .520. This regional inteipretation of events was borne out by his 
diary entry o f ,Iune 9"', 1981 in which he obseiwed: “its high time to raise h— 1 worldwide for a 
settlement of the Middle East problem. What has happened is the result of fear and suspicion on both 
sides. We need a real push for solid peace” (Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (London: Hutchinson; 
1990), p.413).
From an interview with Fred McGoldrick, conducted via e-mail, 30 June 2000.
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Clearly, the implications of the shock were far fi*om self-evident, encouraging 
the divisions between Congress and the executive. “In sum,” one analyst observed, 
“while the Reagan Administration may have been reestablishing its good faith with 
nuclear suppliers and users, its relations with Congress in the matter of 
nonproliferation continued to deteriorate.”^’ An official submission by the 
Department of State to the fu’st Senate hearing on the subject continued to argue that 
“fundamentally, the Israeli bombing was part of the unresolved conflict in the 
Mideast, in which the IAEA was not central, nor was the NPT.”^^  The Senate and 
House’s inclination to see the attack as having implications for the IAEA was thus 
dismissed, as indeed were those fomier IAEA inspectors and other prophets of doom 
who had attempted to convince Congress of the threat to the safeguards aspect of the 
nonproliferation regime. Official State Department comments on an NRC letter to 
Congress, which expressed concerns about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, 
were almost contemptuous. The NRC, Congress was told, “oversimplifies a complex 
subject, and may therefore be misleading....We believe that, at the present time, the 
IAEA has at its disposal all the techniques and instruments necessary to detect...the 
diversion of nuclear materials. As for the hapless Roger Richter, whose testimony 
in the first Senate hearing had opened the floodgates for widespread criticism of 
perceived IAEA inadequacy, the dismissal of his statements were more scathing.
■' Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 377-78.
“Has the IAEA Role Been Impaired?” (submitted by the Department of State in answer to the 
question of whether the role of the IAEA had been compromised by the attack) in The Israeli Air 
Strike, p.6. Another former State Department official recalled that “the US did see this attack as 
emblematic of the Middle East peace problem” (Interview with Fred McGoldrick via e-mail, 30 June 
2000).
“State Department’s Comment on the NRC Letter to Congress,” in IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, 
p.28-29. The letter in question was written by Nunzio J. Palladino -  chairman of the NRC -  and, 
among other things, expressed concern “that the IAEA safeguards system would not detect a diversion 
in at least some types of facilities...[orjthat the member states would be notified of a diversion in a 
timely fashion.” (Reprinted in IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, p.2).
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Richter, claimed an ACDA representative, “presents no specific facts to support his
claim except to refer to the existence of facilities and materials in Iraq.”^^  Congress
was then informed that
the Administration is separately providing answers to the 
question as to whether Iraq was engaged in a nuclear weapons 
program. From our perspective Mr. Richter’s testimony sheds 
no additional specific light on this question^^
Senator Glenn, who thus saw his latest efforts to rouse the State Department and
Administration to action fiiinly rebuffed, commented bitterly on “the State
Department’s reflexive desire to classify and hold any information which raises
questions about the IAEA s y s t e m . S e n a t o r  Cranston, too, was on record as
complaining that
twice this year former IAEA inspectors have come forward 
and expressed their deep concern about safeguards inadequacies, 
and twice the State Department had responded with deliberate 
campaigns to discredit these individuals and to cast their 
conclusions as those of disgruntled fonner employees.^^
There existed a clear discrepancy between the understanding of danger within 
Congress and within the executive. Unlike the case of the Indian test. Congress 
remained unable to convince the State Department and Administration of the threat to
Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities, p.59.
Ibid., p.59.
IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, p. 8.
“^Reprinted in Nuclear Safeguards: A Reader, Report Prepared by the Congressional Research 
Service, Library o f Congress for the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production, transmitted to 
the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congi ess, 
first session, December 1983, p.729. Representative Hart lashed out at the Administiation, 
complaining that “despite the inadequacies of safeguards, the Reagan Administi ation wants to make the 
United States...a ‘reliable supplier of nuclear technology and materials tliroughout the world.’” {The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards, p.2. Speaking in front of the 
Senate, Hart accused the administration of “sending tlie wrong signals to the world about US 
commitment to nonproliferation.” {Congressional Record -  Senate, Tuesday, 16 June 1981, 
Proceedings and Debates of the 97' ’ Congress, first session).
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the nonproliferation regime — a step which the events of 1974 -  1978 showed to be 
crucial in inspiring them to action.
The IAEA
How to interpret the danger revealed by the attack likewise affected its overall 
assessment by the IAEA. As has previously been noted, the capabilities of IAEA 
came under heavy attack fi'om Congress as well as fi*om independent observers . I t s  
response was defensive, and marked by an unwillingness to believe that the attack 
required changes to the safeguards system. Instead, the IAEA bureaucracy largely 
considered that the reaction to the bombing had unfairly placed the organisation itself 
-  both its safeguarding abilities and its loftier goals of universal access to peaceful 
nuclear technology -  under attack. The hazard posed by the shock had, thus far, been 
interpreted in Congress as indicating problems in the regime and in the executive as 
representative of problems in the region. The IAEA’s Department of Safeguards was 
to interpret the danger of the shock in a thii*d way: as representative of the ignorance 
about the Agency and the lack of faith in its abilities, and thereby a danger to the 
IAEA itself. The shock was not understood as having revealed problems in the 
regime but was seen as having actually endangered the regime by undermining in the 
Agency’s credibility.
Typical statements, as demonsti ated earlier, refeired to the “pitiful inadequacy o f the IAEA” 
(Representative Markey speaking during The Israeli A ir Strike, p. 195) and assertions of the “increasing 
signs that the Agency is beset with technical and political problems” (Senator Percy speaking during 
IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards, p.2). In addition, the IAEA came under fire in a variety o f journals, 
most notably, Paul Jabber, “A Nuclear Middle East: Infrastructure, Likely Military Postures and 
Prospects for Strategic Stability,” in AGIS Working Paper No. 6, Center for Anns Control and 
International Security at University of California, L.A., September, 1977; Trudy Rubin, “That Israeli 
Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: the facts -  and deeper issues” Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1981; 
Richard Wilson, “Using Treaties, Not Air Strikes to Halt Nuclear Spread,” in Ibid.; Anthony D’Amato 
“Israel’s Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,” The American Journal o f  International Law, 
vol.77, 1983.
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This sense that the bombing stood as an implicit attack on the effectiveness of 
safeguards was articulated in the address to the Board of Governors by Director- 
General Ekluiid, who had immediately stated that “from a point of principle, one can 
only conclude that it is the Agency’s safeguards system which has also been 
attacked.” "^* The notion that the capabilities of the IAEA had been unjustly and 
wrongly found wanting, was underscored by David Fischer (at the time a Special 
Adviser to Director General Eklund) who confirmed that “the Director-General and 
the Board of Governors also interpreted the attack as an assault on IAEA 
safeguards.” *^* The Agency’s raison d'etre, the support of the peaceful development 
of nuclear power, was felt to be unnecessarily threatened by the outcry. The fear that 
this aspect of the Agency’s work was threatened by such criticism was expressed in 
an IAEA Bulletin article entitled, “Peaceful nuclear development must continue.”^’ 
The attack was perceived as a dangerous precedent, as it had opened the door for a 
potentially damaging challenge of the IAEA Statute’s Ai'ticle III.A.1, guaranteeing 
assistance in the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy. This concern was 
expressed by both Dfrector-General Eklund and, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, was a bone of contention in the General Assembly debates that 
folio wed.^^
The IAEA understanding of the danger posed by the Osiiaq incident was 
therefore predicated on the sense of injustice that accompanied it. The organisation
Speech reprinted in “Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue,” IAEA Bulletin, vol. 23, no.3, 
p.4-5.
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 104.
IAEA Bulletin, vol.23, no.3.
Eklund, in his address to the Board of Governors, quoted Article III. A. 1, stating that he was 
“personally convinced that the right attitude that the Member States and the Agency should 
continue...‘to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic 
energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.’” Ibid., p.6
165
accepted that the credibility of safeguards had been damaged not, crucially, by the 
attack itself but by the unjustified over-reaction in some levels of government and by 
the “technical ignorance” of the media?^ Furthermore, the belief that the shock had 
set a dangerous precedent was predicated not on its having disclosed a loophole in the 
regime, but as having augured a future in which one of the crucial aspects of the 
IAEA’s mandate -  aiding the development of peaceful nuclear energy -  could be 
challenged and put on trial.
France and the USSR
Although less influential in the eventual outcome of the Osiraq shock, the 
interpretations of this event by France and the USSR require some clarification.
As was discussed previously, the governments of both France and the Soviet Union 
reacted angrily to the Israeli accusations. Their official assessments of the tlireat 
created by the shock echoed that of the executive branch of the United States. The 
Israeli attack, according to the headline of Le Monde, “was judged unacceptable by 
Paris.” '^* Prime Minister M. PieiTe Mauroy stated that “the raid cannot but increase 
the tension in this part of the world.”^^  This tendency to view the danger in the 
context of the region rather than the regime was clear, and contained expressions of 
anger with Israel which were, for the most part, absent in the American expressions of 
regret.^*’
Gruemin, “Safeguards and Tamuz; setting the record sti'aiglit,” p. 10.
Le Monde, 10 June 1981. (“Le raid israélien est jugé inacceptable par Paris.”)
Official statement by Prime Minister Mauroy, reprinted in Le Monde, 10 June 1981. (“un tel raid ne 
peut qu’accoître la tension dans cette région du monde.”)
The generally pro-lsraeli sentiments of the new President Mitterand was demonstrated to have 
limited such anger to verbal expressions of annoyance only.
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In this, the American and French reactions were similar to that of the Soviet 
Union, whose displeasure with Israel combined with the conviction that the shock was 
most accurately understood in terms of its destabilising effects on the region. It will 
be recalled that Minister of Defence -  Dmitri Fedorovich Ustinov -  declared angrily 
that “these Israelis completely threw aside all restraint -  they’re aheady falling upon 
our allies. It’s time to give them a reproach, or else Syria will be next.”^^  That the 
shock had set a dangerous precedent was evident but, once again, primarily regional 
in context. In the words of one former official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
attack had ensured that “one thing was clear to Moscow: nuclear capability had now 
been brought into the Middle East conflict.”'*'* Concerns for the credibility or 
effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime were outweighed by those which 
emphasised the instability of the region.
In addition, and to retui n briefly to the French understanding of the danger, 
there was a defensiveness (similar to that in the IAEA) regarding the fact that French 
nuclear supply standards were being again questioned. It was this implicit attack on 
France’s credibility, rather than the dishonest intentions of a non-nuclear state or 
concern over self-appointed counterproliferation, which appeared to foim the basis of 
the French understanding of the danger. The Foreign Minister, Claude Cheyssoii, was 
quick to point out that Iraq was a member of the IAEA as well as a non-nuclear 
signatory of the NPT. One journal quoted a French source as dismissing the outcry 
and asserting that “this reactor is extremely poorly adapted to the regular production
Grinevsky, The Atomic Bomb and the Middle East, (for Russian text, see Chapter 4, footnote 18), 
Grinevsky also discussed Andropov’s concern, following the attack, that the Israeli action was “a 
prelude, an experimental step to a military action in Lebanon or against Syria.” (The text states: “ to  
BOeUHblM  aKUHflM B JÎHBaHe HJIH npOTHB Chphh.”)
38Ibid.
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of plutonium.” *^* The United States, on the other hand, was accused in a newspaper 
editorial of indulging the Israelis and overreacting to a non-existent Iraqi threat. 
Instead of chastising Israel tor its destabilising action, the US was claimed to be 
fixated on “the bloodthhsty regime of Saddam Hussein and expresses the greatest 
contempt for an ^responsible and mercenary France.”'*** For the French, the problems 
raised appeared to have come about as a consequence of the unwarranted panic on the 
part of the American Congress. This perceived hysteria manifested itself not only in 
attacks on the IAEA but also in attacks on French safeguards and integiity. Any fear 
for the credibility of the safeguards system, or the nonproliferation regime, so far as 
the French were concerned, had been conjured up from needless anxieties.
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f danger
Wliile the bombing of Osiraq prompted a great deal of concern, it failed to 
generate a consensus on the grounds for such concern. Outside the American 
Congress there was a general belief firstly, that the credibility of the regime had been 
unjustly undermined and secondly, that this thereby masked the real basis of the 
problem, which was regional. France and, especially, the IAEA interpreted any 
danger to the credibility of the regime as having been created by Israel’s style of 
unilateral counterproliferation and the unjustified acceptance -  in the American 
Congress -  of its reasons for doing so. In emphasising the damage done to safeguards 
credibility by such counterproliferation, neither France nor the IAEA appeared to be 
overly concerned about the intentions of Iraq or the possibility that the signing on as a 
non-nuclear member of the NPT was not necessarily a guarantor of pure intentions.
Rob Lanfer, “IAEA’s Role Seen as Undiminished Despite Israeli Action,” Nucleonics Week, vol.22, 
110.23, 11 .lune 1981, p.2.
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Furthermore, of course, there was the ambiguity of the evidence for Iraqi 
proliferation. Without direct and strong evidence of military intention, it was hard to 
build a consensus around the existence and extent of damage to the regime and the 
need for change. Rather, the danger was viewed as having been created by Israel’s 
unnecessary action and the utterly uncalled for hand-wringing that followed, 
particularly in parts of the United States government.
The unwillingness to accept that the shock had implications beyond regional 
tensions or had justifiably called safeguards into question thus boded ill for the 
possibility of significant regime change eventually being enacted. Nor were the 
parties affected by the shock inclined to be persuaded of the view broadly adopted in 
Congress, having already decided on (and evidently decided to stick to) the ‘correct’ 
understanding of the danger posed by the event. The increasing “suspicions about the 
administration’s insensitivity to congressional concerns”'*' reflected the division 
between the Congressional interpretation of the danger as being to the regime, and the 
interpretation of the danger by the American (and Soviet) governments as 
unnecessarily undermining the credibility of the safeguards system but primarily as 
reflecting the problems of the Middle East and heightening the insecurity of the 
region. The end result stood in contrast to the consensus which had eventually been 
reached both within and outside the US following the Indian test. The time following 
the bombing of Osiraq revealed a um esolved conflict between those who understood 
the shock as having undermined the regime by revealing genuine problems and those 
who understood the shock as having undermined the regime by raising unnecessary 
questions which, especially in the eyes of the Reagan Administration, detracted fl om 
the ‘real’ issue of regional conflict.
Le Monde, 12 June 1981. (American opinion was fixated on “le régime sanguinaire de Saddam
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Understanding of Responsibility:
With the disagi'eements that existed regarding the nature and extent of the 
dangers raised, the reaction to the Osiraq shock began to differ from that which 
followed the Indian test. This was not the sole reason for the inaction that followed, 
although the lack of consensus certainly helped to bring about the eventual stalemate. 
However, the lack of acceptance of responsibility for leading regime change -  one 
which was so strongly evident tbllowing the Indian test -  was also absent in the 
aftermath of this later shock.
The rhetoric of responsibility which, in the United States, surrounded the 
Indian test was linked consistently with the calls for an initiative to be taken towards 
regime change. In the Indian case, the actor who instigated, and even pressured 
through, change to the regime was also the actor which felt responsible for taking 
action. However, following the attack on Osriaq, the understanding of the 
responsibility for leading change instead veered rather nanowly between a belief (in 
the American Congress) that someone should do something, and an equally 
determined belief elsewhere that no one need do anything.
The United States
Beginning again with the United States, and specifically with the Congress, 
the differences between the rhetoric of the Indian test and the Osii aq bombing are 
apparent. This discrepancy occurred despite the initial similarities between both cases 
with respect to the fear that the shock had endangered the regime and revealed 
weaknesses which required change. In the case of Osfraq, the attempts at 
consciousness-raising were not accompanied by expressions of responsibility for
Hussein, et exprimer le plus profond mépris pour une France irresponsible et mercantile.”)
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bringing about change to the regime. This is not to ignore the fact that anxiety was 
expressed about the seeming nebulousness of the Administration’s nonproliferation 
policy. For example, shortly after the attack Representative Hart charged the Reagan 
Administration with “responsibility for sending the wrong signals to the world about 
US commitment to nonproliferation.”'*^ Senator Glenn, as was noted previously, 
expressed his confusion over, as he put it, “what the nonproliferation policy of this 
administration is.”'*^ Nonetheless, while such criticism certainly indicates some sense 
of American responsibility for supporting nuclear nonproliferation and the 
nonproliferation regime, it differs in an important way fi’om the Indian case. Not only 
was the sense of responsibility relatively mild in its expression, no causal connection 
was made between American policy and the events in Iraq.'*'* There was no 
demonstration of a belief that a failure on the part of the United States had contributed 
to the circumstances leading to the shock; no reference to the event itself was made 
even in those statements which brought up question of responsibility generally. Such 
sentiments as existed tended to cite the event as highlighting the need for a concrete 
nonproliferation policy which would provide a kind of template on how to react to 
such things.
In addition, the questions which arose regarding the efficacy of IAEA 
safeguards fiirther appeared to dilute the connection between the United States and the
BQckmdwx, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p.376.
Representative Hart, as quoted in the Congressional Record, Tuesday 16 June 1981 (Proceedings and 
Debates o f the Ninety-Seventh Congress, first session, 12449)
The Israeli Air Strike, p.46.
The four Congressional hearings which dealt with the bombing appear to contain no expression of a 
belief that the issues raised had been brought about, at least in part, by American inattention or 
mishandling of the situation International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards; 
Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities; IAEA Programs o f Safeguards; The Israeli A ir Strike).
This, o f course, contrasts with the prevalent sense, following the Indian test, that the lack of attention 
devoted to such matters had paved the way for India both to acquire and test its nuclear capability.
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Osiraq shock. Given the obvious mistrust of Iraq’s nuclear intentions, and given an 
underlying conviction that Israel had done the world a favour, this is hardly 
surprising. If Israel was justified in attacking Oskaq -  if it indeed “did the only thing 
a countiy could do”'*^ -  the obvious implication was that Iraq was intending to 
abrogate its NPT commitments. Not having been a supplier state to Iraq (being, in 
fact, diplomatically estranged from it) the United States was able easily to divest itself 
of responsibility for the problems revealed and created by the shock.'*  ^ The 
Congressional understanding of American liability for creating the circumstances 
which brought about the shock therefore fell on those actors directly responsible for 
preventing it: the supplier (France) and, particularly, the lAEA.'*^
Despite a clear sense that the United States had not been the architect of the 
shock, there was nonetheless a lingering sense, within Congress, of responsibility for 
bringing about change to what were seen to be deficient IAEA safeguards. While calls 
for American leadership were less strident that in the case of the Indian test, 
suggestions persisted that the United States must initiate much-needed change in the 
IAEA. Opinions were voiced that “there is presently no basis for public confidence in 
agency safeguards...[and that] the IAEA, unless we strengthen it, must negotiate with
Ibid., p. 148 (speaker: Senator Pressler). Similar sentiments, such as Representative Lantos’ 
declaration that “the surrounded and beleaguered Israelis did exactly what we would do in our part of 
the world should the occasion arise” (Congressional Record, March 24, 1982) and Representative 
Bingham’s statement that “Israel had every reason to be alarmed by Iraq’s nuclear progress” in Israeli 
Air Strike, p. 185, led the Committee on Foreign Affairs itself to admit, as noted earlier, that such 
beliefs were “a common theme” in Congress (Congress and Foreign Policy, 1981, p.98) and even 
fi-etted that such admiration was able to “override the self-defense and nonproliferation questions” 
(Ibid., p.98).
This was an opportunity which, in the case of tlie hidian test, had been prevented by the gl owing 
awareness of the American role in the Indian nuclear programme.
As has been detailed, criticism of the ability o f the IAEA to thwart nuclear ambitions began from the 
first hearings on the subject and gave rise to Senate and House of Representatives hearings specifically 
on the utility and effectiveness of the IAEA (see The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 
Improving Safeguards and IAEA Programs o f  Safeguards).
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each host country what it will be shown and when it will see it.”'*'* In addition,
hearings in the House of Representatives put forward the idea that the United States
should reconvene the Nuclear Suppliers Group once more.'*  ^ Such suggestions, as
well as demonstrating a desire for the United States to lead change, are clearly
reflective of concerns regarding nuclear supplies and the policies of nuclear suppliers
(in the case of Osiraq: France).^**
However tentatively suggestions of US leadership were voiced, they ran into
film opposition fl om the State Department and Administration. The official State
Department response to suggestions of a reconvened Nuclear Suppliers Group was
rejected on the grounds that such an initiative would simply serve to
rekindle the resentment and opposition of many developing 
nations...We believe that former NSG members themselves 
would be reluctant to embark on another highly visible, formal 
attempt to control further their nuclear exports.^'
Given that concern in the executive tended to emphasise the regional context of the
shock, this lack of will to initiate regime change is unsuiprising. In addition, the
Director of the ACDA claimed that “unilateral American attempts to impose our
views on other states encourage the spread of reprocessing facilities and weaken the
possibility of achieving cooperative solutions for the problem.
48 The Israeli A ir Strike, p .22.
The International Atomic Energy Agency: Improving Safeguards, 147 & 219. The proposal to 
reconvene the NSG was originally put forward, not surprisingly, by Senator Glenn in the June 1981 
Israeli A ir Strike hearings, p .177.
Representative Lantos, who had argued in favour of Israel’s action as self-defence, also called upon 
the administiation “to take immediate and effective action to remind our European friends to stop their 
ill-conceived propagation of nuclear weapons.” (from the Congi essional Record, March 24, 1981). 
The testimony o f John Moore, the Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and National 
Security at the University of Virginia. Moore, a former Department of State official, said that France 
shares a greater portion of the responsibility for this than it has yet received in the overall public 
assessment.” Israeli Air Strike, p.250
The International Atomic Energy Agency: Improving Safeguards, p .219.
Ibid., p. 147.
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In conclusion, the Reagan Administration showed no gi'eat longing to lead the 
charge into an arena which it considered to be external to the problem at hand. 
Congressional carryings-on over the perceived inadequacy of the IAEA were felt to 
be unwarranted and misdii ected. As one official recalled: “the US Administration 
did not want the US Congress to take actions that would have damaged the IAEA 
safeguards system, and hence it did what it could to defend the efficacy of the 
safeguards. The understanding of the responsibility for bringing about regime 
change, like the understanding of the danger posed by the event, failed to generate a 
consensus.
The IAEA
The sense of obligation for initiating change was even less apparent in the 
IAEA. As was made clear in the discussion of the initial IAEA reaction to the shock, 
the understanding of the danger was not of one posed by Iraq, but of one created 
solely by the Israelis and the subsequent (over)reaction of others to the event. One 
would thus not expect to find a sense of responsibility for rectifying a problem which 
is not considered to exist. Indeed, the attack appears to have hardened the view that 
neither the IAEA safeguards in use, nor the ones that the Agency intended to apply to 
Iraq in the future, would allow diversion to go undetected even in the event of Iraqi 
non-compliance. The IAEA Board of Governors and Department of Safeguards felt 
no duty to instigate change to the safeguards aspect of the nonproliferation regime as 
a response to the questions raised by the attack on Osiraq.
Interview with Fred McGoldrick, 30 June 2000.
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The fu'st indication that the Agency placed liability for the problems squarely
on Israel and not on its own safeguards was evident in Director General Eklund’s
address to the UN Security Council, in which he asserted that
in fulfilling its responsibilities, the Agency has inspected the Iraqi 
reactors and has not found evidence of any activity not in accordance 
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, a non-NPT country 
has evidently not felt assured by our findings and by our ability to 
continue to discharge our safeguarding responsibilities effectively. '^^
On July two and a half weeks after this statement, Eklund again addressed the
IAEA Board of Governors and informed them that the IAEA earned no responsibility
for the circumstances leading up to the attack, given that “there was thus nothing
wrong with the safeguards being applied on the Tamuz reactors nor any deficiencies
in the inspection schedule or procedures.”^^  This was supported in print on two
occasions by the Deputy Director General of the Department of Safeguards (H.
Gruemm) who claimed that potential diversion scenarios had been applied to Iraq and
found not to be credible. In fact, Gruemm argued, “it is to be doubted that the
effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is really the weak link in this interaction.”^^  Going
still further, he claimed that the IAEA was a strictly technical organisation and that
“nonproliferation is not really a technical, but a political p r o b l e m . T h e  issues of
nuclear proliferation, it therefore follows, were not the IAEA’s responsibility.
Address to the United Nations Security Council by IAEA Director General Eklund, 19 June 1981, 
[extract] in Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue, p.4.
Address to the IAEA Board of Governors by Director General Eklund, 6 July 1981, [extract] in Ibid.,
p.6.
H. Gruemm “Potential and limitations of International Safeguards,” in IAEA Bulletin Supplement 
1982, p.43. Gruemm also attacked the media’s ignorance for putting IAEA safeguards in a bad light, in 
an article immediately following the shock, entitled “Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record 
Straight,” IAEA Bulletin, vol.23, no.4. He continued to deny IAEA responsibility in “Safeguards 
verification -  its credibility and tlie diversion hypothesis,” T4EW Bulletin, vol.25, no.4, December 1983.
57 H. Gruemm “Potential and limitations of International Safeguards,” p.40.
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In 1983, the Dii'cctor of the Division of External Relations continued to refute the idea 
of an ineffectual IAEA as having “forced” Israel into the attack, noting that “the 
Israeli raid has resulted in wide public debate on IAEA safeguards but, almost 
ironically, safeguards were not put to the test in that case.”^^  He went on to claim 
confidently that the various methods suggested for the Iraqis to divert fuel would be 
untenable, stating that “any attempt to use such a diversion strategy would have been 
easily detected by IAEA safeguards.” '^^
The Agency therefore felt no responsibility to initiate change in its own 
practices. Instead, the IAEA considered that it had a responsibility to prevent calls for 
drastic change to the safeguards system -  such as those coming fi'om Israel and 
certain parts of the United States -  fi'om coming to pass. This was particularly 
evident in the concern over the perceived danger to the place of the IAEA as a 
guardian of the right to peaceful nuclear development as well as nonproliferation.^^ 
This found expression in a desiie to prevent perceived attempts to alter the established 
norm of peaceful nuclear assistance. Change to the regime, in the eyes of the IAEA 
bureaucracy, was not considered something to seek, but something to avert.
France and the USSR
France likewise evidenced no belief that it had been deficient in theii' dealings 
with Iraq and thus “forced” Israel into a pre-emptive strike. The Foreign Minister, M. 
Bernard Pons was quoted as affirming that France had supplied Iraq with a research
Christopher Herzig, “Correspondence; IAEA Safeguards,” International Security, vol.7, no.4. 
Spring 1983, p. 195.
Ibid., p. 195.
^  The Director General’s concern, expressed in his address to the Board, was that “following the 
Baghdad incident, there may be renewed attempts to impose new restrictions and constraints on certain 
areas of peaceful nuclear technology.” (in “Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue,” p .6.)
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reactor and taken precautions against its ever being put to military use.^* Israel -  not 
France -  was viewed as bearing primary responsibility for problems raised by the 
shock by indulging in an unnecessary attack. This, at least, was the impression 
created at the time. As one article headline announced: “Angry French Contend 
Osirak Couldn’t Have Served Weapons Purpose,”^^  Another quoted a French source 
as saying that “the reactor is extremely poorly adapted to the regular production of 
plutonium.Publ icly,  at least, the French government remained unwilling to admit 
that its nuclear relations with Iraq were problematic. As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, however, concerns regarding Iraqi intentions ultimately motivated 
France to push the Iraqis towards less proliferation-prone fuel, and to prevent them 
from rebuilding the Iraqi reactor, despite declarations of the unassailability and 
comprehensiveness of French standards of supp ly . Such  actions displayed an 
apparent mistrust of Iraq, despite official reaction.
There is, however, no evidence of a concerted attempt by the French 
government to take the lead to correct any such problems, or initiate a change in 
aspects of the regime dealing with such matters. The evident irritation over having its 
nuclear supply standards yet again exposed to the international spotlight provoked this 
kind of defensive response. Having so vociferously denied any impropriety, it
M. Pons stated tliat “le gouvernement fiançais, en livrant à ITrak un réacteur de recherches, avait 
puis toutes dispositions pour que celui-ci ne puisse être détourné à des fins militaires.” {Le Monde, 9 
Juin 1981). M. Pons was also quick to note that Iraq’s nuclear programme was also under the control 
o f the IAEA. (“De plus, cette activité de recherches était soumise au contrôle peniianent de l’Agence 
international de Vienne” in Le Monde, 9 juin 1981).
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.24, 18 .Tune 1981, p.3.
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.23, 11 June 1981, p.2.
Le Monde, 11 June 1981. The Quai d ’Orsay statement on the attack proclaimed that “le president de 
la République a lui-même insisté sur la nécessité de prendre les mesures indispensables pour guarantir 
l’utilisation de ces installations (de Tamuz) à des fins pacifiques.” (“The President of the Republic, at 
the same time, insisted on the necessity of taking certain crucial measures to guarantee the use o f the 
reactor (Tamuz) for peaceful purposes.”)
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became difficult to accept responsibility for leading change to the safeguards and 
supply standards which were not seen to be in need of revision.
Although the Soviet Union was the first state to embark on nuclear 
cooperation with Iraq, care had been taken not to provide it with technology or 
equipment that could be used to military ends. As the previous chapter pointed out, 
Soviet insistence on the application of IAEA safeguards inclined Iraq towards seeking 
French assistance in the mid-1970’s. Given such indications of concern over Iraqi 
intent, and having played no part in the development of the doomed Osiraq reactor 
(and given, of course, that the attack was apparently viewed in a regional context), it 
is hardly surprising that that Soviet Union was reluctant to lead changes to the 
nonproliferation regime. Indeed, it was recorded that the Soviet Prime Minister 
Tikonov was asked by the Iraqis, following the bombing, for help in nuclear areas, 
and that, “understanding the delicacy of this issue, and lacking a firm position, [he] 
evaded answering.”^^
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f responsibilit}>
This examination of the sense of responsibility for leading regime change 
reveals significant differences in how the bombing of Osii*aq and the 1974 Indian 
nuclear test were understood. In the United States, the diverging opinions of the 
Congress and the State Department and Administration were once again important. 
General agreement existed, in contrast to six years earlier, that the United States bore 
no direct responsibility for the circumstances leading to the shock. Congressional 
opinion, however, still suggested that the United States must again play a leading role 
in changing the regime and fixed upon the IAEA as the institution in need of
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salvation. This time, however, the State Department and Administration did not share 
this assessment and indicated that, given the unjustified criticism of the regime which 
was obscuring the ‘real’ issue of the Middle East, there was no obligation on the part 
of the United States to stir up the hornet’s nest that calls for change would produce. 
The IAEA, for its part, denied any flaws in either the safeguards applied to Osiraq or 
those that were to have been applied after the reactor became operational. In addition, 
the Board of Governors and Department of Safeguards apparently felt a greater 
responsibility to avert change to the safeguards than encourage it, fearing an attack on 
the norm of peaceful nuclear assistance .T he USSR, which shared the view of the 
Reagan Administration that the bombing was symptomatic of regional problems and 
which had taken care in the past not to supply Iraq with militarily useful technology, 
likewise saw no need to lead regime change. Finally, evidence of previous French 
concern regarding Iraq -  and the subsequent failure to rebuild the reactor in question -  
points to some sense of liability for bringing about the Israeli attack. At the same 
time, annoyance at being the focus of attention yet again for theft nuclear supply 
policy led into the kind of stringent denials of wrong-doing which undermined the 
possibility of France calling for or leading change to the regime even had the desire to 
do so been sufficiently strong. The French government considered itself already to 
have taken the necessary steps to prevent any Iraqi proliferation and that, combined 
with the strident denials of carelessness, mitigated against a French acceptance of the 
need to be at the fbreft ont of change to the regime.
Grinevsky, “The Atomic Bomb and the Middle East,” (the Russian text states; “IToHHMaa bck) 
nejïHKaxHOCTb 3toh tcmw h He HMea mctkoh no3HUHH, Thxohob yKnoHHjica ot oxBeta.”).
This norm was one which was not just enshrined in the IAEA, but at the heart o f the regime in 
Article IV of the NPT, which spoke of the “inalienable right o f all Parties to the Treaty to develop
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Understanding of Immediacy:
The United States
However much it upset notions of how accused proliferators were to be dealt 
with, the shock of the Osiraq incident can aheady be seen to have been interpreted 
quite differently from the Indian test. The fact that Israel’s fears regarding Iraq’s 
intentions could be neither definitively proven nor discounted did not help matters. 
The preceding sections point also to an understanding in the IAEA , USSR, and 
France that the hazard to the regime was one which had been created by Israel and the 
subsequent overreaction to her claims in, for example, the American Congress. The 
United States government, which had almost single-handedly been the architect of the 
regime change following the Indian test, did not ultimately come to accept 
Congressional interpretations of the need to initiate regime change.
In the case of India, these interpretations of the shock existed alongside the 
belief that regime change could not be postponed. No other concerns were seen to 
obviate the need for regime change and the issue of nuclear nonproliferation 
generally. Such beliefs, however, were absent in the case of the Osiraq incident, 
particularly (and crucially) in the United States and revealed yet another discrepancy 
between the priorities of the Congi ess and the State Department. As one author 
observed in the wake of the bombing: “the issue is simply how important 
nonproliferation is compared to other issues.”^^  Following the bombing of Osiraq, it 
became clear that nonproliferation -  and thus the need for immediate action -  came a 
long way down the list of priorities. Not only were the issues raised by the Osiraq 
incident not perceived as requii'ing immediate action, but there appears to have been a
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Aiticle IV., para.l of Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons).
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conviction that several competing interests took primacy over nuclear 
nonproliferation. This conviction appears to have been especially entrenched in the 
Reagan Administration which, as one author noted at the time, began from a premise 
that “competing US national interest must often take precedence over efforts to halt 
proliferation.” ’^^
Such an assessment was assisted by the lack of what has was described, in the 
discussion of the Indian test, as a “reinforcement”.^’’^ After the Indian test, the sense 
that the time to act was running out was brought about primarily by the 
French/Pakistani and West German/Brazilian deals, and the resulting sense that the 
Pandora’s box India had opened was rapidly emptying. No equivalent ‘after-shocks’ 
existed in the Osiraq case. The Israeli attack was not imitated, nor was a non-nuclear 
NPT country proven to have been breaking its treaty obligations. On this occasion, 
the initial fears in Congress that the shock had damaged the regime by setting a 
dangerous precedent were not reinforced by subsequent events. This is not to argue 
that the absence of a reinforcing event was sufficient, or even necessary, for creating a 
sense of time running out. However, given the fact that such an occurrence had, six 
years earlier, proved helpful in creating a need for action, its absence following the 
Osiraq shock may assist in understanding why change to the nonproliferation regime 
was not seen as requiring immediate attention.
Several other considerations may also have played a part in persuading the 
American government that the shock did not requfre immediate action and that other 
interests were more pressing than nuclear nonproliferation. Not least among these 
was the desire of the new Administration to break with the policy o f ‘nuclear denial’,
Richard K. Betts, “Nucleai* Proliferation after Osirak,” Control Today, vol. 11, no.7, September 
1981, FkS.
Feldman “The Bombing of Osiraq -  Revisited,” p. 132.
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which had characterised Carter’s approach to nonproliferation, and to re-launch the
United States as a competitive nuclear supplier.
The first statement by the Reagan Administration on American nuclear
nonproliferation policy made clear the intention to break with that of Carter.^® These
intentions were underscored by an official State Department response to questions in
the House of Representatives regarding the American response to the events like
Osiraq, The new administration, it said, intended to hold a review
focused on approaches for a more predictable policy for 
exercising US rights to approve reprocessing and use of 
plutonium subject to US control under our peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreements.^*
Earlier in the same hearings, the Director of the ACDA had also articulated this new
dii ection in nuclear policy when he declared the need to recognise “that such
activities [civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development] in the stable industrial
democracies simply do not in themselves present a proliferation risk.”^^  The
antiproliferation, denial policies of Carter had clearly come to an end.^^
This new turn was an important demonstration of the reprioritisation of
American nuclear policy. It was impossible both to carry on the denial policies of the
See Chapter 3 of this text, pp. 107-9.
This statement, it will be recalled, announced the need to “reestablish this Nation as a predictable and 
reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards.” (Statement on United 
States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” 16 July 1981, reprinted in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  
the United States -  Ronald Reagan, p.630.) The Administration’s intentions were reiterated to the 
IAEA eight months later by the Ameiican Representative, who claimed that “this Administration 
intends to take a positive attitude toward, and foster increased domestic reliance on, nuclear 
power...We seek, for example, to lessen the regulatory impediments which have contributed to tlie 
reluctance of utilities to purchase new power plants.” (Statement by US Permanent Representative 
(Kennedy) to the International Atomic Energy Agency; US Nuclear Energy Policy, March 22, 1982 in 
Documents on Disarmament, 1982, US ACDA, p. 160-61).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards, p.231.
Statement o f  Hon. Eugene V. R ostow, in Ibid., p. 147.
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Carter Administration and, as was desired, to re-establish America’s position in 
nuclear commerce. As one journal put it, the new Administration found itself obliged 
to “attempt to reconcile [the] goals of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
promoting the use of nuclear power.” '^* The unwillingness in the State Department 
and Administration to reconvene the NSG or further restrict nuclear commerce, is 
indicative of this new preference. The fact that the shock, in the end, inspired no 
flurry of activity on the part of the US underscores the suggestion that 
nonproliferation concerns lost out to, among other things, the resuscitation of nuclear 
trade.
The increased focus on the relaxation of the rules governing American nuclear 
trade was not the only issue which served to push concern over the nonproliferation 
regime farther down the list of those things which required immediate attention. The 
Cold War had, after a slight thawing in relations between the US and USSR, chilled 
considerably. Indeed, 1980 was described in the annual review of one political 
journal as having “represented the lowest point in Soviet-American relations in over a 
d e c a d e . T h e  greatest nuclear threat once more stemmed fi-ora the possibility of 
hostilities between the two superpowers. The fears, in the previous decade, of a world 
of many nuclear powers had been subsumed by the aggressive rhetoric and vertical 
nuclear proliferation which characterised US/USSR relations.
The question of a NPT state’s possible intentions to construct a nuclear bomb 
or two, indeed the question of the structure and overall health of the nonproliferation 
regime, seemed of secondary importance as a consequence. What was understood by
Not surprisingly, this did not please the old guard of nonproliferation campaigners in Congress, 
Senator Glenn, in particular, disparaged the Administi ation’s relaxation of policy and, as was noted 
earlier, the incoherence (in Senator Glenn’s eyes) o f its nonproliferation policy.
The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 1981.
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the Administration to be of immediate importance in the Middle East was superpower
relations and Israel’s security. Reagan, for his part, cited his Administration’s goals
in the Middle East as “trying to reduce instability...which we saw as an invitation to
Soviet t a m p e r i n g . E v e n  in Congress, voices were raised identifying the Cold War
as much more important than anything raised by the Osiraq incident. One
Congressman expressed his concern that
today, as many are mesmerized over the destruction of the 
nuclear capability of the radical and irresponsible regime in 
Iraq, the Soviet Union is again poised on the brink of crushing 
the budding independence of Poland... We as Members of Congress 
have a supreme obligation to the American people to focus on 
the dangerous Soviet fall game and not become distracted by the 
momentary sideshow in the Middle East.^^
The heightening of Cold War tensions supported the assessment that the most 
immediate source of concern was not Iraq, the IAEA, or the nonproliferation regime, 
but rather the Soviet Union. Insofar as nuclear weapons were concerned, superpower 
conflict outranked the as-yet unsubstantiated ambitions of Iraq, and the prevention of 
horizontal proliferation in the face of ever-spftalling vertical proliferation was pushed 
still farther down the list of American priorities.
It was American relations with Iraq which provide further assistance in 
understanding the outcome of the shock. Iraq, simply put, was perceived to be more 
useful than damaging to American interests. The fear that the time for action was 
rapidly expiring was not only unchallenged by the occurrence of a similar event, but 
was inherent in outcome of the shock itself. “As far as Iraq was concerned,” one 
former State Department official recalled “we viewed it as a long-term proliferation
Strategic Survey 1981-1982, p.29. 
Reagan, An American Life, p.504.
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threat anyway, and the Israeli attack had pushed that threat even fiirther into the
future.”^^  Not only was the need for action not pressing, but the shock was even
perceived to have bought valuable time.
Good relations with Iraq, however, could be of immediate benefit. As one
witness testified to the Senate:
[Iraq] is a potential trading partner of enomious value to 
the United States. Actions which would tend to discourage 
efforts to achieve an opening to the West, and which would 
push Iraq back toward the embrace of the waiting Soviet bear, 
are not in the national interest.
Such a statement echoes the Administration’s desire, cited earlier, that the
Soviet Union be prevented fiom gaining too strong a foothold in the Middle East.
Following the successful revolution in Iran, and the resulting hostilities between
Iran and the US, Iraq’s usefulness increased. The United States in 1981, it was
claimed, wanted “a regional ally that could replace Iran in America’s strategic
n e t w o r k . T h e  fact that at the time of the shock, the Iran-Iraq war was going badly
for Iraq, further contributed to the belief in the immediate need not to delve too
deeply into Iraq’s nuclear intentions (the threat of which, as stated earlier, had become
a long-term consideration). In the shorter-term, an Iranian victory was distinctly
undesirable. “The last thing Washington wanted to see”, it has been contended, “was
Tom Lantos, quoted in the Congressional Record, 11 June 1981 reprinted in The Israeli Air Strike,
p .2 0 2 .
Fred McGoldrick, interview via e-mail, 30 June 2000. It should be noted, however, that tiie notion of 
regime inaction as a consequence of Iraq’s more immediate perceived use is one which is contested by 
McGoldrick, for one.
Prepared Statement of Joseph J. Malone (President, Middle East Research Associates Inc.) in The 
Israeli A ir Strike, p.268.
Feldman “The Bombing of Osiraq -  Revisited,” p. 129. Feldman goes on to claim that tlie American 
condemnation of Israel following the attack was done with this in mind: “if  the ‘Iraqi Option’ were to 
be kept alive, the United States could not help but make its disapproval of Israel’s action explicit.”
(p. 129).
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a victorious Iran spreading fundamentalist revolution into the Aiab heartland.” '^
Certainly Reagan’s own estimation of a powerful Iran was one of concern:
the sudden emergence of fanatic Islamic fundamentalism as 
a political force in the Middle East was a development 
that would have posed a difficult challenge to any Western 
leader concerned without strategic interests there.
Iraq, in short, was revealing itself to be amenable to American interests precisely at
the time Israel attacked the Osftaq reactor, and precisely at the time that interest in the
nuclear nonproliferation regime was sliding down the list of priorities.
The belief that Iraq was of more immediate use as, if not an ally, exactly, then
not an enemy was one which appeared to win the day. Nuclear proliferation,
particularly unconfirmed accusations of it, was not calculated to be an issue of any
gieat urgency. That such an assessment was made is reflected in the warming of
relations between Iraq and the US which occurred in the years following the attack.
The New York Times reported in November 1982 -  during the American withdrawal
h'om the IAEA to protest the perceived ill-treatment of Israel -  the simultaneous
growing relationship with Iraq, observing that “the United States, although it still does
not have full diplomatic relations with President Saddam Hussein’s government,
appears to be wimiing respect and a measure of influence.”^^  More noteworthy still is
a staff report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which declared that “the
United States has undertaken a number of steps to shore up Iraq and to forestall an
Iranian victoiy.”**'^
Kenneth R. Timmennan, The Death Lobby, (London: Fourth Estate; 1982), p. 125.
82 Reagan, An American Life, p .218.
The New York Times, 22 November, 1982. On November 27*'’, 1984, the newspaper reported the 
restoration of full ties with Iraq, noting that such an event “underscored the improving ties o f recent 
years between Washington and Baghdad.” This trend continued and was observed in an article titled: 
“Iraq is Improving Links to Both US and Soviet Union.” (See The New York Times, 29 March 1984.)
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The IAEA, France and USSR
Turning briefly to the remaining actors, there was little inclination to embark 
on immediate action. This is unsurprising in the light of the apparently unanimous, 
and strident, public repudiation of the Israeli accusations as well as a responsibility for 
creating the problem or bringing about change. The IAEA’s belief in its obligation to 
prevent change ran counter to a desire for immediate action and in favour of 
immediate inaction. The fact that IAEA publications, statements and behaviour in 
response to the Osftaq incident reveal no sense of time running out or an urgent need 
for change reflects this.^  ^ The French and Soviet governments, for their parts, gave 
no indication of a desire for immediate corrective action. Despite any lingering sense 
of concern regarding Iraq’s intentions, the prevailing sense that France was again 
subject to unwarranted overreaction in some cftcles mitigated against a desire for 
immediate action to be taken to change the regime. The Soviet Union appeared to 
share the Reagan Administration’s belief that regional and Cold War politics were 
more urgent.
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f immediacy
The attack on the Osiiaq reactor did not result in a sense that change to the 
regime must be implemented before the opportunity passed. The prevailing belief, 
that if a danger of Iraqi proliferation had existed it had been ended for the time being
War in the Gulf, A Staff Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, August 1984. Quoted in Timmennan, The Death Lobby, p. 125.
In IAEA Bulletins, please see FI. Gruemm “Safeguards verification -  its credibility and tlie diversion 
hypothesis” ; L.W. Herron “A lawyer’s view o f safeguards and non-proliferation” (vol.24, no.3, Sept.
1982); H. Gruemm “Potential and limitations of international safeguards”; H. Gruemm “Safeguards 
and Tamuz; setting the record straight”; “Peaceful nuclear development must continue.” Also see 
Herzig “Correspondence: IAEA Safeguards”.
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by Israel’s attack, remained unchallenged by subsequent events. Moreover, the 
concern which had been raised in the American Congress -  having no parallel to the 
West German and French nuclear supply agreements which had followed from the 
Indian test -  went unsupported by further evidence. In the meantime, the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and issues of nuclear nonproliferation generally, were 
relegated to relative unimportance. The desire to re-establish the US as a nuclear 
supplier, the increase of Cold War and Middle East tensions, and the potential 
benefits of befriending Iraq all worked against the desire to propel a conflicting 
interest such as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, to the forefront of immediate 
concerns. The IAEA, concerned with preventing change to the safeguard aspect of 
the regime rather than fostering it, was therefore hardly inclined towards taking 
action, immediate or otherwise. The USSR, much like the Reagan Administration, 
appeared to see the question of balance in the region as outweighing regime issues. 
France, of course, had charged Israel with creating the threat, not Iraq (and by 
extension itself). The conviction that French supply standards were more than 
adequate was incompatible with a belief that action to alter further the supply and 
safeguards aspect of the regime was needed.
Understanding of Solvability:
The above discussion regarding the interpretation of the Osiraq shock among 
those actors dfrectly involved has revealed a broad reluctance to instigate change in 
the nonproliferation regime. Conclusions to this end were formed by differing 
assessments of the danger posed, responsibility held, and immediacy required and all 
appear ultimately to have worked against a consensus for change. The same 
characterised interpretations of the solvability of any dangers raised by the shock.
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The questions raised by the Osiraq shock centred primarily on the efficacy of 
IAEA safeguards and whether or not they were capable of detecting a potential 
diversion of nuclear material to military ends. However, a clear view of how such 
déficiences might be addressed did not emerge in the aftermath of the shock. This 
was even true in the American Congress, which evidenced the greatest concern over 
apparent flaws in the safeguards system. More importantly, still, the antipathy of the 
United States Administration and the IAEA to such changes meant that the possible 
ways by which to strengthen or reform safeguards were not examined. Such an 
examination (which could only lead to change if undertaken by governments and the 
IAEA), undermined the chances of Congressional concerns being heeded. The 
determination by the US government and the IAEA that there were no safeguards 
problems which requfted resolution foiled the chances of this type of regime change. 
The eventual metamorphosis of the Osftaq incident into a showdown between the 
IAEA General Conference and the United States cemented the improbability of any 
solutions being found and implemented.
Insofar as nuclear trade was concerned, change to this part of the regime was 
equally implausible. It was only in Congress that any will at all has been shown to 
have existed regarding the need to re-invigorate the NSG. Such a suggestion was 
rejected the the State Department and Administration, while France reacted 
defensively to accusations of lax trading standards, giving no indication of a 
willingness to be dragged into such talks yet again. The absence of the USSR and its 
Eastern bloc allies ft om the eventual NSG meeting indicated that these states held a 
similar view on the utility of such talks.
More to the point, while suggestions were made regarding a reconvening of 
the NSG, there were no concrete suggestions -  even in Congress -  of a need for
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changes in the rules of the NSG. The Guidelines which had been agreed in the wake 
of the 1974 Indian test were considered to be suffcient when applied by the member 
states. It was thus the implementation of the NSG, rather than regime change, which 
was considered to be a solution to the problems raised. France’s eventual refusal -  in 
spite of its protestations -  to supply Iraq with a second reactor indicated that the 
agreed-upon Guidelines were increasingly being honoured by all members of the 
NSG.
Conclusions:
Despite the unprecedented nature of the Israeli attack, and the fact that the 
shock clearly raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
regime, the incident had no lasting effect. The attack on the Osftaq reactor aroused 
serious concerns amongst the relevant actors regarding the possibility of imitation and 
the damage done to the safeguards system. Certainly there was a shared concern that 
the bombing of Osiraq had undermined the credibility of the nonproliferation regime 
by setting a precedent tor unilateral, self-appointed counterproliferation.
However, the ambiguity of the shock -  the fact that Iraqi ambitions could not 
be proven and that Iraq had not breached any safeguards obligations -  made it 
difficult to come to a consensus over the danger posed. In this it differed sharply 
from the Indian test of 1974. Firstly, of course, the explosion of a nuclear device was 
uncontestable. India’s claim that it was a peaceful explosion and that it had not 
breached any trade undertakings were rejected by the United States and its allies. 
Further claims by France and West Gennany that the explosion had not revealed 
deficiencies in the trade regime were also rejected. This allowed for a clear
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interpretation of the event which contrasted with the lack of claidty surrounding the 
bombing of Osii aq and what it implied.
It was only in the American Congress that the safeguards and verification 
aspects of the regime were considered to be so compromised by the event as to justify 
regime change. The Reagan Administration, State Department and the Soviet 
government considered any damage to the regime to be much less important than that 
done to the stability of the Middle East and the peace process. The IAEA and French 
government reacted defensively to suggestions of ineffectual standards of safeguards 
and supply and, much like the Reagan Administration, considered the greatest danger 
to the regime to stem fi'om Congressional over-reaction to the Israeli accusations.
In the United States, which had taken the initiative in favour of regime change 
six years earlier, differences in interpretation between the Congress and the State 
Department/Administration also prevented the kind of unity that had been so vital for 
the creation of the NSG. The American Congress found itself unable to persuade the 
rest of government of the validity of its assessment and the need for action. The 
IAEA and France, meanwhile, considered themselves responsible for combating 
Congressional mistrust more by preventing unwarranted change to the regime than by 
initiating it. The USSR, while showing little concern that Iraq’s reactor had been 
destroyed, also recognised the opportunity to use Israel’s action to score political 
points off the United States.
To make regime change still more improbable, there was little sense of 
urgency for action, particularly in the US. A reinforcing event (something akin, 
perhaps, to the French and West German nuclear deals after the Indian test) never 
occurred to place change to the nonproliferation regime firmly at the top of any list of 
priorities. This was even more true when such an event had to compete with
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increasing tension between the US and USSR, the conflict in the Middle East, and the 
potential benefits of cultivating Iraq as a regional counterweight to a post-revolution 
Iran. Moreover, the question of nuclear nonproliferation generally had lost its 
previously high place on the American list of priorities. These disparate evaluations of 
the raid on Osftaq hindered the identification and achievement of solutions to 
problems around which little consensus existed in the first place.
Although the possibility of the Osiraq shock translating into regime change 
was not doomed from the outset, it is difficult to see how regime change could have 
occurred. Those components which were so necessary to bringing about regime 
change following the Indian test of 1974 were absent in 1981. It seems, therefore, 
that the handling of the 1981 shock in the context of the regime can only be regarded 
as a failure in the light of subsequent events, namely the revelations of the enormous 
Iraqi nuclear weapons programme in 1991 and the abject failure of IAEA safeguards 
to detect it. Ultimately, it took the much greater (and notably unambiguous) shock of 
1991 -  the subject of the next chapter -  to initiate genuine regime change.
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Chapter 6; The Iraqi Revelations of 1991 -  A Case of Regime 
Change?
The post-Gulf War discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme (as 
well its biological and chemical weapons programmes) occurred almost exactly 
ten years after the Israeli raid on the Osftaq reactor in June 1981. Although Iraq’s 
nearness to completing its quest for a nuclear bomb was vociferously debated in 
the months that followed, its atomic programme had progressed far enough to 
warrant serious concern about the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. ' Something had gone dangerously wrong, both in terms of the nuclear 
exports and materiel which had ended up in Iraq and in the apparent IAEA 
ignorance regarding Iraq’s military activities. Unlike the Osiraq incident, there 
could be no ambiguity about Iraqi intentions and the failure of the regime thus far 
to thwart those intentions.
This time, however, the implications of the shock were not discounted. 
Rather, the revelations regarding Iraq’s nuclear programme “had a major impact 
on the nonproliferation regime, exerting a catalytic effect on the non-proliferation 
policies of numerous actors.”  ^ The shock led to a period of rapid and vigorous 
change which was institutionalised in a variety of ways in the nonproliferation 
regime. Such change was preceded by a decade of comparative dormancy in the 
regime’s evolution.
' Much of the debate regarding the evolution and success o f the Iraqi atomic progi amme can be 
found in various issues of the Bulletin o f  Atomic Scientists in 1991-3. See particularly Mark Hibbs 
and David Albright, “haq and tlie bomb: were they even close?” in The Bulletin o f Atomic 
Scientists, vol.47, no.2, March 1991.
■ Müller, Fischer and Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, p. 131.
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This study of the Iraqi shock and its effect on the nonproliferation regime 
will begin in the years immediately prior to the Gulf War. This will allow a 
comparison with the years following the revelations about Iraq’s intentions, and 
make it possible to draw some conclusions as to whether the shock did in fact 
interrupt a period of inactivity in the regime. More importantly, however, the 
examination of the years following the shock will be the means by which to 
detennine the extent and type of regime change which occun ed.
The Regime and Nuclear Context Prior to the Shock:
The years immediately following the bombing of Osiraq were 
demonstrated, in chapters four and five, not to have yielded the regime change 
which followed in the wake of the 1974 Indian nuclear test. The years leading up 
to the Iraqi revelations were relatively uneventful in terms of nuclear proliferation. 
Immediately prior to the 1990 NPT Review Conference it was noted that since the 
last Review Conference in 1985, “there has been no case of overt nuclear 
proliferation, and fears regarding the intentions of at least three states (Ai'gentina, 
Brazil and South Africa) have abated.”^
The nuclear nonproliferation regime had undergone no significant changes 
in the last half of the 1980’s. The bilateral agreements which came out of this 
period, however, showed that arms control was generally alive and well. One 
example was the 1987 Treaty between the USA and USSR on the elimination of 
their intermediate-raiige missiles, or the INF Treaty. Moreover, the negotiations
 ^ John Simpson and Daixyl Howlett “The 1990 NPT Review Conference,” in Siin’ival, vol.32, 
no.4, July/August 1990, p.349. Following the 1987 debate over whether or not to suspend South 
Africa from the IAEA, diere were “hints that South Africa might be changing its policies and 
might now accede to the NPT” (Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 110). Fischer also noted die fact 
that, in the 1980’s Argentina, Brazil and Chile, “radically changed their policies concerning non- 
proliferation and IAEA safeguards” (Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p. 113).
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for the Strategic Aims Reduction Treaty (START) I Treaty had continued and 
were coming to a close by the end of the decade/ In addition to these agreements 
between the two superpowers, India and Pakistan had signed an agreement in 
1988 prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities/
In terms of the nonproliferation regime, however, the years preceding the 
revelations about Iraq had not brought the kind of deep-seated change which had 
come about in the aftennath of the 1974 Indian test. This is not argue that there 
were no concerns regarding the regime and its ability to keep potential 
proliferators in check. In the last few years of the decade, an investigation was 
begun in West Germany regarding nuclear export standards.^ Nonetheless, the 
nonproliferation regime had not been seriously disturbed since the bombing of 
Osii aq a decade earlier. Not surprisingly, the final five years of the 1980s saw no 
great leaps forward in its structure or its underlying norms and principles
The Iraqi programme between Osiraq and the Gulf War
The discovery of what Iraq had been up to had self-evident implications 
for the nonproliferation regime not only because of Iraq’s status as a non-nuclear 
member of the NPT but because, as one commentator noted, “there had been no 
comparable nuclear proliferation shock since India’s 1974 nuclear test.”  ^ Writing
 ^The Treaty of the Reduction and Limitation of Sti'ategic Offensive Anns, subsequently START I, 
was finally concluded on 31 July 1991, after nine years of negotiations.
 ^ See the Agreement Between Pakistan and India on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear 
Installations and Facilities, signed 31 December 1988.
 ^The consequence o f this reawakened attention to nuclear exports was a tightening of W. German 
law regarding nuclear exports. (For a more detailed discussion, see Harald Müller, “After the 
Scandals; West German Nonproliferation Policy,” PRIF no. 9, (Frankfui t: Peace Research 
Institute Frankfurt; 1990) or also see Eric Chauvistré, Arbeitspapiere der Berghof-Stiftung für 
Konfliktforschung, nr. 43, “Germany and Proliferation; the Nuclear Export Policy,” (Berlin: 
Berghof-Stiftung fur Konfliktforschung; 1991).
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in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists in 1998, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist, Khidir 
Hamza, observed that, in Iraq’s quest for nuclear weapons, “manipulation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency was key”/  It became gradually apparent, 
following the discovery of the weapons programme, that not only had Iraq’s 
appetite for the bomb not been sated by the Israeli attack a decade earlier, but that 
it had been whetted by it. Dr. Jafar dhia Jafar, a leader in Iraq’s nuclear quest was 
cited as claiming that “it was the Israeli bombing of Osiraq that had initially 
prompted [Saddam’s] government to proceed with a secret enrichment program”.^  
The Osiraq incident, in other words, seemingly moved the entfte progiamme both 
figuratively and literally underground.
As discussed previously, the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme had its 
beginnings in 1976, with the construction of the ill-fated Osiraq reactor. Iraq was, 
by that time, afteady in possession of small amounts of plutonium produced from 
the Soviet-supplied IRT-5000 research reactor in 1968. The post-Osfraq phase of 
Iraqi nuclear development saw a concerted effort to produce a nuclear bomb. In 
1982 research began into various gas-eni ichment methods and five years later, lab 
scale quantities of low-enriched uranium (LEU) were produced by calutrons (also 
referred to as ‘Baghdadtrons’).*® Aiound the same time (1987-88), construction 
of the Sharqat calutron enrichment plant began. Documents later recovered by an
 ^Lewis A. Dunn “Containing Nuclear Proliferation,” in Adelphi Paper 263 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies; 1991), p.3.
* Kliidir Hamza, “Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, 
vol.54,110.5, September/October, 1998, p.26.
 ^A1 J. Venter “How Saddam Almost Built his Bomb,” Middle East Policy, vol.5 1, no.3, February 
1999, p.52.
For a more detailed description of the progression of the Iraqi nuclear effort, see Richai'd 
Kokolski Technology and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 1995), Chapter 4; Venter “How Saddam Almost Built His Bomb”; and Hamza, “Inside 
Saddam’s secret nuclear program”.
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IAEA inspection team clearly demonstrated that “since 1988 or 1989 Iraq had 
invested heavily in facilities to develop and make nuclear weapons.” * * Finally, in 
1990 (and following the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait), a crash programme was 
initiated which made use of reactor fuel in the form of safeguarded highly 
eni'iched uranium diverted from peaceful uses.
As had happened prior to 1981, Iraq once again turned to the West -  
particularly Western Europe -  in search of the required technology and expertise. 
West Germany “featured prominently in almost every phase of the Iraqi nuclear 
program”, with some West German technicians even working for the Iraqis.*^ 
France, too, provided a source of chemical emichment technology, having been 
wheedled into revealing the technology by the Iraqis’ expressed desire for more 
data in order to reach a decision to purchase the teclmology. *^ The Italian hot- 
cells, which had been a subject of controversy post-Osiraq were also used in the 
subsequent reprocessing of the small amounts of plutonium.
The end result was the inauguration of the EMIS (electromagnetic isotope 
separation) programme for uranium enrichment. The decision to embark on the 
EMIS programme followed the abandonment of gaseous diffusion and occurred 
under the banner o f ‘Petrochemical Project 3’, the front organization in charge of 
Iraq’s covert programme. *"* EMIS technology had the good grace to be 
declassified and thus the most easily accessible, “a fact which, when coupled with 
the relative abundance of inexpensive electrical power that Iraq could make
' ' David Albright and Mark Hibbs “Iraq’s Bomb; Blueprints and Artifacts,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic 
Scientists, vol 48, no .l, January-February 1992, p.30.
Venter, “How Saddam Almost Built His Bomb,” p.55.
It should be noted, however, tliat despite gaining access to French chemical enrichment 
technology, the technique has never yet been used successfully, either inside or outside Iraq.
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.279.
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available certainly had an impact on Iraq’s decision to develop the technique.” ’^
Its inefficiency, however, meant that Iraqi efforts ultimately shifted in favour of 
centrifuge enrichment. This became the central focus of the Iraqi nuclear 
weapons effort in the late 1980’s. It was this approach which made the greatest 
use of so-called dual use technology purchased outside Iraq.*^
What is of key importance to an understanding of the eventual effect this 
shock on the regime is the fact that the history of the programme is the history of 
Western aid and involvement, without which Iraq’s atomic ambitions would have 
been fruitless. Everything that was acquired by Iraq “was [ostensibly] intended 
for civil or peacefril use.” '  ^Iraq’s nuclear programme was therefore halted only 
fleetingly by the destruction of Osiraq. Instead, the intervening years between the 
reactor bombing nd the Gulf War only sharpened Iraq’s desire for a successful 
atomic weapons programme -  a programme which, for the most part, went 
unnoticed and undetected until the invasion of Kuwait and the resulting hostilities.
The Shock:
Unlike the case of both the Indian test explosion of 1974 and the attack on 
Osfraq in 1981, the shock of 1991 did not come in the form of a single incident, 
but manifested itself more as series of revelations. During this period, which 
began in April of 1991 and culminated approximately six months later, it became 
irrefutably clear that a massive clandestine nuclear weapons programme had been
15 Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons p. 102.
For a more detailed discussion about the initial discovery o f the Iraqi use of this technology, see 
Gamini Seneviratne, “IAEA Inspectors Focus on haqi Centrifuge Program” in Nucleonics Week, 
vol.32, no.31, 1 August 1991. For a good history of the nuclear technology employed by the 
Iraqis, see David Albright, Frans Berkliout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched 
Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
1997), chapter 11.
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operating in a non-nuclear NPT signatory and, moreover, had been operating 
undetected for some time. Such disclosures were to have a profound impact on 
the states and organizations which made up the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
and therefore on the regime itself.
Suspicion had long been growing regarding the true nature Iraq’s nuclear 
programme and, indeed, had existed as a low level concern since before Osiraq. 
The significance gianted to these suspicions increased immediately prior to the 
Gulf War, but it was not until April of 1991 that the gates were finally and 
formally opened to an exhaustive exploration by an international body. On the 
3rd day of that month the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 was 
passed which authorised Iraq’s disarmament. This resolution, among other things, 
stressed the IAEA’s “[concern with] the reports in the hands of Member States 
that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme 
contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons of 1 July 1968.” '  ^ It therefore authorised the IAEA, in cooperation with 
the United National Special Commission (or UNSCOM), “to carry out immediate 
on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declaration and the 
designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission.” ®^
Venter, “How Saddam Almost Built His Bomb,” p.55
This concern about Iraq’s intentions crops up regularly in much of tlie literature on the subject, 
fi om Leonard Spector’s assertion in 1984 of the “doubts as to Iraq’s commitment to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty” (Spector. Nuclear Proliferation Today p. 188) to the Presidential Address to 
the Nation announcing the start of military action in the Gulf, in which President Bush declared the 
Allies “determined to knock out Saddam Hussein’s military potential” (‘Address to the Nation 
Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian G ulf 16 .January 1991 in Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States: George Bush 1991 Book I  published 1992).
UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), preamble.
Ibid., Section C, para. 13
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The first of the inspections devoted to uncovering the full extent of the
Iraqi nuclear programme was carried out between 15-21 May 1991.^* Over the
following few months it became indisputably clear that the Iraqi programme was
both extensive and “basically i n d i g e n o u s . T h e  Netherlands invited all
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had not met in full for fourteen
years, to reconvene at long last in the Hague. This proposal was greeted with an
enthusiasm which contrasted sharply with the reluctant participation which had
characterized the dawn of the NSG. As one observer commented,
the old objections that some of the suppliers that 
‘ganging up’ by the industrialized exporters would 
offend and alienate the developing countries had 
disappeared under the impact of the Gulf War.^^
Between May and the end of September 1991, six visits took place, all o f which
confirmed the evasion of NPT obligations by Iraq. The partially complete EMIS
programme at A1 Tarmiya, large quantities of natural uranium, hot cells and small
amounts of plutonium were all discovered, but it was not until the sixth
inspection, in September, that extensive documentation was uncovered. It was at
this time that the IAEA inspections revealed, beyond a doubt, the true extent to
which Iraq had abrogated its NPT obligations.^"^
For tlie puiposes of this chapter there is no need to go into the chronological history or other 
minutiae of the lAEA/UNSCOM inspections. A much more detailed account of the inspections 
themselves may be found, once again, in Kokolski, Technology! and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear 
Weapons, Chapter 4, part IV.
-- Ibid., p. 109.
Harald Müller, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Beyond the Persian G ulf War and the 
Dissolution of the Soviet Union,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmamen t 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1992) p.97.
Kokolski, for his part, identifies the findings of these inspections as “a watershed in 
understanding the true purpose and scope of Iraq’s nuclear programme -  particulai'ly concerning 
weaponization” (Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons, p. 123).
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By July, however, the IAEA Board of Governors had already seen fit to 
declare Iraq in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA -  “the first 
finding of a violation of an agieement since the IAEA began applying its 
safeguards in 1959.”^^  In September, as the contents of the documentation was 
being reported, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution condemning 
Iraq’s non-compliance with its obligations.^® In addition, the UN Security 
Council on August 15®’ foimally concluded that Iraq’s failure to comply with its 
safeguards obligations did indeed constitute “a violation of its commitments as a 
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 
1968/^7
The true shock itself -  the unveiling of an extensive Iraqi weapons 
programme -  was thus revealed with the first IAEA inspections in May 1991 and 
culminated four months later in September. It was during this period that strong 
suspicion gave way to hard proof (despite the best efforts of the Iraqis to disguise 
their work) of the first official violation of of the NPT.^  ^ Less than a year before, 
Nucleonics Week referred to IAEA reports that “its latest safeguards inspection in 
Iraq detected no diversion of safeguarded materials” and quoted a US government 
source as declaring that “Bush is beating the drum based on a very speculative 
worst-case scenario.” ®^ By mid-July of 1991, however, the “London Economic
25 Fischer, History o f  the IÆ A : The First Forty Years, p. 281.
Ibid., p.281. The resolution was adopted by 71 votes to 1 (Iraq, predictably), although there 
were seven abstentions in the form of Algeria, Cuba, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Namibia and Sudan.
UN Security Council Resolution 707, para. 2 (Reprinted in Kokolski, Technology and the 
Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons, p.338).
It was, at this point, still unclear whether or not INFCIRC/153 safegaurds had been violated, 
although it was becoming plain tliat the system was flawed.
Mark Hibbs, “Iraqi Nuclear Threat Warnings Called Unrealistic War Rationale,” Nucleonics 
Week November 29 1990, p. 7.
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Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical Weapons Proliferation” had asserted that: “the Gulf Crisis has 
highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons... [and 
that the members were] determined to combat this menace by strengthening and 
expanding the non-proliferation regime.” ®^ The events of September, however, 
brought to light “two ‘smoking gun’ documents that belied Iraq’s denials about a 
weaponization effort.” '^ The four initial months of revelation had consisted 
chiefly of evidence-gathering and the formal condemnation of Iraq by both the 
IAEA and UN Security Council. The months following the inspection of 
September 1991 stood as the beginnings of the reaction to the shock: post­
revelation and post-condemnation. In spite of a history of suspicion regarding 
Iraqi intentions, the confirmation and manner of such a deception shattered 
confidence in the IAEA safeguards system, and raised serious questions about the 
effectiveness of the NPT and the regime as a whole.
Initial International Reactions:
It has been observed of the period following the Iraqi shock that if 
“1991 was marked by major changes and turbulence in the non-proliferation 
regime [then] 1992, by contrast, could best be characterized as a year of quiet 
consolidation.”^^  This formal consolidation began in 1992 and continued for a 
period of approximately three years, ending with the indefinite extension of the
London Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation, 16 July 1991, reprinted in Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: George Bush, Book II. p,891.
David Albright and Robert Kelley “Has Iraq Come Clean At Last?” Bulletin o f  the Atomic 
Scientists, vol. 51, no.6, Nov/Dec. 1995, p.57.
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NPT in 1995. However, prior to the institutionalization of the lessons of Iraq lay 
the period between the event and the response: the initial reactions and 
considerations by the members of the regime as to what was to be done. In this 
case, this phase lay between the end of September 1991 (when Iraqi nuclear 
ambitions ceased to be open to question) and the beginning of April 1992. During 
this time, actors such as the United States, Gennany (and other major suppliers), 
the UN Security Council and finally the IAEA were able to react to the shock and 
consider its implications in the context of the regime. These initial post-shock 
months are thus vital to understanding the events that eventually followed.
The United States
It is generally accepted that, as one article on the subject observed, the 
revelations regarding Iraq’s nuclear ambitions “shook the international 
nonproliferation regime, revealing major weaknesses in inspection routines, 
export controls, and intelligence-gathering and s h a r i n g , a n d  the initial reaction 
in the US to the shock certainly appears to have borne this out. Unlike the Osiraq 
shock of 1981, Iraqi ambitions were no longer an allegation, but a reality. After a 
decade of emphasis on the Cold War, nuclear relations between the US and 
USSR, and a series of bilateral agreements to restrict vertical proliferation, 
a non-nuclear NPT signatory had been found in contravention of its treaty 
obligations.
As early as March 1991, a White House Statement had already declared 
that “our experience in the Gulf has reinforced the lesson that the most effective
Jolin Simpson “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 1992,” in Verification 1993: 
Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie (eds.) (London:
Brassey’s; 1993).p77.
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export controls are those imposed multilaterally.” "^^ The ACDA, in its annual 
report to Congress, concurred, stating that “Iraq’s unsafeguarded clandestine 
nuclear activities have also served to remind the international community that 
adherence to nonproliferation treaties alone may not suffice as proof of a state’s 
good faith.”^^  A month later, the US House of Representatives met and initiated a 
debate on the implications of the story emerging from Iraq. This initial domestic 
discussion of clandestine nuclear proliferation and Iraq was held, appropriately 
enough, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and was 
concerned to address “failed efforts to curtail Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.” ®^ 
It was in this hearing that the role of the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its 
relationship with Iraq was scrutinised and attacked as both inadequate and 
hopelessly naïve.
Following the incontrovertible evidence of Iraq’s deception in September 
of 1991, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations convened a month later.
Once again, it met with the intention of trying to understand what had happened 
and to make an explicit attempt (as the title claimed) of “learning from the Iraq 
experience.”^^  This hearing, which took place over two days, served to
33 Albright and Kelley, “Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?” p.55.
“White House Statement on Weapons of Mass Destmction,” 7 March 1991 in Public Papers o f  
the Presidents o f  the United States, George Bush, 1991 Book I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office; 1992) p.223.
“United States Anns Control and Disarmament Agency Annual Report to Congress, 1991,” 
p.90.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
o f the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House o f Representatives, One Hundi ed and Second 
Congress, first session, Concerning failed efforts to curtail Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, April 
24, 1991. This hearing was initially classified but was subsequently declassified and the bequest 
o f the Department of Energy with any remaining classified information deleted.
Nuclear Proliferation: learning from  the Iraq experience, Hearing Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred and Second Congress, first session, 
October 17 and 23, 1991.
204
consolidate the deep concern with which Congress first greeted the discoveries in 
Iraq. Continued attacks on the export policy of various American firms and the 
US government were this time accompanied by testimony from IAEA 
representatives who called for greater cooperation between state governments and 
the IAEA, as well as among individual states themselves.^^
In Congress especially, the question of nuclear non-proliferation (and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destmction generally) had moved rapidly nearer 
the top of the agenda than had been the case since the brief ffuny of activity which 
had surrounded the bombing of Osiraq ten years earlier. The belief was expressed 
that, as one article put it, “Washington has been too quick to sacrifice 
nonproliferation goals to other foreign policy objectives” -  not least the perceived 
expediency of supporting Iraq in its eight year war with Iran.^ ® In the months 
immediately following the Iraq revelations, deliberations began within the 
government on what had gone wrong and why. Newspapers such as the 
International Herald Tribune and The Wall Street Journal continued the 
discussion more publicly. To be sure, this consisted mainly of disparaging the 
IAEA. The International Herald Tribune, for example, canded the contention in 
October 1991 that “the IAEA did what it could -  which wasn’t much.”"^® Five 
months later, in March 1992, it continued to assert that “Iraq had demonstrated 
that this previous system was grossly inadequate.”"^  ^ The Wall Street Journal, in a 
somewhat more circumspect fashion, merely pointed out that “Iraq used
Testimony on behalf of the IAEA was given by Dr. David Kay (the IAEA’s chief inspector for 
the decisive sixth inspection of Iraqi facilities) as well as Dr. Hans Blix (still the Director-General 
o f the Agency).
John M. Deutch, “The New Nuclear Tlireat,” Foreign Affairs vol.71, no.4, Fall 1992. 
International Herald Tribune, 18 October 1991.
International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1992.
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equipment from German, Swiss and US companies in its secret program to build a 
nuclear bomb.”"^  ^ Nuclear non-proliferation had not merely returned as a subject 
of debate but, as the initial reaction shows, was an immediate cause célèbre in the 
United States for the first time since under the Ford and Carter Administrations in 
the aftermath of the Indian test explosion. Dfrectly after the discoveries in Iraq, it 
is possible to observe real American concern (and as will become apparent later, 
the beginnings of the undermining of American confidence in the politico-legal 
institution of the nuclear nonproliferation regime).
The USSR/Russia
The break-up of the Soviet Union was, naturally enough, an event which 
overshadowed the shock of the Iraqi revelations fi'om Moscow’s perspective. The 
Cold War was at an end and had been replaced by what was to be a relatively brief 
golden era of cooperation between Russia and the United States both within and 
outside the UN Security Council. Correspondingly, as the Soviet Union officially 
dissolved in December of 1991, the question of Iraq and its nuclear programme 
was one which took a back seat to the upheaval closer to home. Traditional 
cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and the regime prevailed. As a 
consequence, it need only be said that the former Soviet Union was happy to let 
the United States and its growing body of supporters in Western Europe take the 
lead, and was willing to cooperate at the international level.
(West) Germany and France
The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 1991.
This, of course, was hardly a radical departure from the behaviour of the USSR in the past 
insofar as nuclear nonproliferation was concerned, that regime being one area, at least, where the 
goals and inclinations of the two superpowers were broadly compatible. As in the case of the
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On the 16®’ of July 1991, a meeting of the European Union (EU) states at 
the London Economic Summit revealed an apparent shift in the broad Western 
European attitude to nuclear non-proliferation and the importance of the regime. 
This movement within the EU states in support of the regime’s restrictions on 
nuclear supply was one which had begun in 1990, with the Dublin Declaration on 
Nonproliferation in June of that year. Nonetheless, the specific revelations 
regarding Iraq prompted the blunt statement that “the Gulf Crisis has highlighted 
the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons” and proclaimed, 
moreover, that “we are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and 
expanding the non-proliferation regime.
After two decades of opposition to the discriminatory NPT system, France 
deposited the instruments of accession to the NPT in August 1991. This gesture 
indicated that a significant shift in the attitude of France to the issue of nuclear 
nonproliferation had already occurred prior to the revelations in Iraq and stood in 
sharp contrast both to French suspicions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group at its 
birth in the 1970’s as well as its anger and strong denials of shortcomings in its 
nuclear relations with Iraq following the bombing of Osiraq ten years earlier.
Although it cannot be claimed that the French accession to the NPT was 
prompted the discoveries in Iraq, France’s resolve in favour of multilateral nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts was cemented by the events. The aftermath of the Gulf 
War saw France “change its policy and...[instead become] determined to 
demonstrate its readiness to co-operate internationally for non-proliferation
Indian test in 1974, if  the Soviet Union did not initiate the institutions that gi'ew out o f the shock, it 
did not, at any rate, try to impede them.
London Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Aims Transfers and Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation 16 July 1991 reprinted in The Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States, George Bush, 1991 Book I, p.891.
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pui'poses.”'^  ^ Most notably, the mistrust which characterised the French attitude 
to institutionalised full-scope safeguards (as originally proposed in London) had 
given way to a keen participation in the revived NSG meetings which began in the 
Hague in March 1992."^ ®
The same was true of Germany, the country whose industries and scientists 
were under the greatest amount of fire for their part in Iraq’s progress towards 
nuclear weapons. Although in the few years immediately preceding the shock. 
West German nuclear export policy had become a focus of domestic concern and 
investigation, Iraq’s ambitions laid to rest any doubt over the flaws that had 
existed. Investigations into deals such as those with Pakistan and Libya took 
place in the final two years of the 1980’s. However, until the discoveries in Iraq, 
concrete evidence of the consequences of such policies remained unforthcoming. 
Nonetheless, and in the words of one commentator, it was amply demonstrated 
“how weak the controls have been in the face of a determined industry backed by 
a sympathetic bureaucracy unmoved by proliferation concerns.
The shock of Iraq was thus followed by an immediate intensification of the 
concern over the German contribution to horizontal nuclear proliferation."^  ^ As in 
France, such concern was markedly different to the heel-dragging which had 
characterised the initial West German reaction to the Indian test explosion in
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War,” p.97.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, this new French enthusiasm in favour of nuclear 
nonproliferation and the regime appeared to have swung back to its former position, with the 
French again keen to water down the commitment to full-scope safeguards, mainly to open the 
door to exporting to India.
Paul Leventhal, “Pluggmg the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bother?” Orbis, vol.36, 
no.2. Spring 1992, p. 169-70.
For a detailed assessment of the companies involved in Iraq’s efforts see David Albright and 
Mark Hibbs, “Iraq’s shop-till-you-drop Nuclear Program,” o f  the Atomic Scientists,
vol.48, no.3, April 1992, pp.26-35. Also helpful is David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Supplier
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1974. In April of 1992 one article observed that “Western companies and 
governments, particularly Germany, do not want to be embarrassed by public 
revelations about their involvement in Iraq’s nuclear program.”"^  ^ Such publicity, 
however was unavoidable. This did not escape the German government, which 
moved to help the investigation into Iraq’s activities, as well as tighten its own 
laws governing nuclear exports. In January of 1992, for example, IAEA officials 
“armed with information from the German government...accused Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry officials of failing to declare large quantities of materials and 
components Iraq had obtained for its gas centrifuge program.” ®^ In the wake of 
the discomfort aiising over previous export policy and then in the face of the 
incontestable revelations about the extent and origins of the Iraqi nuclear 
programme, German levels of cooperation over the issue of nuclear export 
controls increased substantially. Immediately following the Iraq revelations, 
Germany make evident its recent transformation from “one of those states 
previously reluctant to stiffen international restrictions [to one which was] very 
interested in an international agreement to reinforce export controls.”®^
The United Nations Security Council
Insofar as the discoveries in Iraq were concerned, the UN Security Council 
played and active and important role in the actions that were to follow. The 
invasion of Kuwait, which roughly coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet
Spotting (Geiman firms supplied Iraq with nuclear components),” Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, 
vol.49, no .l, January/February 1993, pp.8-9.
Ibid., p.29
Ibid., p.29. Also in tlie early months of 1991, the twelve EC member states, with full German 
and French support, “agreed to consider the possibility o f a more sophisticated common policy on 
nuclear exports” (Müller “The nonproliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War” p.98-99).
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Union and subsequent visions of a cooperative new world order, found the P-5 of 
the Security Council unusually united, at least as far as Iraq’s behaviour and the 
undesirability of horizontal proliferation was concerned. As a result, when the 
extent of Iraq’s misbehaviour became clear, the Security Council was quick to 
authorise Resolutions 786 and 707, in April and August of 1991, respectively. 
Resolution 687 officially empowered the IAEA to begin inspections in Iraq and 
called on Iraq “to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty of the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968.”^^  Resolution 707 was 
agreed after a report by the IAEA to the Security Council in July, and found the 
Security Council disposed to “[condemn] non-compliance by the Govermnent of 
Iraq with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.”®^
After the “smoking gun” documents of September 1991, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 715, which maintained the show of unity and reiterated 
the demand “that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans 
approved...and cooperate ftilly with the Special Commission and the Director- 
General of [the lAEA].” "^^ The efforts by Iraq to attain nuclear weapons and later 
to inhibit IAEA attempts to reveal these aims were of a sort which bred unanimity 
in the Security Council. The profile of nuclear proliferation (as well as that of 
chemical and biological weaponry) had been immediately raised in January 1992
Müller, “The nuclear nonproliferation regime beyond die Persian Gulf War,” p.97.
UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, Sec. C, para. 11. The resolution invited 
IAEA inspections as a request to tlie Director-General of the IAEA “with the assistance and 
cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General 
refen ed to in paragraph 9(b), to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear 
capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations” (UN Security Council Resolution 687, Sec. C, para 13).
UN Security Council Resolution 707, 15 August 1991, para.2
U N  Security C ouncil Resolution 715, 11 October 1991, para. 6
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when the Security Council spoke of its conviction that “the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.”®^ As one American expert observed, “the Security Council have taken 
cognizance of the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, in 
a sense, put on notice would-be proliferators.”®®
Without any doubt, it was the IAEA which was dealt the most serious
blow by the discovery of Iraq’s weapons programme, and it was the IAEA which
had to learn the most lessons. In August of 1990, the IAEA Deputy Dfrector-
General, Jon Jennekens had publicly maintained that Iraq was “a solid citizen”
whose cooperation with safeguards and the NPT itself was “exemplary.”®^
The subsequent revelations did little to inspire confidence in the IAEA’s abilities.
As one IAEA publication admitted:
Iraq’s non-compliance with the provisions of its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, and the magnitude of its undeclared 
nuclear weapon development programme, have forcefully 
underlined the fact that the safeguards assurances presently 
provided by the IAEA...alone are insufficient.
Director-General, Hans Blix was quoted in a newspaper article in October 1991 as
saying that, even in spite of IAEA suspicions regarding Iraq, “to see the enormity
Declaration of the Security Council Summit Meeting, 31 January 1992 (reprinted in tlie New  
York Times 1 February 1992).
Lawrence Sclieinman “The Non-Proliferation Treaty; On the Road to 1995,” IAEA Bulletin 
vol.34 ,110.1, 1992, p.37-38.
Jennekens quoted in Eric Chauvistré, “The Future of Nuclear Inspections,” Arms Control, 
vol. 14,110.2 (August 1993), p.33.
J. Jennekens, R. Parsick and A. von Baeckmann “Strengthening tlie international safeguards 
system,” IAEA Bulletin, vol.34, no .l, (1992) p.6
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of it is a s h o c k . A n  article in another newspaper even went so far as to 
proclaim that the discoveries in Iraq “must signal the beginning of the end of the 
Vienna-based international nuclear watchdog in its current form.”®® The IAEA 
was surprised and embaiTassed by these revelations, and for good reason. Prior to 
the Gulf War it was generally thought (not simply by the IAEA) that “the 
establishment of a self-contained capability to produce nuclear weapons materials 
entfrely separate from a state’s declared nuclear program would be too large and 
difficult an undertaking for most would-be proliferators.”®'
The information coming out of Iraq clarified two key questions. Firstly, 
the question of whether or not Iraq had, in fact, violated its INFCIRC/153 
agreement with the IAEA was answered when it became apparent that 
safeguarded HEU had been diverted during the Gulf War. Secondly (and more 
importantly) the question of whether IAEA safeguards were, in practice, capable 
of detecting clandestine activities was answered in the negative.
Consequently, it was the IAEA (specifically, it’s safeguards, inspection and 
verification procedures) which “was seen by many as having failed its 
(presumably) fii st diversion detection test.”®^ After initial defensiveness, the 
IAEA admitted to the existence of flaws in its system -  an acknowledgment which 
differed sharply from the reaction of the Agency to the accusations levelled at it 
following the Osiraq bombing. At an emergency meeting of the Board of 
Governors on 18 July of 1991, Iraq was officially cited as the first confinned
International Herald Tribune, 14 October 1991.
The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1991.
John Carlson, Victor Bragin, John Bradley and John Hill “Nuclear Safeguards as an 
Evolutionary System,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol.6, no.3. Winter 1999, p. 109.
62 Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.284.
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violation of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Hans Blix, addressing the Board, 
acknowledged that “the case of Iraq demonstrates the challenges that may need to 
be met and the ability of the IAEA to meet them.”®^
The period between July 1991 and February 1992 was for the IAEA, as for 
most the national govermnents involved, a time for discovering exactly what had 
happened, how it had happened, and what was to be done about it. During this 
initial phase, the IAEA was able to assess, more or less, the extent of the Iraqi 
programme. It was then able to secure a verbal declaration of the support of the 
UN Security Council in the event of any future violations.®"^  It also, in February 
1992, took what an Agency publication itself described as “the first concrete steps 
to strengthen safeguards”®^ when, on the proposal of the Dfrector-General, the 
Board reaffirmed the IAEA’s “right to carry out special inspections at any location 
in a State having a comprehensive safeguards agreement if the Agency had reason 
to believe that the State was carrying out unreported nuclear activities.”®® Finally, 
Director-General Blix stated in an address to the UN General Assembly that the 
ability of the IAEA to safeguard effectively and uncover undeclared material and 
installations such as that in Iraq “would increase dramatically if the IAEA, was to 
be routinely provided with relevant information available to Member States.”®^
Hans Blix -  address to the IAEA Board o f Governors, quoted in “International Newsbriefs 
Section: Nuclear Capabilities o f Iraq; IAEA inspections continue,” IAEA Bulletin vol.33, no.3 
1991.
^  This Security Council backing of the IAEA in h aq was first stated in Resolution 687.
'^^ “The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards,” International Nuclear Verification Series no.2 p. 24 
Ibid., p.24.
IAEA Director-General statement to UN Assembly, quoted in IAEA Bulletin vol.33, no.4, p .38. 
This sentiment was reiterated by Dr. Blix a year later in his article, “IAEA Safeguards; New 
ChaWengesfi Disarmament, vol. 15, no.2 p.43.
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The thi’ee lessons immediately apparent from Iraqi experienee -  the need 
for aceess to the Security Council, access to relevant intelligence, and Security 
Council support of the IAEA’s right of special inspections -  were the initial 
eonelusions drawn in the IAEA’s “consolidation phase” during the first year of 
inspections in Iraq. Moreover, it was becoming clear that following the 
discoveries in Iraq, that “the danger of proliferation arises chiefy from clandestine 
nuclear weapon progi'ammes and not the diversion of fissile material fr om 
safeguarded civilian facilities.”®^ The role of the IAEA would therefore be not 
only to verify that safeguarded materials were not being diverted, but also to 
detect separate clandestine activities as well. Its first tangible step towards 
formalising these lessons was by way of the reaffirmation of its rights of special 
inspections under the provision of INFCIRC/153. The second half of 1991 and 
fii'st part of 1992 was, perhaps more for the IAEA than for any other regime actor, 
a time to investigate what had gone wrong (by way of the inspeetions) and plan 
for the friture. The uncovering of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, however, were 
eventually to prompt not just a reaffirmation of the existing rights of the IAEA, 
but the creation of new ones as the shoek of 1991, unlike that of 1981, brought 
considerable change to the structure and practiee of safeguards themselves.
The Outcome of the Shock:
Warsaw Guidelines
The shoek of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear progiamme evoked immediate 
international concern and determination to make amends. In this it differed from 
both the delayed reaction to the Indian test of 1974 and the disunited vitriol which
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followed the bombing of Osiraq. The rebirth of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 
the Hague in 1991 -  after a sabbatical of thftteen years -  was not a coincidence 
occuning as it did on the heels of the Gulf War and the disturbing findings in Iraq. 
Despite the reproaches handed out to the IAEA, it was observed, too, that “the 
Persian Gulf War also brought to light the weakness of existing export control.”®^ 
This was underscored by the beleaguered Ageney itself. “The disclosures in the 
Gulf War” an IAEA publication observed, “...underlined the important role that 
dual use items had played in the evolution of Iraq’s nuelear weapon 
programme.” ®^ The ambiguity of technology requii ed had not escaped the 
attention of key regime members and supplier states, and it had become clear that 
“the hardware used to make nuclear weapon material may not be the type of 
material that intelligence services normally look for or that is on export control 
lists.” '^ As was demonstrated above, states such as the US, France and Germany 
were particularly aware of and woiried as much by the method of proliferation as 
by the near-proliferation itself. The result was what one participant in the Hague 
meetings described as “a dynamie new spirit of cooperation.”^^
After a year of negotiations, April 1992 saw the official unveiling of the 
first and most important of the broadened conditions of export. Iraq had exploited 
the dual use gap that existed in nuelear trade policies, and the so-called Warsaw 
Guidelines attempted to address and close that gap. The stated objective of these 
expanded guidelines was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by
Müller, Fischer and Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, p. 132.
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War,” p.97.
“The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards,” p. 73
Fischer, Towards 1995, p.71.
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implementing stricter controls on “the transfer of certain equipment, material, and 
related technology that could make a major eontribution to a ‘nuelear explosive 
activity’ or an ‘unsafeguarded nuclear activity. The same types of transfers, in 
other words, whieh had contributed to the progress of Iraq’s nuclear weapon 
progi amme. The Guidelines also introduced a new annex of dual-use equipment, 
material and technology, thereby extending the list of proscribed items that would 
trigger export controls. The items cited in the annex, not surprisingly, “included 
detailed descriptions of many of the techno logieal methods that had been explored 
by Iraq, particularly in the area of centrifuge technology and EMIS.” "^^
Agieement on the Warsaw Guidelines stood as the first multilateral 
fonnalisation of the lessons which had been learned following the revelations of 
Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. The critical role of the disclosures of the Gulf War in 
inspiring the revival and spirit of these new guidelines has been cited not merely 
by outside observers but by at least one participant in the negotiations of the 
guidelines themselves. Writing in The Nonproliferation Review, Ambassador 
Tadeusz Stmlak, Chairman of the NSG meeting in 1992, stated that “the war 
made the suppliers realize the potential dangers involved and the urgent need for 
action to prevent them. This, in my view, was a major factor in reviving the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.”^^  Moreover, the NSG -  identified as “an essential part 
of the nuclear nonproliferation regime” -  had been donnant for nearly a decade
Tadeusz Stmlak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol.l, no .l, Fall 
1993, p.4.
Warsaw Guidelines, 3 April 1992 Objectives, para. 1
Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons, p. 189.
Strulak,“The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” p.4.
Ibid., p.7. As a key participant of the talks which led to the creation and adoption of the Warsaw 
Guidelines, it could of course be argued tliat Ambassador Stmlak was unlikely to see the
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and half previous to the shock of the Iraqi disclosures. The unwillingness, in the 
late 1970’s, to countenance full-scope safeguards continued long into the 1980’s, 
with Germany formally making them a condition of trade only in 1990. However, 
it was at the1990 NPT Review Conference that the endorsement of full-scope 
safeguards took place, again demonstrating the momentum in the EU, particularly, 
which had existed before, and been subsequently galvanised by, the Iraqi 
revelations. The Warsaw Guidelines, consequently, did not suffer from the 
dissent which had plagued the question full-seope safeguards. States such as 
Germany and France were, by the time of the shock, afready keen publicly to 
show a pro-active dedication to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NSG 
meeting in Warsaw was able to adopt a declaration requiring full-scope safeguards 
for non-nuclear states.^^ The shoek of Iraq in 1991 may thus be seen to have 
generated both an understanding of the loopholes in the regime that remained, as 
well as a flurry of mle-making which stood in sharp contrast to the time
78previous.
The Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Revised London Guidelines, April 1993) 
Exactly a year from the adoption of the Warsaw Guidelines, April 1993 
gave rise to the seeond significant move to strengthen the nonproliferation regime 
in reaetion to the Gulf War shock. The Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, adopted 
in Lucerne, were less a new set of guidelines (as were those on dual-use
Guidelines as anything less than integral. Despite tlie recent extended period of inactivity, 
however, the creation of and controversy surrounding the NSG in 1977 seems to indicate that the 
perception of their importance to tlie regime was broadly shared.
As noted previously, this new French commitment to the strict application of full-scope 
safeguards was much less in evidence during the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
The Warsaw Guidelines were agreed by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
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technology) and instead a revision and expansion of the original London 
Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers and the attached trigger list which had remained 
unchanged from their creation in 1977. These new guidelines expanded the 
principles for safeguards and export controls, which “should apply to nuclear 
transfers to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes.” ®^ Among the 
recommendations on physical protection, retransfer and security were special 
controls on sensitive exports which, as in 1977, called for suppliers to “exercise 
restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons useable 
materials.” ®^ In addition, the need for international support of IAEA safeguards 
and thefr implementation and verification was emphasised.^*
The trigger list for nuclear transfers, like the trigger list for dual-use items, 
arose out o f concerns which had been raised by the structure of the Iraqi 
programme. This was particularly evident in the inclusion of EMIS-related 
technology. IAEA inspectors were informed by the Iraqis that “the only real 
obstacle remaining in the development of an efficient [calutron] system was an 
improved ion s o u r c e . T h e  expanded London Guidelines’ trigger list duly 
identified, among other things, components closely associated with Iraq’s nuclear 
efforts such as “plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium and equipment”.
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA.
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Revised London Guidelines) 1 April 1993, para. 1.
Ibid., para. 7.
Ibid., para 12.
Mark Hibbs, “Ion source problems held up Iraqi program,” Nucleonics Week vol.32, no.32, 8 
August 1991, p. 9. Quoted in Richard Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f  Nuclear 
Weapons p. 189-190.
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including gas centrifuges and components and equipments for gas centrifuge 
eni'ichment plants, as well as “ion sources [and] ion collectors’’^ ^
Finally, IAEA calls for international support and backing in the wake of 
the Iraqi disclosures were heard and institutionalised in the revised London 
Guidelines. The revised Guidelines called on supplier states to “make special 
efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards.” "^* Moreover, 
they lent support to the IAEA for making changes of its own to its methods of 
preventing nuclear proliferation. The new Guidelines call on its signatories to 
“make every effort to support the IAEA in increasing further the adequacy of 
safeguards...and to support appropriate initiatives aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.
Like the Warsaw Guidelines, the revised London Guidelines of 1993 were 
part of the renaissance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They expanded a trigger 
list which had gone unchanged for thirteen years. The fact that the revised 
guidelines and trigger list focused heavily on such things as EMIS technology and 
gas centrifuge enrichment points as much to the influence of the Iraqi shock as the 
creation of guidelines on dual-use equipment a year earlier. The translation of the 
shock into regime change had been undertaken at the state level in a manner 
which differed markedly from the indecision over the Osiraq incident and 
expanded the scope of the nonproliferation regime considerably.
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Revised London Guidelines) para. 5 (isotope separation), 
para. 5.1 (gas centrifuge), para. 5.2 (equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment 
plants) and para. 5.9.1 (electromagnetic isotope separation)
Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers para. 13
Ibid. The revised London Guidelines were agreed by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
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The 93 A-2 Safeguards Programme
It was written in 1992 that “one consequence of the revelations about Iraq
was considerable momentum to refoim IAEA safeguards.” ®^ In contrast to a
decade earlier, this momentum translated into concrete changes to the safeguards
system. At the end of September, 1993, the UN Secretary-General addressed the
IAEA General Conference in Vienna and observed that
Iraq’s secret and extensive efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons must serve as a warning against complacency....The 
opportunity to make substantial progress is now before us.
We must not let it slip through our grasp.^^
After initial resistance, such concern was shared by the IAEA. As noted
above, the Agency’s reaction to the shock of Iraq involved a rapid attempt,
particularly by Director-General Blix, to draw out the lessons that had been
unearthed and a recognition by its officials that the “events of 1991 made it clear
that the evolutionary development of safeguards approaches need acceleration”
and, just as significantly, that “safeguards assurances presently provided by the
IAEA...alone are insufficient.”^^
The attempt to transform the lessons of Iraq into tangible improvements to
the safeguards system began, somewhat innocuously, with a reaffirmation of the
IAEA’s established right to special inspection in Febmary 1992. The fii'st
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War”, p.95.
“Message o f the Secretary-General to the General Conference of the IAEA in Vienna” [UN 
Press Release SG/SM/5113] 27 September 1993, reprinted in United Nations Blue Books Series 
Volume III: The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (New York: United Nations 
Department o f Public Information; 1995).
Jennekens, Parsick, and von Baeckmann, “Stiengthening the international safeguards system,”
p. 10.
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tangible initiative came with the establishment of Programme 93+2. It started
with the April 1993 recommendation of the IAEA’s Standing Advisory Group on
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) that the role of safeguards should be
expanded to provide assurance of no undeclared nuclear activities. This, as the
IAEA itself asserted,
was an important departure from a practice that had 
developed in implementing INCIRC/153, namely, of 
focusing on safeguards primarily (in practice, almost 
exclusively) on nuclear material in declared facilities.^®
The potential importance of undeclared facilities had, of course, been highlighted
by the discoveries in Iraq.
There is not space here to give a detailed account of the complicated
history of Programme 93+2. Suffice it to say that the programme itself was
formally endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in December 1993 and
sought to codify the experiences of Iraq into IAEA practice. Its emphasis lay
particularly in the areas of environmental sampling, verification of the
completeness of State declarations, and extension of the IAEA’s right of access.
In addition, the programme sought to achieve greater cost efficiency in an attempt
to “enable the IAEA to reduce its routine inspections at certain standard types of
plant.”®® The first documents of Programme 93+2 were submitted to the Board of
Governors in June 1995, and adopted by the General Conference in September
1996.®'
“The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards,” p.25.
Ibid.
This document -  Part I of the programme -  contained additional measures “that the IAEA had 
the authority to undertake within the framework o f  existing comprehensive safeguards 
agreements^ (Ibid., p.25).
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Prior to the conclusion of the second part of Programme 93+2, the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference of 1995 was covered to decide the Treaty’s 
future. In the end, indefinite extension of the Treaty was unanimously approved, 
although with three collateral documents: “Strengthening the Review Process”, 
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament” and 
the resolution on the Middle East. Of these, the “Principles and Objectives” 
called for, among other things, universality of adherence to the Treaty, nuclear 
disarmament, and the creation of NWFZ.®^
The second part of Programme 93+2 (whose negotiation began in 1993 but 
was not concluded until 1997) was intended to provide the IAEA with greater 
legal authority than it afready possessed. The “Model Addition Protocol” (MAP) 
was developed between June 1996 (when the Board set up a committed to draft 
the protocol) and April 1997. The approval of this new protocol (INFCIRC/540) 
was hailed by the Chair of the Board of Governors as “a major achievement, 
crowning five years of effort by IAEA Member States and the Secretariat.”®^
The History and Outcome of the Shock: a case of regime change?
As before, the history of the shock and the years immediately before and 
following it have served to provide a context with which the occurrence or 
absence of regime change may be understood. It is necessary first to draw
The call for universality as well the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East became the means 
by which Ai ab states were persuaded to vote in favour of the indefinite extension. Earlier in the 
Conference, these states had threatened to withhold support for indefinite extension unless Israel 
joined and ratified the NPT. For a good overview o f the 1995 Conference, see John Simpson, 
“The nuclear non-proliferation regime after the NPT Review and Extension Conference,” in SIPRI 
Yearbook 1996.
Ambassador Peter Walker quoted in “International Newsbriefs,” IAEA Bulletin vol.39, no.2, 
June 1997. By 1997 (as the chapter focusing on the 1998 Indian/Pakistani nuclear tests will later 
argue) the momentum which had begun following the Iraqi revelations had faded. As a 
consequence, very few states have signed up to an ratified the Model Additional Protocol.
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conclusions as to whether significant regime change did indeed follow the 
revelations about Iraq and how this fits with the understanding of change in 
regime theory generally. To reiterate, the occurrence of “significant” regime 
change hinges upon not simply the addition of new i*ules and decision-making 
procedures, but evidence that those rules and decision-making procedures reflect a 
change in some of the underlying norms and principles of the regime.
The nairative which has formed the bulk of this chapter has revealed that, 
according to this criteria, significant regime change did occur in the wake of the 
Iraqi shock. The Iraqi shock, like the Indian test explosion of 1974, provoked a 
divergence and then reconvergence of expectations. The reconvergence of 
expectations, in this case, consisted of new rules and decision-making procedures 
which were entrenched in new regime institutions and reflected new nonns and 
principles. In addition, such change stood in contrast to a period of inactivity in 
the regime in the years previous to the revelations regarding Iraq.
In the few years prior to the Iraqi shock, it has become clear that the 
regime had undergone little alteration. After the revelations in Iraq, however, a 
serious structural elaboration of the regime occurred. In the realm of nuclear 
exports, the creation of the Warsaw Guidelines accompanied the expansion of the 
scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. The IAEA launched its Programme 
93+2, while the NPT itself was indefinitely extended in 1995.
The Warsaw Guidelines of 1992 were the first and most radical example of 
the new rules and decision-making procedures which followed fi'om the Iraqi 
shock. For the first time, the role and potential of dual-use items in assisting a 
clandestine nuclear weapons progiamme were addressed. The Guidelines codified
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the desire to withhold items which presented “an unacceptable risk of diversion’’^ "^* 
The trigger list of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, first agreed in the wake of the 
Indian test in 1977, was also expanded, presenting another instance of new rules 
and decision-making procedures. Finally the creation of Programme 93+2 
entrenched, for the first time, the need for safeguards to detect undeclared nuclear 
programmes, as well as to inspect existing ones.
However, the regime change which occuned following the Iraqi shock was 
not confined to the creation of these new rules and procedures. As noted above, 
these new rules and procedures may be seen to have reflected a more fundamental 
change in some of the norms and principles of the nonproliferation regime. The 
norms of the regime had, with the Indian explosion, altered inter alia to enshiine 
an obligation on the part of supplier states to exercise restraint in theh nuclear 
trade. Prior to Iraq the nonns of the regime did not encompass the obligation of 
suppliers to take into account the potential dangers of dual-use technology and the 
possibility of such technology being used militarily. The Warsaw Guidelines and 
expanded trigger list required supplier states to assume a worst-case scenario not 
only for any recipient state’s intentions but, for the first time, of non-nuclear NPT 
signatories. This represented an alteration in the norms of suppliers obligation 
although, clearly, not as radical a one as had taken place following the Indian test 
explosion (which led to the initial notion of supplier obligations). In 
addition, fundamental changes to the way in which IAEA inspections were to be 
conducted reflected a further nonnative shift. The Agency’s obligations expanded 
to encompass not just the verification of cun ent activities, but the detection and 
anticipation of clandestine activities.
Guidelines fo r  Transfers o f  Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related
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Indeed, the whole question of clandestine nuclear programmes was 
brought to the fore. The belief (or principle) underlying the regime that a non­
nuclear NPT signatory would not, and could not, cheat on its obligations had been 
well and truly shattered. The notion that NPT membership was necessarily 
indicative of a state’s intentions -  first raised following Osiraq -  was dismissed.
As a consequence, and as in the 1970’s, the expectations of the regime’s actors 
regarding the course of the regime had diverged and then reconverged, in the fonn 
of the establishment of the Warsaw Guidelines as well as the expanded NSG 
trigger list.
In addition, the beliefs and expectations that clandestine nuclear 
programmes were detectable through then-current IAEA safeguards was 
destroyed. Programme 93+2 stood as evidence of new beliefs and reconverged 
expectations on this subject. Clandestine programmes were now acknowledged to 
be both possible and needing actively to be searched out. The case of Iraq had put 
paid to the belief that such programmes could not evade IAEA safeguards. The 
resulting change to the rules and decision-making procedures reflected the shift in 
this principle -  one which was at least as dramatic as any that had occurred 
following the Indian test.
Conclusions:
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 became the patron of the changed 
nuclear nonproliferation regime which emerged by 1997 (with the completion of 
INFCIRC/540). By September of 1991, with the discovery of the “smoking gun” 
documents by IAEA inspectors, the ambitions and extent of Iraq’s nuclear
Technology (Warsaw Guidelines), para.2.
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programme had become clear. The attempt by a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT 
-  a signatory which was under IAEA safeguards -  to develop nuclear weapons 
was no longer the stuff of the kinds of allegations made ten years earlier.
The activity which followed ftom this discovery brought substantial 
changes to the regime and “its lessons served to strengthen many of the regime’s 
major components.”^^  More importantly, however, these developments were not 
confined simply to the addition or subtraction of a few rules, but consisted (in the 
case of the Warsaw Guidelines and Programme 93+2) of entirely new creations. 
Moreover, the narrative of the years following the shock and the implementation 
of new rules and procedures appears to indicate corresponding changes to some of 
the norais and principles upon which the nonproliferation regime was previously 
founded. The fact that such change occurred after a period of regime inactivity 
again demonstrates a pattern of regime change which runs counter to the 
disinterest in change -  or the assumption of incremental development -  which 
characterises the approach to the subject in mainstream regime theory.
Given the depth of the regime changes which occurred, the history and 
prehistory of the revelations in Iraq demonstrated that the case of the Indian test 
explosion -  and the regime change which occuned in its wake -  was not an 
isolated incident in the history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Instead, it 
seems that the lessons which had not been learned following the bombing of 
Osnaq in 1981 had resurfaced a decade later, this time successfully translating 
into significant regime change. The circumstances under which such change 
occurred will now be explored.
Hans Blix, “Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Lesson of Iraq,” The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 15, no.4, Fall 1992, p.65.
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Chapter 7: The Iraqi Revelations of 1991 -  Understanding Regime 
Change
The shadow of the Osiraq incident, naturally, hangs over the regime change of 
the 1990’s, and the contrast between the reaction to the “Iraq question” in 1981 and 
1991 is sharp. The significance of the Osiraq raid to the nonproliferation regime was 
downplayed by almost all the actors involved (excepting Iraq), resulting in no 
substantial change to the regime itself. However, Iraq’s next foray into the 
international nuclear spotlight led dhectly to the very sort of transformative change to 
the regime which had previously been absent.
The years between 1991 and 1995 have been shown to have encompassed a 
period of dramatic change to the nuclear nonproliferation regime -  change due largely 
to the revelations of Iraq’s nuclear progi amme. Barely a year after the initial 
revelations, it was observed that “the main consequence of the war was to stimulate a 
major effort to improve the regime.”* A multilateral overhaul of nuclear export 
criteria among supplier nations echoed the changes that had followed the Indian test
V
two decades previous, this time without the reluctance which had characterised the 
initial suppliers group negotiations. In addition, the events in Iraq inspired significant 
change in the IAEA which had, ten years earlier, ardently denied Israeli accusations 
of safeguards deficiencies. Such changes to the rules and procedures of the regime, 
however, have been demonstrated to have reflected more fundamental changes to the 
underlying norms and principles.
The goal remains of how best to understand why this shock inspired such 
activity in 1991, particularly as opposed to 1981. Like the Osiraq case, and unlike the
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War,” p. 106.
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Indian case, there was no completed act of proliferation -  no test nor even a fully 
assembled weapon. Nonetheless, the following discussion shows that the 
interpretation of the shock of 1991 more closely resembled that following the Indian 
test than that inspired by the bombing of Osiraq. It will be maintained that the shock 
revealed a danger to the regime by undermining its credibility and serving as a 
warning of what was potentially to come. It also inspired an acceptance, in the key 
actor(s), of responsibility for creating the conditions for the shock to occur and, more 
importantly, for leading the regime change deemed necessary. Furthermore, there 
was a general belief, among the relevant actors, in the need for immediate action and 
thus a con esponding belief that no other interest took precedence over bringing about 
such change. Finally, the problems revealed by the shock were understood as ones to 
which workable solutions could be found and implemented.
Such interpretations minor those which eventually followed the Indian test of 
1974 and which likewise led to a rapid development of the regime. This said, the two 
cases differed significantly. The changes to the regime following the Indian test 
depended ultimately upon the will of the United States that change was needed and 
must be forced through, despite the objections of the European suppliers, in particular. 
The post-Gulf War shock, however, saw the impetus for change infuse not only the 
US, but also those who were previously reluctant to alter the status quo. As a 
consequence, it will be argued that the shared understandings of danger, 
responsibility, and immediacy made it possible for solutions to the problems raised to 
be both identified and acted upon. Indeed the near-total lack of conflict between the 
interpretations of the Iraqi shock meant that regime change could be even more 
dramatic than that inspired by the Indian test.
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The Understanding of Danger:
The extent of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, in contrast to the accusations made hy 
Israel ten years earlier, was this time not debatable. Consequently, the answer to the 
question of what the shock ‘meant’, for the actors involved and for the regime, was 
much more straightforward. It was agreed by the IAEA, the United States, and most 
of the rest of the international community that an Iraq with active nuclear aspirations, 
let alone nuclear weapons, was a dangerous thing.
Such a conclusion is, in itself, insufficient for helping to understand the 
decision to embark on significant changes to the regime. The belief that a nuclear­
armed Iraq was a danger which had to be prevented was necessary as a starting point. 
If the conclusion that the Iraqi nuclear programme was a danger remained limited to 
that, however, little reason could exist for initiating a series of multilateral discussions 
and negotiations aimed at regime change. The conclusion that only Iraq’s ambitions 
must be suffocated would be far more likely to be limited to condemnation of Iraq’s 
actions and sanctions against it. However, the danger revealed went beyond Iraq 
itself, and there was a palpable concern that there may be “other Iraqs, that is, 
countries successfully hiding nuclear material that they should have declared and 
placed under international safeguards.”  ^ It was observed that the
NPT was shown to have been ineffective in restraining Iraq’s 
quest for nuclear arms, raising questions about the utility of 
the pact as a curb on proliferation elsewhere in the region.^
~ Blix, “Verification of Nuclear Nonproliferation,” p.58.
 ^ Leonard S. Spector “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East -  the next chapter begins,” in Efraim 
Karsh, Martin S. Navias, Philip Sabin (eds.), Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle 
East: Tackling the Spread o f  Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; 1993), p. 135.
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Iraq had revealed serious problems which -  in order to reassert the regime’s 
credibility -  requhed correction. The danger implied by the shock, in other words, 
lay in the understanding of Iraq as the thin end of a wedge.
Understanding o f danger -  United States
This crucial understanding of the danger was one which was evident among 
the actors most actively involved in bringing about change. These actors, as in the 
Osiraq case, were the United States, the IAEA and, to a lesser but still important 
extent, the other supplier states (particularly the fonner West Germany). Following 
the revelations, all held in common the view that “Iraq’s deliberate efforts to 
cii'cumvent the NPT, and the inability of the IAEA to detect these violations, have 
shaken confidence in the accord as a mechanism for constraining...nuclear activities.”"* 
In the United States the fear of the Iraqi threat was also clearly linked with the fear of 
the possibility that other states, similarly hostile to America, might eventually succeed 
in their quest for a nuclear capability in spite of IAEA safeguards or NPT 
membership.
As in the Osnaq case, Congi*essional hearings were peppered with such concerns. 
What appeared to differ in 1991, however, was the extent to which Congressional 
concerns complemented those in the Administration and the State Department. 
Whereas before, the State Department and Administration had visibly downplayed the 
concerns of Congress, this time all appeared equally alarmed by the disclosures about 
Iraq’s nuclear programme.
Ibid., p. 156.
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Not only was the will to disarm Iraq shared, but “calls for finding the means of 
avoiding such occurrences in the fiiture were strong and immediate.”  ^ Those who had 
previously been strong supporters of nonproliferation initiatives, such as Senator 
Glenn, declared that Iraq had revealed nuclear proliferation to be “the gravest national 
security threat we face today...[and that]...this threat will shape our national security, 
foreign policy and intelligence agenda for years to come.”  ^ The determination was 
also expressed, and met with widespread agreement, that the United States “must 
learn fi'om this experience so that we can prevent any other nation from pursuing the 
path of Saddam Hussein and posing such dire threats to others.”  ^ One hearing even 
went so far as to declare the necessity of focusing not only on the lessons learned 
from Iraq, hut on “how to prevent a similar incident fi'om recuning in the friture.”*^
The intei*pretation of the shock not simply in the context of Iraq, but with reference to 
other potential proliferators, pervaded such hearings, hinting strongly at the desire to 
take wider initiatives than the simple disarming of Iraq.
This time, and in marked contrast to the Osiraq case, those expressing such 
sentiments were in agreement with President Bush, who stated that “[nuclear] 
proliferation would jeopardize the conuuon defense and security of the United
 ^Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, p.97,
 ^Proliferation Threats in the 1990’s, Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United 
States Senate, One Hundred and Third Congress, first session, February 24“’, 1993, p .l.
 ^Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from  the Iraq Experience, p.2 (speaker: Senator Pell.) Such 
affirmations, and the resolve to discover “whether other nations have emulated Iraq” (Senator Roth, in 
Proliferation Threats in the 1990’s p. 50) were typical o f the rhetoric tliroughout the hearings on the 
subject. Such rhetoric was underscored by such documents as the annual report to Congress by the 
Aims Contiol and Disarmament Agency, which expressed its wider concern that “Iraq’s unsafeguarded 
clandestine nuclear activities have also served to remind the international community that adherence to 
nonproliferation treaties alone may not suffice as proof of a state’s good faith.” (in US ACDA Annual 
Report to Congress 1991, p. 104.
® Ira q ’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspections in Iraq, Joint hearing before tlie 
Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International Security, International Organizations 
and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred and 
third Congi'ess, first session, June 29, 1993, p .l.
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States.”  ^ This was underscored later with a statement to the press expressing the 
Administration’s determination, in an obvious reference to Iraq and other hostile 
states, “to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to 
regions of instability.”*** The prime regions of instability which concerned the US 
were the Middle East and East Asia, and the consensus appears to have been that Iraq 
was far from an isolated threat. As the previous chapter noted, the Administration 
tended, if anything, to overemphasise the wider danger. Secretary of Defense 
Cheney, for example, went on record as declaring that no fewer than nine countries 
were close to getting nuclear weapons. * * It was maintained by one former 
government official (and supported by statements such as those above) that “while 
aspects of the Iraqi case are unique, it is widely acknowledged that several states in 
the Middle East, notably Algeria, Iran and Libya, are moving towards a nuclear 
capability, as is North Korea.”*^ There was grave concern that other non-nuclear NPT 
signatories might follow Iraq’s example.
The Congress and Administration were thus far more in accord on the danger, 
posed both by Iraq and by potential copycats, than they had been when the question 
had first been forcefully put ten years earlier. The common belief existed that Iraq’s
 ^ “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Nuclear Cooperation with EURATOM,” March 8, 1991, in 
Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States -  George Bush, 1991 Book I, (Washington, DC.: 
US Government Printing Office; 1992), p.231.
“Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Restrictions on US Satellite Component Exports to 
China,” April 30, 1991 in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f  the United States: George Bush, Book I, 
p.446.
‘ ' BBC World Service, (7:00am GMT, 14 January 1992), quoted in David Fischer, “Nuclear non­
proliferation: the prospects for the non-proliferation regime after the Gulf War” Energy Policy, vol.20, 
110.7, July 1992. This over-emphasis on the part of Cheney is noted by Fischer, who writes that “even a 
worst case analysis would have difficulty getting beyond six: Algeria, haq, Iran, India Pakistan and 
Nortli Korea and for various reasons it is very dubious whether any of the first Üiree are now within 
sight of nuclear weapons.” (p.681, footnote 1).
Deutch, “The New Nuclear Tln eat,” p. 120. John Deutch was the former Under Secretary of the US 
Department o f Energy. The DOE, of course, later came under heavy fire fi-om Congress about its role 
in Iraq’s programme and its trade and export standards generally.
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actions had both damaged the regime’s credibility and raised the spectre of further 
proliferation on the part of other, officially non-nuclear, states. In this it bore greater 
resemblance to the (eventual) interpretation, following the Indian test, of the danger 
posed. Indeed, on this occasion such an intei*pretation occurred with significantly less 
need for Congress to convince the presiding Administration of the accuracy of its 
point of view.
Understanding o f danger -  the IAEA
The acceptance of the wider dangers exposed hy the shock was evidenced
from changes in the IAEA safeguards system. The 93+2 programme and Model
Additional Protocol had implications far beyond Iraq. The IAEA’s understanding of
the danger was not confined to one violator, but recognised the ominous implications
for the wider regime. The problems exposed in one area were considered not only to
have undermined the credibility of the present safeguards system, but also to indicate
others, or the threat of others, in the future.
Evidence can be found in the rhetoric of IAEA officials in the period
following the revelations in Iraq. The fact that a member state had, contrary to its
agreement, attempted to use peaceful assistance for military ends was undeniable.
As one article discussing the safeguards changes later noted:
the failure to address adequately the possibility of undeclared 
nuclear activities totally separate from safeguarded activities, 
as revealed in Iraq have been seen as a major shortcoming, and 
expectations have changed accordingly.*^
The IAEA’s interpretation of the 1991 Iraqi shock was very different to that of 
ten years earlier. In the case of the Osiraq bombing there was a perceived 
overreaction to the shock, particularly in the American Congress, and it was this
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oveiTeaction which had been seen within the IAEA as the real danger to the Agency’s 
credibility. Following the Gulf War, however, the danger was accepted as stemming 
from the reality of the shock itself, and not merely the reaction to it. Certainly, the 
uniqueness of Iraq was noted and accepted. One IAEA official correctly observed 
that “Iraq’s vast oil wealth relative to its small population, and its large pool of 
Western-educated scientists and engineers, have made that country a particularly 
tough case of WMD proliferation.”*"* Nonetheless, and as Director-General Blix 
noted in a statement to the General Conference, “the case of Iraq demonstrated that 
nuclear activities which should have been declared but were kept secret, could go 
undetected by the safeguaids system as it was designed.” *^
Blix frirther noted that “the Agency is strengthening its nuclear verification 
system to increase the prohability of detecting violations, drawing on the lessons of 
Iraq.”**^ The concerns of the IAEA did not end with Iraq, hut rather hegan with it.
One former IAEA employee observed that “initially IAEA safeguards were 
introduced to make sure that peaceful nuclear activities were not misused. But now 
we’ve seen that this assumption was not right in Iraq and it may not be coiTect 
anywhere else.”*^  Still more significant was the testimony before the US Senate by
Carlson, Bragin, Bardsley and Hill, “Nuclear Safeguards as an Evolutionary System,” p .l 10.
Jonathan B. Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from 
the UN Experience in Iraq,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol.3, no.3, Spring/Summer 1996. David 
Fischer later concuned, although he noted that while Iraq was a very specific case, “it would be 
dangerous to assume that there will be no more like Iraq.” (Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.678.)
Dr. Hans Blix, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, C19, “Statement to the 36“' 
Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 21 September 1992” 
(Vienna: IAEA; 1992) p. 16.
IAEA Press Release, 21 October 1992, PR92/37. The press release deals with tlie address to the UN 
General Assembly by Dr. Blix on the same date.
“Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Strengthening tlie Non-Proliferation Treaty,” 
in Disarmament -  New Realities: Disarmament, Peace-Building and Global Security: [ excerpt from  the 
panel discussion organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc., at a conference held at the 
United Nations in New York, 20-23 April 1993] (New York: United Nations; 1993), p.219 (Speaker:
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David Kay, the IAEA’s chief inspector in Iraq on the September inspection which had 
uncovered the incriminating documents and which made clear the extent of the Iraqi 
prograiume. Kay explicitly drew implications for the credihility of the regime and its 
future when he asked “what does this [the revelations in Iraq] say about other NPT 
countries such as Iran or non-NPT countries such as Libya? What secret multi-billion 
[dollar] nuclear weapons programs are underway in those countries?”***
The IAEA thus came to interpret the danger of Iraq in a similar manner to the 
United States. Both saw the shock as having revealed serious problems both in itself 
and as a portent of things to come. The fact that the IAEA did not confine its 
activities merely to inspecting and dismantling Iraq’s nuclear capability, but 
advocated a wide-ranging reform of the safeguards system, supports such an 
appraisal. Programme 93+2 was even identified as evolving out of a desire to be able 
to detect clandestine activity “if another State tried to follow the example of Iraq.”'  ^
An IAEA publication on the changes to nuclear safeguards, albeit written in 1998, 
identified IAEA determination, in the light of the Iraqi revelations, “to reduce the risk 
that other States might be able to undertake clandestine programmes.” *^*
Understanding o f Danger -  elsewhere
The understandings in the key supplier states (particularly Germany) of what 
Iraq had attempted to do manifested themselves most obviously in terms of their 
inteipretation of their own responsibility and the immediate need for action. The full
Ben Sanders, at the time the Executive Chairman of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation).
Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from  the Iraq Experience, p.27 (speaker: David Kay).
Fischer, History o f  the IÆ A , p .295. Although this is, strictly speaking a secoiidaiy text, the author’s 
past career in the IAEA, as well as the fact that the book itself is an IAEA publication, may be argued 
to correctly identify general IAEA inteipretations of the shock.
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participation of Germany, France and other states in the reanimated NSG, reflected a 
belief in those states that not only must Iraqi ambitions be halted, but that other states 
may have similar desires which must also be thwarted by changing the regime it self-  
in this case, the export control component of it. Gennany was identified, in the wake 
of the Iraqi revelations, as having “become very interested in an international 
agreement to reinforce export controls” *^ -  a determination which 
suggests an anxiety not only that the shock itself had damaged the integrity of the 
regime, hut that danger also lay in the apparent exposure of a path by which others 
either were proliferating or intended to do so.^  ^ France, too, reinvented itself as a 
concerned supplier, “determined to demonstrate its readiness to co-operate 
internationally for non-proliferation purposes.”^^
In addition to these two suppliers, and as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the P-5 states in the UN Security Council displayed a unity of purpose which was 
unlike anything which had been seen in that hody before. It was observed, for 
example, that “had the Cold War not ended, it is at least questionable whether the 
Security Council would have reached agreement on measures for eliminating Iraq’s 
nuclear weapon potential.” "^* Certainly, such harmony was reflected in an apparently 
shared acceptance of the danger posed by the revelations in Iraq. Although Security 
Council Resolution 687 focused on Iraq’s non-compliance and the solutions which
The Evolution o f  IAEA Safeguards, p. 19.
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War,” p.97
The shock of Iraq, of course, came at a time when German attitudes to nuclear export policy were 
filled with giowing unease following, for example, the Hempel case and the NTG/PTB revelations.
See Müller “After the Scandals: West German Nonproliferation Policy,” PRIF Reports no.9, Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt, (Frankfurt am Main: Febmary 1990), and Eric Chauvistré, “Germany and 
Proliferation: the Nuclear Export Policy,” Arbeitspapiere der Berghof-Stiftung für Konfliktforschung 
Nr. 43 (Berlin: Berghof-Stiftung für Konfliktforschung; 1991).
Ibid., p.97.
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were to be implemented, it also stated that the Security Council was, in a broader 
sense, “conscious of the thi eat that all weapons of mass destmction pose to the peace 
and security in the area.”^^  Certainly, the stated willingness of the Security Council to 
vouch future support for the IAEA was indicative of the shared belief that the 
disaiining of Iraq had not, in itself, solved the problems raised after the Gulf War. 
However, it should be noted here that the wide-ranging safeguards reforms requfred 
the cooperation of all non-nuclear NPT signatories. Thus, the recognition of danger 
had to go far heyond supplier states and the UN Security Council.
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f danger
The awareness of what Iraq had attempted to do, and exactly how close it had 
come to being successful, spawned a broad consensus within the United States, the 
IAEA, the UN Security Council and the rest of the international community. Unlike 
in the aftermath of the Osii aq bombing, the American Congi'ess found itself in 
agreement with the State Department and Administration. All were concerned not 
simply by the shock itself but -  cmcially in terms of its necessity for regime change -  
the way in which the Iraqi rejection of its NPT obligations had damaged the 
credibility of the regime and revealed what could potentially be achieved hy 
apparently reputable participants. In this, the reactions more closely resembled the 
eventual response to the 1974 Indian test explosion. Unlike the case of the Osii aq 
bombing, the IAEA this time interpreted the danger of the shock as stemming not 
from external overreactions to the event, but horn the event itself. As in the United
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.305.
UN Security Council Resolution 687, preamble in Kokolski, Technology: and the Proliferation o f  
Nuclear Weapons.
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States, a conception of the shock as an omen of things to come was also evident, 
bringing the two into accord.
Finally, there are indications of a similar assessment in Iraq’s major suppliers 
and the abnormally unified P-5 of the UN Security Council. There is again a contrast 
with the unwilling, even non-existent participation in the NSG following the Indian 
test, and the discord in 1981. Again, change to the regime, rather than merely 
changes to relations with Iraq, point to a fear of Iraq as symptomatic of wider 
problems in the regime. This brought the states’ assessments into line (immediately 
this time) so that establishing the consensus for regime change was not the uphill 
battle that it had been previously.
The Understanding of Responsibility:
In the cases of India and Osiraq, the acceptance of responsibility, or lack of it, 
was a significant element in the outcome. In the Indian test, the main author of 
regime change (the United States) became convinced of its own responsibility for 
initiating and leading the necessary changes to the regime. Following the Osiraq 
shock, however, the actors directly affected by the shock accepted neither 
responsibility for indirectly creating the shock nor responsibility for instigating 
change. The one exception was the American Congress, which called for American
This near-miiversal concern found its way, for instance, into the 1995 Principles and Objectives -  
one of the tlu ee documents which emerged fi-om tlie 1995 NPT Extension Conference.
In the Indian case, of course, the United States Administration had to be persuaded of the danger to 
die regime by Congress, and then had to persuade others of that potential danger. As will be discussed 
ill the concluding chapter, such a delay embodied the leap fi-om the belief that while the Indian test was, 
in itself, not directly threatening, a significant danger lay in the threat of imitation by other, hostile 
nations. In the case of Iraq 1991, however, the proliferator, Iraq, was itself was actively hostile to the 
West, perhaps allowing for a clearer understanding of why die alignment between the United States and 
other suppliers (especially the formerly recalcitiant Germany and France) suffered no delay this time. 
Lawrence Freedman alludes to the contrast between the indirect threat of die Indian test and the more 
‘direct’ danger of the Iraqi 1991 case in “The ‘Proliferation Problem’ and die New World Order,” in
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leadership to alter the regime, but was unable to convince the State Department or 
Administration of the necessity. In the post-Gulf War environment, the deske for 
regime change was, as in the aftermath of the 1974 Indian test, couched frequently in 
terms of liability. However, in the wake of this shock, this was evident not simply in 
rhetoric of the United States, but also in the IAEA and the other suppliers. Questions 
were raised about the adequacy not only of nuclear export policies, but of safeguards, 
inspections procedures, and intelligence gathering and sharing. As was previously 
observed of the 1974 shock, it is difficult to countenance how change to the regime 
could have been enacted without finding evidence of a pervasive sense of 
accountability for fixing past mistakes and, more importantly, for leading the changes 
necessary to prevent future ones.
The United States
In the US, Congressional hearings were again rife with discomfort over the
American role in indirectly aiding Iraq in its quest for nuclear weapons or at least, in
not doing nearly enough to ftmstrate it. The first hearing on the subject dealt
explicitly, almost exclusively, with the alleged failure of various areas of government,
in particular the DOE, to prevent Iraq’s neai* success. The Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, focusing on the question of Iraq, rounded on the DOE.
Its Chairman declared that
the DOE appears to have left open an even larger 
avenue toward the development of the bomb, nuclear 
proliferation. This is unacceptable. The DOE must 
be a leading force in efforts by this govermnent to 
prevent proliferation.^^
Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin (eds.), Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in 
the Middle East, p. 164.
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He went on to censure the “failure of the DOE to issue a DOE order...to control
sensitive information may have helped Iraq’s nuclear weapon p r o g r a m . T h e  DOE,
even admitted partial responsibility for aiding Iraq by not warning the Secretary of
State, despite growing internal concerns regarding Iraq’s intentions. The Director of
the Office of Classification recalled that
the Intelligence Office [of the DOE] did not believe that the 
information they or we had justified escalating the matter within 
the DOE. The Intelligence Office also disagreed with the policy 
recommendation. We could therefore not reach agreement 
on a meaningful document to go to the Secretary.^**
Such sentiments pervaded both Congress and the Administration. Senate
hearings in October of 1991, for example, paid particular attention to the role of
American companies in providing technology for export to Iraq.^* Following the
testimony of Dr. Blix, it was declared to general approval that “the US has to play a
leadership role in helping to give the IAEA added powers and resources.”^^
Congressional belief in the necessity of American leadership was not terribly
different fr om that which emerged following the bombing of Osiraq, although it went
beyond the lAEA-bashing which had occurred ten years previously. The sense that
the United States had been partially at fault -  had contributed to Iraq’s nuclear
Nuclear Nonproliferation, p.2 (speaker: Congressman Dingell, chairman). The hearing was initially 
classified, but was declassified in April 1992 by the DOE with information that was still deemed 
sensitive deleted.
Ibid., p.2.
Ibid., p.35. Evidence of these growing concerns within the DOE (which were not acted upon) was 
provided in the testimony o f former Secretary of Energy Watkins who, in a letter to the Chairman dated 
March 19'*', 1991, recollected that “during my first few months as Secretary of Energy it became clear 
that DOE’s intelligence program was not effective, not well known or respected in the Intelligence 
Community, and not responsive to Departmental need.” (p.445).
*^ DuPont came under particular scrutiny by the Senate, and the hearmgs contain a reprinting of an 
article in the New York Times which proclaimed as its headline that “Dupont says US Cleared Export of 
Item Used in Iraqi Bomb Effort” (12 December 1991). See Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from  the 
Iraq Experience, pp.57-58.
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program -  had deepened. The DOE had shown itself to have been complacent over 
the Iraqi proliferation threat and to have revealed sensitive information, while the 
Department of Commerce came under foe for the issuing of certain export licences.^^ 
Such interpretations gained strength following the initial hearings and extended 
beyond Congiess.
In the two hearings dealing with nuclear proliferation in 1993, this feeling of 
accountability had, if anything, increased. Assertions regarding American 
responsibility for the nonproliferation regime in the wake of Iraq were typified by 
declarations to the effect that “it is evident that the United States must now take the 
lead.” '^* Underlying such proclamations was a tangible sense of anger, not only over 
the DOE’s bungling but over American support for Iraq in the 1980’s. John Deutch -  
the former Under-Secretary of the DOE -  admitted in an article that “the failure of 
American policymakers to receive or believe realistic assessments of the Iraqi thi eat 
was undoubtedly influenced by Iraq’s political role as a counterweight to Iran and 
Syria.”^^  This past calculation of Iraq’s utility was identified in the discussion of 
Osii aq as one basis for American inaction, underscored the sense of US responsibility 
for the shock on this occastion. The rueful remembrance of one Congi'essman was that 
“we thought we could use Saddam Hussein... we wanted to play off the Iranians or 
others in the area.”^^  Another refen ed to “the palpable failure of our Government to 
pull together a coherent policy with respect to Iraq.”^^
Ibid., p.38 (speaker; Senator Pell).
When quizzed, CIA Director R. James Woolsey reluctantly admitted that “there certainly have been 
some instances of American companies having been involved.” {Proliferation Threats in the 1990’s, 
p.33.) Despite Woolsey’s stated conviction tliat European companies carried most o f the guilt on this 
score, the admission nonetheless elicited a goodly amount of hand-wi'inging from the Senators present.
Ibid., p.49.
Deutch, “The New Nuclear Threat,” p. 128.
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These perceived past failures by the government were not only recognized in
Congress. Admissions by the DOE and CIA of inadequacies in intelligence gathering
and assessment were freely acknowledged by the Administration itself. In contrast to
the rejection of responsibility for any aspect of the Osiraq incident, the Assistant
Secretary of State this time informed the House of Representatives that “before the
end of the Gulf War, our intelligence community and the intelligence coiumunities of
others in the West, had focused on Iraq’s nuclear progiam [in the wake of the Osiraq
shock]. And it is clear, in retrospect, that they got it w r o n g . T h e  Administration,
moreover, implicitly recognised the existence of flaws in American nuclear export
standards when acknowledging to Congress the role of American companies in
exporting equipment to Iraq and thus aiding the Iraq bomb project. In January 1992, a
letter from the Administration to Congress stated:
We have received from UNSCOM a preliminary list of US 
company names whose equipment has been seen in Iraq by 
UN inspectors. We provided this list, on a confidential basis, 
to investigative agencies and appropriate congressional committees.^^
Such admissions were restated in the press, which made much of American
culpability. This ranged from simple reports of the involvement of American
companies in Iraq’s atomic program"*** to the wailing and gnashing of teeth which
Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspections in Iraq, p. 12 (speaker: Congressman Sam 
Gejdenson).
Ibid., p.42. The speaker. Congressman Lantos went on to rail against “Western failure and 
in esponsibility...during the decade of the 1980’s”, p.42. This is, of course, the same Congressman 
Lantos who, during the aftermath of tlie Osiraq incident, had called on the government to focus on the 
bigger picture of the Cold War, and not be distracted by the “momentary sideshow” in the Middle East. 
(See The Israeli A ir Strike, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, June 18, 19, and 25, 1981, p.202.)
h a q ’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspections in haq, p.6 (speaker: Robert L. Gallucci, 
Asst. Secretary o f State).
“Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions, 14 January 1992,” in Paper^s o f the Presiderrts o f  the United States: George Bush, 
1992-1993, Book I, pA63.
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followed the publications of the hearings which focused on the role of the DOE.
Iraq’s ambitions were cited in editorials as having been “silenced within the Federal 
bureaucracy nearly two years before the West went to war against Iraq and its atomic 
complex.”"** Previous US policy towards Iraq was attacked with claims that 
“warnings and plans were dismissed by Energy Department superiors, who knew of 
Washington’s long tilt towards Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran in the Persian Gulf 
region.”"*^ The Administration itself was even accused of complicity in questionable 
exports to Iraq, with headlines such as “US Tolerated Iraqi Fronts.”"*^ The conviction 
that the United States had made a significant contribution, both dir ectly and indirectly, 
to the Iraqi nuclear effort, found a significant level of support throughout the political 
elite in Washington.
The IAEA
It is evident that the reaction of the IAEA in 1991 was markedly different fiom 
1981. The unequivocal fact of Iraq’s successful attempts at cir cumventing its NPT 
and safeguards obligations made the denial of this danger all but impossible.
However, it was the acceptance of responsibility for the shock in which the reaction 
of the IAEA diverged most sharply fi'om that of 1981. The post-Osiraq defensiveness 
within the IAEA bureaucracy in response to sustained attacks on its capabilities was,
See, for example. The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 1991, which reported that “Iraq used 
equipment from German, Swiss and US companies in its secret program to build a nuclear bomb.”
The New York Times, 20 April 1992.
Ibid. The accusations tiiat American support of Iraq blinded it to the realities of Iraq’s nuclear 
ambitions, were frequently reiterated. A month later, it was bluntly asserted in an editorial that 
“Americans now know that the war in the Persian Gulf was brought about by a colossal foreign-policy 
blunder: George Bush’s decision, after tlie Iran-Iraq war ended, to entrust regional security to Saddam 
Hussein.” (New York Times, 18 May 1992).
The Washington Post, 11 August 1992.
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after a brief delay, replaced by public admission of inadequacies and detennination to 
enact change to the safeguards components of the nonproliferation regime.
The author of the Agency’s official history (published after the most 
substantial changes to the IAEA had occurred) observed that, in the period following 
the revelations, “there was no doubt that a fundamental review and redirection of the 
existing safeguards system was essential.”"*"* After a brief internal battle between 
traditionalists and reformers within the Agency rapid regime change occurred in 
concert with admissions of liability and acceptance of the need for change.
One of the most significant admissions of the IAEA’s inadequacy came in an 
article written by the Dftector-General. He cited the case of Iraq as “a reminder of 
some of the limitations of the present safeguards system” and admitted that “the 
ability of Iraq to construct and operate undeclared uranium enrichment facilities 
without detection highlighted a weakness in the system.”"*^ Nonetheless, the 
Agency’s admission of its weaknesses and limitations were a far cry from the vitriol 
which infused the American press, resulting in the dismissal of IAEA safeguards as 
“grossly inadequate.”"*^ In comparison with previous reactions by the Agency to any 
criticisms of safeguards, such admissions were nevertheless significant.
The tenor of the relevant articles in the IAEA Bulletin were also very different 
fi-om those which had previously examined Iraq’s ambitions. In contrast to the 
defensiveness which characterised articles written by H. Gmemm in the wake of 
Osiraq, the intei-pretation of events by the Agency’s Department of Safeguards was
Fischer, History o f  the IAEA, p.285.
Blix, “IAEA Safeguards: New Challenges,” p.34.
The International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1992. Tlie same newspaper also ran an editorial late the 
previous year which noted tliat “that IAEA did tlie best it could -  which wasn’t much.” (International 
Herald Tribune, 18 October 1991). British newspapers, generally speaking, were no more generous in 
their assessment of the Agency. See, for example, The Times, 17 July 1991; The Daily Telegraph, 25 
September 1991; The Independent, 21 March 1992.
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much more reflective. Whereas post-Osiraq attacks on the IAEA were rejected as a
product of media ignorance, the shaken post-Gulf War IAEA was eventually prepared
to adopt a much more conciliatory tone. The first such confession of inadequacy
came early in 1992, with an article whose title, “Strengthening the international
safeguards system”, indicated the determination of the IAEA bureaucracy to initiate
change. The article’s authors, one of whom had famously and publicly rejected
concerns over Iraq prior to the Gulf War, stated that
Iraq’s non-compliance with the provisions of its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, and the magnitude of its undeclared 
nuclear weapon development programme, have forcefully 
underlined the fact that the safeguards assurances presently 
provided by the IAEA...alone are insufficient."*^
In addition, Giiremm’s successor as the Deputy Director-General of Safeguards,
Briino Pellaud, proclaimed that “the case of Iraq exposed some apparent weaknesses
of the INFCIRC/153 system.”"*^ The article made no mention of attacks on the
Agency fiom outside, but did go on to accept IAEA responsibility. Pellaud wrote
that:
in reviewing the Iraqi experience, it is clear that Agency 
safeguards did not provide adequate assurance that States 
subject to comprehensive safeguards agi eements would 
submit all nuclear materials to safeguards or that undeclared 
operations were not carried out in facilities that were 
submitted for safeguards."***
The IAEA, then, accepted its own role in Iraq’s increasingly successful 
attempts at attaining nuclear weapons. In addition, there is evidence of a willingness
Jennekens, Parsick, and von Baeckmann “Strengthening the international safeguards system,” p.6. It 
was Jennekens who had, only a few months before the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, declared Iraq 
to be in compliance with its NPT obligations (see Kokolski, Technology and the Proliferation o f  
Nuclear Weapons, p. 101).
Bruno Pellaud, “Safeguards in Transition; Status, challenges, and opportunities,” IAEA Bulletin, 
vol.36, no.3, 1994, p.4.
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to be proactive in reforming safeguards. Self-congi'atulatory tones of the Department 
of Safeguards towards the end of the 1990’s were predicated on the Agency’s 
recognition that the case of Iraq had “demonstrated vividly the serious limitation of 
the ability of the IAEA safeguards system to detect possible undeclared nuclear 
activities.” *^*
Supplier States
The crucial role played by nuclear exports to Iraq by non-American suppliers 
became evident with the uncovering of both what Iraq had attempted to do and how it 
had managed to achieve its partial success. It became apparent that the primary 
offenders in this regard had been German suppliers, although it was rightly noted that 
“with Germany heading the list, practically all technologically advanced countries had 
contributed to Iraq’s concentrated effort.” *^ It will be recalled that following the 
Indian test explosion, West Germany had played an actively obstructive role insofar 
as negotiations for multilateral agreements on nuclear exports was concerned. This, 
combined with the fact that “the Iraqi program was greatly assisted by transfer of 
sensitive technology through trade, mostly from Germany,”^^  rendered the German 
understanding of responsibility worthy of consideration. The corresponding 
interpretation by France -  given its previous role as key nuclear supplier to Iraq and 
vocal critic of Israel’s 1981 accusations -  is also of interest.
Ibid., p.6. Again, the contrast with the claims of Gruemm (“it is to be doubted that the effectiveness 
of IAEA safeguards are really the weak link in this interaction”, in “Potential and limitation of 
international safeguards,” IAEA Bulletin Supplement 1982, p.43) is highly visible.
IAEA Department of Safeguards and the Division of Public Information, The IA E A ’s Safeguards 
System: Ready fo r  the 2 f ‘ Century, (Vienna: IAEA; 1998), p.4.
Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War,” p.97.
Deutch, “The New Nuclear Threat,” p. 126.
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As was noted in the previous chapter, German concerns regarding the 
standards of its nuclear exports had, prior to the Gulf War, increased in the wake of 
several scandals. Nonetheless, only months before the outbreak of hostilities in the 
Gulf, it was declared that West Gennany “stands out as the undisputed number one as 
far as the... apparent reluctance of the country’s political leadership to take energetic 
corrective action are concerned.”^^  The reaction to the shock of Iraq, appears to have 
cemented the growing domestic sense of responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation 
and for corrective action, in a way which far outstripped the uneasy mmblings which 
preceded it. At the reconvened NSG, Germany was not merely behaving in an 
unobstuctive manner, but rather in a positively helpful fashion. "^* The IAEA 
benefited, too, with inspectors receiving information from the German govermnent 
detailing what it had sold to Iraq.^  ^ Such actions indicate an acceptance of 
responsibility for helping to bring about the danger created and a desire actively to 
assist in developing the regime in whichever way was considered necessary. Indeed, 
the government itself explicitly admitted liability to the US State Department, which 
was able to observe in an official statement before a Congressional hearing that “the 
German Government has acknowledged that German companies account for a sizable 
number of items discovered in Iraq’s WMD programs.”^^  As one commentator stated,
Müller, “After the Scandals: West Gennan Nonproliferation Policy,” p. 15. The report was 
published in February, 1990.
For example, it was declared that “Gennany, one of those states previously reluctant to stiffen 
restrictions had become very interested in an international agreement to reinforce export conti'ols.”
(See Müller, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf War ,” p.97.) This change 
of heart following Iraq would seem to point to some sort of an acceptance of responsibility for taking 
initiative.
An IAEA press release applauded German aid, remarking that “the initiative of the German 
government has greatly assisted tlie ongoing inspection effort with regai d to the Iraqi centrifuge 
progi'amme.” See IAEA Press Release PR 92/4, 17 January 1992.
Ira q ’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspection in haq, p. 10. Another key declaration of 
responsibility occurred in January o f 1992, when a German Foreign Ministi y spokesman was quoted 
as admitting that “the government has information showing that before the Gulf war, several major
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accurately it appears in light of the admission of liability and the nonproliferation
initiatives subsequently taken:
in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the evidence that a number 
of German companies had sold Iraq the technology, parts and 
advice it needed for its various programs of mass-destmction 
weapons lent greater urgency to the voices of those who both at 
home and abroad were clamouring for tightening of the country’s 
still-weak export-control legislation/^
Similarly, it was likewise proposed that “unlike any other crisis before, the 
Gulf War and its aftermath have shaipened France’s awareness of the perils of its 
theretofore highly permissive nuclear export p o l i c y . F r a n c e ’s role as the major 
supplier of Iraq’s nuclear program had ended with the bombing of Osii aq. 
Nonetheless, the denials of wrongdoing -  which had been made in response to the 
shock of 1981 -  were noticeably absent. As with Germany, France’s whole-hearted 
participation in the NSG implies a determination to be one of the authors of the new 
multilateral nuclear supply standards.
This was equally, if not more true, of the United Kingdom. The revelations 
that British companies had been implicated in Iraq’s supergun effort led to the Scott 
Inquiry and was particularly embaiTassing for a state which (like Canada after the 
1974 Indian explosion) “traditionally held an image of itself as being at the forefi-ont 
of global non-proliferation efforts.” *^* The vigorous participation of the UK in the 
suppliers group negotiations -  in the wake of Iraq -  becomes still more
German fimis supplied ring magnets and casings which could have put Iraq in a position to build and 
operate a large number of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment installations.” The spokesman stated that 
criminal proceedings against these finns were underway. (International Herald Tribune, 15 January 
1992).
”  Alexander Kelle “Germany,” in Harald Müller (ed.) European Non-proliferation Policy 1988-1992, 
(Brussels: European Interuniversity Press; 1993). p. 112.
Fhillipe Richard, “France,” in European Non-proliferation Policy 1988-1992, p.83.
DaiTyl Howlett, “United Kingdom,” in Müller (ed.). Nuclear Export Controls in Europe, p. 55.
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understandable when viewed in this light (echoing the whole-hearted support of 
American initiatives by Canada after the events of 1974).
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f responsibility
The Iraqi revelations of 1991 prompted a very different assessment, in tenns 
of responsibility, than they had ten years previously. The United States government, 
in contrast to the two previous cases, was unanimous ftom the start in its assessment 
of American responsibility and the need for American leadership. There was, on this 
occasion, no need for Congress to persuade the Administration and State Department 
of its point of view. In the IAEA, the contrast with the Osiraq incident is perhaps the 
sharpest. The defensiveness which characterised the reaction in 1981 was gone and 
there soon emerged a conciliatory tone ft om both the Department of Safeguards and 
the Director General, which acknowledged flaws in IAEA procedures and the need 
for change. Finally, key suppliers displayed a determination and willingness to 
introduce changes to multilateral nuclear supply standards while accepting liability for 
assisting Iraq’s nuclear effort. As a result of this unusual level of international 
agreement, a declaration could be made following an international economic summit 
that “the responsibility to prevent the re-emergence of such dangers [of weapons 
proliferation] is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as 
the international community as a whole.”^^
Understanding of Immediacy:
The changes made to the nonproliferation regime after the Iraqi revelations 
stood in contrast to the inactivity of the previous decade. They occuiTed more quickly
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than those following the Indian test which had undergone a near-two year delay as the 
American Congress tried to rouse enthusiasm for immediate action. It will be argued 
below that the speed of this response was a logical extension of the belief, firstly, that 
there was urgency and, secondly, that no other (national) interests existed which were 
of a higher priority than nuclear nonproliferation and strengthening the regime. Such 
beliefs are evident not only in the speed of the action taken, but also in the language 
of the relevant actors.
The United States
The acceptance of danger to the nonproliferation regime followed the Iraqi 
revelations almost immediately. Agreement existed within the American government 
that a serious problem existed and required American leadership to rectify it. In 
addition. Congress had no need in 1991 to persuade the Administration of the need for 
immediate action. Hearings in Congress spoke of the threat created by Iraq and its 
potential imitators not as something which hovered in the distant future, but one 
which was already at hand. The expression of Congressional fears regarding 
“whether other nations have emulated Iraq”^’ revealed anxiety over the present as 
well as the future. The concern that other states hostile to the US might be imitating 
Iraq pervaded the discussions. The belief that the danger revealed by Iraq had not 
been ended was very different ftom the assessment which had prevailed ten years 
earlier, and so too was the consequent sense of whether or not the need for action was 
pressing or could be delayed. A letter to Congress ftom the Administration regarding
“London Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: George 
Bush, 1991 —Bookl, p. 890.
Proliferation Threats in the 1990’s, p .50 (speaker: Senator Roth).
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cooperation with European suppliers expressed the belief that questions of nuclear
proliferation be dealt with sooner rather than later -  and that
it is essential that cooperation between the United States and 
the Community continue and, likewise, that we work closely 
with our allies to counter the threat of proliferation of nuclear 
explosives/^
It was therefore possible to identify -  in the words of one Congressman -  “the 
President’s sense of urgency” regarding nuclear proliferation/^ The incompetence of 
the DOE, for example, was contrasted with efforts elsewhere, and it was noted that 
“the DOE mission in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons should also be 
one of a great sense of real urgency.” "^^
This sense of urgency was underscored by growing evidence of attempts by 
another NPT signatory -  North Korea -  to acquire nucleai' weapons. In the aftermath 
of the Indian test explosion, the nuclear deals between West Germany/Brazil and 
France/Pakistan had done much to foster the sense of time miming out and the 
consequent need for immediate action. Events in North Korea, while not crucial in 
creating a sense of urgency, encouraged the growing perception that there was a 
limited time for the necessary preventative action to taken. As one DOE official 
asserted, the dealings with Iraq had made “the United States and other nations more 
concerned about what North Korea is actually doing and more prone to taking serious 
steps to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons.
This sense of urgency which peiwaded the US government was accompanied 
by a belief that no other competing interests should prevent action being taken
“Letter to Congressional Leaders on Nuclear Cooperation with EURATOM, March 8"’ 1991,” in 
Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: George Bush, Book I, p.230.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerning Failed Efforts to Curtail Iraq’s Nuclear Weapon Program, 
p .2 (speaker: Congressman Dingell, chairman).
64 Ibid., p.2.
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immediately. The elements which had interfered with American action following the 
bombing of Osiraq -  concern over Israel’s position in the IAEA and the growing 
utility of Iraq as a power balancer -  were now absent. The Cold War, which in the 
eyes of the Reagan Administration had taken precedence over the niceties of a nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, was also at an end. The cooperation over such issues that 
had characterized US/USSR relations in the case of India had, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, moved from an unspoken understanding to a positively helpful 
partnership.^^ Moreover, the motivation for waimer relations with Iraq had dissipated 
with the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. The fear of post-revolution Iran as 
the exporter of further Islamic revolution had declined, and with it any reason to 
refrain from sending a message to would-be proliferators by protecting Iraq. Action 
against nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world was not, on this occasion, 
superseded by other interests. Immediate movement was thus not only desirable but, 
with nothing else taking precedence, achievable.
Understanding o f immediacy — the IAEA
Once its initial defensiveness had passed, the IAEA also displayed urgency in 
seeking remedies for the failings revealed by Iraq. The first indication of this was the 
decision in 1991 to bring the Board of Governors meeting forward from its usual 
September date to July.^  ^ The revelations in Iraq raised questions which could not be 
postponed even by a mere two months.
65 Deutsch, “The New Nuclear Threat,” p. 131.
David Fischer notes, for example, that without the end of the Cold War, it is doubtful “the [UN 
Security] Council would have been able to agree unanimously on its January 1992 declaration 
regarding tlie tln eat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation o f weapons of mass 
destruction.” (Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p.305.)
67 Tlie decision to change the meeting dates was reported in The Financial Times, 19 July 1991.
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It was, furthermore, publicly accepted by the Agency that any changes that 
had been taking place previous to the shock of Iraq were occurring too slowly. Early 
in 1992, IAEA safeguards officials referred to the Agency’s recognition that the 
“events of 1991 made it clear that the evolutionary development of safeguards 
approaches need acceleration.”*’^  This acceleration duly having occurred over the 
years to come, the Agency continued to identify its position as having been inspired 
by a sense of the need for immediate action. “The Iraqi experience,” a publication of 
the safeguards division seven years later stated, “thus highlighted the urgent need for 
the IAEA to review its cunent safeguards system.”*’^  David Fischer, in reviewing the 
post-Iraq activities of the IAEA, noted that “it is to the credit of the IAEA that this 
review [of safeguards and procedures] was promptly undertaken and fii'st applied in 
the case of the DPRK.”^^  Again, the genuineness of such sentiments was 
demonstrated by prompt overhaul of much of the safeguards system immediately 
following Iraq and concluding with the creation of the Model Addition Protocol.
Understanding o f Immediacy — the supplier states
Just prior to the Gulf War, it was remarked of Germany that nuclear 
nonproliferation had taken a back seat to industry and that, in order for change to 
occur, “priority in this field must shift fiom economic to political and strategic 
concerns.” *^ After 1991, and on the heels of the aforementioned domestic scandals, it 
was observed of Germany that it had “become very interested in an international
68 Jennekens, Parsick and von Baeckmann, “SUengthening the International Safeguards System,” p. 10.
International Nuclear Verification Series, p.20.
™ Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p.285.
Müller, “After the Scandals: West German Non-Proliferation Policy,” p.41.
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agreement to reinforce export c o n t r o l s , a  statement which indicates the shift which 
had taken place. The flurry of activity within the NSG immediately following the 
Gulf War was not solely at the behest of the United States, but rather a cooperative 
effort on the part of all the key supplier states. The rapid resuiTection of the suppliers’ 
group (in April 1991) reflected not merely the determination to be proactive, but the 
shared conviction that time was of the essence. In the words of one participant in the 
reconvened NSG, “the war made the suppliers realize the potential dangers involved 
and the urgent need for action to prevent them'''' [my italics]. Again, with the Cold 
War at an end, security considerations which had emphasized the thieat from the 
nuclear rivalry between the two superpowers could turn instead to the now more 
immediate problem of horizontal proliferation, particularly in regions of instability.
Conclusions regarding the understanding o f immediacy
Unlike in the cases of both India and Osiraq, the belief that action was 
urgently required followed almost immediately on the heels of the first revelations. In 
the United States, this was aided by the same assessment of the shock in both the 
Administration and Congress. The lack of delay in the American reaction which 
followed the Gulf War reflects this shared sense of immediacy, which was fui'ther 
unhindered by competing concerns about the Cold War or reaping the possible 
benefits provided by Iraq as a counterbalance against Iran. In addition, the rapidity of 
response from the IAEA and the European suppliers indicated a similar assessment of 
nuclear nonproliferation as requiring immediate attention. Even small delays, such as 
the gap before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, were prevented by moving the 
date forward. The NSG, for its part, was convened as early as April 1991, again
Millier, “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond tlie Gulf War,” p .97.
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demonstrating the desire for corrective action to be taken sooner rather than later.
The restmcturing of much of the regime, therefore, both benefited from and reflected 
the consensus which existed, from the moment the reality of the shock became clear: 
that the time to enact change to the regime was at hand.
Understanding of Solvability:
The existence of a problem, the assessment of responsibility for it, and the 
assessment of the urgency of corrective action are necessary antecedents to the kind 
of regime change which followed fr om the shock of Iraq. Solutions to these problems 
-  or rather evaluations made regarding available solutions -  are equally important to 
an understanding of the resulting regime change which occurred. The acceptance of 
the need to solve the problems revealed does not automatically imply an 
understanding of what those solutions are or, indeed, whether they exist at all.
The shock of Iraq did inspire dramatic and, more importantly, deliberate change to the 
regime. Such purposeful action implies a belief, following the shock, that the 
problems revealed did indeed have workable solutions within the context of the 
regime.
The US and the understanding o f solvability
Following the Iraqi shock, the general consensus that existed between 
Congress and the Administration regarding nonproliferation, continued during the 
search for specific, negotiable solutions. In both, the need to tighten the regime’s 
existing export controls, expand the trigger list and include dual-use technology, and 
improve IAEA safeguards, met with general agreement. Hearings such as those
73 Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” p.4.
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addressing the problems in the DOE were, in fact, specifically focused on preventing 
another shock of this nature by tightening American nuclear export standards/"^
The American identification of the need to target international standards for 
nuclear exports was, on a basic level, evidenced by its willing participation in the 
reinvigorated suppliers’ group. The submission by the US delegation, in one such 
meeting, of a paper on dual-use controls further indicates the American conviction 
that such controls were an integral part of the solution to the problems. The 
identification of expanded multilateral export controls by the United States was 
specifically cited in a White House Statement, in which it was claimed that “our 
experience in the Gulf has reinforced the lesson that the most effective export controls 
are those imposed multilaterally.”^^  A letter to Congress also alluded to the belief that 
solutions could be found in greater multilateral cooperation between the US and 
Europe. In it, the President declared that “it is essential that cooperation between the 
United States and the [European] Community continue and, likewise, that we work 
closely with our allies to counter the threat of proliferation of nuclear explosives.”^^  
The implied deteimination that there were specific, workable solutions to the 
problems raised by Iraq has been borne out. The shock had not only been understood 
to have exposed loopholes requiring closure, but was equally (and crucially) 
interpreted as being amenable to such repaii*.
Simultaneous American identification of the need, and possibility of support, 
for improved IAEA safeguards was also evident. The Assistant Secretary of State, for 
example, met with no opposition when he suggested before the House of
74 See the hearing: Nuclear Nonproliferation (concerning fa iled  efforts...).
“White House Statement on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f  
the United States: George Bush, Bookl, p.223.
76 “Letter to Congress: Leader on US Cooperation With EURATOM,” p.230.
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Representatives that “fundamentally, the revelations about Iraq demonstrated the need 
for the international community to strengthen the Agency’s ability and authority to 
detect undeclared nuclear activities outside declared safeguarded f a c i l i t i e s . I n  
addition, as was noted earlier, the need for increased American support for the IAEA 
(financial and political) was also deemed necessary in Congress.
Once again, the differences between 1991 and 1981 are conspicuous. The 
post-Osiraq period had seen only criticism of the IAEA from Congress with the sole 
proposal of a solution -  the reconvening of the NSG -  rejected by both the State 
Department and Administration as both untenable and undesirable. This time, as with 
the assessments of the danger, responsibility and immediacy, there was again broad 
agreement within the United States over the feasibility of fixing the damage done to 
the regime by Iraq actions. There was a perceptible sense of confidence, in the US, at 
having identified realistic solutions.
The IAEA and the understanding o f solvability
The Board of Governors’ belief that the problems of the shock had -  and had 
to have -  solutions was demonstrated almost immediately following the shock itself. 
“There was no doubt,” it was stated, “that a fundamental review and redfrection of the 
existing safeguards system was essential.”^^  Although this indicated a primary belief 
that realisable solutions existed, specific suggestions were not long in coming. The 
case of Iraq, it was recalled by one member of the Department of Safeguards, 
“underscored the breadth of information and access needed by the IAEA to
Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspections in Iraq, p.5 (speaker; Assistant Secretary 
o f State, Robert L. Gallucci).
Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from  the Iraq Experience, p.39.
Fischer, Histoiy o f  the IAEA, p.285.
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confidently fulfill its mandate.”^^  The emergency Boai*d of Governors meeting in 
July 1991 was accompanied by the Director-General’s proposal of three specific 
responses to the questions raised about the efficacy of safeguards. This ability to 
quickly and specifically identify solutions (as discussed in the previous chapter: 
access to the Security Council; access to intelligence; exercising the right to special 
inspections) is, in itself, indicative of a belief that realistic solutions to the problems 
not only could be, but had been identified. Blix’s solutions were echoed in such fora 
as an IAEA Bulletin article (which noted the IAEA report to the UN Security Council 
about Iraq’s violation and maintained that “it is important that this linkage be 
confirmed and institutionalised”^^ ), and in the testimony of IAEA inspectors before 
the American Congress, in which was cited a need for “much closer collaboration 
with individual states,” as well as the necessity of “short notice inspection with 
greater freedom of movement.”^^
However, the Dii ector-General’s proposals were followed by the suggestion of 
the 93+2 Programme -  an initiative which was more significant. The decision to 
embark upon such negotiations indicated an acceptance of the shocks eventual 
solvability. It should be noted here that the negotiations for the 93+2 Programme 
were embarked upon two years after the shock of Iraq (in 1993) and were ultimately 
more protracted than expected, ending only in 1997, with the completed Model 
Additional Protocol. Nonetheless, such negotiations stand as evidence of a belief in 
solvability once the need for fundamental change had been accepted. The head of 
some of the IAEA inspection teams, David Kay, confirmed this belief in the
Richard Hooper, “Strengthening IAEA Safeguards hi an Era of Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, 
vol.25,110.9, November 1995, p.I5.
Scheinman, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: On the Road to 1995,” p.38.
Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from the Iraq Experience, p.23 (speaker: Dr. David Kay).
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solvability of the shock when he testified before Congress that “it seems to me that 
the world is prepared, more than ever before, for the major powers, as unfair as this 
may be, to insist that things stop, and enforce this thiough sanctions.
The IAEA Board of Governors, as well as at least one leading inspector, 
apparently came to believe that the shock of Iraq was able to be fixed. In spite of 
some difficulties in bringing some major states on board -  particularly in reference to 
the Model Additional Protocol -  negotiations for safeguai'ds refonn continued and 
concluded with an agreement. The frank admission of the ominous implications of 
the shock for IAEA credibility was accompanied almost immediately by the citation 
of, and negotiations for, ways by which to correct the problems -  actions which 
indicate a belief in the existence of specific, negotiable solutions.
Understanding o f Solvability and the Suppliers (including, where appropriate, the 
United States)
The agreement that existed between the United States and those suppliers 
which were fomierly somewhat reticent about tightening export standards constituted 
a change in nonproliferation relations. Some European states, such as the United 
Kingdom had usually been willing participants in such negotiations. However, the 
traditional dance to persuade states such as Germany and France to align themselves 
with the policy desired by the US had become unnecessary in the face of the universal 
deteimination to reconvene and expand the previous supplier guidelines. There was, 
as a consequence a harmony within the non-American suppliers (most significantly 
Germany and France) over the possibility of solving the problems that they accepted
Ibid., p.26 (speaker; Dr. David Kay).
As noted in the previous chapter (p. 212), these states had already demonstiated themselves to be 
amenable to such changes in the year prior to the shock of 1991. Thus, tliis universal determination
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had been created. The willing participation of these two in the NSG indicates the 
assessment of nuclear export policy not simply as the root of the problem, but one 
which had solutions which were acceptable.
The simple resuiTection of the NSG is, on its own, an unieliable indicator of a 
belief among non-American supplier countries that the problems in the regime could 
be solved. Indeed, this was demonstrated in the case of the Indian test, when the US 
all but dragged the belligerent France and West Germany to the negotiating table. The 
new fact of support for this revival, and the whole-hearted participation in it, does 
imply a belief that the NSG was the avenue by which corrective action should be 
taken. The German submission calling for tull-scope safeguards as a condition of 
supply and the creation of guidelines on dual-use items further underscores not only 
the German desire to be proactive, but also the belief that there were specific solutions 
which were necessary and that the damage caused by the shock was repairable. .
The existence of such interpretations was perhaps best articulated in joint 
supplier statements, which included the United States. The conviction that there were 
and had to be solutions, and that they lay within the context of the nonproliferation 
regime, was evident in pronouncements such as that which declared that “we are 
determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non­
proliferation regimes.”^^  The confidence that supplier states knew precisely what to 
do to heal the regime, and the confidence that these solutions were workable and 
working, was evident a year later. A joint declaration in Munich reiterated the 
existence of the “New Partnership” and expressed the belief that “nuclear cooperation 
will in future be conditional on adherence to the NPT or an existing equivalent
had been coming into alignment before the reconvening of the NSG and the negotiations for the 
Warsaw Guidelines.
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internationally binding agreement as well as on the adoption of full-scope safeguards, 
as recently laid down by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.” *^’ A more important change, 
however, was the decision to solve the new problems raised by widening the existing 
trigger list and including dual-use technology under the category of prohibited items 
for export. These too were accepted as viable solutions.
The corresponding belief, that resolution of the shock would also be dependent 
on improved IAEA safeguards, was further evidence of the understanding of 
solvability. In the same statement, it was declared that “we will support reference by 
the IAEA of unresolved cases of proliferation to the UN Security Council. Once 
again, the belief in having identified, specific, workable solutions underscored an 
overall belief that the damage to the regime which (it was agreed) must be repaired, 
could be repaired.
Conclusions:
The aftermath of the revelations in Iraq following the Gulf War led to perhaps 
the most drastic change to the nonproliferation regime since its inception just over 
twenty years earlier. Indeed, the damage done to the regime by Iraq and its potential 
imitators was such that, in order to maintain any credibility, the regime was obliged to 
change in response. An investigation into how the shock and its effect on the regime 
were understood allows some conclusions to be drawn as to why this might have 
been. It has further revealed both distinct differences fi'om, and notable similarities to, 
the Osiraq and Indian shocks which will be expanded on in the concluding chapter.
“London Economic Summit Declaration,” in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f  the United States: 
George Bush, Book I, p .893.
“Munich Economic Summit, Political Declaration; Shaping the New Partnership, 7 July 1992,” in 
Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: George Bush, (1992-1993) Book I, p. 1087.
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Despite the fact that the Iraqi attempt to construct a nuclear weapon remained 
incomplete, the accusations that an non-nuclear NPT signatory had been seeking a 
nuclear capability were proven for the first time. The awareness of this undetected act 
of deception sent shock waves through the regime, and these were shared in equal 
measure between those actors most diiectly affected by it: the United States, the 
IAEA, and the main suppliers of Iraq.
There developed a conviction that Iraq’s actions were not only dangerous in 
and of themselves, but were indicative of wider problems in the regime. Questions 
were raised regarding the ambitions of other states, both in and outside the formal 
nonproliferation regime. The fact that Iraq was an NPT signatory which had only 
recently been declared to be in good standing seriously damaged the credibility of the 
regime itself, particularly the prestige of the NPT and the perceived effectiveness of 
the IAEA. The question of responsibility for leading the necessary changes were 
answered resoundingly among all those directly involved. Once again, the United 
States Congress and Administration found themselves in broad agreement on 
American miscalculation and liability -  this time without the need for a campaign on 
the part of Congress. The result was a consensus on the need for the US to lead the 
necessary changes to the nonproliferation regime. The IAEA, after the triumph of the 
reformers over the traditionalists, admitted the existence of flaws and limitations in its 
safeguards and procedures which had helped Iraq in its quest. The P-5 powers of the 
UN Security Council, as well as suppliers such as Germany (and France), were 
likewise shown to have accepted liability in their previous standards of nuclear trade 
and evidenced a desire to be proactive in bringing about change.
87 Ibid., p. 1087.
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It is further clear that, following the shock, nuclear proliferation and the 
condition of the nonproliferation regime, were able to move to the top of the 
American agenda, as well as that of the other states. The events in North Korea did 
not so much generate this inteipretation (as had the West German and French nuclear 
deals following the Indian shock) as reinforce it. The belief that the problems revealed 
required immediate coiTection was assisted by the evaluation that, on this occasion, 
there were no other competing interests which needed to be addressed first. The 
danger posed was such that the commercial interests which had caused hesitancy, 
particularly in Germany and France, were now seen as secondary to nonproliferation 
and bolstering the regime. Moreover, the end of the Cold War had removed another 
important distraction which had previously hindered the assessment of the urgency 
required. Finally, the American need for Iraq as a counterweight to Iran had ended.
A widely-held belief in the essential solvability of the problems revealed by 
the shock allowed the final barrier to be lowered and the successful negotiations for 
regime change to take place. The IAEA’s vague murmurings in 1981 about 
constantly strengthening safeguards had given way to the Director-General’s three 
points and the 93+2 Programme. The enthusiasm for the reconvening of the NSG, as 
well as the all-important creation of guidelines on dual-use items was further evidence 
of the interpretation of the shock as having specific, workable solutions -  a sentiment 
which was perhaps best reflected in the joint statements of the suppliers involved.
The regime change which followed the Iraqi shock thus demonstrates the a 
specific understanding of danger, responsibility, immediacy and solvability.
Moreover, it is clear that not only were the necessary assessments made and 
consolidated within the United States, but in other suppliers and the IAEA as well.
The speed at which change to the regime took place, and indeed the extent of such
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change is the result of such consensus. This is in contrast to the significant, but less 
extensive elaboration that resulted in the 1970’s when the United States was 
obliged to initiate such change in the face of reluctant participation on the part of 
some suppliers. The timing of the Iraqi revelations were such that rapid and 
significant regime change was requhed in order to maintain credibility in the face of 
the upcoming 1995 Extension Conference. It has therefore been possible to draw 
conclusions regarding those interpretations of the shock which underscored the 
“genuine” regime change which so clearly resulted.
264
Chapter 8 -  The 1998 Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan
The investigation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime from its birth until 
1997 -  the examination, specifically, of shocks to the regime -  has yielded some 
valuable results. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 meant that, nominally 
at least, the ‘shelf-life’ of the nuclear nonproliferation regime was indefinitely 
extended. Consequently, it is incumbent upon an investigation of this sort not simply 
to end abruptly but to evaluate recent events in light of the conclusions drawn from 
the previous three case studies.
Prominent among the events alluded to above are the series of Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. Coming thi ee years after the extension of the NPT 
which had capped extensive change to the nonproliferation regime, the tests occuned 
in circumstances which were, in some ways, similar to those in 1974, when India fii*st 
tested. Sentiments surrounding nuclear nonproliferation and the related regime were 
again a curious blend of complacency and foreboding. The sense of satisfaction, that 
key problems had been fixed and that, as Time magazine put it, “the age of nuclear 
terror seemed over” ', was at the same time accompanied by a growing disillusionment 
with the optimistic prospects for the harmony of the “new world order” which had 
been prophesied following the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Gulf War.
Given that it has been only four years since this latest shock to the regime, it is 
clearly not yet possible successfully to declare the ‘outcome’ of the tests or their 
ultimate effect on the regime. As a result, whereas the previous thiee case studies 
have been split into two chapters each, the shock of 1998 will be amalgamated into 
one. Nonetheless, this latest shock to the regime requfres some exploration. The
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Indian shock of 1974 was an instance of a shock in which regime change followed a 
delayed reaction. The bombing of Osiraq, on the other hand, was an example of a 
shock in which such delay never gave way to regime change. Finally, the 1991 Iraqi 
revelations in which little delay existed before regime change was undertaken. The 
1998 South Asian nuclear tests appear to be developing into an example of a different 
type of shock again: one in which an immediate reaction was followed by no regime 
change.
Thus, it is both possible and important to examine this latest shock to the 
nonproliferation regime in the light of the conclusions drawn from the investigation of 
the three previous cases. In spite of its relative recency, enough time has passed since 
the South Asian tests that their apparent effect on the regime may be discussed. The 
next few years will eventually reveal whether or not the conclusions drawn regarding 
the shocks of 1974, 1981 and 1991 have also provided useful insight for this most 
recent shock.
The Regime and Nuclear Context Prior to the Shock:
It was declared, in the most comprehensive study of the Indian nuclear 
progiamme, that the tests which took place in Rajasthan on May 11"’ and 13^*’ 1998 
“shocked the world.”  ^ This assessment was echoed elsewhere, with observations that 
the series of tests by the two states had “caught the world by surprise”  ^and meant that 
the regime had, as a consequence, “received a jolt. This sense of the tests as a shock
* Johanna McGeary, “Nukes...They’re Back,” in Time, May 25*, 1998, p.28.
 ^Perkovich, Ind ia’s Nuclear Bomb, p.404.
 ^ David Albright, “The Shots Heard ’Round the World,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, vol.54, no.4, 
July/August 1998, p .21.
T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India’s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” The Non- 
Proliferation Review, vol. 6, no.l. Fall 1998, p .l.
266
to the regime prevailed despite the fact that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons 
programmes were among possibly the worst kept secrets in the arms control world. 
India had demonstrated its nuclear capability with its ‘peaceful’nuclear explosion 
twenty-four years earlier and Pakistan’s ambitions had been publicly acknowledged, 
for instance in President Bush’s October 1990 letter to Congress in which he asserted 
that he could no longer guarantee that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons.
India’s nuclear program had been reined in following the 1974 test. The 
strengthening of the regime’s trade controls with the establishment of the NSG -  as 
well as the termination of nuclear cooperation between India and Canada — had 
hindered the further development of the Indian nuclear progi amme. Nonetheless, the 
return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980 reinvigorated the desire to build up Indian 
nuclear capability. The growing discomfort with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities 
provided further impetus towards the extension and sophistication of the nuclear 
option. Incidents such as the ‘Brasstacks’ exercise (in which military exercises 
conducted by both India and Pakistan were inteipreted by each side as genuine 
militaiy preparations^) underscored the tension that continued to exist between the 
two states, despite the ostensible ‘peace’ which had held since 1971. The dispute over 
Kashmir flared again in 1990 and thioughout the 1990’s calls grew within India for 
the nuclear option to be declared. In 1995 (under a Congress government) and in 
1996 (under the auspices of the Bharatiya Janata Party), reports circulated that 
preparations for a test had been detected by American intelligence and that the 
determination to test had been extinguished by American pressure.^ The re-election
 ^ For a fuller account of the fallout of the Brasstacks exercise, see Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 
pp.277-282. Also see Devin Hagerty’s The Consequences o f  Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from  
South Asia, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press; 1998), chapter 4.
 ^Following the successful tests in May 1998, it was reported in Nucleonics Week that “US intelligence 
has indicated that since 1996 India was likely prepared to carry out a nuclear weapons test at Pokaran
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of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 led very shortly to preparations to test 
which, this time, went undetected by American intelligence and were successfully 
carried out, in spite of the apparent thaw in relations between India and Pakistan as 
well as between India and China.
The fact of a Pakistani nuclear capability was equally well-known and had 
been ever since Zulifikar Ali Bhutto’s 1966 announcement that Pakistan would match 
any Indian nuclear capability “even if Pakistanis have to eat grass.”  ^ Its momentum 
was dissipated by France’s decision, taken under pressure from the United States 
following the Indian test, to pull out of its agreement to supply a reprocessing plant to 
Pakistan. The temiination by the Canadian government of a deal for spare parts and 
fresh fuel for the KANUUP reactor was a further setback. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s 
determination to be India’s nuclear equal meant that its nuclear programme began in 
earnest after the 1974 Indian test.^ The breakdown of nuclear cooperation with 
France meant simply that Pakistan revived and expanded its reliance on non- 
indigenous equipment and technology.^ Much as in Iraq’s proliferation efforts, 
several countries supplied Pakistan with materiel. The Swiss government was 
identified by the US as having “knowingly permitt[ed] exports of sophisticated
(sic) in the Rajasthan desert.” (see Mark Hibbs, “India was Ready to Test A-bombs on a ‘few days 
notice’.” Nucleonics Week, vol.39, no.20, 14 May 1998, p .l.)
 ^Quoted in Samina Alimed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Choices,” in 
International Security, vol, 23, no.4, Spring 1999, p. 183. Again, for a fuller account of the history of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program, see this article or Samina Ahmed and David Cortiight (eds.), Pakistan and 
the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options, (Norte Dame, hid.. University of Notre Dame Press; 
1998).
® In the mid to late 1970’s, a Pakistani working at the Dutch Almelo centrifiige enrichment plant (Dr. 
Khan) obtained enrichment technology, and the Pakistani nuclear programme also acquired 
components for gas centrifuges and computer technology in Switzerland and Holland.
 ^ It has been generally accepted, for example, that “Pakistan developed its capacity sometime in die 
early-or mid-‘80’s” (in Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global 
Nuclear Disarmament, (Oxford: Signal Books; 2000), p.73.
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nuclear technology to Pakistan.” '  ^ Pakistan obtained the facility for converting
yellowcake to uranium hexflouride (the feedstock for enrichment) from a German
firm -  CES Kalthof GmbH of Freiburg China was the key assistant in Pakistan’s
quest for nuclear weapons, much to the distress of India. In testimony before a 1997
Senate Committee, for example. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for non-
proliferation, Robert J. Einhorn affirmed that
in the nuclear area, we have long had concerns about China’s 
assistance to Pakistan’s efforts to produce unsafeguarded 
fissile materials and to Pakistan’s program to develop nucleai' 
explosives. These concerns were especially acute in the 
1980’s but have continued even after China acceded to the 
NPT in 1992.'^
Pakistan’s unceasing quest for nuclear weapons could not be thwarted 
indefinitely. By the end of 1990 Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions had succeeded to the 
point that President Bush informed Congress of his inability to confirm that Pakistan 
did not have nuclear weapons. Consequently, and as the American Deputy Secretai-y 
of State observed, “even before May 11 1998, no one doubted that India had a 
nuclear-weapons capacity, just as Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons capability was 
universally recognized before May 28.” '^
It was thus said of the Indian and Pakistani tests that they ran counter a spirit 
of progiess and optimism that was otherwise reigning in the sphere of 
nonproliferation efforts -  that the actions of these two states were “bucking that trend
Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 89.
“ Ibid., p.90.
Statement of Robert J. Einliom before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and 
Federal Services, of the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 10, 1997, quoted in 
Mohammed Ayoob, “India’s Nuclear Decision: Implications for Indian-U.S. Relations,” in Raju G.C. 
Thomas and Amit Gupta, India's Nuclear Security, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc.; 2000), p. 143 (fii.lO).
Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with tlie Bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs, vol.78, no.2, March/April 
1999, p. 117. Talbott served as President Clinton’s envoy in the ensuing talks with India and Pakistan.
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and putting it into jeopardy.” ''' The days of wine and roses which had followed the 
end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq -  during which nuclear nonproliferation 
was a high international priority and disarmament seemed for once, within the realm 
of possibility -  were aheady giving way to a growing cynicism. Indeed, with the ink 
barely dry on the agreement to extend the NPT indefinitely, the optimism which had 
pervaded the four years following the Iraqi revelations was already fading into apathy 
and disillusionment, in a manner similar to that blend of complacency and 
apprehension which provided the backdrop of the first Indian test in 1974. Problems 
were arising which put paid to the notion of the new world order. As one observer 
remarked, “the global nonproliferation regime was in trouble before the South Asian 
nuclear tests. The tests themselves were merely a symptom of this condition, not the 
cause.”
The unity which had reigned among the P-5 states of the UN Security Council 
-  in particular, the accord between the US and Russia -  had been gradually 
uni avelling for the past tlnee years. The period of cooperation which had peaked with 
the extension of the NPT was, by the time of the Indian and Pakistani tests, aheady 
revealing itself to be an interruption in the usual discord rather than a genuinely new 
beginning. Instead, the United States, Russia and China found themselves 
increasingly at loggerheads on a range of issues, bringing to a halt the accord which 
had allowed negotiations on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament not only to 
take place but to progress and be implemented. The differing views on what courses
Transcript of US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report, by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary 
o f State, at the Brookings Institution, November 12*, 1998.
(www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19981112a.htm)
Wade Huntley, “Nonproliferation Prospects after the South Asian Tests,” The Nonproliferation 
Review, vol.6, no.3, Fall 1998, p.91. Even in achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT, problems 
were visible. The success in achieving this extension was by no means a cakewalk but rather (as 
detailed in Chapter 6) was the result o f compromise and discussion on the nuclear status of Israel and
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of action to pursue with respect to Bosnia and Iraq, for example, did little to bring the 
US and Russia together diplomatically. The application (later accepted) from Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO did further damage to their relations, 
particularly in light of the conditions attached to the US ratification of the NATO 
expansion. These conditions included the proviso that no limitations be placed on 
numbers of NATO troops or types, and the rejection of Russian efforts to establish an 
NWFZ in Central Europe.
These appearances of divisions between the United States and Russia over the 
future of arms control occurred, as one commentator observed, “at the precise 
moment when more nationalist and more anti-Western feelings are being awakened in 
Russia.” '  ^ The three years following the extension of the NPT had seen a narrowing 
of interests in the United States as well. Rather than the multilateralism which had 
underscored many of the changes to the nonproliferation regime in the early years of 
the decade, the lack of progress in the years 1995 to 1998 also reflected “that a 
decisive shift had occurred in the US towards unilateralism, against arms control and 
against any technological restraint.” '  ^ The ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty, 
both in the United States and in Russia, remained elusive. It was noted by the UN 
Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala, in the year 
following the India and Pakistani tests, that “it is no secret that the bilateral nuclear 
talks between Russia and the United States have made no progress since 1995.” '^
die necessity o f NWS beginning the negotiations in good faith towards fulfilling their disarmament 
obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
Hugh Beach, “The Expansion of NATO,” in Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (eds.), A Nuclear- 
Weapons-Free World, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.; 2000), p. 178.
William Walker, “Nuclear order and àï&oràQxf International Affairs, vol.76, no.4, October 2000, 
p.713.
“Illuminating Global Interests: The UN and Anns Control -  An Interview with UN Undersecretary- 
General Jayantlia Dhanapala,” Arms Control Today, vol.29, no.6, September/October 1999, p.4.
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Again, this stagnation which followed the tumultuous changes which had 
occuiTcd between 1991 and 1997 coincided with an increasing American 
disenchantment with multilateralism and scepticism regarding the utility of 
international treaties (those connected to nuclear nonproliferation included). This 
disenchantment, ironically, had its immediate antecedents in the very event which led 
to so much regime change: the 1991 revelations about Iraq. It was more acidly 
perceived by one commentator as being “symptomatic of a senate which esteems only 
American interests narrowly defined [and] despises any international body (OSCE, 
UN, IMF) that America cannot dominate.” '  ^ While the impatience underlying such 
an observation is apparent, the declining American interest in international 
institutions, post-1995 and pre-May 1998, is equally evident.
This was particularly tme in Congress, where there was open hostility to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had been sent to the Senate for 
ratification in September of 1997. Significantly, the head of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, “repeatedly stated that the CTBT was a low-priority 
item and that it would only receive consideration after the committee had voted on 
two unrelated sets of agreements not yet submitted by the administration.” '^'
Finally, it is significant to note that the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the 
international body charged with negotiating most multilateral security treaties, 
had likewise stagnated in the three years prior to the Indian test of 1998. It was 
pointed out by Dhanapala, for example, that “for two of those years members have not 
even been able to agiee on a working program.” '^ Again this was credited to the
Beach “The Expansion of NATO,” p. 178.
Craig Cemiello, “Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to Continue 
Moratorium,” Arms Control Today, vol.29, no.6, September/October 1999, p.26.
272
waning of interest in arms control in the face of renewed international tensions, as the 
Undersecretary-General stated: “I believe it is a symptom of the international 
situation [and] the deep disagreements among the great powers.
The international context in which the South Asian nuclear tests took place, 
then, was one in which nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control more generally, had 
become unsettled by growing international dishannony. Moreover, American 
leadership in this arena had given way, domestically, to a cynicism -  even antagonism 
-  towards international institutions and agreements.
In addition, India’s 1996 preparations for a nuclear test had aheady indicated 
that the self-imposed twenty-four year moratorium on testing was, in all likelihood, 
drawing to a close, expecially on the heels of the election of the vocally pro-nuclear 
BJP to government. The April 1998 missile tests, first by Pakistan with its “Ghauri” 
missile, and then by India with “Agni-2”, provided further evidence that the future of 
nuclear nonproliferation was less bright than it had seemed in the halcyon days of the 
early-to-mid 1990’s.
The Shock and Initial International Reactions:
On the eleventh and thirteenth of May, India’s period of restraint came to an 
abrupt end, and put paid to the idea that “since nuclear arsenals were seen as 
inseparable from East-West hostility, the end of the East-West confrontation [would] 
sign thefr death w a r r a n t . O n c e  again, the tests met with overwhelming support in
“Illuminating Global Interests: An Interview with UN Unsecretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala,’ 
p .3.
Ibid., p.4.
“Thérèse Delpech, “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’; Early Warning ftom Asia?” 
Swwival, vol.40, no.4, p .58.
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India^ "^  and Prime Minister Vajpayee proudly proclaimed that “India is now a nuclear 
weapons state.”^^  Fifteen days later, Pakistan commenced its own series of tests. 
These were held on the 28^ and 30^ '^  of May and, taking the idea of one-upmanship 
literally, totalled six to India’s five.^^
The reaction, first to the Indian tests and then to the tests by both countries as 
a whole was mixed. This reflected, as will be argued later, less indifference than a 
kind of fatalism about what had occuned and what the future held. Indeed, it has 
been proposed that, following the initial Indian tests, “the absence of a concerted 
international response tilted the internal balance in Pakistan in favor of a retaliatory 
test.”^^  This is not to say that either India or Pakistan were applauded for theft 
actions. The Chinese government expressed, in its own words, a “strong 
condemnation” of India’s actions.^^ The United Nations Security Council, in one of 
its increasingly rare moments of unity, passed Resolution 1182 which condemned the 
tests by both countries. However, the reactions over the following three years
‘^*It was noted in the Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, for example, that “in India, support appeared 
universal”, (see Kalpana Shanna, “The Hindu Bomb,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, vol.54, no.4, 
July/August 1998, p.21).
Interview with Prime Ministei* Vajpayee in India Today, 25 May 1998 (www.india- 
today.com/itoday/25051998/vajint.html). Such a statement was echoed two days later in the Indian 
House o f Commons, in a paper which likewise declared that “India is a nuclear weapons state. This is 
a reality that cannot be denied.” (see Paper laid on the table of the House: Evolution o f  Ind ia’s Nuclear 
Policy, 27 May 1998.)
It is said, however, tliat Pakistan conducted six tests to equal hidia’s five in 1998 and the one in 
1974.
Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Progi am,” p. 195. This sentiment was echoed elsewhere, 
when it was suggested that “although India’s five nuclear tests...were widely criticized, they met witli 
rather tepid reactions from the world’s leading powers tliat were certainly insufficient to stave off 
Pakistan’s subsequent ‘retaliatory’ nuclear tests.” (See Huntley, “Nonproliferation prospects after the 
South Asian tests,” p.85.) Wliile such an indifferent response may have provided slightly more 
incentive to test, it nonetheless seems reasonable to suppose that given the history between the two 
countiies, nuclear tests by India -  accompanied as they were by declarations of nuclear-weapons-state 
status -  would have been followed by Pakistani tests even in the face of strident and universal 
international condemnation.
“Statement o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs on India’s Nuclear Tests,” News Bulletin, 
(No.NB9809), issued 14/05/98 by the Chinese Embassy in the United Kingdom. An article in The
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indicate that the reforming zeal, and the optimism that such problems could be solved 
within the context of the regime, had ebbed away.
This was evident in the reactions of countries such as Russia, France and, 
perhaps surprisingly, the United Kingdom, all of which questioned the efficacy of, 
and even the justification for, sanctions. An article about the tests, which appeared 
two months later, was titled “From Russia, a muted reaction”. T h e  public reaction 
of President Yeltsin, moreover, was to observe that “India is frankly a close fiiend of 
ours and we enjoy very good relations...when my visit to India takes places next year,
I will do my utmost to somehow settle the problem.
This refusal to damn India and Pakistan partly reflected a reluctance to apply 
sanctions. Problematically, the application of sanctions would inevitably cause more 
harm to Pakistan than India. It was observed by one commentator that “Prime 
Minister Nawaz’s apparent reluctance to test reinforced the perception on the part of 
some Western observers in the wake of the tests that Pakistan was less 
blameworthy.” '^ Even before Pakistan had carried out its expected retaliatory tests, 
“European nations, led by Britain, made clear to the US they would not agree to a
Beijing Review  shortly after the tests echoed this perception (see Guangyao, Hu and Xiaoming, Hu, 
“Nuclear Tests Tlireaten Stability” The Beijing Review, June 1-7, 1998, p.7).
Igor Kliripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “From Russia, a muted reaction,” Bulletin o f  the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.54, no.4, July/August 1998, p.42. While conceding that “Russian criticism of India has 
been muted”, the authors claim, however, that “it would be false to conclude that Russia is only 
mai'ginally interested in promoting nuclear nonproliferation” (p.42).
Quoted in article by McGeary, “Nukes...They’re Back,” p.31.
Eric Arnett, “Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, 
Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999), p.374. In a 
similar vein, one American Senator stated that “one of the reaasons that I am more concerned in the 
case of Pakistan about the impact of economic sanctions is I do not want Pakistan to increasingly have 
to turn to the Irans of the world to remain solvent.” (See Crisis in South Asia: Ind ia ’s Nuclear Tests; 
P akistan’s Nuclear Tests; India and Pakistan: What Next? Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Near Eastern and Soutli Asian of tlie Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One 
Hundred and fifth Congi*ess, second session, May 13, June 3, July 13, 1998, p.89.)
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coordinated policy of applying tough sanctions on India.”^^  This new European 
attitude to these latest acts of nuclear proliferation did not, however, necessarily 
indicate a disinterest in nonproliferation issues, only a departure from the previous 
consensus that the application of such sanctions was the best way in which to deal 
with a proliferator/^ Another article hinted at the eventual outcome of the tests when 
it was reported that “Europe is expected to dodge the sanctions and intensify trade 
with the subcontinent once the fuss dies down.” '^' Indeed, Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee noted in an interview that “aheady, countries like Russia, England and 
France have shown a commendable sense of realism in their response.”^^  In contrast 
to the reversion to ambivalence by the French, Germany nevertheless expressed 
strong objections to the tests. The Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, stated of the Indian tests 
that “this was the wrong decision for them to take. We do not accept that decision.”^^  
The Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, proclaimed that “the Gemian government 
condemns today’s nuclear tests in India. They mean a setback for the international 
efforts for international disarmament and nonproliferation.”^^  Moreover, and 
distinguishing itself still further from the French reaction, the German government 
swiftly cancelled $400 million worth of aid to India.^^
32 Not Keen to Find Canots to Reward India & Pakistan,” Nucleonics Week, vol.39, no.23, 4 June 
1998, p. 11.
With its telegram of congratulations to the Indian government, France nonetheless appears to have 
reverted, at least somewhat, to its former disinterest in multilateral solutions to prevent proliferation 
and deal with proliferators.
Tim McGirk, “Nuclear Madness,” in Time, 8 June 1998, p.26.
Interview with Prime Minister Vajpayee in India Today, 25 May 1998 (www.india- 
today.com/itoday/25051998/vajmt.html).
www.cnn.coni/WORLD/asiapcF9805/13/india.us/htm.
McGeary, “Nukes...Tliey’re Back,” p.30.
Sweden, too, withdrew $119 million in assistance to India, while Japan suspended $1 billion.
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The otherwise rather resigned attitude to these new developments was by no 
means universal. Both in word and in deed, the United States Administration was 
immediately and strongly critical of the tests. In contrast to previous shocks, 
however, the aftermath of the 1998 tests found the Clinton Administration attempting 
to convince Congi*ess -  and to some extent itself -  of the need for sanctions against 
India and Pakistan and for further action to be taken in the context of the 
nonproliferation regime generally. Congress, moreover, appears this time to have 
been as important in thwarting regime change as it previously had been in motivating 
it.
Speaking immediately after the Indian tests, President Clinton stated his basic 
belief that “they were unjustified.”^^  As in 1974, India (and Pakistan) had not broken 
any international laws by proliferating. Nonetheless, in accordance with the Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, sanctions on both India and Pakistan were 
automatically put into place, involving a cutoff of economic and military aid totalling 
$140 million. Despite this action, however, American enthusiasm for reinvigorating a 
multilateral nuclear nonproliferation drive was minimal, particularly in Congress. 
Rather, the bulk of concern focused less on the tests themselves than on the failure of 
American intelligence to predict them. An investigation into this apparent 
intelligence failure was ordered by CIA Director George Tenet.
The necessity and utility of sanctions, however, was vigorously debated in 
Congress, and was even expressed by several key members of the Administration, 
including Secretary of State Madelaine Albright.''^ Given this lack of unity within the
'^’See www.cnn.com.WORLD.asiapcF9805/l 3/india.us/htm
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of 
the Committee on International Relations, House o f Representatives, One Hundred and Fifth Congress, 
second session, 18 June, 1998. This importance of this debate in the possible outcome o f the shock in 
the context o f the regime will expanded upon later.
277
United States it is perhaps not surprising that by Autumn of 1998, the decision had 
been made to ease the sanction applied in order to allow for “greater flexibility in 
export controls.”"" Instead, American policy on India and Pakistan moved away from 
the initial punishment and towards an attempt, albeit short-lived, to integi*ate these 
new nuclear states into some aspects of the regime, although not the NPT. Rather 
than force a withdrawal of India and Pakistan’s claims to nuclear weapon status, 
“American policy subsequently focused on more modest and specific objectives: 
notably securing India’s adhesion to the CTBT...and the participation of both 
countries in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations.”"'^  At their most 
productive, these negotiations “produced a committment by Pakistan to sign the 
CTBT by the end of 1999...and indications from India that it too might be willing to 
sign under certain conditions.”"'^
The CTBT, however, was to prove a sticking point not simply in terms of 
Indian and Pakistani membership, but in terms of American ratification as well. 
Ratification of the treaty ran into trouble in the Senate, which was continuing its pre- 
1998 retreat into unilateralism. On October 13'\ 1999, the CTBT was rejected in a 
Senate vote (51-48), and with it went the overtures to India and Pakistan to make the 
same commitment."'"' Being, as it was, “largely partyline”"'^  the vote against the 
CTBT’s ratification betrayed the cynicism towards arms control -  what one
Shannon Kile, “Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, 
Disarmaments and International Security, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999), p. 523.
'*■ Giles Andréani, “The DisaiTay of US Non-Proliferation Policy,” Sunnval, vol.41, no.4. Winter 1999- 
2000, p.53.
43 Mutimer, “Testing Times,” p. 15.
The treaty could not come 
India and Pakistan to join it.
 into force without American ratification, thereby lifting any pressure on
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newspaper referred to as “a new skepticism on arms control”"'^  -  which was taking 
hold.
This decisive rejection of the CTBT -  a treaty which had, ironically, first been
proposed by Indian Prime Minister Nehi*u in 1954 (and heartily advocated by several
US Administrations) -  upset whatever momentum remained in the Administration’s
nonproliferation policies. In spite of President Clinton’s professed determination to
keep pushing for the implementation of the CTBT, the inward trend continued. As
one author pointed out, the rejection of the treaty meant, in effect, that “the United
States and India [and Pakistan] now appear to be in almost identical positions vis-à-
vis the CTBT.”"'^  The rise and rise of National Missile Defence (NMD) in the
security psyche, moreover, occupied a far greater part of the strategic focus, while
multilateral arms control efforts -  including the nuclear nonproliferation regime -
continued to move farther down the list of priorities. As a consequence,
American policymakers [moved] down a road towards the 
downgrading of arms control and upgrading of political 
military coercion, to a focusing on the mainly 
politico-military practice of ‘counter-proliferation’ rather than 
the politico-legal practice o f ‘non-proliferation’."'^
The Outcome of the Shock and Conclusions:
This brief discussion of the outcome of the relatively recent Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear tests inevitably simplifies the events which followed from them. It 
has become clear, however, that the optimism and the determination to correct
Cemiello, “Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to Continue Moratorium,” 
p.26. All o f those voting against the CTBT were Republican. Four Republicans crossed over to vote 
for the CTBT with Democratic Senators.
The Washington Times, 18 October 1999.
Mohammed Ayoob, “India’s Nuclear Decision,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, India’s 
Nuclear Security, p. 138.
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perceived problems in the nonproliferation regime by changing the regime itself had 
faded. Following the tests of May 1998, the Clinton Administration found itself 
arguing for multilateral solutions both internationally and with its own Congress. The 
failure of the CTBT and the growing support for NMD within the US Senate 
demonstrated that the Administration had lost this argument.
The unsuccessful American efforts to bring India and Pakistan into the CTBT 
stood as the final attempt to incorporate these two states into the nonproliferation 
regime, albeit without bringing them into the NPT. In the few years which have 
followed, action to alter or expand the regime have been all but non-existent. 
Certainly, regime change on the scale which followed the shocks of 1974 and 1991 
has been unforthcoming as, too, has the reconvergence of international and (in the 
US) domestic expectations which so clearly diverged in the wake of the tests. No 
alteration or elaboration of the regime’s rules, decision-making procedures and 
institutions has taken place, let alone the kind of change to the nonns and principles 
which would constitute genuine regime change. More than four years after the series 
of tests, there remains no hint that any change -  even as little as the addition of a few 
rules or procedures -  is likely to occur. It is now possible to examine the 
interpretations of events that underline the absence of regime change thus far and that, 
in light of the conclusions drawn about the previous three cases, may provide a basis 
for speculation as to whether such inaction is likely to continue.
Understandings of the Indian and Pakistani tests:
Even the brief nanative that has been offered has revealed that the 1998 
nuclear tests exposed the fading consensus on the value of further development of the
Walker, “Nuclear order and disorder,” p .? 16.
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nuclear nonproliferation regime. The unity between Russia, the European suppliers, 
and the United States -  which had followed the Gulf War and been so instrumental in 
bringing about change to the regime -  had fragmented. Even within the United 
States, Congressional support for multilateral nonproliferation initiatives, which had 
proven so important in the past, had given way to a suspicion of the utility of regimes 
and treaties in general. The rejection of the CTBT stood as the most conspicuous 
evidence of this trend and it was after this point that unilateral attempts by the 
American administration to persuade India and Pakistan to join the regime (in the 
context of the CTBT, at least) essentially ended.
Understanding of Danger:
As the previous three case studies indicated, eventual change to the 
nonproliferation regime was linked to a belief that the shock, by itself and as a  ^
precedent was profoundly damaging to, and threatened the credibility of, the regime. 
Following the Indian test of 1974, this consensus began in Congress which, in turn, 
persuaded both the Ford and Carter Administrations of the danger who, in turn, 
persuaded the international community either to agree to, or not to obstruct, the 
desired changes. In the case of the Osiraq bombing, while the shock was viewed as 
having set a dangerous precedent and damaged the credibility of the regime, it was 
considered to have done so gi'oundlessly. The danger of the (ambiguous) shock was 
instead viewed in a much more regional context -  as symptomatic of deepening 
troubles in the Middle East -  rather than in the context of the regime generally.
Finally, the case of Iraq in 1991 saw a return to a consensus about a serious danger, 
current and potential, to the regime.
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Following the Indian and Pakistani tests, however, the understanding of the 
danger was mixed. Internationally, as has already been shown, sharp divisions 
existed between Russia, the European countries, and the United States. However, the 
unwillingness of Europe, Russia and much of the American Congress to apply 
sanctions to India and Pakistan -  in contrast to the United States government -  was 
(with the exception of France) less a reflection of concern regarding the regime’s 
credibility than a consequence of differing assessments of the gains to be made or 
losses to be incurred. Neither India nor Pakistan were seen as being amenable to 
sanctions, nor is there a great deal of evidence that sanctions were considered a 
successful means by which to deter possible imitators.
It has been claimed that the tests “created a new sense of unease about what 
might lie ahead in the Middle East and North-East Asia, two regions of proliferation 
concern.”"'^  Attempts to universalise their application were rejected with France, in 
particular, working “to moderate the response of the Security Council.” '^' The refusal 
to apply sanctions was not replaced by any alternative designed to deter further 
nuclear development by India, Pakistan or other potential mimics. It was becoming 
clear that, as one observer remarked “the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council are not united in theft perception of the thi*eats posed by nuclear proliferation 
and the best measures in response.” '^ The unwillingness of other states to apply 
sanctions does not, however, demonstrate a lack of concern with the problems which 
India and Pakistan had undoubtedly raised.
Arnett, “Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan,” p.521. 
Mutimer, “Testing Times,” p. 17.
Ramesh Thakur “Envisioning Nuclear Futures,” Security Dialogue, vol.31, no .l, March 2000, p .36. 
Thakur was speaking of such disunity as having been demonstrated by “the difficulties in ftaq in 1998- 
99” — nonetheless, the existence of such differences between the P-5 is in evidence at this time.
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The eagerness of the Clinton Administration to apply sanctions was evidently 
not shared in Congress, which remained generally unpersuaded that the tests had 
compromised the health of the nonproliferation regime. While a few were of the 
opinion that “India’s lack of restraint is a signal to the rogues of this world that they, 
too, can flout international opinion and international noims,”^^  such sentiments were 
decidedly in the minority. More common was the belief that concerns about the 
damage inflicted by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons had been wildly 
overstated in the past and were in danger of bemg overstated again. “Despite its grave 
miscalculation this week,” one Senator observed, “India is not rogue state. It is not a 
Libya, a North Korea, or an Iraq.”^^  The Pentagon concurred in a statement on the 
tests, expressing doubt about sanctions on the grounds that “these are not rogue 
states.” "^'
Broadly speaking then, the concerns which arose from the tests tended to be 
regional, with the conclusion being drawn, that the direct danger posed to the United 
States by a nuclear anned-India and Pakistan was minimal. Little mention was made 
outside the Administration of the tests as a setting a dangerous precedent which could 
adversely affect the nonproliferation regime. Significantly, though, such a possibility 
was referred to by both the Director of the CIA (R. James Woolsey) and President 
Clinton. Woolsey, while suggesting that “Iraq and North Korea are likely to do 
whatever they are going to do anyway and are not likely to be affected this,” 
nonetheless expressed concern that “over the long mn Iran, however, may learn some
Senator Brownback, speaking in Crisis in South Asia: India’s Nuclear Tests; Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Tests; India and Pakistan: What Next?,^.22.
Ibid., p.25 (Speaker: Senator Biden).
Ibid., p. 63 (Pentagon Statement on India/Pakistan Sanctions).
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lessons about how to move into the nuclear club.”^^  President Clinton, for his part, 
claimed that the tests created “a dangerous new instability in the region.”^^
Congress, however, intei*preted the danger not in the context of a regime in 
which it had lost faith, but rather in the apparent exposure of the unpreparedness of 
US intelligence. Immediately after the tests a Senate Subcommittee on Oversight was 
convened to investigate why the Indian tests should have caught American 
intelligence unawares. Its concerns were heightened by the fact that American 
intelligence had ostensibly been watching the Pokhran test site. Theft failure to 
predict the tests resulted in what one article accurately described as “a widely 
criticized intelligence failure.”^^
That the tests were dangerous to the regime was, with the exception of France 
and the American Congress, accepted as a reality. The nonproliferation regime had 
been founded on the notion of the sole acceptability of five legal nuclear weapon 
states and (in spite of Iraq, North Korea, South Africa and Israel) this presumption 
had not been so gravely challenged. Even the 1974 Indian test was identified by India 
as a ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion. In May 1998, however, the number of self-declared 
nuclear weapon states had increased fi'om five for the fftst time. The preference on 
the part of several key European nations, as well as in Russia, was not to apply 
sanctions to either India or Pakistan. The US Administration -  perhaps the most 
vocally concerned about the danger posed to the credibility of the regime -  sought to 
draw these two states into negotiation, specifically regarding theft* potential accession 
to the CTBT.
55 Crisis in South Asia, p .30 (Speaker: R. James Woolsey, CIA Director).
World News, 13 May 1998, “US imposes sanctions on India,” (see 
www.cnn.com/WORLD.asiapcF98G5/13/india.us/litm).
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Understanding of Responsibility:
A sense of responsibility for the events in India and Pakistan was largely 
absent following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, for reasons which will be 
argued later. While best exemplified by the reaction of the US Congress, it has been 
observed more generally that “there was little willingness among most states and 
international institutions to pose punitive measures or take other concrete steps that 
would translate from words into deed their committment to halting nuclear 
proliferation.”^^
Although the American reactions were strong, they contrasted sharply with 
that which had followed the post-Gulf War revelations. Rather than communicating a 
sense of obligation to lead the way in shoring up the nonproliferation regime, 
increasing sentiment “against arms control and technological restraint”^^  found 
expression in revived desire for more a more defensive security such as that typified 
by NMD.
Public opinion in the United States, interestingly, reflected and even 
encouraged this new insularity. Far fi om supporting the norm of nuclear arms 
control, support increased for American nuclear weapons and a nuclear deterrent. 
When asked to rate the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons on a scale of 1 
(not at all important) to 10 (extremely important) the mean response was 6.6 in 1993, 
6.8 in 1995, and 7.2 in 1997.^ There was, too, giowing support for maintaining the
Albright, “The Shots Heard ‘Round the World,” p.21.
Kile, “Nuclear amis control and non-proliferation,” p.525.
Walker, “Nuclear order and disorder,” p.713.
From a survey by the Stimson Center, quoted in Dennis M. Gormley and Thomas G. Mehnken, 
“Facing Nuclear and Conventional Reality,” Orbis, vol.4, no.l. Winter 2000, p. 113.
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ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons in the future (38% in 1993, 46% in
1995, and 53% in 1997).' '^
This disinterest in ringing any necessary changes to the nonproliferation
regime was pervasive. Voices such as that of Congressman Faleomavaega, who
called for “the nuclear powers to take responsibility and set an e x a m p l e , w e r e
decidedly lonely. Echoing the concern over the damage done, in part, by the
disconcerting intelligence failure, the Administration was called upon in the House to
accept responsibility for having been caught off-guard. Congressman Rohiabucher
stated that “we are talking about a significant failure on the part of this
Administration... You are going to have to start bearing some of the responsibility for
these failures.”^^  The “failure” being spoken of, however, was the apparent
intelligence failure, not a failure of nuclear nonproliferation policy or the regime. The
momentum which had been in evidence in Congress following the Indian test in 1974
and following the Gulf War -  the belief that the United States was under an obligation
to lead international change -  was absent.
The same could not truly be said of the US Administration. There existed no
sense of culpability for assisting Indian and Pakistani capabilities, the Deputy-
Assistant Secretaiy of State for Non-Proliferation, for example, asserted that:
one has to recognize that these were two govermnents 
that acted on their own. I think they deserve the blame... 
rather than blaming the United States...We think this [the 
tests] was wrong, but we don’t point the finger at
Ibid., p. 113, This disinterest was observed shortly after the rejection of the CTBT in a newspaper 
article whose headline proclaimed: “Voters Seem Indifferent to Senate Treaty Scuttle” (see The 
Washington Times, 17 October 1999).
“India’s Nuclear Tests: A call for international nuclear disarmament,” speech by Congressman 
Faleomavaega in the United States House of Representatives, 12 May 1998. (See 
WWW. indianembassy. org/pic/congress/faleomavaega .htm).
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of 
tlie Committee on International Relations, House o f Representatives, One Hundred and Fifth Congress, 
second session, 18 June 1998), p.22.
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ourselves for their actions.^"'
Nonetheless, there was a recognition that neither India nor Pakistan were prepared to
renounce their weapons and thus be willing and able to join the NPT. Instead, the
Clinton Administration attempted to bring these two states into the regime via the
CTBT. Demonstrating the Administration’s understanding of its responsibility to take
the multilateral initiative. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott declared that
the United States is encouraging India and Pakistan to 
take five practical steps that would help avoid a destabilizing 
nuclear and missile competition, as well as more generally 
reduce tensions...and bolster global nonproliferation.^^
These steps, in addition to CTBT membership, sought agreement between India and
Pakistan on dealing with fissile material, strategic restraint, export controls, and the
conflict over Kashmir.^*  ^ However, it is important to note that the Administration’s
understanding of responsibility, in this instance, was a fatalistic one in which the US
attempted simply to bring India and Pakistan into the existing regime rather than
seeking to alter or bring about changes to the nonproliferation regime overall.
The tests of 1998, then, did indeed prompt one of the key actors in the regime
to seek changes to that regime. There was a similar maiiced absence of calls for
change coming from Europe or Russia. Even in the United States, there was a
weary resignation which greeted the fact of Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation.
In addition, the Congressional fervour which had been so useful in the early years of
the decade and so instrumental following the 1974 test was missing. The
increasing belief, in Congress, that the United States was liable for itself only, and the
growing faith in defensive security as evidenced by NMD, undermined the
Ibid., p.23 (Speaker: Hon. Robert J. Einliom, Deputy-Assistant Secretaiy o f State for Non- 
Proliferation, US Department of State).
Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” p. 120.
Ibid., p.120-21.
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Administration’s international intiatives, such as they were. Nonetheless, such 
initiatives did exist and, as the case of the 1974 Indian test demonstrated, such activity 
was a necessary precursor to regime change.
Understanding of Immediacy:
Difficulties in translating the shock of the tests into regime change were only 
increased by what appeared to be a scepticism regarding how highly the tests should 
be prioritised. In an echo of the Osiraq shock, the goodwill of India and, to a lesser 
extent Pakistan, were held in greater regard than the bolstering the nonproliferation 
regime by making futile examples of these two states.
The misgivings, in Russia and in some European countries, over the utility of 
sanctions have aheady been noted, and give the first hint of the reasons for not falling 
out of favour with either India or Pakistan. The opening of the Indian economy in 
1991 meant the opening of a vast economic market. Apart from the obvious fact that 
sanctions had not previously worked as a detenent against proliferation, the post­
proliferation application of sanctions to all but humanitarian assistance would involve 
the effective closure of this new financial arena. The temptation to Europe offered by 
the Indian market was noted soon after the explosions occurred, in an article which 
suggested that “Europe is expected to dodge sanctions and intensify trade with the 
subcontinent once the fuss dies down.”^^
However, the United States’ inaction had greatest significance. Following the 
1974 test, the same reluctance by the European suppliers to act was countered in part 
by the apparent belief within the United States Congress (and eventually
In addition, there were persistent calls from NNWS for tlie complete disannament envisioned in 
Article VI of the NPT.
Tim  McGfrk, “Nuclear M adness,” in Time, 8 June 1998, p.26.
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Administration) that change to the regime was an immediate priority and therefore 
could not be delayed by other considerations. While similar reluctance (although 
perhaps for different reasons) on the part of Europe and Russia followed the 1998 
tests, it was now accompanied by a growing mistrust of the utility of multilateral 
objects like regimes in the American Congress.
In addition, the grumblings over the elevation of nuclear nonproliferation over
other considerations manifested themselves in Congress almost immediately. The
fact that, since the opening of India’s markets, the United States had taken the
opportunity to establish itself as a key trading partner, was not lost on the members.
In his address to the House of Representatives, Congressman Frank P alio ne stated that
while I oppose nuclear testing by India or any other nation,
I want to stress that this week’s test should not de-rail the 
US-India relationship, which has been giowing closer and 
stronger over the past 5 or 6 years. Particularly in the areas 
of trade and investment, the United States and India are finding 
that we have much in common.
That such sentiments found favour in both the House and the Senate was particularly
evidenced by the Congressional lifting of sanctions against both India and Pakistan a
mere five months after they were initially imposed.^'' Even those who had,
traditionally, been proponents of active American support for the nonproliferation
regime, expressed uncertainty about placing nonproliferation concerns above
American economic interests and of the utility of the regime as a vehicle for realising
those (and other) interests. Speaking of potential benfits to be gained from trade and
“Developments in South Asia; Congressman Frank Pallone in the US House o f Representatives, 
May 12‘'\  1998.” (See www.indianembassy.org/pic/congress/pallone.htm).
In addition, and as noted previously, there was obviously no basis to believe that a sacrifice of 
American interests would, in the end, dampen Indian or Pakistani ambitions.
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investment, one Senator cautioned that “in spite of our justifiable outrage at this 
moment, I think it is important to keep in mind our long term strategic interests.” '^
Concerns, however, did not merely centre around the benefits to be gained by 
retaining good relations with India. The assessment of the damage likely to be done 
to those relations by the United States flinging itself into a reinvigoration of both the 
nonproliferation regime and its own anti-proliferation policies was also significant. 
There were expressions of disquiet at the harm that could be done, in the short-term, 
to American jobs and investors by stftring up the hornet’s nest of nuclear 
nonproliferation once more. Speaking before the House of Representatives, one 
Congressman declared -  to no opposition -  that while no one thought that nuclear 
proliferation was a good thing, “hurting American jobs because of what India did 
doesn’t make sense.”^^  Continuing in this vein, he wondered: “how does it deter 
India and Pakistan from detonating if the punishment they get is that we lay off 
American workers?”^^
There was therefore a widespread concern, in Congress, that the established 
norms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime should not trump the economic benefits 
(both real and potential) to be gained by maintaining decent relations with the 
subcontinent. In addition, there was some anxiety that the Administration might find 
itself inclined to embark on a crusade against proliferation rather respect than what 
Congiess evidently considered the more important economic objectives. One Senator 
felt sufficiently anxious about this possibility to write a letter to President Clinton in 
which he maintained that
since the liberalization of India’s economic policies five
Crisis in South Asia, p.25 (speaker; Senator Biden).
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, p. 14 (speaker; Congressman Donald A. M anzullo).
73 Ibid., p. 15.
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years ago, the US has worked in concert with the Indians 
to establish freer flowing lines of trade. This mutually 
beneficial relationship has now come to a sudden halt. I 
urge you to work closely with Congress to overcome 
the impasse and reclaim our position as India’s leading 
trading partner.^"'
As it happened, the Clinton Administration shared this hesitancy to sacrifice 
economic benefits on the altar of nonproliferation, particularly (as will be discussed in 
the following section) when it seemed that such a sacrifice would be in vain. It was 
observed, even immediately following the application of sanctions by the 
Administration, that “the Clinton Administration and the US Congress take the thi eat 
seriously, but are preoccupied with other issues.”^^  Nuclear nonproliferation 
objectives, and by extension change to the nonproliferation regime, were little 
competition for the economic harvest that could be reaped on the subcontinent.
Rather than focusing on the nonproliferation regime, it was noted, “the trade-minded 
Clintonites are more interested in cracking open India’s vast protected markets”^^  -  an 
assessment which was partially home out by the lifting of sanctions and almost total 
inactivity in the context of the regime.
Evidence for such an assessment is also to be found in the statements of 
important members of the various government departments who also expressed 
worries that nuclear nonproliferation as a cause célébré would damage more 
immediate American economic interests to very little, if any, reward. Speaking 
before the House of Representatives, Undersecretary for International Trade David 
Aaron affii'ined that “the sanctions and the climate created by the sanctions will
'^^ “Senator Lauch Faircloth’s Letter to President Bill Clinton on Sanctions Against India,” see 
www.indianembassy. org/pic/congress/faircloth.htm.
McGeary, “Nukes...They’re Back,” p.30. 
Ibid., p.30.
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inevitably affect US companies.”^^  He went on to warn that “the sanctions will 
preclude export of selected items and the ability of the US government to provide 
important financial assistance and support to US compan ies .Gi ven  that Aaron was 
speaking in an official capacity, it seems safe to suggest that the Department of 
Commerce, in addition to Congress, was far keen to see nuclear nonproliferation 
given priority in US policy. Concern was also expressed that such a decision would 
only benefit those other countries who were akeady engaged in placing their 
economic advantage before the niceties of multilateral action. The ability of 
American business to pursue projects would be “diminished without US government 
financial support. Certainly, suppliers and investors in other countries whose 
governments have not imposed comparable sanctions will inevitably benefit.” "^^
Such sentiments were shared by the department of South Asian Affafts.
Rather than viewing the test explosions as an opportunity to reinvigorate the stalled 
momentum of the regime, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affafts 
stated before the Senate that “as the other great giant of Asia, we see India with gi eat 
potential. We see India as a democracy we want to engage, and that has been the 
signals [sic] we have been sending in terms of economic engagement.” '^^
This immediate interest in the region rather the regime was true to an extent of 
Pakistan, although less in an economic sense than a political one. Alienating Pakistan 
as a consequence of its nuclear tests risked not only losing its goodwill, but of pushing 
a Pakistan with nuclear capability in a more radical direction. Congress was warned.
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, p .8 (speaker: Hon. David Aaron, Undersecretary for 
International Trade, US Department of Commerce).
Ibid., p .8.
Ibid., p.9.
Crisis in South Asia, p. 110 (speaker: Hon. Karl Inderfurtli, Assistant Secretaiy o f State for South 
Asian Affairs).
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and accepted the warning with no audible dissent, that a severe American reaction 
risked such an eventuality. A former Senior Dftector of the National Security Council 
(with expertise in the Near East and South Asia) stated with foreboding: “I do not 
want Pakistan to increasingly have to turn to the Irans of the world to remain 
solvent.”  ^'
Regional concerns, therefore, dominated the assessment of the immediacy of 
action requiied by the shock. Whether those regional concerns were centred on the 
economic benefits to be reaped by trade and investment or political calculations about 
the need to avoid pushing Pakistan into the arms of those hostile to the US, they 
effectively elbowed the regime aside. The Senate was advised that the United States 
should “not allow [itself] to approach this through the lens of what we can do here to 
shore up the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. I would really focus on what we 
can do here to shore up stability in South Asia.”^^  Indeed, as the tenor of the 
discussions and statements within Congress has suggested, such advice found a 
willing audience.
Unlike in the case of the 1974 test or even the 1991 revelations, this initial 
lack of urgency for regime change went gone unchallenged by subsequent events. 
After the 1974 test, the French and West Gennan deals did a great deal to entrench a 
belief that the time for regime change too be enacted was rumiing out. Even 
following the Iraqi revelations in 1991, the problems in North Korea (although clearly 
not as instrumental as those which followed the 1974 Indian test) nonetheless helped 
to maintain the momentum for regime change which had been established by the Iraqi 
shock. In the absence of a similar reinforcing event, the 1998 shock more
Ibid., p.89 (speaker: Dr. Richard Haass, Brookings Institution and former Senior Director, Near East 
and South Asia, NSC).
Ibid., p.87.
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closely echoes the Osiraq bombing than the other two cases. The apparent 
preliminary assumption, especially in the US Congress, that the nonproliferation 
regime was not an immediate concern could thus remain uncontested.
Understanding of Solvability:
This brief historical overview has revealed some activity to expand (if not 
develop) the regime as a consequence of the shock -  namely the attempts by the US 
government to bring India and Pakistan into the CTBT. The failure of India and 
Pakistan to join the treaty, the international scepticism regarding the utility of 
sanctions, and the failure of the treaty in the US Senate, thwarted such efforts.
Rather, the 1998 tests seemed to accompany a fatalistic belief that nuclear 
proliferation, if not inevitable, was not something that could be resolved through 
further development of the nonproliferation regime. There was, instead, a growing 
belief that “the United States -  and the international community more generally -  will 
have to cope increasingly with a problem of proliferation mangement.”''^  This stood 
as the fundamental barrier to regime change in this case. However dangerous for the 
regime the shock was considered to be, and however willing the regime actors 
(particularly the Clinton Adminstration) to take immediate action to solve the 
problem, the belief that no such solution existed necessarily foiled any change to the 
regime.
Traditionally, the nonproliferation regime had provided several solutions to 
such shocks. One solution was the further development of export controls, which had 
been part of the response to the shocks of 1974 and 1991. The regime, however, had 
already incorporated a universal adoption by the NSG of full-scope safeguards and the
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creation of a trigger-list of dual-use items. However, India and Pakistan had managed 
to proliferate despite these initiatives. As a consequence, it was unclear as to how 
export controls could be further altered to prevent a similar incident. More 
disturbingly still, the NPT-centred nonproliferation regime was unable to incorporate 
India and Pakistan. In fixing a date (January 1 ,^ 1967) as one which distinguished 
legal from extra-legal nuclear weapons states, the possibility of bringing India and 
Pakistan into the NPT became on the one hand illegitimate (as NWS) and on the 
other, unachievable (as NNWS). “In demanding to be identified as nuclear-weapon 
states,” it was observed, “India and Pakistan dfrectly challenge the definition of the 
term and thereby the NPT itself.” "^' The regime simply did not possess the flexibility 
to adapt to such a situation. A change to the regime which allowed the incorporation 
of these two states would, by doing so, nullify the NPT, its fundamental 
nonproliferation norm, and thus the basis of the regime itself.
As noted, the European and Russian unwillingness to apply sanctions, 
combined with an equal unwillingness to suggest or enact any other solutions strongly 
imply that the problems posed by nuclear proliferation in South Asia could not be 
solved through the regime. The reassertion of the French conviction, noted earlier, 
that India and Pakistan were only doing what other nuclear powers had done before 
them by acting in their own national interests went hand-in-hand with a belief that 
nuclear proliferation will occur when such a calculation is made, regardless of the 
punishments (such as sanctions) levelled by other states. Again, the likelihood of any 
solutions to the problem being multilateral and law-based was undermined.
Jason Ellis, “Beyond Nonproliferation: Secondary Supply, Proliferation Management, and US 
Foreign Policy,” Comparative Strategy, vol.20, no .l, January-March 2001, p.2.
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., “South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Arms 
Control Today, vol.28, no.4. May 1998, p.4.
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The United States, of course, did implement sanctions and showed, at the level 
of the Administration at least, a real concern about the implications of the tests and a 
desii'e to do something. However, even those isolated few who were in favour of 
action being taken, admitted to qualms about the utility of sanctions, especially in the 
face of substantial international refusal to follow suit. One of these minority observed 
that
Secretary [of State] Albright has noted sanctions, 
particularly unilateral sanctions, are not particularly 
effective. Certainly it would be preferable to have 
caiTots to complement the stick of sanctions.
The lack of faith in sanctions was not confined to the appai ent hopelessness of
international coordination. The very effectiveness of this particular problem-solving
technique came under fiie. Sanctions, it was argued by one Senator in a letter to the
President, would act only to “[alienate] the world’s largest democracy and one of our
long-standing allies.”^^  The Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, for his part,
expressed concern over the utility of sanctions in terms of their possible
iiTeversability. He suggested that sanctions should perhaps be lifted on the grounds
that “we have little ability to modify their application in the event there is an
unintended negative outcome to their implementation.”^^  Sanctions as a solution were
not only ineffective but, it was feared, could turn out to be somehow dangerous in the
long tenn.
The only other avenue for possible action which was actively explored was the 
possibility of Indian and Pakistani participation in the CTBT. Again, this initiative
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, p.2 (Speaker: Congressman Doug Bereuter).
“US Senator Lauch Faircloth: Letter to President Bill Clinton on US Sanctions Against India,” (see: 
WWW. indianembassy. org/pic/congi-ess/faircloth.litm).
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation, p .5 (Speaker: Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary o f Stae for 
South Asian Affaii's).
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fell in the domestic battle between the Clinton Administration and an increasingly 
insular Congress which saw demands for American military restraint as an 
infringement of national interest. While some in the Administration (such as Strobe 
Talbott), pursued Indian and Pakistani adherence to the CTBT,^^ its rejection in the 
Senate demonstrated Congressional dismissal of this second possible avenue of 
action. Since this rejection, no further attempts have been made to bring about regime 
change. The shocks had raised problems which were considered to have no solutions, 
particularly in a US which “tends to see treaties as a burden on itself and other 
deserving members of the international community, and of little effect on 
proliferation.”^^  Rather, nuclear proliferation was more and more viewed as 
something which was not preventable at all, or at least not preventable by reliance on 
the nonproliferation regime. The United States had already “moved away from its 
earlier attempt to roll back the nuclear status quo in South Asia.”^^  Instead there were 
discussions of what one newspaper article refen ed to as “a quiet, conditional 
acceptance of Asia’s new nuclear realities.” '^ Certainly, the existence of Andréani’s 
“perceptible sense of gloom” which pervaded American nonproliferation policy, was 
underscored by the Congressional testimony of former NSC Senior Director Haass 
who declared not only that “the possibility of...a rollback -  that is, to bring about a 
nonnuclear South Asia is not a realistic policy option for the United States”^^ , but also
Talbott, of course, led the diplomatic talks between the US and India, and the US and Pakistan and 
spoke o f his desire that such talks should ultimately “reduce tensions on the subcontinent and bolster 
global nonproliferation.” (Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” p. 120). Talbott, in this 
article, listed the signing of the CTBT by India and Pakistan as the first step which needed to be taken 
to achieve these stated goals. (Ibid., p. 120.)
Andréani, “The Disarray of US Non-Proliferation Policy,” p.59.
^  Amit Gupta, “Nuclear Forces in South Asia: Prospects for Arms Control,” Security Dialogue, 
vol.30,110.3, 1999, p.325.
The Washington Post, 21 Februaiy 1999 (quoted in Ibid., p.325).
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his belief in “the foreign policy challenge facing the United States for the foreseeable 
future in this part of the world as one of management, not prevention.
The Congressional confidence in the regime’s capacity to provide solutions to 
the shock of 1998 and the very problem of nuclear proliferation itself, was clearly at a 
low ebb -  its validity increasingly challenged by a “growing appetite for military 
options designed to counter proliferation once it has occuned,” "^' such as the holy 
grail o f NMD. While the Clinton Administration appeared to hold more faith in the 
existence of multilateral solutions to the problems raised, the rejection of the CTBT 
by India, Pakistan and the American Senate put the nail in the coffin of the only 
international solution which seemed to hold promise. This, the scepticism of Russia 
and the European suppliers regarding the utility of sanctions and their unwillingness 
to join in multilateral action, pointed less to an unconcern with nuclear proliferation, 
but an inability to see a means by which the problems raised could be addressed.
Conclusions:
The shock of the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, although severe, did not 
and have not induced the kind of change to the regime inspired by the shocks of 1974 
and 1991. The international reactions, while reflecting serious concern at the damage 
that had been done to the regime, betrayed hesitancy over who was react and how.
The fundamental inability of the regime to incorporate states such as India and 
Pakistan made this unsurprising.
Crisis in South Asia, p .76 (Speaker: Dr. Richard Haass, Brookings Institution, and ex-Senior 
Director, Near East and South Asia).
Ibid., p .76 (Speaker: Dr. Haass).
^  Andréani, “The D isairay o f  US N on-Proliferation P olicy,” p.43.
298
There was nothing ambiguous about the 1998 nuclear tests. Nevertheless, the 
1998 South Asian tests bear a closer resemblance to the bombing of the Osiraq reactor 
in both the confusion over how to respond to the shock, as well in the sharp divide 
between the will of Congress and the Administration. While 1981 saw the Reagan 
Administration’s detennination to ignore Congressional calls, such as they were, for 
action, the post-1998 context saw a Congress which did not see the nonproliferation 
regime, or any multilateral initiative, as holding the answer to horizontal proliferation 
and an Administration which, thwarted by that Congress, ran out of ideas following 
the rejection of the CTBT. The failure to achieve either domestic or international 
consensus on the solvability of the problems raised by the shock meant that no change 
-  either in the regime or outside it -  was able to occur.
There is little sign, moreover, that this defensive posture is likely to change in 
the near future. The election of the Bush administration in 2000 has meant that 
multilateralism has moved even forther into the background, with military responses 
and power maximisation now being given priority. Unless a radical change occurs, 
the 1998 shocks seems likely to join the Osiraq bombing as a shock to the 
nonproliferation regime which failed to result in change in the regime’s structure or 
norm (although for different reasons). In addition, this demonstrates again that while 
substantial change in the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been preceded by a 
shock, a shock does not necessarily preface change.
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Conclusion
The dust of exploded beliefs may make a fine smiset.
Geoffrey Madan, Livre san nom: Twelve Reflections
In the thirty-three years since the creation of the NPT, the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime has developed considerably. Its membership has expanded to 
include all states except Israel, India, Pakistan and Cuba. There has been no 
withdrawal from the ti eaty by any of its members. Finally, in 1995, the NPT marked 
its twenty-fifth birthday by being indefinitely extended. The nonproliferation regime 
has, in other words, become entrenched in the international sphere.
The expansion of the number of participants in the NPT, however, is not the 
only -  or even the most significant -  way in which the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime has changed since its inception. It was the contention of the introduction to 
this study that the regime has not been characterized by stability or even gradual 
development. Instead, the possible role of shocks in facilitating rapid change of the 
regime, in contrast to periods of relative inactivity, was deemed worthy of 
investigation. Thiee questions were raised regarding this proposed relationship. The 
first asked whether such a pattern of change did in fact characterise the manner of 
regime’s development in contrast to the assumptions that prevail in mainstream 
regime theory. Secondly, it was asked whether a relationship between shock and 
regime change was always reciprocal. If change to the regime does occur following 
shocks, is it necessarily the case that a shock to the regime will always be followed by 
regime change? Finally, the investigation turned to the question of how such change, 
or the lack of change, to the regime following a shock may be understood. The 
similarities and differences of these interpretations, and their correlation to subsequent
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regime change, lends itself to a possible model of the relationship between shocks and 
regime change, which will be proposed as part of the following discussion.
The exploration of the cases of the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the Osiraq 
bombing in 1981, the uncovering of Iraq’s proliferation attempt in 1991, and the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 have allowed some conclusions to be drawn 
regarding all of these questions through then examiniation in two chapters apiece.
The first of these dealt with the way in which such change occun'ed and whether it 
was part of an overall pattern of non-incremental regime development. The second 
chapter investigated the circumstances under which regime change following a shock 
occurred (or failed to occur) in the context of how the shock was understood by the 
relevant regime actors. The conclusions drawn are by no means definitive answers to 
the questions posed. Rather, they are an attempt to consolidate the patterns and 
themes that have recuiTed thioughout.
How the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Developed (or, the existence of a 
pattern and implications for regime theory):
The preceding chapters have shown that the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
has indeed developed in a way that poses problems for regime theory in its current 
form. As the first chapter of this study argued, regime theory has rarely devoted time 
to, nor allowed much theoretical space for regime change. Although a commonly 
accepted definition of ‘genuine’ regime change was suggested by Khasner in 1982 
(change not merely to the mles and decision-making procedures of the regime but 
also to its norms and principles), explorations of regime change have, in practice, 
tended to be few in number, in spite of what appears to be a self-evident need for 
regimes to change over time in order to remain effective and valued by their
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participants.' In reality, those who concern themselves with international regimes and 
theories thereof have “mostly examined regime fonnation processes.”  ^ Regime 
change, from the realist or neo-liberal approach, tends to refer to the collapse (rather 
than the maintenance of the regime) due to a coixesponding decline of the relevant 
hegemonic power. Certainly, there are those who do engage with the possibility of a 
regime change occurring between the establishment and demise of the regime. These 
‘cognitivist’ theories of regimes, it was argued, often incorporate ideas of regime 
change, as manifested particularly in some of the literature dealing with the 
development of environmental regimes. However, the assumption of incremental 
regime change prevails against any others.^ Although the possibility of regimes 
undergoing significant change in the aftermath of a shock has been suggested before, 
the lack of a concrete investigation has meant that no direct challenge to notions of 
change in regime theory has been posed."'
The examination of the role of shocks in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, 
however, indicates that a pattern of non-incremental regime change -  in the aftermath 
of a shock and in contrast to a preceding period of regime inactivity -  does indeed 
exist, and thus that the inattention paid to the question of regime change, as well as
' Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” p. 189.
 ^Lasse Ringius, “Environmental NGOs and Regime Change: the Case of Ocean Dumping of 
Radioactive Waste,” European Journal o f  International Relations, vol.3, no .l, March 1997, p. 63.
 ^ See, once again, the example of Hopkins’ assertion that “synoptic change [to a regime] is not 
plausible” (Hopkins, “Reform in the international food regime,” p.264), or Gehring’s statement that 
“careful case studies did not support the hypothesis of institutional change, but revealed a gradual, 
continuing development of regimes” (Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions fo r  
International Environmental Governance, p.29).
Among those who noted the link between shocks and regime change were Nye, “ Nuclear Leammg 
and US-Soviet Security Regimes,” p.398. Christer Jonsson, it may be remembered, also proposed that 
“a pertinent question for further research is whetlier international regimes tend to change together after 
periods of regime persistence and stability” (“Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics,” in Rittberger 
(ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, , p.220. Harald Müller also referred to a shift in the 
nonns of the regime (Ki asner’s ‘genuine’ regime change) as a consequence of the Iraqi revelations
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the assumption of gradual regime evolution, are not justified. The indifference to 
regime change inherent in realist and neo-liberal theories of regime appears 
unwan anted, while the assumptions of incremental change which pervade cognitivist 
theories appear to be incomplete, rather than incorrect.
The Indian shock of 1974, the first case to be examined, was demonstrated to 
have occurred following a period of comparatively little activity in the 
nonproliferation regime which had prevailed broadly since the founding of the NPT in 
1968 and certainly since the creation of INFCIRC/153 in 1971. The oil crisis of 
1973-74 had increased the belief in the need for increased reliance on nuclear power. 
The concomitant belief that this increased reliance entailed the construction of fast- 
breeder reactors thus raised fears of a greater availability of plutonium. This, in turn, 
would increase general access to weapons-grade material and thereby foster nuclear 
proliferation. In addition, the emergence of new suppliers such as France and West 
Germany into the previously American-dominated nuclear market was inspiring 
competition for orders in markets such as Argentina and Brazil, where nascent nuclear 
weapons progiammes already existed.
The history of the five years which followed the Indian peaceful nuclear 
explosion did much to support the proposal of non-incremental regime development. 
There was, as a consequence of the shock and in its immediate aftermath, a 
divergence of the expectations whose original convergence Krasner’s definition cites 
as underlying an international regime. These expectations then reconverged during 
the following few years, allowing change to the regime to be negotiated. Accordingly, 
the regime underwent a significant elaboration with the creation of the London 
Suppliers Club and its agreement on the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. These
“from ‘commerce over non-proliferation’ to ‘non-proliferation over commerce’” (“The Internalization
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guidelines entailed the introduction to the nonproliferation regime of specific rules 
and decision-making procedures to be adopted by nuclear supplier states when 
exporting. By making such a change, it was felt, proliferators would find it more 
difficult to acquir e weapons-related technology on the international market.
These guidelines, the result of much debate between the United States and the 
Western European suppliers, constituted not only a rapid change to the structure of the 
regime but, crucially, reflected an accompanying change to some of its underlying 
norms and principles. The NSG expressed the understanding, which arose from the 
Indian test and hints of further likely proliferation, that supplier states had a 
responsibility beyond thefr own borders to prevent proliferation by exercising caution, 
or ‘restraint’ as the guidelines themselves put it, in their own dealings with countries 
whose motives may be questionable. In addition, the principle of the ‘inalienable’ 
right of access to peaceful nuclear technology, as implied in the Atoms for Peace Plan 
of 1953 and as enshrined in the NPT, had been challenged; it was acknowledged that 
the acquisition of nuclear technology and materials for possible military use should be 
regai'ded as ‘proliferation’, extending the definition beyond the acquisition of nuclear 
explosive devices (as implied in the NPT). The notion that a ‘peaceful’ nuclear 
explosion was somehow different fr om a weapons test, and that a meaningful 
distinction could be made between some peaceful nuclear teclinologies and military 
ones, was also found lacking -  a change which was reflected by the creation of a 
suppliers club and guidelines. The stmctural alterations which followed fr om the 
shock echoed the nonnative challenge to the ideals behind Atoms for Peace, which 
had managed to survive the past thiee decades.
of Principles, Norms and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in Ibid., p.381.)
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It seems, in other words, that the response to the shock of the Indian test was 
able to meet ICi asner’s criteria of genuine regime change as affecting the norms and 
principles of the regime, and not merely the rules and decision-making procedures. 
More importantly, these events resulted in an overall pattern of change -  rapid change 
in contrast to previous regime inactivity and mediated by a shock -  which differs from 
that allowed for or assumed by regime theory generally.
The next phase of so-called ‘genuine’ nonproliferation regime change which 
was argued to have occurred took place following the post-Gulf War revelations of 
Iraqi nuclear ambitions.^ As in the case of the Indian nuclear explosion, the shock of 
the Iraqi revelations galvanised the regime’s participants, in particular the United 
States, into imiovative activity. The nuclear nonproliferation regime had received 
comparatively little attention during the early and mid-1980s, as the Cold War 
deepened and took precedence in American and Soviet security concerns. The end of 
the Cold War, however, paved the way for the return of the nonproliferation regime to 
become something approaching a priority.
However, the shock of Iraq’s attempts at nuclear (as well as chemical and 
biological) proliferation prompted yet another divergence and (this time rapid) 
reconvergence of actor expectations. This shock acted as the catalyst for regime 
change to occur in a significant way for the first time in over a decade. The years 
between 1991 and the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 involved, if anything, 
even more extensive regime change than had occurred in the 1970’s.  ^ For the first 
time since their establishment in the wake of the 1974 Indian test, that part of the
 ^The second case, the ‘uninspiring shock’ of the Osiraq bombing, will be left out of this part of the 
discussion for reasons which will become apparent in the next section.
 ^ It should be noted again that, although the final conclusion of negotiations reforming the IAEA 
safeguards system were not concluded until 1997, innovations and impetus for reform were begun
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regime dealing with nuclear supply standards was finally elaborated upon. This 
included the creation of entirely new guidelines on the transfer of dual-use technology 
-  Iraq's favoured means of building WMD capabilities -  and the revision of the 
objectives and instmmental measures of the international safeguards system. The 
steps taken in the 93+2 programme to reaffirm the IAEA’s right to special inspections 
and the support of the UN Security Council were complemented by a stated 
determination to make use of the right of access to all sites in the search for 
undeclared nuclear material (again, reflecting the lessons learned from the Iraqi 
experience).
This decisive change to the rules and decision-making procedures of the 
nonproliferation regime was triggered by the shock of Iraqi nuclear ambitions and 
capabilities. Moreover, and again frilfilling the accepted conditions for genuine 
regime change, the aftermath of the Iraqi shock was further demonstrated to have 
brought about changes to the principles and, to a lesser extent, the noims which 
governed the regime. The 1974 Indian test, it will be recalled, stood as the fu*st shift 
in the norms governing nuclear trade. In the years following this shock, the 
responsibility for preventing nuclear proliferation was deemed to fall as much on 
those states supplying nuclear technology as on those desiring it. In the intervening 
years between the aftermath of the Indian test and the Iraqi shock, however, the 
impetus behind the NSG refoims slackened. The shock of 1991, with its re­
awakening of the NSG and revised guidelines on trade, heralded a normative shift 
back to the precedence of nuclear nonproliferation over nuclear trade. More radically 
still, the nonns of IAEA safeguards expanded to include not only cun ent activities, 
but to anticipate clandestine ones.
before 1995 and reached their zenith with the indefinite extension of tlie NPT, with the 1997
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In the context of the regime’s principles, the shock of 1991 led to the 
proscription on dual-use items and IAEA determination to have access to undeclared 
sites. Following the revelations in Iraq, non-nucleai' membership of the NPT was no 
longer understood to be a wholly reliable indicator of a state’s intent. The assumption 
of compliance -  the benefit of the doubt previously extended, in practice, to non­
nuclear NPT states -  was overturned. Instead, a request for dual-use items was 
treated with suspicion rather than trust, overshadowed now by the possibility of 
undeclared nuclear facilities.
In the case of the Oshaq bombing, the lack of enthusiasm in the US 
Administration was met with an equal disinterest in, or hostility to, regime change 
elsewhere. Congressional hearings, which support such change, met with hostility 
from State Department officials who observed that, even were regime change 
required, the United States could not simply force actions such as a reconvening of 
the NSG. Rather, it was declared, other suppliers would be unlikely “to embark on 
another highly visible, formal attempt to control further their exports.”  ^ The 
divergence of expectations -  how to deal with the vote of no-confidence in the regime 
that the Israeli attack symbolized and how to approach the accusations of Iraqi non- 
compliance -  was neither emphatic enough, nor did it result in the kind of 
reconvergence of expectations which characterised the shocks of 1974 and 1991. The 
inherent ambiguity of the event -  the fact that Israeli accusations of Iraqi non- 
compliance could not be proven -  helped to thwart the possibility of significant 
change to the norms, principles, rules, or decision-making procedures. This left the 
regime largely unaffected by the Osiraq bombing.
conclusion of safeguards reform standing as the hangover of such innovation.
’ Official State Department response to Congressional calls for a reconvening of the NSG in The 
International Atomic Energy Agency: Improving Safeguards, p .219.
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Finally, the brief examination of the latest shock to affect the regime -  the 
1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests -  showed it to have occuned when the 
international consensus over how best to tackle nuclear proliferation had weakened. 
Divisions had appeared between the United States and Russia over aims control and 
American interest in the future of a National Missile Defence was increasing. While 
the international reaction to the tests was generally one of concern and dismay, no 
change to the regime has thus far been forthcoming, either to the regime’s rules and 
decision-making procedures or to its norms and principles. The American rejection of 
the CTBT typified this lack of progress in the context of the regime -  a lack of 
progress which has shown no sign of altering. The confiision over the future of the 
regime has remained um esolved. As in the case of Osiraq, diverging expectations 
have not, as yet, reconverged.
These case studies, which encompass the years before and after the actual 
shock, demonstrated that the development of the nonproliferation regime, between 
1970 and 2000, thus consisted of two substantial periods of what may be considered 
‘genuine’ regime change (1974-1979 and 1991-1997). Moreover, those periods of 
change were not part of a general pattern of incremental evolution, but evinced 
discontinuity -  in contrast to a preceding phase of regime inactivity and in the 
aftermath of a shock.
Such a pattern, however, is beyond the abilities of mainstream regime theory 
to account for, even those aspects of it which hold superficial appeal in terms of the 
capacity to explain regime change. Hegemonic stability theory (HST) was identified 
in the introductory chapter as being historically both unhelpful and uninterested in 
questions of regime change. HST, predisposed as it is towards questions of stability, 
had been applied almost exclusively to the question of why an international regime
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would be created and, to a lesser extent, why it might collapse (in both cases the 
determining factor being hegemonic power). Yet despite its neglect of the processes 
which occur between regime creation and demise, it was postulated that HST could 
help to explain the occurrence of transformative regime change in spite of itself.
However, the foregoing naixatives of the histories of the three cases do little to 
support this notion. While the case of the Indian test of 1974 resulted in regime 
change due primarily to initiatives by the United States, it is equally true that 
suppliers such as France and West Germany had to come on-side for multilateral 
suppliers guidelines to have any meaning and thus for change to an international 
regime to occur. Moreover, the tacit acceptance of American actions by the Soviet 
Union was essential in allowing such change to proceed. Problematically for the 
assumptions of HST, the challenge of the shock to the regime did not, in accordance 
with the perceived declining power of its hegemon, result in the expected collapse of 
the regime. Rather, the regime change which occurred took place despite shifts in US 
hegemonic influence in the nuclear supply and exports and in other realms. The shock 
of Osiraq, on the other hand, was characterized not only by American disinterest in 
change, but also by sharp disagreements among the key regime actors.
A simple detennination on the part of a hegemonic power for regime change is 
therefore insufficient to understand both the occurrence and extent of regime change 
which took place following the thiee shocks. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envision a 
situation in which an international regime could flourish in the face of the hostility of 
a hegemonic power or powers. The acceptance of, and desire for, regime change by 
its hegemon appears thus to be a necessary, if not sufficient precursor to regime 
change. Consequently, while HST is ultimately unhelpftil as a means by which to
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understand the mechanisms of regime change, its emphasis on the centrality of the 
hegemon is valuable.
It is not clear, from this study of only one regime, if this pattern of change is 
something that is peculiar to the nonproliferation regime, or whether it may be found 
elsewhere. It may be, for example, a type of change which appears in other security 
regimes or even -  and despite Geliidng’s refutation -  in environmental regimes as the 
consequence, say, of an environmental catastrophe. Even if such a pattern is specific 
to the nonproliferation regime, its existence remains a strong challenge to the 
understanding of change, and even to the lack of interest in the whole question of 
change, which have thus far prevailed in regime theory.
The disinterest in notions of regime change, which pervade much of 
mainstream regime theory, therefore appears unmerited. Realist and neo-liberal 
approaches to regimes, furthermore, remain unequipped to deal with regime change 
generally. HST -  in spite of its helpful emphasis on the necessity of the hegemon’s 
acceptance of such change -  is ultimately insufficient for explaining the 
circumstances of such change.
As was pointed out by those concerned with cognitivist approaches to regime 
theory, regime formation and, to a lesser extent regime demise, have been emphasised 
at the expense of the developments that occur after or in between. However, the 
general assumption in such approaches of a particular type of gradual, continuous 
regime change seems unmerited. This is not to argue that incremental change is not 
present, or perhaps even the most common fonn of regime change that occurs.^ As
® Neither is this to argue that incremental change is not in any way a part of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. The development of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, for example, constitutes a 
part o f the regime’s development which occurred gradually (although, to be sure, the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco which was, to a great extent, a reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis). Nonetheless, the 
preceding history seems to indicate genuine change to the nuclear nonproliferation regime tends to be 
characterised by rapid, non-incremental development.
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noted above, it is possible that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is exceptional in 
this respect. Nonetheless, the investigations which have formed the basis of this study 
have demonstrated, in contrast to mainstream regime theory, the significance of the 
development of a regime between its establishment and demise. They have, 
furthermore, illustrated a very different pattern of development from that assumed in 
cognitivist regime theory. Although a number of cognitivist regime theorists have 
alluded specifically to the possibility of a pattern of regime inactivity followed by 
sudden change, theorizing on the subject of regimes has continued to assume, or even 
openly declare, a style of change which is incremental and predictable. The clear 
existence of a different pattern of change, therefore, requires that existing assumptions 
of regime change be supplemented, though not supplanted, to include this particular 
type.
Shocks and Regime Change: a reciprocal relationship?
The preceding summary has indicated the existence of a pattern of rapid, non- 
incremental regime development, following a period of regime inactivity and 
punctuated by a shock. The investigation of shocks in the nonproliferation regime 
also gave rise to the question of whether, if instances of regime change did indeed 
follow in the wake of such shocks, it therefore followed that a shock to the regime 
would necessarily be followed by regime change. As it was reiterated above, the 
regime developed rapidly in two episodes following the Indian test of 1974 and the 
Iraqi revelations in 1991.
The investigation of the Osiraq case, and the brief examination of the 1998 
Indian and Pakistan tests, failed to reveal the kind of pattern which had characterized 
the shocks of 1974 and 1991. This was not because these incidents were not
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shocking. As an act of counter-proliferation, the bombing of Osiraq clearly ran 
against the accepted practice of nonproliferation policy. More importantly, the 
growing acceptance of the possibility of Iraqi non-compliance confounded the goals 
of the regime, as well as expectations of the regime’s effectiveness and stability, 
particularly with respect to safeguards procedures. In addition, the effects of the 
Indian shock had begun to dissipate: the shock thus occuiTcd after a three year period 
of comparative inactivity in the regime. Similarly, the 1998 Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests constituted the first instances of self-declared nuclear weapons 
proliferation since the establishment of the NPT and were, accordingly, greeted with 
genuine anxiety. These tests, like the thiee shocks previous, also occuiTed after a 
period of inactivity in the regime.
Ostensibly, then, the Osiraq bombing and the 1998 Indian/Pakistani tests 
could have affected the regime in a similar fashion as the shocks of 1974 and 1991. 
The history of these cases, however, does not support this. Despite both its nature and 
the context in which it occuiTed, the shock of Osiraq did not result in any significant 
change to the regime. There was no change in, or expansion of, the export standards 
which had been devised following the 1974 Indian test. The Guidelines went largely 
unchanged for another decade. The concerns about IAEA safeguards and inspections, 
which were expressed, particularly in the United States Congress, were not met with 
the overhaul which eventually swept thi ough them during the first half of the 1990s. 
Instead, the discourse between (and within) the regime actors during the years 
immediately following the shock degenerated into the adoption of incompatible 
positions and an American walkout of the IAEA. Shortly after the 1985 NPT Review 
Conference, the whole episode faded out of international consideration. There was 
little evidence, in other words, that the bombing of Osiraq resulted in genuine change
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to the regime and the kind o f rapid regime development which characterised the other 
two case studies.
The bombing of Osiraq therefore contradicts any assumption of a necessary 
reciprocal relationship between shocks and regime change, while the recent Indian 
and Pakistani tests appear to hint that they, too, have not and will not lead to the kind 
of regime change of the late 1970’s and early to mid-1990s. Although the two periods 
of rapid change which occurred in the nonproliferation regime in the 1970’s and 
1990’s were preceded by shocks to that regime, it does not therefore follow that a 
shock will necessarily initiate regime change. The consequences of such an event 
may not be assumed to be inevitable.
The Circumstances of Regime Change Following a Shock: overview and model:
The final question which remained to be answered in this investigation 
followed from the study of the relationship between shocks and regime change. This 
had to do with the circumstances under which a shock to the regime was or was not a 
forerunner to regime change. The investigation thus sought to clarify which 
interpretations of the shock were present or absent in the Indian and Iraqi shocks and 
not in the Osiraq incident.
The preceding investigation proposed that, in order for regime change to 
occur, it was necessary for the agents of such change to have interpreted the shock in 
certain ways. These understandings, which were a necessary intermediary between a 
shock and subsequent negotiations for regime change, were first manifested in the 
investigation of the 1974 Indian test and appeared to comprise four components. In as 
yet no particular order, they are: the understanding of the danger indicated by the 
shock; the understanding of responsibility for engendering the shock and, more
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importantly, for leading change to the regime; the understanding of the urgency of 
reghue change; and the understanding of the solvability of the problems posed or 
revealed by the shock -  the question of whether feasible corrective action exists.
The relationship between shoclcs and regime change (a proposed model)
Having explored the ways in which the shocks of 1974, 1981, 1991 and 1998 
were interpreted by the actors involved, certain patterns have emerged. In the cases 
where a shock led to rapid, non-incremental regime change, there existed four 
variables which preceded the political manoeuvrings and negotiations which 
eventually brought about regime change. These variables -  the actors’ understandings 
of danger, responsibility, immediacy and solvability -  manifested first in the 
investigation of the 1974 Indian test and were central, by both their presence or their 
absence, to the outcome of the other thi ee shocks examined. The relationship 
between a shock, the four understandings of it, and regime change may be illustrated 
by the model (figure 1) on the following page.
The model of regime change makes several assertions as to the processes 
between the occurrence of a shock and the negotiations and politicking which 
institutionalise regime change. The contention is that the presence of all four 
conditions is a prerequisite for successful negotiations for non-incremental regime 
change. Accordingly, the absence of any of the four is antithetical to such change.
To elaborate, if a belief that a dangerous precedent had occuiTed which endangered 
the international security and credibility of the regime was absent, regime change (and 
the o hen-difficult political wrangling required to bring it about) would be simply 
unnecessary. If one makes the safe assumption that significant regime change cannot 
occur by accident, a willingness to lead or assist such regime change thus becomes
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necessary. Equally, the actor or actors desiring to lead such change must be capable 
of successfully taking on a leadership role. It is here that the value of HST -  such as 
it is -  comes into play in the context of regime change.
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In addition, in the absence of a belief that need for regime change was urgent 
and oveiTode other competing interests, no regime change would be required.
Neither, too, would such change be able to take place at the relative speed at which it 
did following the shocks of 1974 and 1991. Finally, without a belief that the 
problems raised by the shock had workable solutions, there would exist no desiie to 
embark on the complicated negotiations for regime change. The necessary acceptance 
of all four variables -  and the impossibility of regime change in their absence -  is 
thereby reflected in the model proposed above.
The model also asserts that a possible acceptance of the four variables -  a 
“maybe” answer to the questions raised -  does not negate the chances of eventual 
regime change. Clearly, regime change is ensured by an eventual and active 
recognition of the danger posed, the responsibility for change, immediacy and 
solvability. Nonetheless, the potential existence of these variables keeps the 
possibility of regime change alive, hence the use of the “yes/maybe” option in the 
model of regime change.
Wliile four conditions of change have been identified through the previous 
examination of the cases, the proposed model -  with one exception -  does not suggest 
that those conditions occur in a preordained sequence. This is because three of the 
four variables could overlap or occur in varying orders -  a fact which is best reflected 
in the circular shape of the model itself.
One of these four, however, must precede the others. The understanding of 
the danger revealed by the shock exists as part of the foundation upon which the other 
intei*pretations are built. An acceptance of responsibility for leading regime change, a 
belief that such change is urgent and that the problems raised may be solved, 
necessarily follow an acceptance that problems for the regime have indeed been
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revealed. The shock, in other words, must initially be interpreted as a shock of great 
magnitude before the thiee further conclusions may be drawn. As a consequence, the 
understanding of danger is located in the model as the first variable which follows 
from the shock.
Conversely, the remaining thiee interpretations may take place in any order. 
One can easily envision a cii cumstance in which a belief in the need to lead regime 
change follows or precedes a belief that such change is required imminently or that 
solutions to the problems raised are both workable and available. The same is true of 
the remaining two interpretations and, indeed, the possibility of all three occurring 
shuultaneously is, while far-fetched, not beyond the realms of possibility. The above 
case studies do not themselves indicate that the understandings of responsibility, 
immediacy and solvability transpired in a permanent, specific order; nor is such 
specificity logically required. By giving the model a circular shape, this lack of 
interpretive hierarchy may be reflected. The double arrow which leads between the 
various understandings of the shock and the negotiations/politicking which they 
precede thus indicate a shift between the phases of regime change rather than a 
procession fi'om the understanding of immediacy and the next stage of regime change.
Finally, it should be noted that the phase of regime change which encompasses 
the negotiations, politicking and arm-twisting is not elaborated on in the proposed 
model. Such processes have not been ignored in the preceding investigation. Indeed, 
the narrative first chapters of each case study deal specifically with these events and it 
is from them that the conclusions were eventually drawn regarding the interpretations 
of the shock which preceded them. The model, however, seeks to depict the 
circumstances which triggered the negotiations for change. While this cmcial phase 
between the interpretations of a shock and subsequent regime change can hardly be
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excluded from a model which seeks to depict such a process, an elaboration of the 
finer points of such negotiations is unnecessary here.
It remains, finally, to review the conclusions drawn from each of the four case 
studies regarding the occurrence or absence of regime change. These may now be 
placed in the context of the model which has been offered. The utility of the model in 
depicting the process of non-incremental regime change may thereby be assessed.
Before reviewing each of the four shocks in terms of the proposed conditions 
of change, it is helpful to condense the results which the preceding study has already 
revealed in the form of the following chart (figure 2). The brief reappraisal of the 
outcome of each shock will thus expand on this chart:
Regime credibility 
undermined and 
dangerous 
precedent set?
Key regime actor(s) 
accept responsibility 
for leading change to 
the regime?
Need for regime 
change considered 
urgent with no 
other interests 
taking priority?
Can solutions to the 
problems revealed by 
the shock be identified 
or are they believed to 
be identifiable?
India
1974 yes yes yes yes
Osiraq
1981 maybe no no no
Iraq
1991 yes yes yes yes
India &
Pakistan
1998
yes yes maybe no
Figure 2
The 1974 Indian Nuclear Test
The preceding investigation revealed that the years following the Indian 
nuclear test of 1974 consisted of rapid regime change. The creation of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Guidelines significantly tightened conditions of supply and, for the first
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time, placed expectations on supplier states to exercise responsibility with respect to 
their nuclear exports. This new burden of obligation on the nuclear suppliers 
reflected not only a change to the rules and decision-making procedures of the 
nonproliferation regime, but a deeper shift in its established norms. In addition, these 
practical changes reflected a qualification -  primarily by the United States -  of the 
principles of the 1953 Atoms for Peace Plan and the inalienable right of peaceful 
supply. Instead, there arose a recognition that unfettered access to peaceful nuclear 
technology -  including so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosions -  could not occur 
independently of its military applications.
The regime change which took place in the second half of the 1970’s was 
initiated and effected by the United States (with the support of the United Kingdom, 
the USSR, Canada and others). This was preceded by emergent understandings of the 
danger, responsibility, immediacy and solvability of the shock in the context of the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Specifically, each of these four elements of regime 
change in response to a shock were accepted by the United States, which alternately 
cajoled and badgered the unconvinced -  particularly France and West Gennany -  into 
acceding to the changes which were eventually to result.
We saw that the United States, after a period in which the response to the 
Indian test was subdued, began to view the shock as one which jeopardised the 
credibility of the regime and set a dangerous precedent for the future. This 
inteipretation, prompted by academics and advisers, appeared fii'st in the American 
Congress. The frequent expressions of a desire “to legislate and see if we can avoid
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some more Indias” ' and the fear that “we will probably see more of this in the future 
if we are not careftil”  ^attested to such an understanding.
Although India was not a signatory of the NPT and had, in a legal sense, done 
nothing wrong in conducting its nuclear test, it was increasingly believed that the 
regime’s emphasis on the right of access to peacehil nuclear technology -  up to and 
including the right to carry out nuclear test explosions -  could not be allowed to stand. 
This conviction spread to the rest of the American govermnent that the shock revealed 
fundamental shortcomings in the regime. It was feared that other Thiid World 
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil or Pakistan, might follow the same path as India 
if there were no response. Moreover, the expansion of market demand for nuclear 
power reactors and fuel-cycle technology would lead to the proliferation of 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities and hence to nuclear explosive capabilities. 
Such possibilities were made more ominous by concerns that the regime set no 
adequate supply standards.
In due course, France and West Germany overcame then antipathy to 
multilateral supply standards and became convinced of the dangers of trade-led 
proliferation. The Soviet Union, for its part, did not protest against the conclusions 
that were being drawn in the United States. Consequently, the Indian peaceful 
nuclear test was accepted as undermining the credibility of the regime and as 
intimating further problems to come. As such, it satisfied the first suggested 
condition in our model for eventual regime change.
The Indian nuclear test was also shown to have caused deep soul-searching, in 
the United States, over the use of American heavy water in the Indian CIRUS reactor. 
Such concerns again originated in Congress, prompting declarations that “the United
Exports o f Nuclear Materials and Technology, p .24  (speaker: Senator Jackson).
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States does not have a coherent nuclear export policy -  unless it is to promote the 
indiscriminate sale of nuclear facilities abroad.”  ^ Disquiet over the policies of the 
Atoms for Peace plan -  which was identified as having laid the grounds for the Indian 
test -  underscored the growing belief in the need for the United States to lead any 
required changes to the nonproliferation regime. As the Frankenstein’s monster 
metaphors abounded, so did calls in Congress for the United States to take steps not 
only to tighten its own nuclear supply standards, but to convince other supplier states 
to do likewise. As one newspaper editorial put it: “the United States, which initiated 
the nuclear era and has provided dozens of nations with civilian technology, has the 
responsibility now to convince France and Pakistan.”"'
That the US had acknowledged responsibility for taking the international lead 
was proclaimed by the US Congress and then accepted by both the Ford and Carter 
Administrations. They initiated the search for an agreement among nuclear suppliers 
regarding the technologies and information that should and should not be supplied.
The other suppliers, notably France, West Gennany and the Soviet Union, 
were less keen on a formalised restraint on nuclear suppliers. In case of the USSR, 
which had carehilly restricted its own supply of nuclear technology to satellite 
countries, reservations were expressed more for rhetorical effect than out of concern 
that its nuclear trade would be limited. In practice, it was more than willing to 
acquiesce to American leadership. France and West Germany, on the other hand, 
were genuinely hostile to American initiatives although they, too, were eventually 
persuaded to cooperate. The shock of 1974 thus provoked an acceptance, by the key 
agent of regime change, of the need to lead such changes. This coincided with a
 ^ The Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act o f 1977, p. 87 (speaker : Senator John Glenn).
 ^Exports o f  Nuclear Materials and Technology, p.24 (speaker: Senator Adlai Stevenson).
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quiet, if grudging, acceptance of such leadership on the part of other regime actors.
As such, the reaction to the shock revealed the existence of another variable of regime 
change proposed in the model: the understanding of responsibility.
The model also made reference to the importance of the perceived urgency of 
action required if regime change is ultimately to occur. This variable -  the 
understanding of immediacy -  was one which emerged very gradually, with the US 
Congress showing initial concern and the presiding Ford Administration only 
becoming convinced of the urgency of action in 1976.
The immediate aftermath of the Indian test prompted Congressional fears that 
the opportunity to act would recede and that “if there is not action, and soon, the 
problem may become ftresolvable.”  ^ Such fears, however, were not shared by the 
Ford Administration until the announcement of the France/Pakistan and West 
Germany/Brazilian nuclear deals which, it was argued, encouraged the belief in the 
necessity of immediate action and the folly of delay. Following this evidence that the 
fears of further proliferation were coming to pass, the Administration’s decision to 
take the international lead was coupled with action to initiate change as soon as 
possible.
This sense of urgency was not shared by France and West Germany, who 
viewed the declining power of the US in the nuclear market as an opportunity to make 
gains of their own. It was their attempts to capitalise on this opportunity which 
convinced the United States not simply that regime change must take place, but that 
the time for closing the loopholes thiough which India had slipped was dwindling and 
that action could not be postponed. The speed at which the regime change ultimately
The New York Times, 25 February 1976.
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occun'ed -  in contrast to the uneventful years preceding 1974 -  attests to this. The 
perceived need for immediate action again satisfies one of the model’s conditions for 
regime change.
The remaining question regarding the perceived solvability of the shock was 
also present in the case of the Indian test, completing the circle required by the model 
of regime change. The identification of workable solutions occurred very soon after 
the test had taken place.
Blame was placed at the door of the regime and its inadequate supply 
standards. The solution was therefore considered to lie in an international agreement 
on tougher mles regarding nuclear trade. It was the absence of such an agreement that 
opened the loophole through which India had passed. Soon, President Ford was 
referring to his intention “to upgrade the safeguards when powerplants are sold or 
made available.”  ^ There was, moreover, a growing conviction that “the United States 
could not unilaterally prevent the spread of facilities and fuels contributing to a 
weapons capability.”  ^ The French and West German deals not only lent urgency to 
the quest for regime change, but suggested that a lack of international export 
standards was indeed at the heart of the problem and that a multilateral supplier 
agi'eement was the solution. The resulting American pressure on other supplier states 
to agree on common trade rules was intense, demonstrating the American belief that 
the problems revealed by the Indian test had specific, workable solutions.
® From the Congressional Record, 13 March 1975 (speaker: Senator Symington), reprinted in Peaceful 
Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation: A Compendium Prepared by the Committee on 
Government Operations, p.528.
 ^President Gerald Ford, interview with European journalists. May 23"\ 1975 in Public Papers o f  the 
Presidents o f  the United States: Gerald R. Ford, p.717.
’ Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 93.
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The perception therefore took hold in the months after the Indian test that it 
had endangered the regime and demonstrated a need for action; that American 
leadership was required in order for the necessary regime change to occur; that the 
action for change could not be postponed; and that the correct course of action had 
been identified. As the model of this process indicates, it was the acceptance o ï all 
these inteipretations which allowed the substantial regime change to occur.
The 1981 Bombing o f Osiraq
The second shock we considered was the Israeli attack on, and destruction of, 
the Iraqi Osiraq reactor. Despite being a shock to the regime, the bombing of Osiraq 
did not initiate a period of rapid and significant regime change as had the Indian 
‘peaceful’ nuclear test seven years previously. While the reaction to the events of 
June 1981 showed genuine anxiety, this anxiety did not translate itself into regime 
change. Instead, the shock sewed political divisions in the regime, ultimately acting 
more to coiTode relations between the regime’s main supporters than to strengthen or 
unite them.
The shock’s ambiguity was an important part of the problem. This had 
implications for the way in which the danger it posed was regarded by the relevant 
actors -  in this case, the USSR, the United States, France, and the IAEA. The 
occurrence of an attack by a non-NPT state against a non-nuclear NPT signatory 
suspected of cheating on its obligations was plain and stood as a blatant vote of no- 
confidence in the effectiveness of the regime. Israel’s suspicions, however, could 
only remain suspicions. No iiTcfutable evidence of Iraqi deception was uncovered, 
hindering a unified reaction in favour of regime change.
324
In the United States, Congressional concerns about the intentions of the Iraqi 
nuclear programme did raise some fears both about allegedly peaceful programmes 
elsewhere and about the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system and the 
credibility of the wider nonproliferation regime. The Reagan Administration and 
State Department, while concerned about the inevitable damage to the regime’s 
credibility by Israel’s action, signalled that they did not share Congressional concerns 
about IAEA safeguards. Rather, the shock inspired relatively little attention to the 
dangerous precedent of Israel’s counterproliferation strategy or the possibility of non- 
compliance by an NPT state. Instead, the reaction emphasised the naiTowly regional 
context of the Middle East peace process (and the damage that had been done to it) as 
well as the increasing dissent within, and politicisation of, the IAEA General 
Conference over Israel’s membership. President Reagan considered the shock to be, 
primarily, “further evidence that a real peace, a settlement for all of the Mideast 
problems is long overdue.”^
There was evidence, too, that the Soviet Union interpreted the event mainly in 
terms of its danger for the region rather than the regime. France -  the main supplier 
of the Iraqi nuclear programme -  was dismissive of Israel’s claims, asserting instead 
that the regime had been undermined by Israel’s behaviour, rather than by Iraq’s. The 
IAEA’s Department of Safeguards, responding to the widespread criticism fi'om the 
US Congress, indicated that it shared the French point of view. The Board of 
Governors, Director General and Department of Safeguards dismissed the possibility 
of Iraqi deception, claiming instead that no danger existed except insofar as that done 
to IAEA credibility by Israel’s unjustified decision to attack Osiraq and by 
Congressional acceptance of Israel’s allegations of IAEA ineffectiveness.
The President’s News Conference, 16 June 1981, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United
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The implications drawn from the bombing of Osiraq were far fr om uniform 
among the relevant actors. Although there was concern that the regime had been 
undermined and a dangerous precedent set, the ambiguity of the event made it 
impossible to decide whether the main danger arose from Iraqi ambitions and the 
inability of IAEA safeguards to detect such things, or from the possibility of the 
regime being undermined instead by further episodes of Israeli-style 
counterproliferation. Nonetheless, and in spite of the regional emphasis, dangers to 
the regime were considered to have been exposed by the shock. As the model 
indicates, the possibility therefore remained that regime change could eventually 
come about.
None of the remaining three conditions of change, however, were satisfied. 
The understanding of responsibility inspired by the bombing of Osiraq stood in 
marked contrast to the Indian test. In the United States, the IAEA, the USSR and 
France, no acceptance of the responsibility for initiating and leading regime change 
was evident. In Congressional hearings -  despite concerns over the credibility of the 
regime -  the questions the shock had raised over the adequacy of safeguards meant 
that the shock was considered to be the IAEA’s problem. Any lingering 
Congressional desire to resuscitate the kind of American leadership which had 
followed from the Indian test was foiled by the State Department’s and 
Administration’s refusal to consider that the US had any need to initiate regime 
change in this instance. Indeed, the research revealed an impatience with the 
increasingly strident Congressional criticism of the IAEA. The conviction that the 
danger of the shock lay in the damage done to the Middle East peace process, and in 
the misplaced criticism of the IAEA, negated the necessity of change to the regime.
States -  Ronald Reagan, Januaiy i f '  1981 to December 3T', 1981, p. 520.
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As noted earlier, Congressional suggestions that the NSG should be reconvened were
dismissed on the grounds that it would merely
rekindle the resentment and opposition of many developing 
nations...[and that] former NSG members themselves would 
be reluctant to embark on another highly visible, fomial 
attempt to control further theii* exports.^
Responsibility for leading regime change was likewise absent outside the 
United States. The IAEA reacted defensively against any suggestion of flaws in its 
safeguards or inspections procedures. This obviated the need for the Agency to 
initiate changes to a part of the regime which, in its consideration, was already sound. 
The same was true of the USSR, which had joined the increasingly shrill chorus 
within the IAEA General Conference over Israel’s allegedly gioundless accusations 
and its own nuclear programme. France, too, refused to accept publicly that its 
nuclear export standards might be at fault (although its eventual hesitance about 
rebuilding Osiraq and supplying Iraq with HEU belied such public declarations).
Unlike the earlier Indian case, the Osfraq bombing therefore failed to instil, in 
any of the relevant actors, an acceptance of responsibility for leading or even actively 
assisting regime change. In the context of the model, the absence of such an 
understanding negated the possibility of regime change, even had the other conditions 
been favourable.
The other conditions of regime change were, if possible, even less favourable. 
There was no acceptance of the need for immediate action. In spite of the generally- 
held belief that the bombing had damaged the regime and set a dangerous precedent, 
regime change was not considered to be an immediate priority. In the United States, 
particularly, the division between Congress and the Administration over the need for
 ^Official State Department Response to Reconvening of the NSG, in The International Atomic Energy |
Agency: Improving Safeguards, p.219. j
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change was exemplified by the low priority it gave to nonproliferation issues. Rather, 
the Administration’s stated desire to “reestablish this Nation as a predictable and 
reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards” '  ^was 
given priority over the regime. So was the growing competition with the Soviet 
Union in the so-called ‘second’ Cold War of the early 1980’s. In addition, the 
growing utility of Iraq as a regional counterweight to Iran discouraged probing too 
deeply into the Iraqi nuclear programme which was, at any rate, seen as a long-term 
rather than immediate thieat.
This lack of belief in the shock as one which required immediate action 
infused the IAEA, the USSR and Iraq’s supplier, France. Having decided that the 
main problem for the regime arose from Israel’s lack of faith, these actors could see 
no need for immediate action to bring about regime change. Outside the American 
Congress, there is little evidence of a sense of regime change as demanding instant 
attention at the expense of any other concern.
The interpretation placed on the solvability of the problems exposed by the 
Osiraq case was no more conducive to generating regime change. The exploration of 
this shock revealed instead a lack of interest in change among those very parties 
which would, in ten years, be pressing for safeguards reforms and effective responses 
to non-compliance. In the United States, solutions which were identified were 
dismissed as being unworkable. Calls in Congress for the reconvening of the NSG 
were rejected by the State Department, and proposals to reform IAEA safeguards and 
inspections procedures were welcomed by neither the State Department or 
Administration. In addition, the US found itself at the centre of the political storm 
within the IAEA over Israel’s membership, and in the unenviable position of
‘Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” July 16**\ 1981, Public Papers o f  the
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protecting both Israel and the IAEA from each other. As a consequence, a clear 
solution to the problems raised by the shock was not believed to be identifiable.
The same was true of the IAEA, the USSR, and France. These actors 
considered that the problems revealed by the shock did not reflect any failings in the 
regime. This necessarily precluded a need to locate and implement solutions.
As a consequence, disagreements between the United States and the other actors on 
the nature of the problem, as well as divisions within the United States on the 
feasibility of suggested solutions, meant that the incident generated no consensus 
either international or domestically of what should and could be done. Once again, 
the model makes clear that this prevented regime change, even had the other 
necessary conditions been present.
The Iraqi Revelations o f 1991
Ten years after the bombing of Osiraq, the truth about Iraq’s nuclear 
programme finally emerged in the wake of the Gulf War. The earlier prospect of Iraqi 
nuclear proliferation -  although admittedly ambiguous -  had failed to galvanise the 
kind of extensive regime change which had followed in the years after the 1974 
Indian test. When it became clear that Iraq (despite its commitments as a non-nuclear 
NPT signatory) had indeed been diverting its resources towards a nuclear weapons 
programme, the interpretations of the shock were very different to those often years 
earlier, and there emerged a greater unity among the regime actors regarding those 
interpretations. As in the case of the Indian test, those who led the changes did so 
believing that the shock had exposed flaws in the regime which other states might 
exploit.
Presidents o f  the United States -  Ronald Reagan, January 20''', 1981 to December 3P ‘, 1981, p.630.
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It was at this time that “rogue states” were identified as posing a particular the 
danger to the regime’s credibility. In the United States, both Congress and the 
Administration agreed on this point. A Senate hearing devoted to the “lessons” of the 
Iraq experience explicitly stated its intention to “learn from this experience so that we 
can prevent any other nations fr om pursuing the path of Saddam Hussein and posing 
such dire thi eats to others.”’ ’ Other statements on behalf of the Administration 
referred to the “determination to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to regions of instability.” ’^
Likewise, it became clear that states such as France and Germany, who had in 
the past proved so reticent in implementing regime change, shared US interpretations 
of the dangers posed by the shock. The IAEA, after its own internal battle to 
overcome lingering resistance, also accepted that the Iraqi case had revealed defects 
in the safeguards system which required change to avert a repetition. As in the case 
of the 1974 Indian test, the awareness of future dangers, and the damage that had thus 
far been done to the regime, opened the possibility of regime change. The shock was 
therefore able to satisfy our model’s first criterion for regime change.
The understanding of responsibility provoked by the Iraqi shock was not only 
the reverse of that which followed the bombing of Osiraq but was, if anything, even 
more emphatic than that which occurred after the Indian test. Post-1974, there had 
been a delay before the US accepted the need to lead the necessary regime change, 
and before unity was established around this objective. In addition, the US also had 
to work hard to persuade suppliers such as France and Germany to accede to such 
change.
Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from the Iraq Experience, p.2 (Speaker; Senator Pell),
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The Iraqi revelations inspired a much greater and more immediate unity of 
purpose. The American Congress this time focused its criticisms on the Departments 
of Energy and Commerce for having, in the words of the Chairman of one 
subcommittee, “left open an even larger avenue toward the development of the bomb, 
nuclear proliferation. This is unacceptable.” '^  Unlike in Indian case, the presiding 
Administration required no convincing that the United States had to act in a 
multilateral context.
The other relevant regime actors this time both supported initiatives to 
strengthen then regime, and instigated or assisted the implementation of such change 
themselves. The IAEA, like the United States, soon accepted past failures of policy 
and sought to make amends by bringing about the changes deemed necessary. The 
Director-General’s determination to bring about a reform of the INFCIRC/153 
system, and confr ont internal resistance, was indicated by his assertion that the Iraqi 
revelations were a “reminder of the limitations of the present safeguards system.” '"' 
The ensuing changes to the safeguards system attested to the belief within the IAEA’s 
Board of Governors that the safeguards system had to change.
The same was true of those suppliers who had previously resisted the calls for 
new measures. In contrast to their behaviour in the 1970’s, Germany, France and 
other European suppliers became champions of regime innovation, and actively 
involved themselves in bringing it about. Germany, for instance, gave information to 
the IAEA on its export sales, advocated and adopted the new requirements of the
“Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Restrictions on US Satellite Component Exports to 
China,” April 30‘'', 1991 in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: George Bush, Book 1, 
p.446.
Nuclear Nonproliferation, p.2 (Speaker: Congi essman Dingell).
Blix, “IAEA Safeguards: New Challenges,” p.34.
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Warsaw Guidelines, and promoted the NSG’s development. France, too, supported 
the adherence to strengthened export controls.
In terms of the evaluation of the need for immediate action, the 1991 shock 
once again differed drastically from the Osiraq case and moderately from the Indian 
case. The shock of Iraq’s nuclear progi amme was, in the United States, never subject 
to the divisions between Congress and the Administration which had characterized the 
reaction to Osiraq and the initial reaction to the Indian test. Agreement on the need 
for immediate action infused the American government. The Bush Administration’s 
concern with nuclear weapons proliferation was galvanized by the shock, as was the 
belief that the regime’s reinforcement was of the utmost importance to the US, and 
outweighed other, competing interests. A “sense of ui'gency” pervaded consideration 
of the shock and the responses to it. As such, the possibility of regime change 
remained vigorous -  a reality which is represented in the proposed model.
Finally, it came to be believed -  this time as much outside as inside the United 
States -  that practical solutions existed to the problems that had been identified. This 
was not to argue that the specifics of such solutions were instantly obvious, but 
it was believed that workable solutions could be found.
Within the United States, a strong consensus emerged on exactly what could 
be and needed to be done to strengthen the regime. It demonstrated itself in a general 
desire for improved export control, involving the reconvening of the NSG, and an 
agreement on the supply of dual-use technology. These were cited and agi eed upon 
as a means by which to counter some of the ambiguities in the regime. In addition, 
there was consensus on the need for changes to the IAEA safeguards system and for 
greater support -  both financial and diplomatic -  for the Agency.
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In the IAEA, too, the issues needing attention -  the need for access to the UN 
Security Council; access to intelligence; and support for implementing its right to 
special inspections -  were soon identified. The belief that there were workable 
solutions became evident in efforts to reform the safeguards system: the 93+2 
Program. This rapid identification and enactment of solutions also reveal a conviction 
that the implications of the shock could be successfully addressed.
The understanding of solvability which resulted from the Iraqi shock therefore 
differed sharply from the post-Osfraq belief that change was unnecessary and, at any 
rate, solutions could not be identified. It differed especially fr om the reactions to the 
Indian test. While the 1974 shock had been followed by an acceptance of the shock’s 
solvability in the United States (which then found itself with the task of convincing 
the more reluctant states), the disclosures about Iraq’s programme gave rise to a 
relatively painless international consensus. The IAEA and supplier states, as well as 
the United States, all evidenced a belief that solutions could be found and quickly 
identified the solutions as lying in the refonu of export standards and the IAEA’s 
safeguards system. As in the case of the 1974 Indian test, the acceptance of the 
shock’s essential solvability meets the final condition of regime change proposed in 
the model, paving the way for the negotiations and politics which remained.
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests o f 1998
The brief discussion of the most recent shock to the regime -  the 1998 South 
Asian nuclear tests -  revealed the difficulties of achieving regime change. Unlike the 
test of 1974, there was immediate realisation of the event’s gi*ave eonsequences, but 
little confidence that anything could be done about it. Instead, it is clear that this 
shock, like that of the bombing of Osiraq, has not brought regime change. The shock
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of 1981, it will be remembered, failed in terms of the understanding of responsibility, 
immediacy and solvability. By contrast, the tests of 1998 appeared to fail on only one 
count. This, as the model indicates, is enough to end the chances of regime change.
The interpretation of the danger posed by the shock was not the foil for 
eventual regime change. Although the political divisions which existed between 
Russia, the European suppliers and the United States differed from the unity which 
had followed the Gulf War, this was not a consequence of indifference regarding the 
tests. Rather, while general concern existed regarding the implications of the shock 
for the nonproliferation regime, there were sharp differences over how such concerns 
should be addressed. The American emphasis on sanctions this time found little 
support in Europe or Russia.
Even the desfre for sanctions was not uniform in the US. While there was 
evident disquiet in the Administration, Congress remained unconvinced not only as to 
whether sanctions were necessary, but as to whether the nonproliferation regime had 
really been damaged by such events. India and Pakistan, it was repeatedly noted, 
were not rogue states and should therefore not be treated as such. Interest in the 
regime as a whole -  evidence that it was considered to be either necessary or useful -  
was less pronounced in Congress than in earlier times.
Despite the growing cynicism in Congress, the notion that the tests had done 
damage to the regime was generally accepted elsewhere. India was no longer making 
the pretence of a peaceful explosion, and thus the number of self-declared nuclear 
weapons states had increased from five for the fii'st time since the establishment of the 
NPT. That this threatened both the credibility and future of the regime was self- 
evident and generally accepted. In the context of the model, the shock of the tests met
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the first condition for regime change and, at this point anyway, the prospects for 
regime change remained healthy.
Such prospects remained relatively healthy in terms of the understanding of 
responsibility. The United States, which had led the regime change after the first 
‘peaceful’ Indian test, was once again subject to a division between Congress and the 
Administration over what, if anything, should be done. This time, however, it was the 
Administration who sought to establish American leadership, while Congress 
remained unconvinced that the United States needed to initiate change to the regime. 
While representatives of the American government such as Strobe Talbott made 
several efforts to convince India and Pakistan to join the regime in the form of CTBT 
membership, the previous Congressional desire to internationalise the dangers 
revealed by the shock had given way to a far more insular, domestic approach. At the 
centre of this was the momentum which had been gathering for NMD -  a different 
way of dealing with the problem of missile proliferation. The Clinton 
Administration’s clear deshe to lead changes in the international sphere found itself in 
conflict with a decidedly inward-looking Congress. Furthermore, no initiatives for 
regime change emerged from any of the other key regime actors, such as Russia or 
any of the European suppliers.
The question of how to prioritise the shock of the nuclear tests -  the 
understanding of how much of a precedence regime change should be given -  was 
also affected by international divisions on the question of the regime. The benefits to 
be gained fr om the recent opening of the Indian market were considered to have 
outweighed the need to take action. This was tme not only in the case of Russia and 
Europe, but also in parts of the American government. The growing scepticism 
regarding the effectiveness of regimes made it easy for the economic advantages of
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trade with India to take precedence over harsh sanctions and improvements to the 
regime. The same was true with reference Pakistan, and the belief in the need not to 
isolate and thus risk radicalising that state. Despite the Clinton Administration’s 
obvious concern with the threat posed to the regime by the test, there was clear 
reluctance to elevate regime change over good relations with both India and Pakistan. 
The answer -  to the question of whether regime change was considered urgent and of 
greater importance than any other conflicting interest -  was thus far from clear-cut.
In the framework of the model, the most accurate answer is “maybe”, a response 
which nonetheless preserves the opportunity for eventual regime change.
Nonetheless, regime change in the wake of the 1998 South Asian tests has thus 
far failed to occur and, four years on, there appears little likelihood that it will. This is 
due to a belief in the lack of solutions to the problems raised by the shock. While the 
other three conditions of change remained favourable, there was no consensus on the 
way in which to address the problems of the shock and, indeed, no confidence that 
such problems could be successfully addressed.
It was argued that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests accompanied a 
growing conviction that nuclear proliferation was perhaps unavoidable and, if not, 
that the nonproliferation regime was not the best means by which to tackle the 
problem. The increasing hostility in the American Congress to regimes and 
international agieements in general attested to this. So, too, did the Senate rejection 
of the CTBT. It was through this treaty that the Clinton Administration attempted to 
solve the problems of nuclear proliferation and bring India and Pakistan into one part 
of the regime at least (although bringing these states into the regime, obviously, does 
not constitute regime change). With the failure of this approach -  at the hands of the 
American Senate -  no more practical solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation
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were deemed to exist or pursued. Instead, both the Administration and Congiess 
began to believe that a more sensible solution lay in “military options designed to 
counter proliferation once it has occuiTed.” '^  However, this approach (typified by the 
promise of a missile defence system) contradicts the very purpose of a 
nonproliferation regime. The initial belief in the Clinton Administration that the 
problems in South Asia could be solved by Indian and Pakistani adherence to the 
CTBT was effectively ended by the Senate’s rejection of the agreement.
In addition, there was little indication that any other key regime actors 
considered themselves to have found a solution to the problem of South Asian-style 
nuclear proliferation. Sanctions, as a punishment for India and Pakistan and a 
deterrent to others, had been rejected by both Russia and the European suppliers.
Then weary resignation echoed that in the American Congress. As such, the desir e to 
pursue solutions (and the belief in the chances of finding any) was defeated and, as a 
consequence of this, the possibility of regime change was ended. Despite the 
encouraging presence of the three other conditions of change, the belief that the 
problems of the shock were not resolvable negated them. As the proposed model 
illustrates, all that is required to foil the chances of regime change is the absence of 
one of the four conditions cited.
The four cases which have been examined indicated four conditions whose 
presence was required for regime change to proceed. This, in turn, allowed for a 
model to be offered which illustrates the interaction of these four conditions. A brief 
review of the cases in the context of this model has demonstrated how it may be 
employed both to understand shocks which have already occurred as well as
Andréani, “Tlie Disarray o f  US Non-Proliferation P olicy,” p.43.
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providing a basis for speculation on how recent and future nuclear shocks may 
develop in the context of the nonproliferation regime.
Conclusion:
The stated goal of the preceding enquiry was to investigate the assumptions 
regarding change in regime theory (how the nonproliferation regime had developed) 
as well as to investigate the manner of that change (the circumstances underlying this 
development). The medium of this investigation -  the apparent existence of shocks 
which result in non-incremental regime change -  has provided a useful resource by 
which to explore the existence of this phenomenon.
This is not to argue that such an exploration is complete. Questions still 
remain regarding the role of shocks in regime change. It remains unclear as to 
whether or not the manner of change evidenced by the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime is one which is peculiar to that regime, or security regimes in general, or even 
one which may be found elsewhere. It is also possible that there may be different 
‘types’ of shocks, and that one of them -  or a series of them -  may be so powerful that 
they overwhelm the regime in question. Indeed, developments since 1998 have had 
precisely this effect on the nuclear nonproliferation regime, although they are beyond 
the scope of this study. Regardless of these possibilities, the preceding discussion 
allows us to assert with some degree of confidence that this pattern of development in 
the nonproliferation regime calls for an adjustment of the notions of change as they 
cuiTently stand in regime theory. The extent of adjustment may, however, only be 
fully ascertained by a broader comparison of this pattern of change with that in other 
regimes.
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This investigation has drawn conclusions regarding the circumstances of 
regime change based largely upon how the shock in question was understood by the 
relevant regime actors. Such an approach revealed interesting correlations between 
the interpretations of the shock by those actors responsible for bringing about or 
preventing change, and allowed for a model to be suggested which reflected such 
processes. In addition, the conclusions regarding the pattern of the regime’s 
development indicate the need for an adjustment of the widely-accepted definition of 
“regime” itself. Kiasner’s definition, it will be recalled, identified regimes as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, noims, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” '  ^ The 
preceding study, however, posed problems for this definition.
While correctly citing the necessity of principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures in a regime, the definition leaves out the role of organisations.
The investigation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime nonetheless highlighted the 
centrality both of established organisations such as the IAEA and those created after 
the formation of the regime, such as the NSG. More importantly, however, the 
definition’s identification of expectations as converging in a given area seems 
unnecessarily limited in light of the conclusions drawn during the course of the study. 
The development of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and an examination of the 
ways in which the regime has changed, points instead to a different possibility. 
Krasner’s definition implies that such expectations converge once and then remain 
fixed, whereas the case studies indicated that regime change instead reflects the fact 
that actor expectations regarding principles, norms, rales and decision-making 
procedures may converge, diverge and then reconverge. Expectations do not
Krasner, “Structural Causes and R egim e Consequences,” p. 186.
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necessarily solidify at the outset of a new regime, but may part and come together 
again. Indeed, it was suggested in Chapter 1 that such divergence and reconvergence 
must occur if a regime is to remain relevant in a changing international context.'^ The 
extent, type and circumstances of such change may vary from regime to regime, with 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime having served to provide interesting insights into 
this area. Thus, rather than standing as the definitive answer to the questions raised, 
the exploration of the relationship between shocks and regime change leaves many 
potentially fruitful avenues open to further examination.
See Chapter 1 -  “Regime Theory and Conceptions of Regime Change,” p,36.
340
Bibliography
Regime Theory and Changes 
Books
Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics o f Organized 
Textile Trade. (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1985)
Ai'gyi'is, Chris and Schon, Donald. Organization Learning: A Theory o f Action 
Perspective. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley; 1978)
Calleo, David, (ed.) Money and the Coming World Order. (New York: New York 
University Press; 1976)
Garrett, Geoffrey. “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The 
European Community’s Internal Market” in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) 
Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f an Institutional 
Form. (New York: Columbia University Press; 1993)
Gehring, Thomas. Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International 
Environmental Governance. (Frankfrirt am Main: Peter Lang; 1994)
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy o f International Relations. (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1987)
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; 1981)
Haas, Ernst B. When Knowledge is Power: Three Models o f Change in International 
Organizations. (Berkeley, California: University of California; 1990)
Haas, Peter M. “Epistemic Communities and Dynamic of International
Environmental Cooperation” in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theojy 
and International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1993)
Haas, Peter M. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics o f International
Environmental Cooperation. (New York: Columbia University Press; 1990)
Hasenclever, Andreas; Mayer, Peter; and Rittberger, Volker. Theories o f
International Regimes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997)
Holsti, O., Siverson, Robert, and George, A. (eds.) Change in the International 
System. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; 1980)
341
Jônsson, Christer. “Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics” in Volker Rittberger 
(ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1993)
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press;
1984)
Keohane, Robert O. “The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European- 
American Research Programme” in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory 
and International Relations. (Oxford University Press; 1993)
Keohane, Robert O. “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in
International Economic Regimes” in Ole Holsti, Robert Siverson and A. 
George (eds.) Change in the International System. (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press; 1980)
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition. (Boston, Massachusetts: HarperCollins Publishers; 1977)
Kindleberger, Charles P. “Systems of International Economic Organization” in
David Calleo (ed.) Money and the Coming World Order. (New York: New 
York University Press; 1976)
Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depression J929-1939. (London: Allen 
Lane, the Penguin Press; 1973)
Kohler-Koch, Beate. Regime in den internationalen Beziehimgen. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos; 1989)
Krasner, Stephen. “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights” in Volker Rittberger 
(ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1993)
Kiasner, Stephen D. (ed.) International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press;
1983)
Kydd, Andrew and Snidal, Duncan. “Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of 
International Regimes” in Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory and 
International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1993)
Martin, Lisa. “The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism” in John Gerard Ruggie 
(ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis o f an Institutional 
Form. (New York: Columbia University Press; 1993)
Mitrany, David. The Functional Theoiy o f Politics. (London: Martin Robertson and 
Company, Ltd.; 1975)
342
Müller, Harald. “Regimeanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik: Das Bespiel
Nonproliferation” in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed) Regime in der internationalen 
Beziehungen. (Baden-Baden: Nomos; 1989)
Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press; 1986)
Oye, Kenneth A. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and 
Strategies” in Kenneth Oye (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy. (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1986)
Pfetsch, Frank R. (ed.) International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical 
Approaches and Empirical Findings. (Münster: Lit.; 1993)
Rittberger, Volker. “Research on Regimes in Germany” in Volker Rittberger (ed.)
Regime Theory and International Relations. (Oxford University Press; 1993)
Rittberger, Volker. (ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1993)
Ruggie, John Gerard. Multilateralism Matters: The Theoiy and Praxis o f an 
Institutional Form. (New York: Columbia University Press; 1993)
Stein, Arthur A. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” 
in Stephen Krasner (ed.) International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press; 1983)
Young, Oran R. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources 
and the Environment. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1989)
Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko (eds.) Polar Politics: Creating International 
Environmental Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1993)
Zurn, Michael. “Problematic Social Situations and International Institutions: On the 
Use of Game Theory in International Politics” in Frank R. Pfetsch (ed.) 
International Relations and Pan-Europe: Theoretical Approaches and 
Empirical Findings. (Münster: Lit.; 1993)
Articles
Baumgartner, Tom and Burns, Tom. “The Structuring of International Economic
Relations” in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, June 1975, pp. 126-59.
Cowhey, Peter F. and Long, Edward. “Testing Theories of regime change:
hegemonic decline or surplus capacity” in International Organization,
VO 1.37, no.2, Spring 1983, pp. 157-88.
343
Gowas, Joanne. “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An 
Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?” in World Politics, vol.41, no.3, 
pp.307-24.
Grieco, Joseph. “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the
newest liberal institutionalism” in International Organization, vol.42, no.3, 
Summer 1988, pp.485-507.
Grieco, Joseph. “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation:
Comment” in The American Political Science Review, vol.87, no.3, September 
1993, pp.729-35
Grunberg, Isabelle. “Exploring the ‘myth’ of hegemonic stability” in International 
Organization, vol.44, no.4, Autumn 1990, pp.431-77.
Haas, Ernst B. “Is there a Whole in the Hole? Knowledge, Technology and 
Interdependence and the Construction of International Regimes” in 
International Organization, vol.29, no.3, Summer 1975, pp.827-76.
Haas, Peter M. “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediten anean 
pollution control” in International Organization, vol.41, no.3, Summer 1989, 
pp.377-403.
Haas, Peter M. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination” in International Organization, vol.46, no.l. Winter 1992, 
pp. 1-36.
Haas, Peter M. and Adler, Emanuel. “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world 
order, and the creation of a reflective research program” in International 
Organization, vol.46, no.l. Winter 1992, pp.367-90.
Haggard, Stephen and Simmons, Beth A. “Theories of International Regimes” in 
International Organization, vol.41, no.3, Summer 1987, pp.491-517.
Hopkins, Raymond F. “Reform in the international food regime: the role of 
consensual knowledge” in International Organization, vol.46, no.l.
Winter 1992, pp.225-64.
Jervis, Robert. “Security Regimes” in International Organization, vol.36, no.2. 
Spring 1982, pp.357-78.
Junne, Gerd. “Beyond Regime Theory” in Acta Politica, vol.27, 1992, pp.9-28.
Keohane, Robert O. “The demand for international regimes” in International 
Organization, vol.36, no.2, Spring 1982, pp.325-55.
Krasner, Stephen. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier” in World Politics, vol.43, no.3, April 1993, pp.336-66.
344
Ki’asner, Stephen. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade” in World 
Politics, VO 1.28, no.3, April 1976, pp.317-47.
Krasner, Stephen. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as
intervening variables” m International Organization, vol.36, no.2. Spring 
1982, pp. 185-205.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. “Regimes, Interpretation, and the ‘Science’ of Politics: A 
Reappraisal” m Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, vol. 17, no.2, 
1988,pp.263-84.
Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard. “International Organization: A State 
of the Art on an Art of the State” in International Organization, vol.40, no.4, 
Autumn 1986, pp.753-75.
Levy, Marc A., Young, Oran R., and Zurn, Michael. “The Study of International 
Regimes” in The European Journal o f International Relations, vol. 1, no. 3, 
September 1995, pp.267-330.
McKeown, Timothy J. “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19"^  Century Tariff Levels 
in Europe” 'mInternational Organization, vol.37, no.l. Winter 1983, 
pp.73-90.
Mitrany, David. “The Functional Approach to World Organization” in International 
Affairs, vol.24, no.3, July 1948, pp.350-63.
Müller, Harald. “The Internalization of Principles, Nonns and Rules by
Governments: The Case of Security Regimes” in Rittberger (ed.) 1993.
Müller, Harald. “Regime Robustness, Regime Attractivity and A m s Control
Regimes in Europe” in Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 30, no.3, September 
1995, pp.287-97.
Neufeld, Mark. “Interpretation and the ‘science’ of international relations” in Review 
o f International Studies, vol. 19, no.l, 1993, pp.3 9-61.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. “Nuclear learning and US-Soviet security regimes” in
International Organization, vol.41, no.3, Summer 1987, pp.371-402.
Ringius, Lasse. “Envir onmental NGOs and Regime Change: The Case of Ocean 
Dumping of Radioactive Waste” in European Journal o f International 
Relations, vol.3, no.l, March 1997, pp.61-104.
Ruggie, John Gerard. “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and 
Trends” in International Organization, vol.29, no.3, Summer 1975, 
pp.557-83.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “A m s Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness” in Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol.29, no.2, June 1994, pp.115-148.
345
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “New States, Old Regimes, Short Time: A Rejoinder” in 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol.30, no.3, September 1995, pp.299-303.
Smith, Roger K. “Explaining the non-proliferation regime: anomalies for
contemporary international relations theory” in International Organization, 
vol.41, no.2. Spring 1987, pp.253-81.
Snidal, Duncan. “Coordination Versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for 
International Cooperation and Regimes” in The American Political 
Science Review, vol.79, no.4, December 1985, pp.923-42.
Snidal, Duncan. “The limits of hegemonic stability theory” in International 
Organization, vol.39, no.4, Autumn 1985, pp.579-614.
Strange, Susan. ''Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis” in 
International Organization, vol.36, no.2. Spring 1982, pp.479-96.
Strange, Susan. “The persistent myth of lost hegemony” in International 
Organization, vol.41, no.4, Autumn 1988, pp.551-74.
Van Ham, Peter. “The Lack of a Big Bully: Hegemonic Stability Theory and the 
study of regime: anomalies for contemporary international relations theory” 
in International Organization, vol.27, 1992, pp.29-48.
Wendt, Alex. “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power
politics” in International Organization, vol.46, no.2. Spring 1992, pp.391-425.
Young, Oran R. “International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions” in 
World Politics, vol.39, no.l, October 1986, pp. 104-22.
Young, Oran R. “Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of 
institutions in international society” in International Organization, vol.45, 
no.3, Summer 1991, pp.281-308.
Young, Oran R. “The politics of international regime formation: managing natural 
resources and the environment” in International Organization, vol.43, no.3, 
Summer 1989, pp.349-375.
346
The Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, 1974:
Books
Alam, Mohammed B. India’s Nuclear Policy. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications; 
1988)
BaiTé, Bernard. “France’s Approach to Nonproliferation.” in Rodney W. Jones, 
Cesai'e Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat and William C. Potter (eds.) The Nuclear 
Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices. (Lexington: 
Lexington Books; 1985)
Beckman, Robert L. Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control o f 
Peaceful Nuclear Activities. (Boulder and London: Westview Press Inc.;
1985)
Brenner, Michael J. Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The remaking o f US 
policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1981)
Bujon de I’Estang, François. “The Delicate Balance: Government and Industry 
Cooperation in Enforcing Nonproliferation,” in Rodney W. Jones, Cesare 
Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat and William C. Potter (eds.) The Nuclear Suppliers 
and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices. (Lexington: Lexington 
Books; 1985)
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping the Faith: Memoirs o f a President. (New York: Bantam 
Books; 1982)
Dunn, Lewis A. “India, Pakistan, Iran...:A Nuclear Proliferation Chain?” in William 
H. Overholt (ed.) Asia’s Nuclear Future. (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.; 
1977)
Fischer, David. History o f the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty 
years. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Fischer, David. Stopping the Spread o f Nuclear Weapons: The Past and Prospects. 
(London and New York: Routledge; 1992)
Fischer, David. Towards 1995: Prospects for Ending the Proliferation o f Nuclear 
Weapons. (Geneva: UNIDIR; 1993)
Goldblat, Jozef. Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. (London: 
Sage Publications Ltd.; 1996)
Goldschmidt, Bertrand. “From Nuclear Middle Ages to Nuclear Renaissance” in
Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley, and Charles K. Ebinger (eds.) Atoms for  
Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years. (Boulder and London: Westview 
Press, Inc.; 1985)
347
Goldschmidt, Bertrand. Le Complexe Atomique, (Paris: Fayard; 1980)
Goldschmidt, Bertrand and Kratzer, Myron B. Peaceful Nuclear Relations: A Study 
o f the Creation and the Erosion o f Confidence, (New York and London: The 
Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs; 1978)
Hackel, Erwin. “International Nuclear Commerce and Non-Proliferation: A West 
German View” in Rodney W. Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat and 
William C. Potter (eds.) The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: 
International Policy Choices, (Lexington: Lexington Books; 1985)
Jones, Rodney W., Merlini, Cesare, Pilat, Joseph F., and Potter, William C. (eds.) The 
Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books; 1985)
Kapur, Ashok. International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and 
Regional Aspects. (New York: Praeger Publishers; 1977)
Kishyak, Sergey I. “A Soviet Perspective on the Future of Nonproliferation,” in
Rodney W. Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph F. Pilat and William C. Potter (eds.) 
The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books; 1985)
Lellouche, Pierre. “Breaking the Rules Without Quite Stopping the Bomh.” in 
George H. Quester (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. 
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press; 1981)
McGrew, Anthony G. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads” in John 
Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (eds.) The International Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd.; 1984)
Müller, Harald, Fischer, David and Kotter, Wolfgang. Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Global Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1994)
Nacht, Michael. “The Future Unlike the Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American
Security Policy,” in George H. Quester (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking 
the Chain, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press; 1981)
Nye, Joseph S. “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” in George H. Quester (ed.) 
Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. (Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press; 1981)
Overholt, William H., ed. Asia's Nuclear Future, (Colorado: Westview Press Inc.; 
1977)
Perkovich, George. India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; 1999)
348
Pilat, Joseph F., Pendley, Robert E., Ebinger Charles K. (eds.) Atoms fo r  Peace: An 
Analysis After Thirty Years. (Boulder and London: Westview Press; 1985)
Pilat, Joseph F. “The French, Germans, and Japanese and the Future of the
Nuclear Supply Regime,” in Rodney W. Jones, Cesare Merlini, Joseph F.
Pilat and William C. Potter (eds.) The Nuclear Suppliers and 
Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices. (Lexington: Lexington 
Books; 1985)
Poulouse, T.T. Nuclear Proliferation and the Third World. (New Delhi: ABC 
Publishing House; 1982)
Quester, George H. (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. (Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press; 1981)
Quester, George H, “Introduction: In Defense of Some Optimism,” in George H. 
Quester (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. (Wisconsin:
The University of Wisconsin Press; 1981)
Salik, Lt.Col. Naeem Ahmed. Nuclear Policies o f India and Pakistan. (Islamabad: 
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad; 1992)
Scheinman, Lawrence. “Multinational Alternatives and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” in 
George H. Quester (ed.) Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. 
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press; 1981)
Schmidt-Küster, Wolf-J. “German Nuclear Energy Development and International 
Cooperation,” in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley and Charles K. Ebinger 
(eds.) Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years. (Boulder and 
London: Westview Press; 1985)
Simpson, John and McGrew, Anthony G. (eds.) The International Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. (London: The Macmillan 
Press Ltd.; 1984)
Singh, Sampooran. India and the Nuclear Bomb. (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co. 
Ltd.; 1971)
Snyder, Jed C. “The Non-Proliferation Regime: Managing the Impending Crisis,” 
in Neil Joeck (ed.) Strategic Consequences o f Nuclear Proliferation in South 
Asia. (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd.; 1986)
Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Proliferation Today. (New York: Vintage Books;
1984)
Timerbaev, Roland. The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Why and How it was Created. 
PIR Library Series. (Moscow: Center for Policy Studies in Russia; October 
2000)
349
Walker, William and Lonnroth, Mans. Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial
Competition and Proliferation Control. (London: George Allen & Unwin;
1983)
Wilmhurst, M. J. “The Development of Current Non-Proliferation Policies” in
John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (eds.) The International Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. (London: The 
Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1984)
Reports, Journal and Newspaper Articles
“...And On Nuclear Proliferation,” (editorial). The Washington Post (Washington 
D.C.) 28 September 1976.
“Canada Should Immediately Cut Off All Nuclear Aid to India.” The Ottawa Citizen 
(Ottawa) 22 May 1974.
Christian Science Monitor, 21 September 1977.
“8 Nations Meeting on A-Exports.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 19 
June 1975.
“Europeans Turning to Soviet Power.” The New York Times (New York) 4 July
1975.
“Experts Fear India’s A-Blast May Trigger New Rivalries.” The Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.) 19 May 1974.
“Foreign Affahs -  Are US Misgivings Just Sour Grapes?” Die Zeit (27 June
1975 (translated and reprinted in “Nonproliferation Issues” Senate Hearing, 
p.l25.)
“French Consider Nuclear Shift.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 16 
December 1976.
“Giscard Pledges A-Sales Restrictions.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 
21 May 1976.
“How We Gave Away Nuclear Control.” Washington Star (Washington, D.C.) 3 
April 1977.
“Iklé Urges Nuclear Aims Safeguards.” Washington Star (Washington D.C.) 12 
March 1975.
“India’s Nuclear Bomb,” (editorial). The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 21 
May 1974.
350
“India Used Own Materials US Feels.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 21 
May 1974.
“Kissinger Bars US ‘Blackmail on Atomic Fuel’.” The Washington Post (Washington 
D.C.) 3 March 1976.
Le Monde, (Paris) 1 and 2 August, 1976.
Le Monde, (Paris) 10 August 1976.
Le Monde, (Paris) 12 August 1976.
“New Nuclear Threat,” (editorial). The New York Times (New York) 25 February
1976.
“Nuclear Fuel Control Urged by Hill Group.” The Washington Post (Washington 
D.C.) 10 October 1975.
“Role in India Atomic Blast Laid to US.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.)
11 June 1976.
“The Nuclear Export Dilemma,” (editorial). The Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 
19 February 1976.
The Daily Telegraph, (London) 27 July 1971.
The Los Angeles Times, (Los Angeles) 28 May 1977.
The New York Times, (New York) 19 May 1974.
The New York Times, (New York) 20 May 1974.
The New York Times, (New York) 26 May 1974
The New York Times, (New York) 28 September 1976.
The Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.) 7 Febmary 1975.
“US Challenged Over India Blast.” The New York Times (New York) 11 June 1976.
“US Joins in Pact on Atomic Curbs with 6 Countries.” The New York Times (New 
York) 25 Februaiy 1976.
Arms Control and Disarmament Prepared by Reference Division, Central Office 
of Information. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; 1978.
“Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards.” Vienna: IAEA, 1978.
351
Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report o f the Nuclear Energy Policy Study 
Group. Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company; 1977.
“Fresh Fears of a ‘Minor League A-Bomb Race” in US News and World Report, 
vol.76, April-June 1974, pp.45-46.
Strategic Survey 1974. London: Institute of International Security Studies; 1975.
Strategic Suiwey 1976. London: Institute of International Security Studies; 1977.
Strategic Sur\>ey 1977. London: Institute of International Security Studies; 1978.
Baker, Steven J. “Monopoly or Cartel?” in Foreign Policy, no.23, Summer 1976, 
pp.203-218.
Bhargava, G.S. “India’s Nuclear Policy” in India Quarterly, vol.34, no.2, April- 
June 1978, pp. 131-44.
Bloomfield, Lincoln. “Nuclear Spread and World Order” in Foreign Affairs, vol.53, 
110.4, July 1975, pp.743-55.
Bull, Hedley. “Rethinking Non-Proliferation” in International Affairs, vol.51, no.2, 
April 1975, pp. 175-84.
Dougherty, James E. “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia” in Orbis, vol. 19, no.3, Fall
1975,pp.925-57.
Edwardes, Michael. “India, Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons” in International Affairs, 
vol.43, no.4, October 1967, pp.655-63.
Epstein, William. “The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” in Scientific American, 
vol.232, no.4, April 1975, pp. 18-33.
Gall, Norman. “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for all” in Foreign Policy, no.23, Summer
1976, pp. 155-202.
Gilinsky, Victor. “Plutonium, Proliferation and the Price of Reprocessing” in Foreign 
Affairs, vol.57, no.2, Winter 1978/79, pp.374-86.
Gilinsky, Victor. “Plutonium, Proliferation and Policy” in Technology Review, 
vol.79, no.4, February 1977, pp.58-65.
Goldschmidt, Bertrand. “A Historical Survey of Nonproliferation Policies” in 
International Security, vol.2, no.l. Summer 1977, pp.69-87.
Greenwood, Ted, Rathjens, George W., and Ruina, Jack. “Nuclear Power and 
Weapons Proliferation” Adelphi Paper No. 130. London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies; 1977.
352
Johnson-Freese, Joan. “Intei*pretations of the Nonproliferation Treaty” in Journal o f 
International Affairs, vol.37, no.2, Winter 1984, pp.283-93.
Jo scow, Paul L. “The International Nuclear Industry Today” in Foreign Affairs,
VO 1.54, no.4, July 1976, pp.788-803.
Joshi, Ram. “India 1974; Growing Political Crisis” m Asian Survey, vol. 15, no.2, 
February 1975, pp.85-95.
Kaiser, Karl. “Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation in the 1980’s” Nuclear Policy 
in Europe: France, Germany and the International Debate. Aibeitspapiere 
zur Internationalen Politik 12., March 1980.
Kapur, Ashok. “India’s Nuclear Presence” in The World Today, vol.30,
November 1974, pp.459-65.
Lellouche, Pierre. “France in the International Nuclear Energy Controversy: A New 
Policy Under Giscard d’Estaing” in Orbis, vol.22, no.4. Winter 1979, pp.951- 
65.
Long, Clarence E. “Nuclear Proliferation: Can Congiess Act in Time?” in 
International Security, vol. 1, no.4, Spring 1977, pp.52-79.
Neff, Thomas L. and Jacoby, Heni'y D. “Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing 
Nuclear Fuel Market” in Foreign Affairs, vol.57, no.5, Summer 1979, 
pp. 1123-43.
Nye, Joseph. “Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strategy” in Foreign Affairs, vol.56, 
no.3, Winter 1977-1978, pp.601-23.
Nye, Joseph. “Sustaining Non-proliferation in the 1980’s” inSunnval, vol.23, no.3. 
May/June 1981, pp.198-207.
Pastinen, Ilkka. “Nuclear Proliferation and the NPT” in IAEA Bulletin, vol. 19, no.4, 
August 1977, p.24.
Poulouse, T.T. “The Third World Response to Anti-Nuclear Proliferation Strategy” 
in India Quarterly, vol.34, no.2, April-June 1978, pp.145-57.
Quester, George H. “Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?” in Foreign Affairs, vol.53, 
no.l, 1974, pp.77-97.
Quester, George H. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation” in Journal o f International Affairs, 
vol.40, no.l, Summer 1986, pp. 177-88.
Ribicoff, Abraham A. “A Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales 
Problem” in Foreign Affairs, vol.54, no.4, July 1976, pp.763-87.
353
Stevenson, Adlai E. III. “Nuclear Reactors: America Must Act” in Foreign Affairs, 
vol.53, no.l, 1974, pp.64-76.
Subrahmanyam, K. “The Indian Nuclear Explosion and its Impact on Security.” 
in India Quarterly, vol.30, no.4, October-December 1974, pp.254-61.
Symington, Stuart. “The Washington Nuclear Mess” in International Security, vol.l, 
no.3. Winter 1977, pp.71-78.
Walker, William. “India’s Nuclear Labyrinth” in The Non-Proliferation Review, 
vol.4, no.l, Fall 1996, pp.61-77.
Weiss, Leonard. “Nuclear Safeguards: A Congiessional Perspective” in Bulletin 
o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.34, no.3, March 1978, pp.29-32.
Williams, Frederick. “The United States and Non-proliferation” in International 
Security, vol.3, no.2. Fall 1978, pp.45-50.
Wonder, Edward. “Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation: Germany and 
Brazil, 1975” in Orbis, vol.21, no.2, Summer 1977, pp.277-306.
Congressional Hearings, Unpublished Papers, and Miscellaneous Other Sources
“An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community?” Statement by 
Secretary of State Kissinger to the United Nations General Assembly [Ex 
Extracts]. 23 \91 A in Documents on Disarmament, 1974.
“Atomic Power for Peace.” Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the
United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 
8% 1953. Reprinted in Pilat, Pendley and Ebinger (eds.) 1985.
“Congress and Nuclear Safeguards.” Prepared for the Workshop on Plutonium, 
Safeguards, and the Breeder Session on Safeguards and the Public of the 
Atomic Industrial Forum, by Warren Donnelly in “Peaceful Nucleai'
Exports and Weapons Proliferation.”
Congressional Record. 13 March 1975. Remarks by Senator Symington, in “Peaceful 
Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation.”
Documents on Disarmament, 1974. Washington, D.C.: US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
Documents on Disarmament, 1975. Washington, D.C.: US Aims Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
Documents on Disarmament, 1976. Washington, D.C.: US Aims Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
354
Exports o f Nuclear Materials and Technology. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Finance of Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, United States, Congiess, Senate, Ninety-third Congress, second 
session (On Export Policy, Control, and Credits with particular attention 
to exports of nuclear technology and nuclear materials), July 12 & 15, 1974.
“Guidelines for nuclear transfers, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.” Reprinted in
Michael Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, Appendix I. pp.296- 
299.
“Highlights of Statement by Dhector General Sigvard Eklund to General Conference 
of IAEA in Vienna.” Press Release IAEA/844. 17 September 1974 in 
“Peaceftil Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation.”
“Internal Paper of the US Mission to NATO” 5 June 1974, para. 2.D, reprinted in 
Appendix Q of Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict
“Interview of French President Giscard d’Estaing at the National Press Cluh: Nuclear 
Export Policy [Extract].” 20 May 1976 mDocuments on Disarmament, 1976.
“Interview with European Journalists.” 23 May 1975 'm Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f the United States: Gerald R. Ford. Book I.
Nonproliferation Issues. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first 
and second sessions on nonproliferation issues, March 19, April 16 & 28,
July 18 & 22, October 21 & 24 1975; February 23 & 24, March 15,
September 22, and November 8, 1976.
“Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Statement on Signing H.R. 8638 Into Law.” 
10 March 1978 in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Jimmy 
Carter. Book II.
“Nuclear Policy Statement by Gerald R. Ford,” 28 October 1976 in Public Papers o f  
the Presidents o f the United States: Gerald R. Ford. Book I.
Nuclear Proliferation: The Situation in Paldstan and India. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, of 
the Committee on Govermnental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth 
Congi'ess, first session. May 1, 1979.
Nuclear Proliferation: Future US Foreign Policy Implications. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety- 
fourth Congress, first session, October 21, 23 28, 30; November 4 & 5,
1975.
356
“Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger to the United Nations General Assembly 
[Extracts].” 22 September 1975 'm Documents on Disarmament, 1975.
“Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.” 17 July 1975 in 
Documents on Disarmament, 1975.
“Statement by the United States Representative to the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament: Indian Nuclear Explosion.” 21 Msiy \91 A'm Documents 
on Disarmament, 1974.
“Televised Interview of French Minister of Foreign Affairs de Guiiingaud: Nuclear 
Export Policy.” 16 December 1976 in Documents on Disarmament, 1976.
The Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Act o f1977. Hearings and Markup before the 
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives and its 
Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and 
International Economic Policy and Trade. Ninety-fourth Congress, first 
session, April 4; May 19, 26; July 27, 29; August 1 and 2, 1977.
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)” in 
Jozef Goldblat Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements.
Williams, Shelton L. “The US, India and the Bomh.” Studies in International
Affairs, No. 12 (The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of 
Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University), Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.
357
The Bombing of Osiraq, 1981: 
Books
Beckman, Robert L. Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control o f
Peaceful Nuclear Activities. (Boulder and London: Westview Press, Inc.;
1985)
Evron, Y air. Israel's Nuclear Dilemma. (London: Routledge; 1994)
Fischer, David. History o f the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first 
forty years. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Fischer, David, Stopping the Spread o f Nuclear Weapons. (London and New York: 
Routledge; 1992)
Fischer, David and Szasz, Paul. Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal. 
(London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis; 1985)
International Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reflections. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Imber, Mark F. The UN, UNESCO, ILO and IAEA: Politicization and Withdrawal in 
the Specialized Agencies. (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1989)
Kennedy, Richard T. “The Period 1980-1993,” in International Atomic Energy 
Agency: Personal Reflections. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997).
Kincade, William H. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980's: Perspectives and
Proposals, (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1982)
Kirk, Roger, “The Suspension of US Participation in the IAEA: 1982-1983,” in 
International Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reflections. (Vienna:
IAEA; 1997)
McGrew, Anthony G. “Introduction: Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads?” 
in John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew (eds.) The International Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd.; 1984)
Müller, Harald; Fischer, David and Kotter, Wolfgang. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Global Order. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1994)
Nakdimon, Shlomo. First Strike. (New York: Summit Books; 1987)
Pajak, Roger F. Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications for the 
Superpowers. National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-1,
(Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press; 1982)
358
Perlmutter, Amos, Handel Michael, and Bar-Joseph, Uri. Two Minutes Over 
Baghdad. (London: Corgi Books; 1982)
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life. (London: Hutchison; 1990)
Shaker, Mohammed Ibrahim. “The legacy of the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
treaty Review Conference: the president’s reflections,” in John Simpson (ed). 
Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Agenda for the 1990’s. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1987)
Simpson, John (ed.) Nuclear Nonproliferation: An Agenda for the 1990’s, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987)
Simpson, John and McGrew, Anthony G. (eds.) The International Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices. (London: The Macmillan 
Press Ltd.; 1984)
Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Proliferation Today. (New York: Vintage Books;
1984)
Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. (London: 
Fourth Estate; 1992)
Winkler, Theodor, “Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980’s” in William H. Kincade (ed.) 
Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980’s: Perspectives and Proposals. (London 
and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 1982)
Reports, Journal and Newspaper Articles
“US, Perturbed with IAEA Politics, Examines Role in Agency” in Nucleonics Week, 
vol.22, no.44, 4 November 1981, p.3
“Despite Raid, Iraq Vows to Press Nuclear Program.” The Washington Post, 
(Washington, D.C.) 11 June 1981.
“Iraq is Improving Links to Both US and Soviet Union.” The New York Times, 
(New York) 29 March 1984.
“Iraqis, at Least Temporarily, Turn a Kind Eye to the West.” The New York Times, 
(New York) 22 November 1982.
“Israel, Air Strike Threatens Habib Mission.” The Washington Post, (Washington, 
D.C.) 11 June 1981.
“Israeli Planes Bomb Major Iraqi Nuclear Facility.” The Washington Post, 
(Washington, D.C.) 9 June 1981.
359
“Reagan to End Boycott of Nuclear Agency.” The New York Times, (New York)
23 February 1983.
“That Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: the fact -  and deeper issues.” Christian 
Science Monitor, 24 June 1981.
“US Restores Fuel Ties With Iraq, But Cites Neutrality in Gulf War.” The New York 
Times, (New York) 27 November 1984.
“US Walks Out as Atom Parley Bars the Israelis.” The New York Times, (New York) 
25 September 1982.
Le Monde, 9 June 1981.
Le Monde, 10 June 1981.
Le Monde, 12 June 1981.
The Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1981.
The Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1981.
The Daily Telegraph, 15 January 1982.
The New York Times, 25 October 1982.
The New York Times, 29 March 1984.
The Observer, 12 June 1981.
The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 1981.
“After the Israeli Shocker,” in US News and World Report, June 22"  ^ 1981, p.67.
“An Expert’s Size-up of the Impact of the Israeli Raid,” in US News and World 
Report, June 22"*^ , 1981, p.68.
Betts, Richard. “Nuclear Proliferation after Osirak,” in Arms Control Today, vol. 11, 
no,7, September 1981, pp. 1-2,7-8.
D’Amato, Anthony. “Israel’s Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,” m The 
American Journal o f International Law, vol.77, 1983, pp.584-88.
Feldman, Shai. “A Nuclear Middle East,” in Survival, vol.23, no.3, May/June 1981, 
pp.107-15.
Feldman, Shai. “The Bombing of Osiraq -  Revisited,” in International Security,
VO 1.7, no.2, Fall 1982, pp. 114-42.
360
Grinevsky, Oleg. “The Atomic Bomb and the Middle Bast,” (Ojier Fph h c b c k h h .
AmoMHH ôoMÔa v  ÔJiuJicmni g o c m o k ) ,  at http://world.ng.ru/azimuth/2001-06- 
01/ 6_bomb.html.
Gruemm, H. IAEA Bulletin Supplement 1982. p.40.
Gruemm, H. “Safeguards and Tamuz: setting the record straight,” in International 
Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.23, no.4, December 1981, pp. 10-14.
Gruemm, H. “Safeguards Verification -  its credibility and the diversion hypothesis,” 
m International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.25, no.4, December 1983, 
pp.27-30.
HeiTon L.W. “A lawyer’s view of safeguards and nonproliferation,” m International 
Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.24, no.3, September 1982, pp.37-39.
Herzig, Christopher. “Correspondence: IAEA Safeguards,” in International Security, 
vol.7, no.4. Spring 1983, pp. 195-99.
Jabber, Paul. “A Nuclear Middle East: Infrastructure, Likely Military
Postures and Prospects for Strategic Stability,” in ACIS Working Paper No.
6, Center for Arms Control and International Security at University of 
California, L.A.; September 1977.
Keeley, Tim. “Angry French Contend Osirak Couldn’t Have Served Weapons 
Purpose” m Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.24, 18 June 1981, p.3.
Lovins, A.B. “Iraq’s nuclear intentions,” in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.42, 
no.8,October 1986, pp.55-56.
Lanfer, Rob. “IAEA’s Role Seen as Undiminished Despite Israeli Action,” in 
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.23, 11 June 1981, p. 1-2.
MacLachlan, Ann. “US Delegation Attends IAEA Boaid Meeting After Last-Minute 
Wrangling,” m Nucleonics Week, vol.24, no.8, 24 February 1983, p.l.
Marshall, Eliot. “Fallout from the Raid on Iraq,” in Science, vol.213, 3 July 1981, 
pp.l 16-17,120.
Nucleonics Week, vol.22, no.30, 30 July 1981, p.3.
Nydell, Matt S. “Tensions Between International Law and Strategic Security: 
Implications of Israel’s Preemptive Raid on Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor”, in 
Virginia Journal o f International Law, vol.24, no2, pp.459-92.
“Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue” in International Atomic Energy 
Agency Must Continue, vol.23, no.3, September 1981, pp.4-7.
Perlmutter, Amos. “The Israeli Raid on Iraq: A New Proliferation Landscape,” in 
Strategic Review, Winter 1982, pp.34-43.
361
Pogany, Istvan. “The destruction of Osirak: a legal perspective,” in The World 
Today, vol.37, no .ll, November 1981, pp.413-18.
Power, Paul F. “The Baghdad Raid: retrospect and prospect,” in Third World 
Quarterly, vol.8, no.3, July 1986, pp.845-68.
Ramberg, Bennett. “Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implications of Israel’s 
Strike on Osiraq,” in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 97, no.4, Winter 
1982-93, pp.653-69.
Snyder, Jed C. “The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb”, in Middle 
East Journal, Autumn 1983, pp.579-81.
Wilson, Richard. “A visit to bombed reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq,” in Nature, vol.302, 
31 March 1983, pp.373-78.
“Non-Proliferation” in Strategic Survey 1980-1981, (London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies; 1981.
“Non-Proliferation” in Strategic Sur\fey 1981-1982, (London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies; 1982.
Congressional Hearings, Unpublished Papers, and Miscellaneous Other Sources
“Administration Comments on the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility, June 25^ *\ 1981,” reprinted in Documents 
on Disarmament 1981, p.245.
Congress and Foreign Policy -  1981. Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of 
Representatives; 1982.
Congressional Record -  Senate. Tuesday, 16 June 1981. Proceeding and Debates of 
the 97‘*’ Congress, first session, p. 12448.
Documents on Disarmament, 1981. Washington, D.C.: US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency; 1982.
Documents on Disarmament, 1982. Washington, D.C.: US Aims Control and 
Disarmament Agency; 1983.
Donnelly, Warren. “The Israeli Raid Into Iraq,” report by the Congressional Research 
Service, reprinted in The Israeli Air Strike, p.72.
“Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT (NPT / CONF. Ill/64/1 
21 September 1985),” reprinted in UNBlueBooh Series Volume III. 1995.
362
Government of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Commission, 
The Iraqi Nuclear Threat — Why Israel Had to Act, Jerusalem; 1981.
IAEA Programs o f Safeguards. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, 
December 2"^ , 1981.
Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities. Hearings before the Subcommittees on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs on Europe and the Middle East 
and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congi'ess, first session,
June 17 and 25, 1981.
Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, prepared for the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and 
Trade of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives and 
the Subcommittee on Energy, nuclear proliferation and federal processes of 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate by the Envii'onmental and 
on Natural Resources policy division, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, August 1985.
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald Reagan. Containing the 
Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. Book I, 1981. 
January 20^  ^to December 3U\ 1981. Washington, D.C.: US GPO; 1982.
“Statement by the Department of State: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility,”
June 8^, 1981, Department of State Bulletin, August 1981, reprinted in 
Documents on Disarmament 1981.
“Statement by the US Permanent Representative (Kennedy) to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency: US Nuclear Energy Policy, March 22, 1982,” 
reprinted 'm Documents on Disarmament, pp. 159-61.
“Statement by US Permanent Representative (Kirkpatrick) to the UN General 
Assembly: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, June 19‘'\ 1981,” 
reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1981, p.228-30.
“Statement by US Representative Kenneth Davis to the General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency: Resolution Condemning Israel for 
Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, September 26^  ^ 1981,” reprinted in 
Documents on Disarmament 1981, p.254.
“Statement on Behalf of a Group of Socialist States by the GDR Representative
(Herder) to the Committee on Disarmament: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear 
Facility [Extract], June 18‘'\ 1981,” reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 
yp&A p.227.
“Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, July 16^\ 1981”
reprinted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Ronald 
Reagan. Book I. p.630.
363
“Statement submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Group 21: Israeli
Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, June 17^\ 1981,” reprinted in Documents on 
Disarmament, 1981, p.222-223.
“Text of resolution adopted by the IAEA General Conference on 26 September
1981,” reprinted in International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.23, no.4, 
December 1981, p.45.
“Text of resolution adopted by IAEA Board of Governors,” reprinted in International 
Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.23, no.3, September 1981, p.7.
“Text of resolution adopted by Security Council of the United Nations,” reprinted in 
International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.23, no.3, September 1981, 
p.7.
The International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific 
Affairs and in International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second 
session, March 3 and 18, 1982.
The Israeli Air Strike. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, fnst session, on The Israeli Aii* Strike 
and Related Issues, June 18, 19, and 25, 1981.
“The President’s News Conference, 16 June 1981,” reprinted in The Public Papers 
o f the Presidents o f the United States -  Ronald Reagan. Book I. p.520.
UN Blue B ooh Series Volume III: The United Nations and Nuclear Non­
proliferation. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information; 
199i
364
The Iraqi RevelationSy 1991: 
Books
Albright, David; Berkhout, Frans and Walker, William. Plutonium and Highly 
Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1997)
Attali, Jacques. Économie de I ’apocalypse: trafic et proliferation nucléaires. (Paris: 
Fayard; 1995)
Ekéus, Rolf. “The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq” in SIPRI Yearbook 
1992: World Armaments and Disarmaments. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 1992)
Fischer, David. History o f the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty 
years. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Fischer, David. Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation o f 
Nuclear Weapons. (Geneva: UNIDIR; 1993)
Freedman, Lawrence. “The ‘Proliferation Problem’ and the New World Order” in 
Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias and Philip Sabin (eds.) Non-Conventional 
Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread o f Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Capabilities. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993)
Goldblat, Jozef. Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreement. (London: 
Sage Publications; 1994)
Howlett, DaiTyl. “United Kingdom” in Harald Müller (ed.) European Non- 
Proliferation Policy 1988-1992. (Bmssels: European Interuniversity 
Press; 1993)
International Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reflections. (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Karsh, Efraim; Navias, Martin S., and Sabin, Philip (eds.). Non-Conventional
Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread o f Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Capabilities. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993)
Kelle, Alexander. “Germany” in Harald Müller (ed.) European Non-Proliferation 
Policy 1988-1992. (Bmssels: European Interuniversity Press; 1993)
Kennedy, Richard. “The Period 1980-1993” in International Atomic Energy Agency: 
Personal Reflections; {Nierma: IAEA; 1997)
Kokolski, Richard. Technology and the Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1995)
365
Müller, Harald (ed.) European Non-Proliferation Policy 1988-1992. (Brussels: 
European Intemniversity Press; 1993)
Müller, Harald. “The nuclear non-proliferation regime beyond the Persian Gulf 
War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union” in SIPRI Yearbook 1992:
World Armaments and Disarmaments, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
1992)
Müller, Harald. “Western Europe and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1987-1992: A
summary” in Harald Müller (ed.) European Non-Proliferation Policy 1988- 
1992. (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press; 1993)
Müller, Harald. Fischer, David and Kotter, Wolfgang. Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Global Order. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1994)
Richard, Phillipe. “France” in Harald Müller (ed.) European Non-Proliferation 
Policy 1988-1992. (Bmssels: European Intemniversity Press; 1993)
Poole, J.B. and Guthrie, R. (eds.) Verification 1993: Peacekeeping, Arms Control 
and the Environment. (London: Brassey’s; 1993)
Simpson, John. “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 1992” in J.B. Poole and 
R. Guthrie (eds.) Verification 1993: Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the 
Environment. (London: Brassey’s; 1993).
Simpson, John. “The nuclear non-proliferation regime after the NPT Review and 
Extension Conference” in SIPRI Yearbook 1996: World Armaments and 
Disarmaments. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1996)
SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmaments. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1992)
SIPRI Yearbook 1996: World Armaments and Disarmaments. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; 1996)
Spector, Leonard S. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: The Next Chapter 
Begins” in Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East in 
Efi-aim Karsh, Martin S. Navias and Philip Sabin (eds.) Non-Conventional 
Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread o f Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Capabilities. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1993)
Wilson, Michael. “Safeguards and the IAEA Board of Governors: 1991-1993. Iraq, 
a Necessary Stimulus for Handling the DPRK” in International Atomic Energy 
Agency: Personal Reflections (Vienna: IAEA; 1997)
Reports, Journal and Newspaper Articles
“Crimes of Iraqgate.” The New York Times (New York), 18 May 1992.
366
“UN Aides Say Iraq May Be Concealing Nuclear Material.” The New York Times 
(New York), 15 June 1991.
“US is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program.” The New York Times 
(New York), 27 September 1991.
“US Tolerated Iraqi Fronts.” The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 11 August 
1992.
“Warning on Iraq and Bomb Bid Silenced in ’89.” The New York Times (New York), 
20 April 1992.
The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 1991
The Independent, 21 March 1992.
The International Herald Tribune, 18 October 1991.
The International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1992.
The Times, 17 July 1991.
The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 1991.
Albright, David. “A Proliferation Primer” in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol. 49, 
no.5, July 1993, pp. 14-23.
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark. “Iraq and the bomb: were they even close?” in 
Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.47, no.2, March 1991, pp. 16-25
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark. “Iraq’s bomb: blueprints and artifacts” in Bulletin 
o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.48, no.l, January/February 1992, pp. 3 0-3 9
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mai'k. “Iraq’s nuclear hide-and-seek” in Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists, vol.47, no.7, September 1991, pp. 14-23.
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark. “Iraq’s shop-til-you-drop nuclear program” in 
Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.48, no.3, April 1992, pp.26-35
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark. “Overestimating Iraq” in Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.47, no.8, October 1991, pp.7-9.
Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark. “Supplier Spotting (German fem supplied Iraq 
with nuclear components” m Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.49, no.l, 
January-February 1993, pp.8-9.
367
Albright, David and Kelley, Robert. “Has Iraq come clean at last?” in Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists, vol.51, no.6, November/December 1995, pp.53-60
“Ai'ins Control and Verification: Safeguards in a Changing World” report in 
International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, 40^ '’ Anniversary Special 
Issue, vol.39, no.3, 1997
Blix, Hans. “IAEA Safeguards: New Challenges” m Disarmament, vol. 15, no.2, 
1992, pp.33-46.
Blix, Hans. “Verification of Nonproliferation: The Lesson of Iraq” in The 
Quarterly, vol. 15, no.4. Fall 1992, pp.57-65.
Cambone, Stephen A. and Garrity, Patrick J. “The Future of US Nuclear Policy” in 
Survival, vol.36, no.4. Winter 1994-95, pp.73-95.
Cohen, Avner and Miller, Marvin. “Iraq and the rules of the nuclear game” in
Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.47, no.6, July/August 1991, pp. 10-11,
43.
Carlson, John; Bragin, Victor; Bardsley, John; and Hill, John. “Nuclear Safeguards as 
an Evolutionary System” in The Non-Proliferation Review, vol.7, no.2. Winter 
1999, pp. 109-17.
Chauvistré, Eric. “Germany and Proliferation: the Nuclear Export Policy.” 
Arbeitspapiere der Berghof-Stiftung fur Konfliktforschung, nr. 43.
Berlin: Berghof Stifung fur Konfliktforschung; 1991.
Chauvistré, Eric. “The Future of Nuclear Inspections” in Arms Control Today, 
vol. 14, no.2, August 1993, pp.23-64
Chauvistré, Eric. “The Implications of IAEA Inspections Under Security Council 
Resolution 687.” UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research) Research Paper no.l 1, New York: United Nations; 1992.
Deutch, John M. “The New Nuclear Threat” in Foreign Affairs, vol.71, no.4, Fall 
1992, pp. 120-34.
Dunn, Lewis A. “Containing Nuclear Proliferation.” Adelphi Paper 263. London: 
Institute nal Institute for Strategic Studies; 1991.
Fischer, David. “Nuclear non-proliferation: the prospects for the non-proliferation
regime after the Gulf Wai,” in Energy Policy, vol.20, no.7, July 1992, pp.672- 
82.
Gafftiey, Frank J. Jr., “The IAEA’s Dirty Little Secret,” m The International 
Economy, vol.8, no.5, September-October 1995, pp.52-55.
Gallucci, Robert L. “Non-Proliferation and National Security” in Arms Control 
Today, vol. 15, no.l, April 1991, pp. 13-16.
368
Hamza, Khidii*. “Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Program” in Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.54, no.5, September/October 1999, pp.26-36.
Hibbs, Mark. “Iraqi Nuclear Threat Warnings Called Unrealistic War Rationale” in 
Nucleonics Week, 29 November 1990, p.7.
Hooper, Richard. “Strengthening IAEA Safeguards in an Era of Nuclear
Cooperation” mArms Control Today, vol.25, no.9, November 1995, pp. 14-18.
Jennekens, J., Parsick, R., and von Baeckmami, A. “Strengthening the international 
safeguards system” in International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.34, 
no.l, 1992, pp.6-10.
Kay, David. “Denial and Deception: Iraq and Beyond.” (Working Group on 
Intelligence Reform Papers). Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the 
Study of Intelligence; 1994.
Leventhal, Paul L. “Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bother?” 
in Orbis, vol.36, no.2, Spring 1992, pp. 167-80.
Müller, Harald. “After the Scandals: West Gennan Nonproliferation Policy” PRIF 
Reports no.9, Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
(Hessische Stiftung Friedens-Und Konflikt-Forschung); February 1990.
Pellaud, Bruno. “Safeguards in transition: status, challenges, and opportunities” in 
International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.36, no.3, 1994, pp.2-5.
Scheinman, Lawrence. “The Non-Proliferation Treaty: On the Road to 1995” in 
International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.34, no.l, 1992, pp.37-39.
Schriefer, Dirk. “New safeguards measures: initial implementation and experience” 
in International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.38, no.4, 1996, pp.7-10.
Seneviratne, Gamini. “IAEA Inspectors Focus on Iraqi Centrifuge Program” in 
Nucleonics Week, vol.32, no.31, 1 August 1991, pp.9-10.
Simpson, John and Howlett, Danyl. “Nuclear nonproliferation: the way forward” in 
Survival, vol.33, no.6, November-December 1991, pp.483-99.
Simpson, John and Howlett, Darryl. “The 1990 NPT Review Conference” in 
Survival, vol.32, no.4, July/August 1990, pp.349-60.
Spector, Leonard S. “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East” in Orbis, vol.36, no.2. 
Spring 1992, pp. 181-98,
Strulak, Tadeusz. “The Nuclear Suppliers Group” in The Non-Proliferation Review, 
vol.l, no.l, Fall 1993, pp.2-10.
369
Tucker, Johnathan B. “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative
Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience” in The Nonproliferation 
Review, vol3, no.3, Spring-Summer 1996, pp. 1-13.
Venter, A1 J. “How Saddam Almost Built His Bomb” in Middle East Policy, vol. 6, 
no.3, Febmary 1999, pp.45-61.
Warnke, Paul C. “Strategic Nuclear Policy and Non-Proliferation” mArms Control 
Today, vol.24, no.4. May 1994, pp.3-5.
Congressional Hearings, Government Publications, and Miscellaneous Other
Sources
“Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf’
January 16^ *' 1991, reprinted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United 
States: George Bush, Book I., p.53.
Disarmament: New Realities: Disarmament, Peace-building and Global Security 
[Excerpts from the panel discussion organized by the NGO Committee on 
Disarmament, at a conference held at the United Nations in New York], 20- 
23 April 1993.
Guidelines for Transfers o f Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and
Related Technology (Warsaw Guidelines) 3 April 1992, reprinted in Goldblat; 
1994, pp.666-68.
IAEA Press Release PR 92/37, 21 October 1992.
“International Newsbriefs” in International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.36, 
no.l, 1994, p.46.
“International Newsbriefs” in International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol.39, 
no.2, June 1997, p.38.
“International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-proliferation” 
(coordinated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group), Vienna: IAEA; 1997.
Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and IAEA Inspections in Iraq. Joint hearing 
before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International 
Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred and thfrd Congress, 
first session, June 29, 1993.
“Letter to Congressional Leaders on Nuclear Cooperation with EURATOM,” March 
8*, 1991 in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George 
Bush, Book I, p.231.
370
“Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United
Nations Secuiity Council Resolutions,” January 14‘*\ 1992, in Public Papers 
o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, Book I, p.463.
“London Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” July 16^  ^ 1991, 
reprinted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George 
Bush, Book I, pp. 890-93.
“Message of the Secretary-General to the General Conference of the IAEA in
Vienna” [UN Press Release SG/SM/5113] 27 September 1993, reprinted 
in United Nations Blue Booh Series; 1995.
“Munich Economic Summit, Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership,”
July 7*’\  1992 in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George 
Bush, (1992-1993), Book I, p. 1087.
“Ninth IAEA Inspection Team Verifies Iraqi Stockpile of Centrifuge Parts and 
Materials,” IAEA Press Release PR 92/4, 17 January 1992.
“Non-proliferation: a strategic priority.” Secretary of State Warren Chiistopher 
speech [transcript]. US Department o f State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 14, April 
4"’ 1994, pp. 183-4.
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges facing the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, US Senate, September 1993.
Nuclear Nonproliferation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred and thiid Congress, first session, concerning 
failed efforts to curtail Iraq’s nucleai' weapons program, April 24, 1991.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Uncertainties with Implementing IAEA ’s Strengthened 
Safeguards System. Report to the Chairman, Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives, July 1998.
Nuclear Proliferation: Learning from the Iraq Experience. Hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred and 
Second Congress, first session, October 17 and 23, 1991.
“Nuclear situation in Iraq.” Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Robert 
L. Gallucci, statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee. US 
Department o f State Dispatch, vol.4, no.27, July 5‘^  1993, pp.483-4.
Proliferation Threats in the 1990’s. Hearing before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred and Third 
Congress, first session, February 24, 1993.
371
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush. Containing the 
Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. January to 
December 3 1991. Washington, D.C.; US GPO; 1992
“Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Restrictions of US Satellite Component 
Exports to China,” April 30^\ 1991, reprinted in Public Papers o f the 
Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, Book I, p.446.
“Statement to the 36‘*’ Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency,” 21®‘ September 1992 (Dr. Hans Blix, Director General), 
International Atomic Energy Agency, pamphlet C l9, Vienna: IAEA; 1992.
“Statement to the 47*^*’ Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency,” 21 October 1992 (Dr. Hans Blix, Dkector General), 
International Atomic Energy Agency pamphlet C l9, Vienna: IAEA; 1992.
The IAEA’s Safeguards System: Ready for the 2P‘ Century. Published by the IAEA 
Department of Safeguards and the Division of Public Information, Vienna: 
IAEA; 1998.
The Evolution o f IAEA Safeguards. International Nuclear Verification Series no.2, 
Vienna: IAEA, 1998.
UN Blue Booh Series, Volume III: The United Nations and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation. New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information; 
1995.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Annual Report to Congress, 
1991. Washington, D.C. : US ACDA; 1991.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Annual Report to Congress, 
7992 Washington, D.C.: US ACDA; 1992.
UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991.
UN Security Council Resolution 707, 15 August 1991.
UN Security Council Resolution 715, 11 October 1991.
“White House Statement on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 7^ '' 1991,
reprinted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George 
Bush, Book I, pp.223-24.
372
The South Asian Nuclear Tests, 1998:
Books
Ahmed, Samina and Cortwright, David (eds.). Pakistan and the Bomb: Public
Opinion and Nuclear Options. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press; 1998)
Aimett, Eric. “Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan” in SIPRI 1999: Armaments, 
Disarmaments, and International Security. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 1999)
Ayoob, Mohammed. “India’s Nuclear Decision: Implications for Indian-US
Relations” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta (eds.) India’s Nuclear 
Security. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; 2000)
Beach, Hugh. “The Expansion of NATO” in Frank Blackaby and Tom Milne (eds.)
A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World. (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.; 
2000)
Bidwai, Praful and Vanaik, Achin. New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global 
Disarmament. (Oxford: Signal Books; 1998)
Blackaby, Frank and Milne, Tom (eds.). A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World. (London: 
MacMillan Press, Ltd.; 2000)
Hagerty, Devin. The Consequences o f Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South 
Asia. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998)
Kile, Shannon. “Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation” in SIPRI Yearbook 
1999: Armaments, Disarmaments, and International Security. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1999)
Perkovich, George. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press; 1999)
SIPRI 1999: Armaments, Disarmaments, and International Security. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; 1999)
Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Proliferation Today. (New York: Vintage Books; 
1984)
Thomas, Raju G.C. and Gupta, Amit (eds.) India's Nuclear Security. Boulder, 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; 2000)
373
Reports, Journal and Newspaper Articles
“ABM collapse prevents ratification of CTBT” ITAR/TASS ~News Agency (Moscow) 
16 November 1999.
“A New Skepticism on Arms Control.” The Washington Times. (Washington, D.C.) 
18 October 1999.
Joeck, Neil. “Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” Adelphi Paper 312. 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1997.
“Linde joue avec le feu nucléaire” in Le Monde, 13 May 1998.
McGeary, Johanna. “Nukes... They he Back” in Time, 25 May 1998, pp.28-35
McGirk, Tim. ‘TMuclear Madness” in Time, 8 June 1998, pp.26-29.
Hii'sh, Richard and Barry, John. “Nuclear Jitters.” Newsweek, vol. 131, no.23,
8 June 1998, p.22.
“Reality Check in South Asia.” The Washington Times, (Washington, D.C.) 29 
December 1998.
“Saddam has made two atomic bombs, says Iraqi defector.” The Sunday Telegraph. 
(London) 28 January 2001.
The Hindustan Times, 15 January 1999. www.hindustantimes.com/nonf-am/150199/ 
detFOR09.htm.
“The ‘Islamic Bomb’: Pakistan raises the stakes in the new nuclear arms race.” 
Maclean's vol.III, no.23, 8 June 1998, p.38.
“Voters Seem Indifferent to Senate Treaty Scuttle.” The Washington Times, 
(Washington, D.C.) 17 October 1999.
“When it Comes to Nuclear Testing, Nations Will Act on their Perceived Self-
Interest.” The Washington Post, (Washington, D.C.) 10 September 1999.
www.cnn,com/WORLD/asiapcf9805/13/india.us.htm.
Ahmed, Samina. “Pakistan’s Nucleai* Weapons Program: Turning Points and
Choices” in International Security, vol.23, no.4, Spring 1999, pp. 178-204.
Albright, David. “Pakistan: the other shoe drops” in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, 
VO 1.54, no.4, July/August 1998, pp.24-5.
Albright, David. “The Shots Heard ‘Round the Word” in Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.54, no.4, July/August 1998, pp.20-25.
374
Andréani, Giles. “The Disarray of US Non-Proliferation Policy” in ^S'wmVa/, vol.41, 
no.4, Winter 1999-2000, pp.42-61.
Cerniello, Craig. “Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to 
Continue Moratorium” in Arms Control Today, vol.29, no.6, pp.26-29.
“Damage Assessment; The Senate Rejection of the CTBT.” An Arms Control 
Association Press Conference mArms Control Today, vol.29, no.6, 
September/October 1999, pp.9-14.
Delpech, Thérèse. “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’: Early Warning 
from Asia?” in Sunnval, vol.40 no.4, pp.57-76.
“Du défi indien au disarmement” in Armées d ’aujourd’hui, no.239, April 1999.
Ellis, Jason. “Beyond non-proliferation” in Comparative Strategy, vol.20, no.l, 
January-March 2001, pp. 1 -24.
Ganguly, Sumit. “India’s Path to Pokhran 11” in International Security, vol.23, 
no.4. Spring 1999, pp. 148-77.
Gormley, Dennis M. and Mahnken, Thomas G. “Facing Nuclear and Conventional 
Reality” in Orbis, vol.4, no.l, Winter 2000, pp. 109-25.
Graham, Ambassador Thomas Jr. and Shaw, Douglas, B. “Nearing a Fork in the 
Road: Proliferation or Nuclear Reversal” in The Non-Proliferation Reviens 
vol.6, no.3, Fall 1998, pp.70-76.
Graham, Ambassador Thomas Jr. “South Asia and the future of nuclear non- 
proliferation” in Arms Control Today, vol.28, no.4. May 1998, pp.3-6.
Gupta, Amit. “Nuclear Forces in South Asia: Prospects for Arms Control” in 
Security Dialogue, vol.30, no.3, 1999, pp.319-30.
Guangyao, Hu and Xiaoming, Hu. “Nuclear Tests Threaten Stability” in Beijing 
Review, June 1-7, 1998, p.7.
Hibbs, Mark. “India was Ready to Test A-bombs on a ‘few days notice’” in 
Nucleonics Week, vol.39, no.20, 14 May 1998, p.l
Holum, John D. “The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament -  the US View” in Journal 
o f International Affairs, vol.51, no.l, pp.263-81.
Huntley, Wade. “Nonproliferation Prospects after the South Asian Tests” in The 
Non-Proliferation Review, vol.6, no.3, Fall 1998, pp.85-96.
“Illuminating Global Interests: The UN and Aims Control -
An Interview with UN Undersecretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala” in 
Arms Control Today, vol.29, no.6,September/October 1999, pp.3-8.
375
“Interview with Prime Minister Vajpayee” m India Today, (www.india-today.com/ 
itoday/25051998/vajint.html).
Johnson, Rebecca. “Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT Tottering?” in Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists, vol.55, no.2, March 1999, p. 16.
Jones, Rodney W. and Ganguly, Sumit. “Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision” in 
International Security, vol.24, no.4, Spring 2000, pp.l 81-89.
Kampani, Gaurav. “In Praise o f Indifference toward India’s Bomb” in Orbis, vol.45, 
no.2, Spring 2001, pp.241-57.
Karp, Aaron. “Indian Ambitions and the Limits of American Influence” in Arms 
Control Today, vol.28, no.4. May 1998, pp. 14-21.
Khan, Ayesha. “Pakistan Joins the Club” in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.54, 
no.4, July/August 1998, pp.34-39.
Khripunov, Igor and Srivastava, Anupam. “From Russia, a muted reaction” in
Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.54, no.4, July/August 1998, pp.42-3.
Mutimer, David. “Testing Times: Of Nuclear Tests, Test Bans, and the Framing of 
Proliferation” in Contemporaiy Security Policy, vol.21, no.l, April 2000,
pp. 1-22.
Paul, T.V. “The Systemic Bases of India’s Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order” in 
The Non-Proliferation Review, vol.6, no.l. Fall 1998, pp. 1-13.
Poulose, T.T., “India’s Detenence Doctrine: A Nehiuvian Critique” in The Non- 
Proliferation Review, vol.6, no.3, Fall 1998, pp.77-84.
“Sanctions Ill-Considered, says Pakistan; No Effect, Says India” in Nucleonics Week, 
vol.39, no.26, 25 June 1998, pp. 18-19.
Sharma, Kalpana. “The Hindu Bomb” in Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, vol.54, 
no.4, July/August 1998, pp.30-33.
Singh, Jaswant. “Against Nuclear Apartheid” in Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.5,
September/October 1998, 41-52.
Synott, Hilary. The Causes and Consequences o f South Asia’s Nuclear Tests.
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1999.
Talbott, Strobe. “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia” in Foreign Affairs, vol.78, 
no.2, March/April 1999, pp.l 10-22.
Talbott, Strobe. “US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report,” Address at the 
Brookings Institution, 12 November 1998 [transcript]; www.brook.edu/comm/ 
transcripts/19981112a.htm
376
Thakur, Ramesh. “Envisioning Nuclear Futures” in Security Dialogue, vol.31, no.l, 
March 2000, pp.25-40.
“US Not Keen to Find Carrots to Reward India and Pakistan” in Nucleonics Week, 
vol.39, no.23, 4 June 1998, p.ll .
Walker, Ronald. “What is to be Done About Nucleai* Weapons?: A Rejoinder” in 
Security Dialogue, vol.31, no.2, June 2000, pp. 179-84.
Walker, William. “International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test 
explosions” in International Affairs, vol.74, no.3, July 1998, pp.505-528.
Walker, William. “Nuclear order and disorder” in International Affairs, 
vol.76, no.4, October 2000, pp703-724.
Zuberi, Martin. “India’s Nuclear Leap Forward” in Journal o f the United Sendee 
Institution o f India, vol.CXXVIII, no.532, April-June 1998, pp. 165-70.
Congressional Hearings, Official Publications and Miscellaneous Other Sources
Crisis in South Asia: India’s Nuclear Tests; Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests; India and 
Paldstan; What Next? Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern 
and South Asian of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
One Hundred and fifth Congress, second session, May 13, June 3, July 13, 
1998.
Evolution o f India’s Nuclear Policy. Paper laid on the Table of the House. Lok 
Sabha, 27 May 1998.
India-Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia 
and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred and fifth Congress, second session,. June 18, 
1998.
Official Press Release. Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division,
New Delhi. 11 May 1998. (www.indiagov.org/news/official/19980511/ 
official.htm.).
“Senator Lauch Faircloth’s Letter to President Bill Clinton on Sanctions Against 
India” (www. indianembassy.org/pic/congress/faftcloth.htm)
“Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on India’s Nuclear Tests” in News 
Bulletin No.NB9809, issued 14 May 1998 by the Chinese Embassy in the 
United Kingdom.
“US imposes sanctions on India.” World News, 13 May 1998 (www.cnn.com/ 
WORLD.asiapcfc/9805/13/india.us/html).
377
Miscellaneous Other Sources:
Achen, Christopher and Snidal, Duncan. “Rational Deterrence Theory and
Comparative Case Studies” in World Politics, vol.41, no.2, January 1989, 
pp. 143-69.
Black, Stanley W. “Learning from Adversity: Policy Responses to Two Oil Shocks” 
in Essays on International Finance, no. 160, (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press; 1985)
Brunner, Karl and Meltzer, Allan H. (eds.) Supply Shoch, Incentives and National 
Wealth, vol. 14, Spring 1981. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company; 1981)
Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John. “Sectoral Shocks, Learning, and Aggregate
Fluctuation” in The Review o f Economic Studies, vol. 60, 1993, pp.777-94.
Carnesale, Albert; Doty, Paul; Hoffman, Stanley; Huntingdon, Samuel P.; Nye, 
Joseph S., Jr. and Sagan, Scott D. Living With Nuclear Weapons.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 1983)
Collier, Paul and Gunning, Jan Willem and associates. Trade Shocks in Developing 
Countries, vol. I: Africa. (Oxford: Oxford University; 1999)
Coppedge, Michael. “Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N 
and Small in Comparative Politics” in Comparative Politics, vol.31, no.4, July 
1999, pp.465-76.
Elias, Carlos G. “Sectoral shocks and unemployment rate fluctuations” in American 
Economist, vol.42 i2, Fall 1998, pp.65-72.
Ganley, Joe and Salmon, Chins. “The Industrial Impact of Monetary Policy Oil 
Shocks: Some Stylised Facts.” Bank o f England Working Paper Series, 
no.68. (London: Bank of England; 1997)
George, Alexander L. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison” in Lauren (ed.) 1979.
Georgellis, Yannis. “The Oil Price Shocks and the unit root hypothesis: the UK 
experience” in Applied Economics, vol.26, no.8, August 1994, pp.827-30.
Ireland, Peter N. “Technology Shocks and the Business Cycle: An Empirical 
Investigation” in Journal o f Economic Dynamic and Control, vol.25, 
no.5, May 2001.
King, Gary; Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press; 1994)
378
Lauren, Paul Gordon (ed.) Diplomacy, New Approaches in History, Theory 
and Policy. (New York: New York Free Press; 1979)
McMillin, W. Douglas. “The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks: Comparing
Contemporaneous versus Long-Run Identifying Restrictions” in Southern 
Economic Journal, vol.67 13, January 2001, pp.618-36.
NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation, Bmssels: NATO Office of 
Information and Press; 1992.
Rasche, Robert H. and Tatom, John A. “Energy Price Shocks, Aggregate Supply and 
Monetary Policy: The Theory and International Evidence” in Karl Brunner 
Allan H. Meltzer (eds.) Supply Shoclcs, Incentives and National Wealth. 
vol. 14, Spring 1981. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company; 
1981)
Yuan, Mingwei and Li, Wenli. “The Dynamic Effect of Government Spending 
Shocks on Employment and Work Hours” in Federal Reserve Bank o f 
Richmond, Working Paper: 98/09; August 1998.
379
Interviews Conducted:
David Fischer (Director and Assistant Dftector General for External Relations, 
International Atomic Energy Agency: 1957-1981. Special Advisor to 
Director General Eklund and Blix: 1981-1982). Interview conducted via 
e-mail, July 18“’ , 2000.
Fred McGoldrick (former State Depaitment). Interview conducted via e-mail,
June 30'", 2000.
Ambassador Roland Timerbaev (former Deputy Dhector of International 
Organizations in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Interview
conducted via e-mail, December 17 '^\ 1999
